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Résumé 
Cette étude analyse l'utilisation de l'argent dans le contexte du colonialisme canadien des 
XIXe et xxe siècles. Elle émet l' hypothèse que l'argent, en tant qu'objet et idée économique 
par excellence de la société occidentale, était au cœur des interactions entre les Premières 
Nations, l'État et le capital. À travers une analyse de l'utilisation de l'argent, tant en ce qui 
concerne son aspect matériel que son côté abstrait, cette thèse conclut que le rôle joué par 
l'argent dans le colonialisme canadien ne fut pas monolithique, fournissant à tout acteur 
historique un moyen d'exercer du pouvoir, parfois de manière étonnante. Elle affIrme que le 
rôle incontournable qu'une grande partie de l'historiographie accorde à l'État (plus 
particulièrement au Département des affaires indiennes) et le carcan législatif qu'il a 
développé en ce qui concerne l'expérience vécue des Autochtones est, du moins au sujet des 
affaires monétaires, au mieux suIfait et au pire caricatural. En effet, cette étude démontre 
qu'en dépit du discours musclé que certains bureaucrates et politiciens ont employé dans la 
correspondance, les rapports publiés et la législation, les conséquences de l'intervention 
monétaire de l'État dans des communautés amérindiennes n'a que rarement correspondu aux 
objectifs officiellement énoncés, allant même parfois jusqu'à contredire ces derniers. En 
s'appuyant sur l'analyse de l'expérience de trois Premières Nations distinctes sur les plans 
culturel, historique et géographique (au Québec, les Huron-Wendat de Wendake et les Innus 
de Mashteuiatsh et, en Ontario, les Cris de Moose Factory), cette étude affirme que les 
politiques nationales de l'État ont eu des effets différents selon le contexte dans lequel elles 
furent mises en œuvre. Ainsi, la présente thèse remet en question les interprétations de 
l'histoire du colonialisme de la première moitié du XX" siècle qui dresse trop facilement des 
parallèles entre les objectifs énoncés d'un État apparerrunent hostile et les difficultés 
socioéconomiques qu'expérimentent actuellement beaucoup de Premières Nations. Cette 
thèse affirme plutôt que l'interaction de la politique et de la pratique, en ce qui a trait à 
l'utilisation de l'argent aux XIXe et XXe siècles, a souvent produit des résultats inattendus, 
créant ainsi un nouvel espace permettant à la fois l'expression de l' « agency » autochtone et 
l'imposition de l'autorité étatique et capitaliste. 
Au cours des années 1820 et 1830, certains débats entre les autorités impériales et coloniales 
quant à la monétisation des présents amérindiens contribuaient à la réification discursive de 
1'« Indien imprévoyant », Jusqu'au milieu du XX" siècle, cette figure influençait le discours 
étatique de deux façons. D'abord, elle permettait aux Affaires indiennes de légitimer le statut 
légal des Amérindiens en tant que pupille de l'État. Ensuite, elle offrait à cette même 
institution un moyen efficace de repousser les prétentions d'autres agences étatiques qui 
tentaient de fournir aux Premières Nations des services au même titre que les autres 
Canadiens, et ce, en affirmant posséder l'expertise nécessaire pour protéger cette population 
particulièrement vulnérable. Cette façon de dépeindre les Autochtones, profondément 
influencée par la conviction très répandue que les pauvres des régions urbaines étaient 
incapables de gérer l'argent liquide de manière judicieuse, amène à concevoir ceux-ci comme 
une masse indifférenciée qui, dans les termes employés par le discours de la politique 
indienne, devait être « protégée », « civilisée» et « assimilée », 
x 
Cependant, les actions concrètes des Affaires indiennes ont fréquemment influencé la société 
autochtone de manière à défier ce genre de représentations unitaires, notamment en ce qui 
concerne la création et l'entretien des divisions de classes, ceci révélant l'écart important 
entre le discours officiel et l'expérience vécue. Au même moment, les grandes corporations 
du commerce des fourrures (institutions qui dominaient l'activité économique dans la région 
subarctique jusqu'au milieu du XXe siècle) dépeignaient également les Amérindiens comme 
des êtres imprévoyants par nature, ce qui leur pennettait de justifier à la fois leur politique de 
ne pas utiliser l'argent en espèces pour les paiements ainsi que leurs fréquents efforts pour 
diminuer les somines qu'elles accordaient en crédit aux Amérindiens. Toutefois, en pratique, 
la concurrence et la place grandissante occupée dans le Nord québécois et ontarien par les 
Eurocanadiens qui n'étaient pas directement impliqués dans la traite de foun-ures 
compliquaient l'utilisation de l'argent, faisant souvent en sorte que la Compagnie de la Baie 
d'Hudson et ses principaux rivaux, en dépit des souhaits de leurs dirigeants, étaient obligés 
d'employer davantage l'argent. Néanmoins, la politique corporative adoptée par ces 
compagnies à partir du XVIIe siècle, qui consistait à n'utiliser qu'une seule monnaie 
d'échange (le castor) avec les Premières Nations, facilitait l'implantation de l'argent étatique 
dans le subarctique aux XIXe et XXe siècles. Un symbole particulièrement visible de sa 
souveraineté sur un ten-itoire grandissant est ainsi fourni à l'État-nation canadien en plein 
essor. 
Cette thèse cherche à démontrer trois principaux points. Premièrement, elle soutient que 
l'argent doit être analysé à la fois sur les plans économique et politique, puisque l'espace 
monétaire dans le contexte colonial servait à légitimer l'autorité responsable de son maintien 
(quelles soit corporative ou étatique) tout en facilitant les activités du marché. 
Deuxièmement, elle affilme qu'en tant que phénomène fondamentalement social, l'argent 
fournissait un moyen par lequel certains acteurs arrivaient à imposer leur domination 
coloniale et d'autres réussissaient à résister à celle-ci ou à l'esquiver, ce dernier résultat étant 
souvent créé par l'application de la domination elle-même. Troisièmement, cette thèse 
affirme que l'histoire des relations entre les Premières Nations et les Eurocanadiens doit être 
examinée en des termes discursifs et matériels, car la juxtaposition de ces deux registres 
d'analyse distincts révèle des inconsistances importantes qui seraient autrement demeurées 
invisibles. 
Mots-clés: 
Amerindiens - Huron-Wendat - Innu - Cri - Monnaie - Impérialisme - Formation de l'État 
- Département des affaires indiennes - Compagnie de la baie d'Hudson - XIXe siècle - XXe 
siècle 
Abstract 
This study analyzes money-use in the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Canadian 
colonialism. It proceeds from the hypothesis that money, as the economic object and idea par 
excellence in Western society, was central to interactions between First Nations, the state, and 
capital. Through an analysis of the use of both abstract and material currency, however, the 
present dissertation concludes that money's role in Canadian colonialism was anything but 
monolithic, providing a means for ail historical actors to exert force, sometimes in surprising 
ways. It argues that, at least insofar as monetary issues are concerned, the historiography's 
tendency to foreground the state (particularly the Department of Indian Affairs) and its 
legislative framework when describing the lived experience of Canada's Aboriginal peoples 
is at best overwrought and at worse caricatural. Indeed, this study demonstrates that despite 
the muscular discourse deployed by bureaucrats and politicians in correspondence, published 
reports, and legislation, the consequences of the state's monetary intervention in Amerindian 
communities rarely corresponded to its avowed goals and sometimes even explicitly 
contradicted them. Moreover, through its analysis of the experience of three culturally, 
historically, and geographically distinct First Nations in Quebec and Ontario (the Huron­
Wendat of Wendake, the Moose Factory Cree, and the I1mu of Mashteuiatsh), this study 
argues that the state's nationwide policies often had entirely different outcomes depending on 
the context in which they were implemented. In this sense, the present dissertation challenges 
the validity of interpretations of the history of colonialism through the end of the Second 
World War that draw easy parallels between the avowed goals of an apparently hostile state 
and the dire socioeconomic straits in which many First Nations currently find themselves. 
Instead, it argues that the interaction of policy and practice with respect to money-use during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries frequently produced entirely unanticipated results, 
creating novel space for Aboriginal agency as often as it provided the state and capital with a 
vector for unilaterally imposing their authority and power. 
During the early nineteenth century, debates between imperial and colonial authorities on the 
monetization of Indian presents contributed to the discursive reification of the "improvident 
Indian." Through the mid-twenticth century, this figure informed state discourse in two ways: 
first, it allowed Indian Affairs to legitimate the legal definition of Amerindians as wards of 
the state and, second, it provided this same institution with an effective means of repelling 
other state agencies that attempted to provide services to First Nations alongside other 
Canadians by claiming that it alone possessed the expertise required to protect this 
particularly vulnerable population. Such discursive portrayals of Aboriginal peoples, deeply 
infonned by the widespread nineteenth-century European and Euro-Canadian belief that the 
urban poor were incapable of judiciously managing cash, painted them as an undifferentiated 
mass, that, in the terms employed in officially proclaimed state Indian policy, needed to be 
protected, "civilized," and assimilated into the wider Canadian body politic. 
However, Indian Affairs' concrete actions frequently influenced Aboriginal society in ways 
that defy such unitary representation, notably contributing to the creation and maintenance of 
class divisions that reveal official discourse on money-use to be entirely divorced from actual 
historical experience. At the same time, large fur trade corporations (the institutions that 
dominated much of the subarctic's economic activity through the middle of the twentieth 
Xli 
century), similarly portrayed Amerindians as being improvident by nature in order to justify 
both their policy of not employing hard currency and their frequent attempts to curtail the 
amount of credit they extended to their Aboriginal trading partners. In practice, however, 
competition and the increasing presence in northem regions of Euro-Canadians who were not 
directly involved in the fur trade complicated money-use, often forcing the Hudson's Bay 
Company and other large fur buying corporations to employ greater amounts of abstract and 
material currency than their management desired. Nevertheless, the corporate policy that 
these companies adopted from the seventeenth century of conducting their business with First 
Nations in terms of a single abstract money of account (beaver currency) facilitated the 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century adoption of state-backed currency by First Nations in the 
subarctic, thereby providing the developing Canadian nation-state with a particularly visible 
means of asserting symbolic sovereignty over its expanding territorial base. 
This dissertation makes three primary claims. First, it asserts that money needs to be analyzed 
in both political and economic terms, as monetary space in the colonial context served to 
legitimate the authority responsible for its maintenance (whether corporate or state) white 
simultaneously facilitating diverse actors' market activity. Second, it argues that as a 
fundamentally social phenomenon, money provided the means for sorne actors to impose 
colonial domination and for others to resist and escape such unbalanced power relations, the 
latter often as a direct result of the former. Third, it claims that the history of relations 
between First Nations and Euro-Canadians needs to be examined in both discursive and 
material terms as the juxtaposition of these two distinct registers of analysis reveals important 
inconsistencies in both that would otherwise remain undetected. 
Keywords: 
Amerindians - Huron-Wendat - Innu - Cree - Money - Imperialism - State Formation ­
Department of Indian Affairs - Hudson's Bay Company - 191h Century - 20lh Century 
Introduction 
"Sans argent, les autochtones se suffisaient à eux­
mêmes." 
- Anonymous Innu Woman, 1992 1 
Today, the dollar is one of the most ordinary objects and ideas in Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal Canada alike. Despite its mundane nature, it provides a highly visible 
metaphor for national unity. In addition to this symbolic charge, the Canadian dollar also 
functionally ties the nation together. Used daily for reckoning value and performing 
transactions by nearly every individual within Canada, money contributes to the maintenance 
of national economic, social, and political space. Even groups that are extremely critical of 
Canada, such as Quebec sovereigntists, have generally supported the use of Canada's state­
issued currency, whether the country remains intact or not. 2 Other Canadians, however, have 
viewed the dollar as a tool of colonial domination. This dissertation seeks to address such 
critical appraisal of money's historical role by asking whether the transformational power 
which the anonymous Innu quoted above assigned it can be witnessed in action. It does so in 
economic and political terms because while economists have generally monopolized the 
scholarly analysis of money, the assertion that Aboriginal peoples lost self-sufficiency as a 
result of the introduction of money is a fundamentally political claim, one that sees in the 
historical process of colonialism the subjugation of Amerindians. The association that this 
woman makes, then, portrays money in very different terms from classical economics' 
1 Conseil des Atikamekw et des Montagnais, Montagnaises de parole: Eukuan Ume Ninan Etentamat, 
Quebec, Conseil des Atikamekw et des Montagnais, 1992, p. 71. 
2 Jacques Parizeau, an economist and the then head of the Parti Québécois, stated in 1992 that, "un 
Québec souverain opterait pour le dollar canadien. C'est absolument certain." Quoted in Patrick 
Grady, "Québec souverain et dollar canadien," Cité Libre, vol. 20, no. 5 (June 1992), http://global­
economics.ca/Que.dollarcanadien.pdf (7 January 20 II). 
2 
depiction of a neutral medium of market-based exchange, begging empirical investigation of 
money's changing l'ole in the place of ahistorical theorization. 
To accomplish this goal, the present study poses a series of questions that situates 
money, First Nations, and colonialism within a single analytical framework. How was money 
implicated in the expansion of authority of overseas empires and domestic states over lands 
and populations that had previously been beyond their reach? How does the theory of 
sovereignty find concrete expression in the object and idea of money? How does monetary 
space change and how do new monetary regimes replace their predecessors? In what ways 
does this object, which is critically first and foremost an idea, allow individuals, groups, and 
institutions ta exert force in their relations with one another? Why do actors perceive money 
to be beneficial in sorne cases and frighteningly dangerous in others? Who is "allowed" to 
make use of cash and in what ci l'cumstances? How does money, when defined both as hard 
currency and as an abstract measure of value, structure relationships between people, 
communities, corporations, and the state? How do concepts, given material force by actors 
and institutions, contribute to the ordering of the physical world? This dissertation, then, 
examines Aboriginal money-use in the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-centUlY Canadian 
colonialism, proceeding from the hypothesis that money played a central role in the extension 
of the unequal power relations that tied First Nations to the increasingly dominant population 
of European origin. 
Ultimately, however, this study demonstrates that together money and colonialism 
created complex relations that defy this relatively simplistic hypothesis. Indeed, in testing this 
premise throughout the following chapters, it concludes that money, a particularly flexible 
social technology, shaped interaction in complicated ways, often favoring Aboriginal agency 
instead of the systematic subjugation generally emphasized by the historiography on 
colonialism. Although this monolithic vision of First Nations history is deeply flawed, it has 
proven to be a particularly fruitful means of structuring the present study. Indeed, it allows a 
demonstration of the necessity of simu1taneously engaging different forms of analysis on 
several scales. This study, then, adopts a twin discursive and material approach in order to 
examine the interaction of money and colonialism at the imperial, colonial, national and local 
levels. This methodology highlights the contradictions between state and corporate policy, 
3 
legal theOl)', and everyday practice. Indeed, the present study argues that while officiais 
frequently used money to discursively portray First Nations as being socially, politically, and 
economically dependent on the state, the ways in which Arnerindians employed it, whether in 
abstract or material form, often contradicted this discourse, sometimes as a direct result of the 
actions of the state itself. In this way, it points to the necessity of analyzing historical 
experience from multiple perspectives, arguing that neither the state's discourse nor 
Aboriginal money-use can be understood in isolation, Although strictly discursive analysis 
suggests that money formed a major tool of colonialism (mostly through the power that the 
state theoretically wielded over First Nations money-use), purely empirical analysis implies 
nearly the opposite - that is, that throughout the period Aboriginal peoples enjoyed relatively 
unhindered access to currency, at least insofar as the state was concerned, This study, then, 
performs these two levels of analysis in parallel, the first through detailed readings of official 
policy as enunciated in legislation, correspondence, and published reports and the second 
through an examination of the material conditions prevailing in Amerindian communities. 
The resulting dialogue suggests that policy and practice were two very different things during 
the period, While the first aimed to legitimate the state's intervention in Aboriginal Canada, 
thereby justifying the existence of the Department of Indian Affairs, the second often served 
more basic ends, effectively seeking to prevent inordinate suffering while engaging money­
use in very limited ways. 
This study's analysis is based on the postulate that by its vel)' nature money favors 
social inequality. Thus, it does not conceive ofmoney along the lines oforthodox economics' 
"neutral veil," a theory that accords it the power to render value intelligible to ail market 
participants while claiming that it exerts no economic influence of its own. Like the Innu 
quoted above, this dissertation rejects money's supposed neutrality, arguing that those who 
possessed currency couId caU on power that was unavailable to those without il. Because 
money arrived with c910nization, the uses to which colonizers applied it exerted force in 
ways that, initially at least, were unavailable to Aboriginal peoples. This is particularly 
4 
evident in the manner in which individuals and groups employed money during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Then, as now, Canadian society privileged money's role 
in the accumulation of capital - that is, the generation, through monetary circulation, of what 
Marx terms "surplus-value.,,3 Those who did not use money in this way did not necessarily 
employ it incorrectly so much as they failed to take advantage of the full force that the 
dominant sectors of Canadian society ascribed to it. In this way, these individuals and groups, 
whether Aboriginal or otherwise, found themselves unable to reap the same rewards that 
money provided in part to their more successful neighbors. 
This dissertation's major research finding resides in the connection it establishes 
between money, First Nations, and state formation. Money, as both an idea and an object, 
provided one of the primary infrastructural tools of empire in Canada. 1ni tially, it allowed 
capital to create new markets in which Aboriginal peoples acted as both producers and 
consumers. These markets, built on monetary systems controlled by private enterprise, placed 
ultimate economic and political authority in extra-regional capital (e.g. the Hudson's Bay 
Company), responsible for the system's creation and maintenance. Beginning in the mid­
nineteenth century, as the colonial state grew at an unprecedented rate, ultimate monetary 
authority in these same networks of exchange shifted as First Nations made use of currency 
backed by the apparently neutral state to lessen the company's power in their evelyday lives. 
This practice, however, legitimized the state's presence in the subarctic, providing the region 
with symbolic and material infrastructure, thereby integrating the area and its population into 
the political system based to the south. This form of everyday colonialism, then, was not 
imposed on unwilling Aboriginal peoples but was rather encouraged by them as an 
apparently innocuous means of contesting the power of actors who influenced their lives in 
immediate and sometimes unwe1come ways. However, this strategy would have unintended 
consequences, as the state used its uncontested monetary authority not only to legitimize its 
control of regions that had previously existed beyond its reach but also to increasingly 
3 Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. by Ben Fawkes, Toronto, Penguin, [1867] 1976, p. 251-2. 
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employ money as a tool in the management of its Aboriginal wards. Indeed, following a 
failed attempt during the 1820s and l830s, which, nevertheless, succeeded in branding 
Amerindians as improvident by nature, the state began using money tlu'oughout Canada 
during the l850s in both treaties and laws to explicitly indicate who was and was not 
"Indian." Such intervention, which continued beyond the mid-twentieth century, provided the 
state with both a large quantity of data on First Nations and the means of discursively 
marking Amerindians as being in need of its protection and guidance. 
The present dissertation examines money-use in several distinct contexts. This is 
ultimately a product of money's highly flexible and social nature. Indeed, the state, capital, 
and First Nations made use of currency to do far more than simply perform market exchange. 
They also used it to account for the rights and responsibilities included in their relationships, 
to describe each other's character, and to cxert political and economic force at the locallevel. 
In this way, money provides insight into a wide array of activities by placing them within the 
same analytical framework, Indeed, this dissertation argues that analysis of the social 
relations revealed by money-use in diverse contexts such as treaties, the fur trade, band 
poli tics, wage work, social assistance, and credit relations provides insight into the ways that 
colonialism, the state, and capital functioned as systems rather than as mere compilations of 
heterogeneous phenomena that more thematic approaches tend to suggest. 
This dissertation integrates two levels of analysis. The first is resolutely local and 
focuses on three First Nations: the Huron-Wendat of Wendake, the Mashteuiatsh Innu, and 
the Moose Factory Cree. The second is based on laI'ger entities, namely the state and capital, 
and their actions throughout Canada. This twinned approach highlights how practice, policy, 
and discourse at both the local and national levels fed back into each other in ways which 
would not be perceptible if analysis had been restricted to one of these two levels alone or to 
a combination of a single First Nation and the more global Canadian context. This approach 
also underlines the ways in which the history of money and colonialism played out in 
Aboriginal Canada both in terms of large structural phenomena and the smaller, intimate 
experience of everyday life. 
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While the present study examines Huron and Innu monetary experience during both 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it restricts its analysis of Cree history to the period 
between the 1890s and 1950. Although the HBC had monetized its business at Moose 
Factory long before this point, through the use of its in-house currency (the made beaver), no 
major changes occulTed within monetary practice in the region between the beginning of the 
nineteenth and the tum of the twentieth century. Furthermore, the state was entirely absent 
from the region prior to 1905. As a result, this study describes ear1ier practice in the context 
of its analysis of the critical years at the very beginning of the twentieth century. 
The conviction that both monel' and First Nations matter in the context of the larger 
sweep of North American history grounds this dissertation. Despite widespread agreement 
among historians that Aboriginal peoples played a central role in the development of the 
continent during the colonial era, no such consensus exists for the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Indeed, scholars working both on synthetic histories of Canada and the United 
States and on specialized studies written in the broad, national context tend to neglect First 
Nations during later periods. The Amerindian-specific historiography, on the other hand, has 
often in sorne sense accepted its own irrelevance to larger scholarly currents, performing 
historical analysis in isolation from work produced in the context of national, continental, 
imperial, and global histories.4 The present study refutes this tendency, arguing that the 
historical process by which imperial and national markets expanded to include ail of northem 
North America, integrating Native peoples into imperial and national polities, is central to the 
history of the continent's present-day political formations. Through monel', the British 
Empire, Canada, and the United States asserted territorial sovereignty in visible ways. This 
process did not occur despite Aboriginal peoples but because of them. Without the 
willingness of Amerindians to make use of this new conceptual and material technology, 
through both accounting currency and circulating cash, distant political authorities and capital 
4 For more on this bistoriographical tendency see Chapter One and Nicolas G. Rosenthal, "Beyond the 
New Indian History: Recent Trends in the Historiography on the Native Peoples of North America," 
His/ory Compass, vol. 4, no. 5 (September 2006), p. 962-74. 
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concerns would have been unable to integrate these lands and their natural resources into the 
structures of governance and business over which they presided. The push of private 
enterprise into regions in which the population was predominantly native provided enormous 
benefits to the state that, as a result, was able to found its legitimacy on the semantic power of 
the abstract and material currency that eventually came to be used there. Although this money 
was imported by newcomers, Amerindians rapidly accepted its merits, often seeking to 
employ state-issued cash as a means of promoting their interests in regions where Euro­
Canadian corporations tried to limit its circulation. In this sense, First Nations played an 
absolutely central role in the monetization of relatively remote regions across Canada during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in the process promoting the legitimacy of the state 
and strengthening its imagined grasp on national space. 
In long-settled regions, Aboriginal money-use developed in different ways. There, 
rather than strengthening the state's authority at the cost of capital, money contribllted to 
changes in First Nations' internai power structure. Among the Huron-Wendat of Wendake 
(and, to a lesser extent, among the Innu of Mashteuiatsh), the monetary economy encouraged 
the emergence ofa small yet powerful group offamilies that controlled much of the reserve's 
economic and political activity. From the late nineteenth through the mid-twentieth century, 
members of these families, who held key political posts and ran successflll and influential 
businesses, held a virtual monopoly on the provision of consumer credit and larger loans such 
as mortgages in Wendake. This proved particularly important during the Depression, when a 
small number of influential men prospered as a result of the difficulties experienced by the 
vast majority of their compatriots. Without the state, whose legislation discouraged Euro­
Canadian businesses from providing loans to Amerindian reserve residents and whose 
approach to social assistance favored the reinforcement of local socioeconomic elites, this 
home-grown financial sector and the power relations that flourished as a result would not 
have been possible. 
The period examined in the present study begins in the 1820s and continues through 
the immediate post-World War II years. The salience of these dates does not reside in the 
simple presence or not of money-use. Rather, they draw their force from changes in relations 
between First Nations, capital, and the state. Although sorne Amerindians made use of money 
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long before the 1820s, it was not until this decade that imperial and colonial officiaIs 
explicitly addressed the subject of Aboriginal money-use. They did so in the context of a 
policy debate conceming the form of the traditional diplomatic presents that the British 
Empire provided its Native North American allies. Officiais in the Colonial Office in London 
suggested replacing these presents with monetary payments as a cost-saving measure. Their 
counterparts in Upper and Lower Canada responded by asserting that such payments would 
pose a very real threat to Amerindian well-being. This debate led to ongoing reflection on the 
potential effects of money on First Nations and on the state's responsibility with regard to 
these communities. It also contributed to shaping the ideological underpinnings of Indian 
policy and state practice beyond the middle of the twentieth century. Irnmediately following 
the Second World War, a similar debate occupied members of parliament, missionaries, 
Indian Affairs' employees, and Amerindians. Although this discussion, which gave rise to the 
1951 revis ion of the Indian Act, did not center on money, it provides a convenient point at 
which to stop the present study, before the major societal changes of the postwar period 
completely altered the terms by which the state framed the "Indian problem" as well as First 
Nations' relationship with both Indian Affairs and capital. 
Chapter Description 
The present dissertation begins with two introductOlY chapters that lay the 
groundwork for the historical analysis that follows. Chapter One reviews the relevant 
historiography, focusing on the wide array of scholarly work upon which this study is 
founded, before turning to a discussion of sources and methodology. The second chapter 
explores in greater depth this dissertation 's two central concepts: money and colonialism. As 
neither of these notions is self-evident, precise definitions are necessary for the analysis that 
follows. The chapter then tums to a study of early modem and modem thought with reference 
to money and Aboriginal peoples. This brief analysis depicts the intellectual environment in 
which the events and debates described throughout this study took place. Chapter Two ends 
with a short monetary history of Canada in order to clarify a subject that, while not the heart 
of this dissertation, is sufficiently important to merit a concise summary that is unavailable 
elsewhere. 
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The dissertation then turns to historical analysis. Chapter Three details the 
relationship between money, First Nations, and the state during the nineteenth century. It 
demonstrates that, despite the strong anti-monetary rhetoric employed by colonial officiais, 
money (or its absence) played only a marginal material role in relations between Amerindians 
and the imperial and federal states. It argues, however, that official discourse with respect to 
money contributed to the redefinition of Aboriginal peoples as improvident by nature, a 
change which would have profound consequences during the twentieth centllry. This delayed 
reaction was primarily caused by the decreased size and reach of the Department of Indian 
Affairs, the state agency charged with managing relations with First Nations throllghout the 
period, along with the generally restrictive legal framework within which this institution 
operated. 
Chapter Four analyzes the role of extra-regional capital and Aboriginal money-use 
in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake during the nineteenth century. It begins by describing the 
process through which the Canadian dollar replaced the HBC's proprietary currency (the 
castor) in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, thereby demonstrating the way in which money served as a 
marker of effective political authority over a given region. The chapter then turns to an 
analysis of money-use among the Huron-Wendat and the Innu which emphasizes the 
emergence of class in Wendake. It demonstrates that in direct contradiction to state discourse, 
which increasingly portrayed Arnerindians as an undifferentiated, improvident mass, the 
Huron experienced socioeconomic stratification during the period, a process that featured the 
accumulation of important amounts of wealth among a small segment of the population. 
Chapters Five through Seven consider money and colonialism in Mashteuiatsh, 
Moose Factory, and Wendake during the first half of the twentieth century. This period 
witnessed continued growth in the state's theoretical monetary powers. White the HBC, by 
abandoning private CUiTency in western James Bay (the made beaver), provided the space 
into which the state expanded, the company also altered its practices by ending the credit 
system upon which its business with Arnerindians had long been built. This change deprived 
northern Natives of their primary means of avoiding dependence on the state in uncertain 
economic times. However, even within this tightly circumscribed space, certain Amerindians 
were able to employ money to increase their personal fortunes and uphold their authority, in 
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the process strengthening class divides within First Nations that mirrored those of Euro­
Canadian society. 
As a whole, then, this disseltation analyzes the process through which mone~y-use 
informed developing political relations, both between Amerindians and the state and within 
First Nations, between the 1820s and the middle of the twentieth century. At the same time it 
describes the ways in which pre-existing monetary relations between capital and Aboriginal 
peoples changed during the same period. The character of these developing relations 
inforrned the ability of the Canadian state and enterprises other than those born of the fur 
trade to occupy regions from which they had previously been absent. The interface of money, 
colonialism, and First Nations also contributed to the portrayal of Amerindians as inherently 
improvident, necessitating protection by their state-appointed guardian, the Department of 
Indian Affairs. In this sense, money-use played an important role in the formation of one part 
of the Canadian state and the extension of national markets. Following the arrivai of Euro­
Canadian currency, then, Aboriginal peoples adopted a new way of measuring and expressing 
value and guaranteed its generalized use across Canada. Despite the widespread Euro­
Canadian belief that Amerindians were improvident by nature, a belief erected in part on a 
monetary foundation, and despite the barriers that capital and the state often placed in the 
path of Aboriginal money-use, the Cree, Huron, and Innu continually demonstrated their 
ability to employ money as a means of exerting force and of, at least to a certain extent, 
shaping their place in Canadian society. Moreover, the analysis of money-use demonstrates 
the extent to which the implementation of policies and legislation forrnulated in response to 
this assumed improvidence provided Amerindians with the means of ensuring their own well­
being, often in entirely unintended ways. The present dissertation, then, aims to complicate 
the general scholarly image of Canadian colonialism, suggesting that a combination of 
discursive and material analyses of money-use results in a profoundly different portrait of 
First Nations-Euro-Canadian relations than that which the historiography has traditionally 
presented. 
Chapter 1 
Historiography, Sources, and Methodology 
This chapter seeks to address the major historiographical debates and developments 
that serve to frame the present dissertation while also describing the methodological approach 
and the sources used in the following chapters. Whereas the second chapter defines this 
study's two central concepts, money and colonialism, through a discussion of more 
theoretical and conceptual work, the majority of the present chapter delineates how scholars 
have approached related questions in a historical perspective. It does this by combining 
several historiographies that scholars generally treat in isolation in order to make their 
similarities as apparent as possible and to clearly indicate those works that have inspired the 
research that follows. The sections devoted to methodology and sources that close the chapter 
describe the ways in which the present dissertation translates the questions raised by the 
historiography into empirical study. 
Money and Colonialism l 
Although relatively sparse, the historiography on the development of money in 
Canada depicts it as being self-evidently interesting and therefore makes no effort to connect 
money-use to any larger social, political, or economic issues. This tendency is exemplified by 
the pioneering work of Adam Shortt on currency and banking in Canada. This study, 
published in installments in the Journal of the Canadian Bankers' Association between 1896 
and 1906, set the tone for the historiography through its concentration on the monetary and 
banking system's Iegislative and institutional development and its presentation of this history 
1 Although this section reviews the pertinent historiography on money and colonialism it leaves several 
issues for later analysis. For a conceptual examination of these issues in addition to a brief history of 
money in Canada, see Chapter Two. 
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in isolation from the lives of any but the most highly-placed individuals? Indeed, prior to the 
1980s, Shortt's study remained essentially the only history of money in Canada. Although 
many of the studies that followed reflect Shortt's preference for top-down, large-scale 
political and economic analysis (thereby failing to consider lived experience), they do 
provide essential numerical data and valuable insight into the changing legal and institutional 
framework within which money evolved. In this sense, A.B. McCullough's work, which 
fumishes a wealth of information conceming money in what is now Canada including 
exchange rates, precious-metal content, and the volume of money in circulation, provides the 
archetypal history of Canadian money.3 James Powell, in a less quantitatively rigorous study 
of the Canadian dollar (he focuses primarily on institutional history, detailing official efforts 
at monetary regulation and policy as weil as the issuance of banknotes), provides what is 
essentially the sequel to McCullough's text.4 While these studies furnish the most detailed 
analyses of the Canadian monetary system, a handful of other works have addressed specific 
issues that affected money-use. The largest number of these studies explicitly follows Shortt 
in concentrating on the history of banks in Canada (the institutions that historically printed 
and placed into circulation much of the nation's currency)5 
Thus, the majority of the historiography on money In Canada concentrates on 
legislative and institutional issues that leave both lived experience and questions of power 
untreated. However, a small number of studies that engage money somewhat incidentally 
2 Shortt's study was only collected in a single volume in 1986. Adam Shortt, Adam Shorlt 's History of 
Canadian Currency and Banking, 1600-1880, Toronto, The Canadian Bankers' Association, 1986. 
3 A.B. McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada 10 1900, Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1984. 
4 James Powell, A History ofthe Canadian Dollar, Ottawa, Bank of Canada, 1999. 
5 See, for example, E.P. Neufeld, The Financial System of Canada: Its Growth and Development, 
Toronto, Macmillan, 1972, R.T. NayJor, The. History of Canadian Business, 1867-1914, vol. 1, The 
Banks and Finance Capital, Toronto, James Lorimer & Company, 1975, Michael D. Bordo and 
Angela Redish, "Why Did the Bank of Canada Emerge in J935?" The Journal of Economie History, 
vol. 47, no. 2 (June J987), p. 405-17, and Bernard Élie, Le régime monétaire canadien: Institutions, 
théories et politiques, Montreal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1998. 
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manage to tie it to larger social, political, or economic issues. Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre 
Wallot, in a chapter in their recent economic and social history of Quebec, provide the most 
in-depth exploration of money's raie in Canadian society. However, given that their study is a 
minimally updated version of an article originally published in 1984, they make virtually no 
use of the increasingly sophisticated historical, economic, and sociological literature on 
money that has appeared over the past twenty-five years, leading their analysis to be 
substantially less profound than it might otherwise have been. 6 Other historians working from 
the perspective of social and economic history, most notably Louise Dechêne, also relate 
money to lived experience, although this remains peripheral to their projects. 7 Although 
scholars only rarely apply this approach to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when 
combined with studies of credit and other forms of abstract money that are often analyzed in 
isolation from cash (frequently seen as the only "true" form of money), this body of work 
provides an important counterpoint to the institutional, legislative, and numerical 
observations that the more purely monetary historiography makes. 8 
6 Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, Un Québec moderne, 1760-1840: Essai d'histoire économique 
et sociale, Montreal, Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 2007, p. 193-274. For the original study, see Gilles 
Paquet and Jean-Pierre WaHot, "Monnaies et finance canadiennes au début du XIX· siècle: un système 
en mutation," Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, vol. 39, no. 6 (1984), p. 1299-1329. 
7 Louise Dechêne, Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XV/Je siècle, Montreal, Boréal, [1974] 
1988, p. 131-40. See also Allan Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec 
Parishes, 1740-1840, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, p. 160. 
8 For the definition of money used in the present dissertation, see Chapter Two. For recent studies of 
credit in the Canadian context, see Béatrice Craig, "Solder les comptes: les sources de crédits dans les 
magasins généraux ruraux de l'est canadien au milieu du XIX· siècle," Journal of the Canadian 
Historical Association, vol. 13, no. 1 (2002), p. 23-47, Sylvie Dépatie, "Commerce et crédit à l'île 
Jésus, 1734-75: Le rôle des marchands ruraux dans l'économie des campagnes montréalaises," 
Canadian Historical Review, vol. 84, no. 2 (June 2003), p. 147-76, and Sylvie Taschereau, "Plutôt 
's'endetter sur l'honneur': Le débat sur la loi Lacombe (1900-1903) et les origines de la société de 
consommation au Québec," Histoire sociale/Social History, vol. 42, no. 84 (November 2009), p. 389­
422. For credit in the context of the subarctic fur trade, see Toby Morantz, "'So Evil a Practice': A 
Look at the Debt System in the James Bay Fur Trade," in Rosemary E. Ommer (ed.), Merchant Credit 
and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective, Fredericton, Acadiensis Press, 1990, p. 203-22. For a 
fascinating analysis of the ways that economic and literary authors dealt with questions of credit and 
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As valuable as these studies are to understanding Canada's monetary history, they 
often fail to account for the ways in which money affected and was affected by human 
relationships. A handful of studies from mostly outside the Canadian context follow Georg 
Simmel's "philosophy of money" to argue that money's meaning can only be rightly 
understood in reference to social relations.9 While Simmel and his immediate followers claim 
that monetization leads inevitably to increased rationalization among individuals and 
societies, replacing emotional thinking with quantitative calculation, recent work has focused 
on the diverse ways in which money has escaped this supposedly ineluctable march toward 
modernity.l0 Viviana Zelizer is the leading contemporary proponent of money's social 
character, asserting in her work on money-use in the late nineteenth and early twentieth­
century United States that it holds a socially fluid character which lat'gely depends on the 
users' perception of sources of monetary revenue and the forms of expenditure that such 
sources allow. 1 J While Zelizer's work is insightful, it disposes too readily with questions 
related to formaI political power, preferring to view money in more informai terms as a 
means of both class stmggle between poor recipients of charity or welfare and the solidly 
middle-class social workers through whom such assistance passed and gender relations 
between male breadwinners and their wives who were responsible for maintaining the 
household. While also paying too little attention to formaI political power, Amy Kaler adds 
depth to Simmel 's and Zelizer's work by demonstrating that not ail actors consider 
monetization to be positive. Kaler considers money to be more than a simple refiection of 
currency, see Mary Poovey, Genres of the Credit Economy: Mediating Value in Eighteenth- and 
Nineteenth-Century Britain, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008. 
9 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. by Tom Bottomore and David Frisby, Boston, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1900] 1978. 
la Another body of lilerature thal complicates older economic models in a very similar way details the 
persistence of gift exchange - a supposedly "primitive" transactional form - in the modern world. See, 
for example, James G. Carrier, Gifts and Commodities: Exchange and Western Capitalism since 1700, 
New York, Routledge, 1995. 
11 Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of Money, New York, Basic Books, 1994 and Viviana 
Zelizer, "Fine Tuning the Zelizer View," Economy and Society, vol. 29, no. 3 (August 2000), p. 383-9. 
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pre-existing social prerogatives, claiming that it is also an agent for change in its own right. 
She argues that according to the "philosophy of money" expressed by elderly men and 
women living in present-day mral Malawi "cash is indeed heralded as a sign of modernity ­
but as a sign that appears in the emotion-laden terrain of individual personalities and social 
relationships rather than the impersonal and rational market, and which is perceived as 
profoundly destmctive.,,12 Kaler, then, reminds us that academic theOl)' and actors' 
perceptions do not necessarily align. 
Although her project contradicts that of Kaler, Angela Redish provides valuable 
insight into the ways in which Canadians perceived money. Redish concludes that the 
widespread belief among late eighteenth and early nineteenth-centUl)' colonists that the 
economy suffered from a shortage ofspecie provides a perfect illustration of Gresham's Law. 
This fundamental law of orthodox economics states that "bad moncy drives out good," 
meaning that as the quantity of "Iow quality money" (money in which users have little faith) 
in circulation increases, economic actors hoard "high quality money." According to Redish's 
analysis, then, the Canadian economy lacked not currency per se but rather quality currency 
(i.e. coins having high precious-metal content).13 Although ultimately serving to assert the 
validity of an immutable law of economics, Redish's study is useful in that it underlines the 
importance of perception to the functioning of the frce market. Of course, First Nations' 
palticipation in the Western market was not necessarily "free" in any sense of the word, 
complicating this rather detelministic and idealized model of human economic behavior. '4 
Nonetheless, it helps illuminate certain phenomena such as the greater faith that Amerindians 
12 Amy Kaler, '''When They See Money, They Think it's Life': Money, Modernity and Morality in 
Two Sites in Rural Malawi," Journal ofSou/hem AfricGn SIl/dies, vol. 32, no. 2 (2006), p. 338. 
13 Angela Redish, "Why Was Specie Scarce in Colonial Economies? An Analysis of the Canadian 
Currency, 1796-1830," Journal ofEconomie His/ory, vol. 44, no. 3, (Sept., 1984), p. 713-28. 
14 Stuart Banner persuasively argues that markets are anything but free in the context of colonialism. 
Stuart Banner, "Conquest by Contract: Wealth Transfer and Land Market Structure in Colonial New 
Zealand," Law & Society Review, vol. 34, no. 1 (2000), p. 47-96. 
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generally placed in widely circu1ating, publicly issued monetary instruments when compared 
to more restrained, privately issued currency. 
Redish's study also underlines the complexity of British North America's monetary 
system. Indeed, during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Canadians made use 
of multiple currencies, in both their material and abstract forms. Redish views this 
heterogeneity as resolving itself into a qualitative hierarchy, in the process generating anxiety 
among the colony's inhabitants as to the value of their money. In more general, historical 
terms, however, this insight points, as Emily Gilbert reminds us, to the need to spatially and 
ternporally situate money. In contrast to studies drawing on orthodox economic theory, 
Gilbert argues against defining money as an ahistorical object according to a list of necessary 
attributes, instead asserting that it should be understood in reference to the ways in which 
people made use of it. 15 She does so by drawing both on works emerging from the Simmelian 
tradition and recent scholarship asserting the primacy of currency to the nation-state as it 
developed during the nineteenth century. Gilbert makes this argument in more concrete terms 
through an analysis of the iconographie content of nineteenth-century Canadian paper money, 
claiming that such representations situated colonists within imperial, colonial, and later 
national geographies, visually enforcing the authority of the state over its population and 
territory.16 Eric Helleiner makes a very similar argument, although he shifts from the national 
to the global scale, claiming that currency provided nineteenth-centulY nation-states with one 
of the primary means ofmarking their territorial sovereignty.17 As Bruce Curtis demonstrates, 
this process proved central to the formation of the Canadian state and polity in that the 
region's increasingly homogenous monetalY system provided it with a single means of 
15 Emily Gilbert, "Common Cents: Situating Money in Time and Place," Economy and Society, vol. 
34, no. 3 (2005), p. 357-88. 
16 Emily Gilbert, "'Ornamenting the Facade of Hell': Iconography of 19th-Century Canadian Paper 
Money," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 16, no. 1 (1998), p. 57-80. 
17 Eric Helleiner, The Making of National Money: Territorial Currencies in Historical Perspective, 
Ithaca, N.Y., Cornel1 University Press, 2003. 
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measuring and expressing abstract value. 18 This account accords with Geoffrey Ingham's 
recent theoretical work which locates money's nature in its origins as a measure of value, first 
used by priests and nobles to correlate the value of precious metals and cereals in the 
redistributive command economies of Near Eastern empires between the third and the middle 
of the first millennium BC. According to Ingham, accounting currency, when decreed by a 
central political power, provides as much a claim to territorial sovereignty as circulating 
cash. 19 
Money, then, was intimately involved in the geopolitical pro cess by which the 
British Empire and the Canadian federal state extended their authority over the northern 
portion of North America, a process anticipated to the south by the United States' westward 
expansion. Despite its fundamental historical impOJtance, colonialism has, until very recently, 
existed on the margins of North American historiography.20 This limited role springs from 
two marked historiographical tendencies. First, historians have traditionally presented both 
the United States and Canada as nations-in-the-making, seeking, often in teleological terms, 
the historical roots of apparently natural present-day political forms. 21 Second, those scholars 
18 Bruce Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer to Money: Metrological Reform in Pre-Confederation 
Canada," Social Studies of Science, vol. 28, no. 4 (August 1998), p. 547-70. On the importance of 
currency standardization to the construction of the United States, see Robert Garson, "Counting 
Money: The US Dollar and American Nationhood, 1781-1820," Journal ofAmerican Studies, vol. 35, 
no. 1 (2001), p. 21-46. 
19 Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money, Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2004. On money's sovereign 
nature, see Michel Aglielta and André Orléan, La violence de la monnaie, 2nd ed., Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1984. 
20 For a recent historiographical review that argues for a reconceptualization of Amerindian history in 
the United States centered on colonialism, see Frederick E. Hoxie, "Retrieving the Red Continent: 
Settler Colonialism and the History of American Indians in the US," Ethnie and Racial Studies, vol. 
31, no. 6 (2008), p. 1153-67. 
21 For a classic example of Canadian history as nation-building, see Donald Creighton, Dominion of 
the North: A History of Canada, 2nd ed., Toronto, Macmillan, 1962. For the classic historigraphical 
critique of the teleological character of nation-building in Canadian history, see J.M.S. Careless, 
"'Limited Identities' in Canada," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 50, no. 1 (March 1969), p. 1-10. 
For a recenl collection of essays that steps beyond nation-building in arder to place Canada squarely in 
the context of the British imperialism, see Phillip Budmer (ed.), Canada and the British Empire, 
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who have analyzed colonialism in greatest detail have overwhelmingly emphasized the 
period of "new imperialism" in Asia and Africa- that is, roughly, between 1880 and 1910­
thereby obscuring Northem North America's role in the colonial enterprise, both in 
geographical and temporal terms. 22 Recently, however, a small number of historians, 
geographers, and anthropologists have begun asserting colonialism's usefulness as an 
analytical tool in the North American context. This movement has contributed to a better 
understanding of both the "colonial period" proper (the period of French and British overseas 
colonies in North America) and the era following the political independence of the United 
States and Canada. 23 In fact, several scholars have asserted the primacy of post-independence 
colonialism vis-à-vis its predecessor. This perspective portrays the process by which the 
United States and Canada extended their territorial limits to engulf vast regions and 
populations that had previously been beyond the pale of Western political control as 
presenting a far more invasive form of colonialism than that of earlier overseas empires in 
Toronto, Oxford University Press, 2008. For one of the only classic studies that uses the term 
colonialism, without, however, defining it, see Stanley B. Ryerson, The Founding of Canada: 
Beginnings to 1815, Toronto, Progress Books, 1972. 
22 A recent survey of colonialism excludes North America from "the core of this vast historical 
process," understood as having occurred over the past 150 years, presenting the region as having 
hosted merely the prelude to Europe's true colonial enterprise in Africa and Asia. Norrie MacQueen, 
Colonialism, Toronto, Pearson Longman, 2007, p. xv. 
23 The United States, in contrast to Canada, is also often portrayed as an empire (albeit, one that is 
reluctant to admit its status). Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, 
Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, p. 194-7. On the historiography of the colonial period 
and its potential for reshaping the national histOlY of the United States along imperiallines, see Jack P. 
Greene, "Colonial History and National History: Reflections on a Continuing Problem," The William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, vol. 64, no. 2 (April 2007), p. 235-50. For an excellent analysis of 
colonialism in the context of post-revolutionary American Indian history, see Jeffrey Ost1er, The 
Plains Sioux and u.s. Colonialism: From Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. Most of the Canadian scholarship on colonialism during the pre-Confederation 
period has focused on British Columbia. See, for example, Adele Perry, On the Edge of Empire: 
Gender, Race, and the Making ofBritish Columbia, 1849-1871, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
2001 and Daniel W. Clayton, Islands of Tnlth: The Imperial Fashioning of Vancouver Island, 
Vancouver, UBC Press, 2000. 
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Northem North America. 24 Somewhat surprisingly, this movement towards understanding the 
history of North America in terms of colonialism does not extend to the historiography on 
Quebec. Although Quebec nationalists, beginning at the very end of the 1950s, employed the 
ideas developed by the then-burgeoning Iiterature advocating decolonization, colonialism as a 
heuristic concept is a1l but absent from the Quebec historiography.25 
This recent wave of studies that views Canadian and American history through the 
pnsm of colonialism has not considered money's role in this process. However, the 
historiography is not entirely bereft of monetary analyses of colonialism or imperialism. The 
vast majority of such work concentrates on the replacement of Indigenous forms of currency 
by new types of money in Africa and emphasizes the power relations that colonial monetary 
history reveals. C.A. Gregory, for example, does so through his "subalternate quality theory 
of money." Rather than explaining the collapse of shell money (cowries) in West Africa 
during the nineteenth century by using the widely-accepted quantity theory of money, most 
notably championed by Milton Friedman, Gregory distinguishes between the "money-value 
systems" of, on the one hand, the imperial state and, on the other, the Indigenous elite and 
contrasts them with the values of the subalterns who occasionally made use of both in their 
production and exchange of goods and services. In this way, he argues that, "there is a 
24 For examples of studies that focus on colonialism across post-Confederation Canada, see Cole 
Harris, Making Native Space: Co Ion ialism, Resistance, and Reserves in British Columbia, Vancouver, 
UBC Press, 2002, Toby Morantz, The White Man 's Gonna Getcha: The Colonial Challenge to the 
Crees in Quebec, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, and David M. 
Quiring, CCF Colonialism in Northem Saskatchewan: Battling Parish Priests, Bootleggers, and Fur 
Sharks, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2004. 
25 On the casting of Quebecker society as colonized within the contexl of the international 
decolonization movement, see Sean Mills, The Empire Within: Postcolonial Thought and Political 
Activism in Sixties Montreal, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010. This 
observation on the absence of colonialism from the Quebec historiography also applies for the most 
part to the province's "other" colonized peoples - First Nations. The most recent synthesis of Native 
history in Quebec does not consider this question at ail. Claude Gélinas, Les Autochtones dans le 
Québec post-confédéral, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2007. For an exception to this rule, see Morantz, 
The White Man 's Gonna Getcha. For Canadiens' historical relationship with the British Empire, see 
Colin M. Coates, "French Canadians' Ambivalence to the British Empire," in Buckner (ed.), Canada 
and the British Empire, p. 181-99. 
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cultural tendency for those with power to impose their standards of value on others with 
different standards.,,26 By emphasizing power's l'Ole in the monetary system, Gregory 
underlines the fallibility of orthodox economic theory's postulate that metallic standards 
naturally oust others. In this sense, money in colonial West Africa was defined not by sorne 
inherent material character, but by the power of authority and, as such, served the interests of 
those who imposed it rather than those who used il. In a study that similarly foregrounds 
power relations, Mahir Saul argues that cowries continued to circulate in colonial West 
Africa into the 1940s because, despite France's attempts to impose the franc following its 
tum-of-the-century conquests, West Africa remained politically fractured, with no single 
authority possessing power over the whole region (since Great Britain he Id West African 
colonies in which they imposed the pound sterling, shell money effectively remained the 
region-wide monetary standard).27 Walter 1. Ofonagoro reports on a similar process of slow 
currency replacement in Nigeria between the late nineteenth century and the 1940s. Like the 
French, the British proved unable to rapidly displace cowries and other Indigenous currencies 
with imported, imperial money. Ofonagoro remarks that this fa ilure arose because "British 
coins were simply not regarded as money by the local population. To them, the coins had no 
monetary value; only their bullion value excited local interest. ,,28 Thus, as in Malawi and 
British North America, perceptions of money influenced its acceptability in Nigeria. 29 
26 C.A. Gregory, "Cowries and Conquest: Towards a Subalternate Quality Theory of Money," 
Comparaiive Siudies in Society and Hislory, vol. 38, no. 2 (April 1996), p. 215. 
27 Mahir Saul, "Money in Colonial Transition: Cowries and Francs in West Africa," American 
Anlhropologisl, vol. 106, no. 1 (2004), p. 71-84. 
28 Walter 1. Ofonagoro, "From Traditiona1 to British Currency in Southern Nigeria: Analysis of a 
Currency Revolution, 1880-1948," The Journal 0/Economie Hislory, vol. 39, no. 3 (September 1979), 
p.648. 
29 This observation accords with anthropo10gical studies that argue in favor of analyses of intercultural 
exchange that conceive of interactions between Europeans and Indigenous peoples as "grounded in 
local cultural and politica1 agendas, rather than naïveté." Nicholas Thomas, Enlangled Objecls: 
Exchange, Malerial Culture, and Colonialism in Ihe Pacifie, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University 
Press, 1991, p. 88. According to this vision of exchange, ideas and objects have no inherent function, 
but are rather assigned one (or many) by the culture that makes use of them. For a groundbreaking 
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In her doctoral dissertation, Wambui Mwangi provides the historiography's longest 
and most detailed study of cUlTency in the context of colonialism. Like Gregory, Saul, and 
Ofonagoro, Mwangi concentrates on relatively recent African history and the power that 
allowed local populations to resist the imposition offoreign money. By way ofa study of the 
East African CUlTency Board, the body that regulated the region 's succession of domestic 
money (the Indian rupee, Seyiddich currency, and East African Currency) through their 
exchange against the British pound sterling from 1919 to 1972, Mwangi examines "how the 
contested attempts to maintain control over the monetalY system in the colonial period 
produced the coercive force that imposed and reified territorial boundaries and homogenized 
political spaces on insistently fluid geographies and dynamic spatial relations.,,3o Her study 
underlines currency's inherently political nature and its contribution to the contested process 
of state formation in colonial East Africa. Although it does this primarily through a top-down 
approach, Mwangi remains sensitive to money's role in connecting the sphere of high poli tics 
and the state to the evelyday lives of "regular people," exploring this connection through 
moments of conflict between bureaucrats and the British East African colonies' inhabitants 
over the value and symbolism of official currency and other monetalY forms. While the social 
and institutional milieu of twentieth-centulY East Africa diverges substantially from that of 
nineteenth and twentieth-centulY Canada, Mwangi 's results make a persuasive case for the 
need to investigate money's role in the colonial setting explicitly in reference to the power 
relations that it helped express. 
Although these studies provide important points of companson, they remalll 
somewhat inapplicable in the present case given that the character of high imperialism as 
exercised in Africa and Asia differed substantially from Canadian colonialism. Indeed, in 
place of large numbers of immigrants originating in the metropole and elsewhere in Europe, 
collection in the anthropology of material culture, see Arjun Appadurai (ed.), The Social Life of 
Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986. 
30 Wambui Mwangi, "The Order ofMoney: Colonialism and the East African Currency Board," Ph.D. 
Dissertation (Political Science), Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania, 2003, p. 5. 
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Indigenous peoples continued to compose the vast majority of the population of Europe's 
African and Asian colonies. Thus, as a result of their demographic preponderance, Natives in 
these regions proved far more capable of influencing the colonial monetary system as a whole 
than did their counterparts in Canada. Moreover, in Africa, imperial actors attempted to 
impose European currency in the face of preexisting Indigenous monetary systems, creating a 
forrn of antagonism that did not exist in the Canadian context. Indeed, during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries sorne Amerindians actively encouraged the introduction of state­
issued currency as a means of displacing earlier monetary forms maintained by fur trade 
companies, thereby apparently increasing their own "freedom" to the detriment of their most 
important corporate trading partner. 31 However, the acceptance of novel forms of currency on 
the pa11 of First Nations did not originate in the nineteenth century, but dates to the 
beginnings of settler colonialism in northeastern North America, a region from which monel' 
appears to have been entirely absent priaI' ta European arrivaI. Through their appetite for 
wampum (beads manufactured with imported metal tools from shells found on the east coast 
of North America), Amerindians contributed to the decision made by governments in mid­
seventeenth-century New Netherland and New England to declare it legal tender. 32 Although 
this system was inspired by First Nations' demand for wampum, a form of currency that 
resembled those used by Indigenous Africans prior to European arrivai, the two monetary 
systems were in fact quite distinct given that one predated colonialism while the other was 
produced by it. 33 In this sense, the present study suggests that while monel' clearly played a 
role across the globe in the creation and maintenance of the power relations that were a by­
product of Europe's expanding overseas empires, the ways in which it did so need to be 
carefully contextualized. Whereas the African experience offers compelling evidence for the 
31 On this process, which ultimately encouraged the state to take back much of this apparent "liberty," 
see Chapters Four through Six. 
32 Lynn Ceci, "The First Fiscal Crisis in New York," Economie Development and Culture Change, vol. 
28, no. 4 (1980), p. 839-47. See also, Jonathan C. Lainey, La "Monnaie des Sauvages": Les colliers de 
wampum d'hier à aujourd'hui, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2004, p. 12 and 20-2. 
33 For more on Wampum's use as money, see Chapter Two. 
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resistance that Indigenous practice cou Id offer European systems, this dissertation argues that 
the Canadian case provides equally convincing evidence of Aboriginal ability to engage such 
systems in order to exert force of their own, often in surprising ways. 
Amerindian-Euro-Canadian Political Relations 
"New Indian History, " Aboriginal Agency, and Empire 
Beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, a new academic discipline, formulated 
specifically to address the methodological difficulties of analyzing the history of Native 
N0I1h Americans, took shape in the United States. 34 Known as ethnohistory, this discipline 
grew from a combination of ethnological and historical approaches to the study of Aboriginal 
peoples and the relations they maintained with colonial society. Initially, ethnohistorians 
concentrated on North American First Nations that had themselves left no written record, 
combining cultural insight gleaned from anthropological fieldwork with information mined 
from colonial archives. This approach was based in the conviction that Aboriginal peoples 
possessed non-negligible historical agency, a sentiment that with a few notable exceptions 
had been entirely absent from the colonial and national historiographies of North America. 
This emphasis on agency became central bath to ethnohistory and to its more formally 
historical offshoot that first appeared in the 1970s, the "new Indian history." This current, 
34 For a recent historiographical analysis of the development of ethnohistory, upon which this 
paragraph draws extensively, see Gilles Havard, "Les lndiens et l'histoire coloniale nord-américaine: 
les défIS de l'ethnohistoire," in Cécile Vidal and François-Joseph Ruggiu (eds.), Sociétés, colonisations 
et esclavages dans le monde atlantique. Historiographie des sociétés américaines des XVl-XIX" 
siècles, Rennes, Les Perséides, 2009, p. 95-142. For other recent reviews of the Amerindian 
historiography, see Denys Delâge, "L'histoire des autochtones d'Amérique du Nord: acquis el 
tendances," Annales. Histoire, science sociales, vol. 57, no. 5 (2002), p. 1337-55 and J.R. Miller, 
"Bringing Native People in from the Margins: The Recent Evolution and Future Prospects of English­
Canadian Historiography on Native-Newcomer Relations," in J.R. Miller, Reflections on Native­
Newcomer Relations: Selected Essays, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. 13-36. Much of 
this historical analysis has developed in a highly juridical environment. For a recent analysis of this 
process's influence on the historiography, see Arthur 1. Ray, "Constructing and Reconslructing Native 
History: A Comparative Look at the Impact of Aboriginal and Treaty Rights Claims in North America 
and Australia," Native Stl/dies Review, vol. 16, no 1 (2005), p. 15-39. 
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infJuenced by increasingly visible First Nations activism across North America, forcefully 
challenged the ethnocentrism of earlier historical works that implicitly (and sometimes 
explicitly) asserted Western cultural superiority. This emphasis on Aboriginal agency 
developed at roughly the same time as postcolonial and subaltern studies.35 In Canada, this 
movement resulted in the publication of a series of transformative studies by Bruce Trigger, 
Arthur Ray, Denys Delâge, and others during the 1970s and 1980s.36 Together with similar 
studies emerging from the United States, these works recast Amerindians as active 
paIiicipants in the political and economic history of North America on a scale that dwarfs a11 
previous attempts to do SO.37 
Richard White 's enormously influential 1991 study of European-Amerindian 
relations in the Great Lakes region between the mid-seventeenth and the early nineteenth 
centuries, The Middle Ground, exemplifies the new Indian history and its emphasis on 
35 For introductions to postcolonial and subaltern studies, see Gyan Prakash, "Subaltern Studies as 
Postcolonial Criticism," The American Historical Review, vol. 99, no. 5 (December 1994), p. 1475-90 
and Isabelle Merle, "Les 'Subaltern Studies'. Retour sur les principes fondateurs d'un projet 
historiographique de l'Inde coloniale," Genèses, no. 56 (September 2004), p. 13 1-47. 
36 Bruce G. Trigger, The Children ofAataentsic: A History ofthe Huron People to 1660, Montreal and 
Kingston, McGill-Queen 's University Press, [1976] 1987, Natives and Newcomers: Canada 's "Heroic 
Age" Reconsidered, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1985, Charles A. 
Bishop, The Northern Ojibwa and the Fur Trade: An Historical and Ecological Study, Toronto and 
Montreal, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1974, Arthur 1. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Theil' Role as 
Trappers, Hunters, and Middlement in the Lands Southwest of Hudson Bay, 1660-1870, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1974, Arthur J. Ray and Donald Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure": An 
Economie Analysis of Relations Bef1.veen the indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978, Sylvia Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties: Women in Fur-Trade 
Society, 1670-1870, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1980, Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, 
Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern James Bay, 1600-1870, Montreal and 
Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983, and Denys Delâge, Le pays renversé. Amérindiens 
et Européens en Amérique du nord-est, 1600-1664, Montreal, Boréal Express, 1985. 
37 For salient examples from the American context, see Francis Jennings, The invasion of America: 
indians, Colonialism and the Cant of Conquest, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1975, 
Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man 's indian: Images of the American indian from Columbus to 
the Present, New York, Vintage Books, 1979, and Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: 
Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos, Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1983. 
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Aboriginal agency above ail else.38 Although White's assertion that Aboriginal peoples 
played an active l'ole in shaping the history of the colonial project is c1early correct, scholars 
have recently begun charging that, in portraying the Great Lakes as a land of proto­
multiculturalism, White neglects certain historical processes. Several historians have noted 
that although White's study effectively communicates the ambiguity of cultural exchange, 
thereby forcefully laying to l'est Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis and the 
ethnocentric notions of progress that it implies, it simultaneous!y neglects the unequal 
material realities of colonialism and imperialism.39 However, such critical readings of The 
Middle Ground appear rooted more in the historiography that it inspired than in the study 
itself. Indeed, as Susan Sleeper-Smitb writes, White's monograph appears to owe much of its 
enormous popularity to its "optimlstic model of how cultures negotiated rather than collided. 
This model has become so appealing that many scholars are guilty of turning every time and 
place of cultural encounter into a middle ground, transforming the phrase into an elusive 
metaphor for various forms of compromise.,,40 Imprecise readings of The Middle Ground, 
then, have led the historiography to present a skewed version of the work, misrepresenting its 
conceptual content and simplifying its fundamental argument 41 
38 Richard White, The Middle Ground: 1ndians, Empires. and Republic in the Great Lakes Region, 
1650-1815, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1991. 
39 See, for example, Gilles Havard, Empire et métissages: Indiens et Français dans le Pays d'en Haut, 
1660-1715, Sillery, QC and Paris, Septentrion and Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003, p. 
15-6 and Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S Colonialism, p. 3-5. 
40 Susan Sleeper-Smith, "Introduction," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, vol. 63, no. 1 
(January 2006), p. 4. Philip 1. Deloria echoes Sleeper-Smith when he argues that the middle ground 
lends itself more naturally to being used as "an elusive metaphor rather than an analytic connector." 
Philip 1. Deloria, "What Is the Middle Ground, Anyway?" The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd 
Series, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 2006), p. 21. 
41 For a detailed analysis of White's study and the historiography it inspired, see Catherine Desbarats, 
"Following The Middle Ground," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, vol. 63, no. 1 (January 
2006), p. 81-96. 
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White hirnself is quite explicit about the power relations and stmctural factors that 
provided the necessary preconditions for the ernergence of the "middle ground" in the Great 
Lakes. This historical formation, which White describes as being dual in nature (a process 
and "a quite pa11icular historical space that was the outcome of this process"), relied on the 
existence of three factors: "a rough balance of power, mutual need or a desire for what the 
other possesses, and an inability by either side to commandeer enough force to compel the 
other to change." Moreover, White argues that, "the construction of a historical space in 
which the process becornes the basis of relations between distinct peoples... depended on the 
creation of an infrastmcture that cou Id support and expand the process." According to White, 
the lack of appropriate infrastructure ("from missions, to posts, to a network of alliance 
chiefs, to a set of rnutually comprehensible and oft-repeated rituals") is what confined the 
middle ground to the Great Lakes, preventing its exportation with the French to regions 
beyond the Mississippi. 42 The middle ground as a concept, then, becomes significantly less 
applicable to the historical study of Arnerindian-Euro-American relations than has often been 
recognized. Moreover, because White's approach to power relations constitutes a 
presumption rather than an analysis, The Middle Ground proves somewhat problematic. This 
is perhaps best illustrated by the study's conception of the French state as being monolithic. 
Indeed, throughout the text, White, though analyzing internai political divisions within the 
ranks of the Great Lakes' Amerindian population, assumes that ail French actors (constantly 
referred to sirnply as "the French") pursued the same goals, essentially rendering structural or 
personal rivalries within the imperial state imperceptible. Thus, while White's study 
consciously serves to remind us of the transformational and often unpredictable nature of 
intercultural interaction, its imperfections provide a forceful reminder that neither European 
nor Amerindian communities were ever homogenous. This dissertation employs both of these 
insights to insist on Aboriginal agency where sorne scholars have emphasized the state or 
42 Richard White, "Creative Misunderstandings and New Understandings," The William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Series, vol. 63, no. l (January 2006), p. 9-10. White develops this definition throughout 
The Middle Ground, presenting it most explicitly in the sll.ldy's introduction. White, The Middle 
Ground, p. x. 
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capital while resisting the conceptualization of Euro-Canadians and their political and 
economic institutions as homogenous. 
At the same time that Amerindian agency started making significant inroads in the 
North American historiography, courts in Canada began providing scholars with a new stage 
on which to discuss First Nations history. Following the Canadian Supreme Court's seminal 
1973 Calder decision, scholars began devoting increased attention to issues of legal 
applicability, particularly those affecting c!aims to Aboriginal and treaty rights. The recent 
"judiciarization" of Amerindian history in Canada has led to research that places emphasis on 
abstract legal concepts such as sovereignty, formai agreements (i.e. treaties), and the 
legislation through which the state has historically shaped its relationship with First 
Nations.43 Although this approach has supplemented the historiography with an impressive 
43 On the "judiciarization" of Aboriginal history, see Alain Beaulieu, "Les pièges de la judiciarisation 
de l'histoire autochtone," Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française, vol. 53, no. 4 (winter 2000), p. 
541-51 and "Une histoire instrumentalisée: Réflexions sur l'usage du passé dans les revendications 
autochtones," in Conférences des juristes de l'État 2009, XVllf conférence: Vert, le droit?, 
Cowansville, Éditions Yvon Blais, 2009, p. 349-71. On sovereignty, see Michel Morin, L'Usurpation 
de la souveraineté autochtone: Le cas des peuples de la Nouvelle-France et des colonies anglaises de 
l'Amérique du Nord, Montreal, Boréal, 1997 and Lauren Benton, A Search for Sovereignty: Law and 
Geography in European Empires, 1400-1900, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2010. For a 
recent study that employs a particularly flimsy version of sovereignty, largely to justify the rejection of 
present-day territorial claims made by several First Nations in Quebec, see Michel Lavoie, Le 
Domaine du roi, 1652-1859: Souveraineté, contrôle, mainmise, propriété, possession, exploitation, 
Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2010. For recent studies of treaties that originated in legal claims, see Denis 
Vaugeois, La fin des alliances franco-indiennes. Enquête sur un saufconduit de 1760 devenu un traité 
en 1990, Montreal, Boréal, 1995, Denis Vaugeois (ed.), Les Hurons de Lorette, Sillery, QC, 
Septentrion, 1996, Alain Beaulieu, "Les Hurons et la Conquête, Un nouvel éclairage sur le 'traité 
Murray,'" Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 30, no. 3 (2000), p. 53-63, Arthur 1. Ray, Jim 
Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A History ofSaskatchewan Treaties, Montreal and 
Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000, and J.R. Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant: 
Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2009. For studies of 
legislation concerning Amerindians, see Wayne Daugherty and Dennis Madill, "Indian Government 
under Indian Act Legislation, 1868-[951," Ottawa, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1980, John S. 
Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change," in 1.R. Miller 
(ed.), Sweet Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1991, p. 145-54, and Robert A. Campbell, "Making Sober Citizens: The Legacy oflndigenous 
Alcohol Regulation in Canada, 1777-1985," Journal ofCanadian Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (Winter 2008), 
p. 105-26. 
28 
number of valuable studies, it has also contributed to distorting the effccts of the legal system 
on the everyday lives of Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, while the articles of the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 and the Indian Act stmcture much of the recent historiographical 
production, as the present dissertation's analysis suggests, these formai documents may have 
exerted less force over Amerindian-Euro-Canadian relations than this explicitly legalistic 
historiography claims.44 Moreover, a significant portion of Canada's Aboriginal population 
has, until relatively recently, lived beyond daily contact with the legal system that occupies 
such an important place in these studies. 
In the same year that The Middle Ground appeared, Ken S. Coates published Ses! 
Left as Indians, a study of Aboriginal-Euro-Canadian relations in the Yukon, one region in 
which First Nations led their lives without significant contact with the legal system. Covering 
the period from 1840 to the present, Coates 's work centers on the native population, what he 
terms "the principal constant in Yukon history.'>45 While sensitive to issues of Aboriginal 
agency, Coates's analysis focuses on the "points of contact between an advancing European 
culture and an indigenous population," most particularly insofar as concems the capitalist 
economy and the federal and territorial states. 46 His study focuses resolutely on local 
conditions, analyzing northem experience in a way that separated it from earlier work on the 
Yukon and elsewhere in the Canadian north that most often adopted a perspective based in 
44 On the gap between the relative ignorance of the Indian Act's provisions among both Amerindians 
and state agents, see Chapters Three, Six, and Seven and Brian Gettler, "La consommation sous 
réserve: les agents indiens, la politique locale et les épiceries à Wendake aux XIX· et XXe siècles," in 
Bulletin d'histoire politique (forthcoming). For an influential study of the Royal Proclamation's issue 
and its subsequent effects, see John Borrows, "Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, 
Canadian Legal History, and Self-Government," in Michael Asch (ed.), Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 
in Canada, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1997, p. 155-72. 
45 Ken S. Coates, Best Left as /ndians: Native- White Relations in the Yukon Territory, 1840-/990, 
Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen 's University Press, 1991, p. xv. 
46 Ibid, p. xix-xx. 
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the south.47 Although it did not offer the sweeping vision of White's work, Best Left as 
Indians provides a somewhat subtler picture of the ways in which heterogeneous, yet distinct 
groups interacted, forming and reforming the Yukon's political and economic landscape. 
However, while Coates claims that this interaction has resulted in the marginalization of 
Aboriginal peoples, he does not systematize this argument by situating their experience in the 
context of the larger historical process by which European society spread across the globe, 
gradually extending its control over natura] resources and Native peoples. 
Toby Morantz, in her study of bureaucratie colonialism in eastern James Bay during 
the twentieth century, addresses precisely this issue through an analysis of the advance of 
southem political, economic, and religious institutions into a region that, with the exception 
of fur traders and a small number of itinerant missionaries, had previously been beyond the 
reach of southem actors. Morantz draws on the typology of eolonialism provided by 
anthropologists Jean and John Comaroff in their study of South African history. The 
Comaroffs propose that historieal forms of colonialism correspond to one of three models: 
statc, settler, and eivilizing or missionary. While Morantz finds these models stimulating, she 
argues that the historical experience of eastern James Bay, in which southern institutions 
effeetively negleeted the region, is best deseribed by a variation on state colonialism that she 
terms "bureaucratie colonialism." This eonceptualization of colonialism, which emphasizes 
"the contradictions caused by the various agencies of government's approach to social 
engineering," provides a means of analyzing Amerindian-Euro-Canadian interactions in a 
way that takes into aeeount both reeent work asserting the fractured internai nature of the 
47 For a more thOTOUgh development of this argument, see Ken Coates and William Morrison, The 
Forgotten North: A History of Canada's Provincial Norths, Toronto, James Lorimer & Company, 
1992. For a recent historiographical review, see Kenneth S. Coales and William R. Morrison. "The 
New North in Canadian History and Historiography," His/ory Compass, vol. 6, no. 2 (2008), p. 639­
58. 
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state and the historiography's description of the Canadian federal state's frequently 
incoherent Indian policy.48 
Although concemed with the ways in which James Bay was tied to southern 
Canada rather than with any larger scale of analysis, Morantz's work reflects the recent rise 
of the "new imperial history." Drawing much of its inspiration from postcolonial studies, this 
historiography, exemplified by Catherine Hall's work on the Caribbean, aims to place 
49
metropole and imperial periphery in a single analytical framework. Scholars working on 
this strain of imperial history emphasize interconnectedness in the place of earlier 
generations' practice of either lauding or lamenting the imperial past. 50 However, this 
historiography has proven somewhat contentious due to its tendency to adopt aspects of 
postcolonial studies' methodology. Cole Harris, drawing on his work on the creation of 
reserves in British Columbia, argues that recent postcolonial scholarship places too much 
emphasis on discourse and culture and not enough on other, more material forms of colonial 
power. As a result, he argues that scholars need "to investigate the sites where colonialism 
was actually practiced," rather than relying solely on metropole-centered analyses of the 
"imperial mind.,,51 In the Canadian context, recent work has done precisely this, intcgrating 
general analysis of distantly generated discourse with detailed analyses of local experience. 
Adele Perry's study of gender and race in mid-nineteenth-century British Columbia, for 
48 Morantz, The White Man's Gonna Getcha, p. 7-9. For the Comaroffs' analysis, see Jean Comaroff 
and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. l, Christianity, Colonialism, and 
Consciousness in South Africa, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991 and John L. Comaroff and 
Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 2, The Dialectics of Modernity of a South African 
Frontier, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997. 
49 Catherine Hall, Civilising Subjects: Metropole and Colony in the English Imagination. J830- J867, 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2002. 
50 For a recent review of attempts to integrate British imperial and national history, see James 
Thompson, "Modem Britain and the New Imperial History," History Compass, vol. 5, no. 2 (2007), p. 
455-62. 
51 Cole Harris, "How Did Colonialism Dispossess? Comments from an Edge of Empire," Annals ofthe 
Association ofAmerican Geographers, vol. 94, no. 1 (2004), p. 166. 
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example, is infonned by the conviction that, "To examine colonialism from the vantage point 
of the periphery highlights the disjuncture between imperial ideals and practice, and reminds 
us that colonialism was a popular social experience as weil as a political arrangement and 
literary discourse.,,52 The work of Peny and Harris, then, demonstrates the necessity of 
supplementing close discursive readings with insight gleaned from in-depth analysis of 
material factors. 53 
"Dld lndian History".· lndian Policy and the State 
In The Middle Ground, Richard White refers to "white policy toward Indians" as 
"the staple of the 'old history,''' an approach that he explicitly contrasts to that of the "new 
Indian history," which "places Indian peoples at the center of the scene and seeks to 
understand the reasons for their actions.,,54 Although White makes an important point about 
the need to re-center Amerindian history so that it truly focuses on Aboriginal peoples, 
"white policy toward Indians" provides even this "new" history with absolutely essential 
contextualization, something which scholars in both Canada and the United States have 
generally recognized, perhaps explaining why in-depth studies of Indian policy emerged at 
precisely the same time as the first great wave of new Indian history. However, most of this 
work deploys relatively unsophisticated analyses of state action and discourse, often 
uncritically accepting the claims of those who formulated and implemented Indian policy. 
Recent work on the state, when combined with the central role that the new Indian history 
assigns agency, opens a space for reformulating "white policy toward Indians." It does so in a 
way that avoids this naïve approach to state discourse while contributing to efforts to correct 
52 Perry, On the Edge ofEmpire, p. 7. 
53 For Harris's materia1 ana1ysis, see Harris, Making Native Space. This point is a1so weil made by 
Gilles Havard's magisteria1 analysis of French-Amerindian relations in the upper Great Lakes during 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Havard, Empire et métissages. 
54 White, The Middle Ground, p. xi. 
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what Nicolas Rosenthal identifies as the tendency of First Nations history to exist in isolation 
"from larger currents of North American history.,,55 
The history of Canadian Indian policy owes its origins and much of its current form 
to the state agency that has long been responsible for its formulation and implementation ­
that is, the Department of lndian Affairs. Indeed, Duncan Campbell Scott, the Department's 
chief bureaucrat (the deputy superintendent general), performed the first lengthy analysis of 
the subject in three articles published in 1913 and 1914.56 The texts describe the development 
of imperial and 1ater federal Indian policy through three phases. Scott daims that from the 
Conquest through roughly 1830 "a purely military administration prevailed, the duty of the 
govemment being restricted to maintaining the loyalty of the Indian nations to the crown, 
with almost the sole object of preventing their hostility and of conserving their assistance as 
allies." During the second period, stretching from approximately 1830 into the 1860s, "The 
civilization of the Indian became the ideal; the menace of the tomahawk and the firebrand 
having disappeared, the apparent duty was to raise him from the debased condition into 
which he had fallen owing to the loose and pampering policy of former days.,,57 Scott's 
analysis of the third period, which began during the 1860s and continued to his own time, 
underlines the economic "advancement" made by Amerindians, particularly in eastern 
Canada, and points to a time in the near future "When by amendment of the lndian Act it has 
become possible to enfranchise Indians without unnecessary and tedious formality, numbers 
of thase who now subsist apart from the reserves will embrace full citizenship.,,58 Throughout 
55 Nicolas G. Rosenthal, "Beyond the New Indian History: Recent Trends in the Historiography on the 
Native Peoples of North America," Hislory Compass, vol. 4, no. 5 (September 2006), p. 963. 
56 Duncan C. Scott, "lndian Affairs, 1763-1841," in Adam Shorll and Arthur G. Doughty (eds.), 
Canada and ils Provinces, vol. 4, Toronto, Brook and Company, 1914, p. 695-725, "lndian Affairs, 
1840-1867," in Adam Shortt and Arthur Doughty (eds.), Canada and Ils Provinces, vol. 5, Toronto, 
Brook and Company, 1914, p. 331-62, and "Indian Affairs, 1867-1912," in Adam Shortt and Arthur 
Doughty (eds.), Canada and Ils Provinces, vol. 7, Toronto, Brook and Company, 1914, p. 593-626. 
57 Scott, "Indian Affairs, 1763-1841," p. 695-6. 
58 Scott, "Indian Affairs, 1867-1912," p. 605-6. 
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the three texts, Scott describes the Department as having always been dedicated to First 
Nations' wellbeing while simultaneously making the c1aim that its senior officiais clearly 
enunciated Indian Affairs' policy goals in their official discourse. 
In 1946, The Canadian Journal ofEconomics and Political Science published two 
papers on Indian policy, both of which had been presented at the annual meeting of the 
Canadian Political Science Association in May of that year and authored by high-ranking 
bureaucrats in the United States and Canada. The first of these, by Willard W. Beatty, the 
director of education for the Bureau of Indian Affairs in the United States, lauds in the 
progressive language of the Indian New Deal the American pol icy of assimilation, defined as 
"the preparation of the Indian to understand and share in the richer standards of living of our 
country, managing his own affairs, and making his own choice of religion and occupation."S9 
While shaped by the policies of the Roosevelt administration, recent scholarship has 
demonstrated that American Indian policy of the 1930s constituted a continuation of earlier, 
progressive-era programs. Beatty's description of culturally sensitive assimilation, then, 
presents nothing more than a timely discursive adaptation for promoting fundamentally 
unaltered policy.60 Although less explicit, T.R.L. MacInnes, the secretary of the Indian 
Affairs Branch, also voices his support for assimilation, a graduai process which he couches 
in the typically Canadian language of enfranchisement. Maclnnes's historical analysis 
implicitly draws on Scott's work by adopting his periodization and structure, reinforcing his 
predecessor's characterization of Canada's Indian policy as clearly spelled out in official 
rhetoric and as benevolent above ail else, while, like Beatty, failing to acknowledge 
discourse's role in cosmetically adapting policy to contemporary concerns. 61 
59 Willard W. Beatty, "The Goal of Indian Assimilation," The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science, vol. 12, no. 3 (August 1946), p. 404. 
60 Russel Lawrence Barsh, "Progressive-Era Bureaucrats and the Unity of Twentieth-Century Indian 
Policy," Americanlndian Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 1 (Win ter 1991), p. 1-17. 
61 T. R. L. Madnnes, "History of Indian Administration in Canada," The Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, vol. 12, no. 3 (August 1946), p. 387-94. 
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These c1aims and methodological shortcomings found their way in relatively 
unaltered form into the prodigious number of doctoral dissertations produced on Canadian 
Indian policy during the 1970s and 1980s.62 These studies, along with the work of John 
Tobias and others, adopted the central points of Scott's and MacInnes's analyses, in the 
process modifying them slightly to fit the environment of the time.63 Together, this work 
argues that the state's historical relationship with First Nations is best understood in reference 
to its evolving, officially stated policy goals. These scholars c1aim, then, that the state's late­
eighteenth and early-nineteenth-century Indian policy sought to conciliate and protect the 
crown's Native allies, while from the period following the end of the War of 1812 its 
successor aimed to "civilize" them, and, finally, beginning in the 1860s, the state sought to 
assimilate (by force, if necessary) Amerindians into the general body politic. Since the 
62 1. Douglas Leighton, "The Development of Federal 1ndian Policy in Canada," Ph.D. Dissertation 
(History), London, University of Western Ontario, 1975, Marion Joan Boswell, '''Civilizing' the 
1ndian: Govemment Administration of 1ndians, 1876-1896," Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Ottawa, 
University of Ottawa, 1977, John Sheridan MiIJoy, "The Era of Civilization - British Policy for the 
1ndians of Canada, 1830-1860," Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Oxford, University of Oxford, 1978, 
Robert J. Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763-1862: The Evolution of a System," Ph.D. 
Dissertation (History), Ottawa, Carleton University, 1983, Anthony 1. Hall, "The Red Man's Burden: 
Land, Law, and the Lord ln The Indian Affairs Of Upper Canada, 1791-1858," Ph.D. Dissertation 
(History), Toronto, University of Toronto, 1984, lan Victor Basil Johnson, ''The Early Missisauga 
Treaty Process 1781-1819 in Historical Perspective," Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Toronto, University 
of Toronto, 1986, and John Edward Crossley, "The Making of Canadian Indian Policy to 1946," Ph.D. 
Dissertation (Political Science), Toronto, University of Toronto, 1987. Although Canadian Indian 
policy ceased to provide a major subject for doctoral studies by the late 1980s, a handful of Ph.D. 
dissertations have been submitted during the intervening quarter century. See, for example, John F. 
Leslie, "Assimilation, Integration or Termination? The Development of Canadian lndian Policy, 1943­
1963," Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Ottawa, Carleton University, 1999 and Emily Arrowsmith, "Fair 
Enough? How Notions of Race, Gender, and Soldiers' Rights Affected Dependents' AIJowance 
Policies towards Canadian Aboriginal Families during World War Il,'' Ph.D. Dissertation (History), 
Carleton University, 2006. 
63 John 1. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's 1ndian 
Policy," Western Canadian Journal 01 Anthropology, vol. 6, no. 2 (1976), p. 13-30 and DJ. Hall, 
"Clifford Sifton and Canadian Indian Administration, 1896-1905," in lan A.L. Getly and Antoine S. 
Lussier (eds.), As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies, 
Vancouver, UBC Press, [1977] 1983, p. 120-44. A large number ofstudies of American Indian policy 
also appeared during the 1970s and 1980s. For the most important of these, see Francis Paul Prucha, 
The Great Father: The United States Government and the American Indians, 2 vols., Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1984. 
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appearance of these studies, the historiography has generally taken these policy goals for 
granted, employing them to stmcture work covering vastly different periods and geographical 
64
contexts. In the 1990s, while still approaching official political discourse on its own terms, 
scholars began questioning the efficacy of these policies for the first time, producing a series 
of studies that demonstrated the ultimate failure to achieve the policy goals that generations 
of departmental employees alticulated. 65 While this work added nuance to the historiography, 
as a whole it remained committed to the general framework proposed by Scott. During the 
1990s and 2000s a handful of book-length studies appeared arguing that Indian Affairs 
historically pursued a fourth, unacknowledged goal: control/coercion. According to this 
argument, the Department sought to impose its programs on docile clients and its employees 
resented any efforts on the part of Amerindians to impede or alter these programs. Robin 
64 John Leslie, "Commissions of Inquiry into Indian Affairs in the Canadas, 1828-1858: Evolving a 
Corporate Memory for the Indian Department," Ottawa, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
1985, E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of 1ndian 
Affairs in Canada, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1986, Robert Allen, His Majesty's 1ndian Allies: British 
1ndian Policy in The Defence of Canada, 1774-1815, Toronto, Oundurn Press, 1993, Leslie, 
"Assimilation, Integration or Termination?", Hugh Shewell, "Enollgh to Keep Them Alive ": 1ndian 
Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2004, Michel Lavoie, "Politique 
sur commande: Les effets des commissions d'enquête sur la politique publique et la politique indienne 
au Canada, 1828-1996," Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 37, no. 1 (2007), p. 5-23, 
Oorothee Schreiber, '''A Liberal and Paternal Spirit': Indian Agents and Native Fisheries in Canada," 
Ethnohistory, vol. 55, no. 1 (Winter 2008), p. 87-118, Heidi Bohaker and Franca Iacovetta, "Making 
Aboriginal People 'Immigrants Too': A Comparison of Citizenship Programs for Newcomers and 
Indigenous Peoples in Postwar Canada, 1940s-1960s," Canadian Historica1 Review, vol. 90, no. 3 
(September 2009), p. 427-61, E. Brian Titley, The 1ndian Commissioners. Agents of the State and 
1ndian Policy in Canada's Prairie West, 1873-1932, Edmonton, University of Alberta Press, 2009, and 
Martha Elizabeth Walls, No Need of a Chieffor this Band: Maritime Mi'kmaq and Federal Election 
Legislation, 1899-1951, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2010. The two primary surveys of Canadian First 
Nations history also adopt this framework fro describing Indian policy. J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide 
the Heavens: A History of1ndian-White Relations in Canada, 2nd ed., Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1991 and Olive Patricia Oickason, Canada's First Nations: A History ofthe Founding Peoples 
from Earliest Times, 3rd ed., Don Mills, Ont., Oxford University Press, 2001. 
65 Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie 1ndian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy, Montreal and 
Kingston, McGiH-Queen's University Press, 1990, J.R. Miller, "Owen Glendower, Hotspur, and 
Canadian Indian Policy," Ethnohistory, vol. 37, no. 4 (Autmnn 1990), p. 386-415, and Leo G. 
Waisberg and Tim E. Holzkamm, '''A Tendency to Discourage Them from Cultivating': Ojibwa 
Agriculture and Indian Affairs Administration in Northwestern Ontario," Ethnohistory, vol. 40, no. 2 
(Spring 1993), p. 175-211. 
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Jarvis Brownlie asserts that during the inteIWar period, "Whenever the clected leaders 
attempted to reach beyond their extremely limited jurisdiction to matters of poli tical 
importance, they ran headlong into the department's restrictive regulations and the 
determined opposition of its agents. ,,66 
Despite its tendency to uncritically assume that the goals proclaimed by Scott and 
his fellow bureaucrats actually animated state action, the historiography on Indian policy and 
the Department of Indian Affairs has grown significantly over the past twenty years, coming 
to include detailed studies of a wide variety of state discourse, practice, and programs 
affecting Aboriginal peoples. Several of those scholars who first questioned the efficacy of 
Indian Affairs' policies focused their analysis on state attempts to encourage agricultural 
"advancement" in western Canada, generally through restrictions on market access, in the 
process demonstrating the preponderant role of the Department in preventing First Nations 
from competing with their newly arrived Euro-Canadian neighbors. 67 Recent work has also 
focused on the imperial and later federal states' land policy, providing in-depth analyses of 
treaty negotiation and the creation of reserves. 68 Other scholars have demonstrated the ways 
in which the state framed natural resource use often prejudicially to Aboriginal interests 
66 Robin Jarvis Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: Indian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal 
Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939, Don Mills, Ont., Oxford University Press, 2003, p. xv. AlLhough he 
refers to "coercion" rather than "control," Dyck recognizes essentially the same phenomenon. Noel 
Dyck, What is the Indian "Problem "? Tutelage and Resistance in Canadian Indian Administration, St. 
John's, The Institute of Social and Economie Research, Memorial University ofNewfoundland, 1991. 
For more recent works in this vein, see Keith D. Smith, Liberalism , Surveillance, and Resistance: 
Indigenous Communities in Western Canada, 1877-1927, Edmonton, Athabasca University Press, 
2009 and Walls, No Need ofa Chieffor this Band. 
67 Carter, Lost Harvests and Waisberg and Holzkamm, "'A Tendency to Discomage Them [rom 
Cultivating. ", 
68 Surtees, "lndian Land Cessions in Ontario," Gérard L. Fortin and Jacques Frenette, "L'acte de 185) 
et la création de nouvelles réserves indiennes au Bas-Canada en 1853," Recherches amérindiennes au 
Québec, vol. 19, no. 1 (1989), p. 31-7, Ray, Miller, and Tough, Bounty and Benevolence, Harris, 
Making Native Space, and Miller, Compact, Contract, Covenant. For a recent study that highlights 
Aboriginal rather than state perspectives on land, see Hans M. Carlson, Home is the Hunter: The 
James Bay Cree and their Land, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008. 
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largely through the passage of a senes of fish and game laws, but also through the 
administration of on-reserve resources. 69 Although not central to this historiography, recent 
work on social assistance and veterans' and dependents' benefits points to the important role 
that these programs have played in the ongoing relationship between the state and First 
Nations, contributing to widespread public perception of Aboriginal peoples as both 
improvident and benefitting from the public purse to a disproportionate extent. 70 Other recent 
studies have emphasized the growth the state's knowledge apparatus experienced through the 
creation of commissions of inquiry ioto Indian Affairs and the practice of census making, 
both of which developed during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.71 The ideological 
underpinnings of authorities' thought has also begun attracting interest from scholars, 
providing insight into the ways in which larger philosophical movements affected lndian 
69 Dianne Newell, Tangled Webs ofHistory: Indians and the Law in Canada 's Pacifie Coast Fisheries, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1993, Toby Morantz, "Provincial Game Laws at the Turn of the 
Century: Protective or Punitive Measures for the Native Peoples of Quebec?" in David H. Pentland 
(ed.), Papen of the Twenty-Sixth Aigonquian Conference, Winnipeg, University of Manitoba, 1995, p. 
275-90, David Calverley, "Who ControIs the Hunt? Ontario's Game Act, the Canadian Government 
and the Ojibwa, 1800-1940," Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Ottawa, University ofOltawa, 1999, Mark 
Kuhlberg, '''Nothing it seems can be done about it': Charlie Cox, Indian Affairs Timber Policy and the 
Long Lac Reserve, 1924-40," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 84, no. 1 (March 2003), p. 33-64, and 
Schreiber, '" A Liberal and Paternal Spirit. '" 
70 ShewelI, "Enough to Keep Them Alive" and Arrowsmith, "Fair Enough?" In many ways, these 
studies echo the arguments made by the historiography on poverty. For influentiaJ examples of this 
Iiterature, see Gertrude Himmelfarb, The Idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age, New 
York, Knopf, 1984, Jean-Marie Fecteau, Un nouvel ordre des choses: La pauvreté, le crime, l'État au 
Québec, de la fin du XVIIf siècle à J840, Outremont, VLB, 1989 and La liberté du pauvre: Crime et 
pauvreté au XIX" siècle québécois, Montreal, VLB, 2004. 
71 Leslie, "Commissions of Inquiry into Indian Affairs ... ," Michel Lavoie, "Politique des 
représentations: Les représentations sociales bureaucratiques et la politique de J'éducation indienne au 
Canada, 1828-1996 (1)," Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 34, no. 3 (2004), p. 87-98, and 
Michel Lavoie, "Politique des représentations: Les représentations sociales bureaucratiques et la 
politique de l'éducation indienne au Canada, 1828-1996 (II)," Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, 
vol. 35, no. 1 (2005), p. 57-67, Lavoie, "Politique sur commande," Michelle A. Hamilton, '''Anyone 
not on the list might as well be dead': Aboriginal Peoples and the Censuses of Canada, 1851-1916," 
Journal ofthe Canadian Historical Association/Revue de la Société historique du Canada, vol. 18, no. 
1 (2007), p. 57-79, and Brian Edward Hubner, "'This is the Whiteman's Law': Aboriginal Resistance, 
Bureaucratie Change and the Census of Canada, 1830-2006," Archivai Science, vol. 7, no. 3 (2007), 
195-206. 
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policy and departmental practice.72 This work, along with that focused on lndian Affairs' 
ability to know its "clientele" dovetails weil with recent scholarship that foregrounds the 
Department's bureaucrats and bureaucracy, underlining the ways in which individual 
employees and lndian Affairs' global administrative structure interacted, in the process 
shaping the everyday lives of First Nations. 73 Scholars analyzing the response of Aboriginal 
peoples to lndian policy have also complicated this historiography, moving activism to the 
foreground and demonstrating the effects that it had on state practice. 74 
While collectively these studies highlight the central role of lndian Affairs and 
Indian policy in the creation and maintenance of unequal power relations, they often fail to 
sufficiently account for the state's complicated makeup and the ways in which this has 
affected its practice. Some scholars, however, have given the state more serious and sustained 
attention in the context of Amerindian history. lE. Hodgetts long ago published a markedly 
more subtle analysis of the imperial state's relationship with First Nations than much of the 
scholarship that draws directly or otherwise on Scott. In his 1955 administrative history of the 
72 David T. McNab, "Herman Merivale and Colonial Offtce Indian Policy in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century," in lan A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier (eds.), As Long as the Sun Shines and Water 
Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1983, p. 85-103 and Theodore 
Binnema and Kevin Hutchings, "The Emigrant and the Noble Savage: Sir Francis Bond Head's 
Romantic Approach to Aboriginal Policy in Upper Canada, 1836-1838," Journal of Canadian 
StudieslRevue d'études canadiennes, vol. 39, no. 1 (Winter 2005), p. 115-38. 
73 Hall, "Clifford Sifton and Canadian Indian Administration...", Douglas Leighton, uA Victorian Civil 
Servant at Work: Lawrence Vankoughnet and the Canadian Indian Department, 1874-1893," in 1an 
A.L. Getty and Antoine S. Lussier (eds.), As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in 
Canadian Native Studies, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1983, p. 104-19, McNab, "Herman Merivale and 
Colonial Offtce Indian Policy... ," Titley, A Narrow Vision, Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye, David Shanahan, 
"Tory Bureaucrat as Victim: The Removal of Samuel Jarvis, 1842-47," Ontario History, vol. 95, no. 1 
(Spring 2003), p. 38-64, Schreiber, '''A Liberal and Paternal Spirit,''' and Titley, The Indian 
Commissioners. 
74 Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in British Columbia. 
1849-1989, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1990, Hugh Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism 
in Canada, 1943-1944," Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 211-42, 
Katharine A. McGowan, '''Until We Receive Just Treatment': The Fight against Conscription in the 
Naas Agency, British Columbia," BC Studies, no. 167 (Autumn 2010), p. 47-70. 
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United Canadas, Hodgetts argues that beforc 1860, the year in which the colonial state gained 
jurisdiction over the Indian Department, a constellation of imperial and colonial institutions 
collaborated with Indian Affairs in order to administer the state's relationship with 
Amerindians. With this shift in jurisdiction, however, the Department was rebom as a 
"clientele" agency, effectively monopolizing al! aspects of this relationship.75 When read in 
conjunction with recent work on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Hodgetts's study 
suggests the necessity of reevaluating the place occupicd by Indian Affairs within the overal1 
76
state apparatus. Together, these studies point to internai competition within the state, 
whether from agencies located on the same level of government or between representatives of 
Canada and the provinces, challenging older scholarship's tendency to study Indian Affairs in 
isolation from the rest of the state. 77 
Somewhat surprisingly, this older approach to writing the history of Indian Affairs 
has much in conunon with newer forms of political analysis based largely in the work of 
Michel Foucault and PielTe Bourdieu. Jean-Marie Fecteau notes that scholars working in this 
tradition have begun viewing the state as largely superfluous, replacing attempts to 
comprehend the state as a whole with analyses of the procedures and policies of 
fundamental1y independent agents, agencies, and groups. Fecteau sees this development as 
symptomatic of "une crise profonde dans J'étude conceptuelle du phénomène politique dans 
les sciences sociales." Indeed, he argues that the state is the dominant manifestation of the 
social relations at the core of politics. For Fecteau, the state comprises several socio-political 
75 lE. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service: An Administrative History of the United Canadas, 1841­
1867, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1955. 
76 McNab, "Herman Merivale and Colonial Office Indian Policy... ", Newell, Tangled Webs ofHistory, 
Calverley, "Who Controls the Hunt?," Morantz, The White Man's Canna Cetcha, p. 176-240, 
Shanahan, "Tory Bureaucrat as Viclim," Quiring, CCF Colonialism, Arrowsmith, "Fair Enough?," and 
Emilie Ducharme, "L'État québécois et les Autochtones: la construction d'une politique, 1960-1970," 
M.A. Thesis (History), Montreal, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2008. 
77 For an eXlremely influential study from outside the field of Canadian hislory that emphasizes intra­
state competition, see Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins ofSocial 
Policy in the United States, Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992. 
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phenomena (e.g. sovereignty, war and diplomacy, administration and bureaucracy, the legal 
system, democracy or other means of accessing political power, and symbolic representations 
of collective identity) that are deeply intertwined and that cannot be fully understood in 
isolation. Moreover, this association of diverse elements is critical to understanding the 
historical development of the Iiberal democratic state, which worked from the nineteenth 
century to deny the legitimacy of rival forms of collective identity through a discourse 
portraying nation-states and nationalities as the basis of politics. 78 Fecteau notes that the 
twentieth-century development of the welfare state, which involved itself in the everyday 
lives of its population to an historically unprecedented extent, would only strengthen the 
ability of this discourse to legitimize the state. 79 
In this spirit, certain scholars, among them Fecteau himself, have conducted 
empirical research aimed in part at understanding the state as a whole. Much of this work 
draws inspiration from Mary Douglas's argument that institutions, like individuals, are 
concemed with ensuring their own survival, making analyses of both their interactions with 
other institutions and their discursive legitimization of their own existence central to 
understanding their history.80 This conviction has led to a growing body of research on state 
78 A burgeoning historiography seeks to analyze Iiberalism's political raIe in nineteenth and twentieth­
century Canada. For major contributions to this debate, see Fernande Roy, Progrès, harmonie, liberté: 
le libéralisme des milieux d'affaires francophones à Montréal au tournant du siècle, Montreal, Boréal, 
1988, lan McKay, 'The Liberal Order Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian 
History," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 81, no. 4 (December 2000), p. 617-45, and Jean-François 
Constant and Michel Ducharme (eds.), Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal 
Revolution, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2009. For a skeptical appraisaJ of the "liberal order" 
in the context of Aboriginal history, see Robin Jarvis Brownlie, "A Persistent Antagonism: First 
Nations and the Liberal Order," in Constant and Ducharme (eds.), Liberalism and Hegemony, p. 298­
321. For a more enthusiastic take on the liberal order's applicability to First Nations history, see Smith, 
Liberalism, Surveillance, and Resistance. 
79 Jean-Marie Fecteau, "Écrire J'histoire de l'État?" Bulletin d'histoire politique, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 
2007), p. 111-3. For an application of this nation-based analysis of the state to contemporary First 
Nations history, see Chris Andersen and Claude Denis, "Urban Natives and the Nation: Before and 
After the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples," Canadian Review of Sociology/Revue 
canadienne de sociologie, vol. 40, no. 4 (November 2003), p. 373-90. 
80 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1986. 
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formation, the process by which the state changed and, for the most part, grew over time. 81 
This literature, which originated from attempts to study the state from below rather than from 
the older perspective of high politics, demonstrates, in the words of Michael Braddick, "that 
the study of the organisation, institutionalisation, representation and expression of political 
power remains an important means by which to approach an understanding of many aspects 
of social, economic, intellectual and culturallife. ,,82 
Although remaining virtually absent from the First Nations historiography,83 
interest in state formation in Canada has led to a wide array of studies dedicated to 
understanding thc ways in which the state's activities intersect with the everyday existence of 
individuals and communities. Bruce Curtis's work on census making demonstrates the effects 
that seemingly neutral developments in the information at the state's disposai had on day-to­
day administrative practices and the lives of individuals living within national territorial 
boundaries. Drawing on Foucault, Curtis argues that through the census, the Canadian state of 
the mid-nineteenth century actually created its population.84 Published in 1992, Colonial 
Leviathan, a collection of texts that analyze various aspects of historical statc formation in 
Canada, provides the historiography with its programmatic statement on the subject, 
combining bottom-up and top-down perspectives to fOClIS on the growth of the state primarily 
81 For the prototypical historical study of state formation, see Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The 
Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1985. 
82 Michael Braddick, "State Formation and the Historiography of Early Modem England," History 
Compass, vol. 2, no. 1 (January 2004), p. 2. 
83 Indeed, state formation has only made inroads in the sociological and anthropological Iiterature on 
contemporary Aboriginal experience. Andersen and Denis, "Urban Natives and the Nation" and Paul 
Nadasdy, Hunters and Bureaucrats: Power, Knowledge, and Aboriginal-State Relations in the 
Southwest Yukon, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2003. 
84 Bruce Curtis, "Révolution gouvernementale et savoir politique au Canada-Uni," Sociologie et 
sociétés, vol. 24, no. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 169-79 and The Politics of Population: State Formation, 
Statistics, and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002. For 
Curtis's theoretical bases, see Michel Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au collège de 
France, 1977-1978, Paris, GaliimardJSeuil, 2004, p. 69-77. 
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during the pivotai decades following the Rebellions of 1837-8.85 This approach has also 
proven important in shaping the application of social regulation to Canadian history, most 
notably in Jean-Marie Fecteau's research on poverty and crime. 86 While refusing to neglect 
the analysis of "high politics," ail of this work highlights the value of focusing on the state 
from below, carrying forward the project of both social history (as exemplified in the work 
E.P. Thompson) and the new Indian history by accepting that those who earlier generations of 
scholars excluded from history not only possess agency, but also have an important l'ole to 
play in historical narratives that go beyond the resolutely local. 87 
This combination of top-down and bottom-up perspectives, coupled with the claim 
that the state and the institutions that comprise it are far more complicated and conflicted than 
their unified, extemal façade suggests, provides this study with its primary conceptualization 
of public policy and the actions of state institutions and their employees. Rather than assume 
an easy conelation between policy and practice, the present study argues that the local 
political, social, and economic context complicated the implementation of legislation and 
discursively defined policy goals. It also claims that instead of being an undivided and 
homogenous whole, the nineteenth and twentieth-century Canadian state, which lies at the 
center of much of the analysis that follows, was in fact subject to a wide array of frequently 
divisive internai forces that further complicated the translation of policy to practice. This 
dissertation employs this conceptual framework to argue that Amerindians both exploited and 
85 Allan Greer and Ian Radforth (eds.), Colonial Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth­
Century Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1992. For a similar reading of the Rebellions, 
see Allan Greer, The Patriots al1d the People: The Rebellion of 1837 in Rural Lower Canada, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1993. 
86 Fecteau, Un nouvel ordre des choses and La liberté du pauvre. See aJso, Martin Petitclerc, "Nous 
protégeons l'infortune ": Les origines populaires de l'économie sociale au Québec, Montréal, VLB 
éditeur, 2007. 
87 For the canonical work that made this daim in the context of social history, see E.P. Thompson, The 
Making of the English Working Class, Toronto, Penguin Books, [1963] 1980. For the argument that 
scholars working on First Nations history need to "show North American historians why Native people 
matter," see Rosenthal, "Beyond the New Indian History," p. 965. 
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fe1l victim to the heterogeneous state and its imperfectly implemented policies, thereby 
rendering far more ambiguous the genera1ly uncomplicated narrative of both whiggish and 
more critical versions of the histOlY of colonialism. 
Aboriginal Peoples, Economie Power, and the Transition to Capitalism 
Until recently, the historiography on Amerindian economies in Canada has been 
dominated by two interconnected approaches: staple theOlY and ethnohistoty. Staple theOlY, 
as origina1ly developed by W.A. Mackintosh and Harold Innis, argues that thc development 
of Canada's economy is best understood in tenus of a small number of high-volume natural 
l'esource and agricultural exports (staples).88 The early fur trade historiography presents the 
most important adaptation of this school of thought to Aboriginal histOlY. Staple theOlY, 
which dominated the Canadian economic historiography through the Second World War, 
came under widespread attack from scholars beginning in the 1960s. At the same time, efforts 
to recuperate the theory by left-wing Canadian nationalists, in pmticular by Mel Watkins, 
failed to restore its earlier consensual status. 89 By the 1980s and 1990s, staple theoty had lost 
much of its analytical appeal for scholars who questioned its utility in explaining even 
economic activity that seemed self-evidently based in the exportation of single agricultural or 
natural-resource-based commodities. Marvin Mclnnis, for example, argues that staple theOlY 
fails to account for the internai comp!exity of the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuty 
Ontarian economy, regardless of its extemal appearance as being dominated by the 
88 W.A. Mackintosh, "Economie Factors in Canadian Hislory," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 4, 
no. 1 (1923), p. 12-25 and Harold A. Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, [1930] 1999. 
89 Melville H. Watkins, "A Staple Theory of Economie Growth," The Canadian Journal ofEconomies 
and Political Science, vol. 29, no. 2 (May 1963), p. 141-158 and Mel Walkins, "The Staple Theory 
Revisited," Journal ofCanadian Studies, vol. 12, no. 5 (1977), p. 83-95. For a collection ofWatkins's 
scholarly and activist writings, see Mel Watkins, Staples and Beyond: Selected Writings of Mel 
Watkins, Hugh Grant and David Wolfe (eds.), Montreal and Kingston, McGili-Queen's University 
Press, 2006. 
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production of wheat.90 Despite the theory's tendency to oversimplify historical economic 
activity, its underlying conviction remains useful in that it explicitly links Canada's domestic 
economy to international markets, in the process emphasizing its dependence on Europe and, 
from the mid-nineteenth century, the United States. 
The other primalY historiographical domain in which Amerindians occupy a central 
economic role grew directly from staple theory studies, while being tempered by 
ethnohistorical insight into Aboriginal cultural prerogatives and historical agency. Harold 
Innis's groundbreaking work on the Canadian fur trade paved the way for Aboriginal 
inclusion in the history of one of northern North America's longest-standing economic 
sectors 91 Of course, Innis's preoccupation with national and international economic histOIY 
led him to neglect Amerindians' role in the fur trade, instead foregrounding the activities of 
European and Euro-Canadian corporations and their employees. However, fol1owing E.E. 
Rich's seminal 1960 article, which centers on the participation of Aboriginal peoples in the 
fur trade, First Nations slowly came to occupy center stage in the fur trade historiography, 
both as producers of pelts and as consumers of trade goods.92 Drawing on Rich's exploratolY 
study, a new body of scholarship emerged beginning in the 1970s that emphasized interethnic 
economic partnership over competition and exploitation, leading the historiography to 
increasingly portray the fur trade as an area in which Amerindians exerted considerable 
force. 93 Studies of Amerindian consumption compellingly make this case by arguing that the 
90 R. M. McInnis, "Perspectives on Ontario Agriculture, J815-1930," Canadian Papers in Rural 
History, vol. 8 (1992), p. 17-127. For another example of a study lhal explicilly challenged staple 
theory's explanatory powers, see André Lemelin, "Le déclin du port de Québec et la reconversion 
économique à la fin du XlX" siècle. Une évaluation de la perlinence de l'hypothèse du staple," 
Recherches sociographiques, vol. 22, no. 2 (1981), p. 155-86. 
91 Innis, The Fur Trade in Canada. 
92 E.E. Rich, "Trade Habits and Economie Motivation among the Indians of North America," 
Canadian Journal ofEconomies and Political Science, vol. 26, no. 1 (1960), p. 35-53. 
93 For canonical examples of fur trade studies that emphasize partnership, see Bishop, The Northem 
Ojibwa and the Fur Trade, Ray, lndians in the Fur Trade, Ray and Freeman, "Cive Us Cood 
Measure ", Van Kirk, Many Tender Ties, and Francis and Morantz, Partners in Furs. 
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eighteenth-century fur trade benefited al\ parties as those companies that proved successful in 
this competitive commercial environment catered to their clientele's merchandise 
preferences.94 By the 1990s, though, several scholars, sorne of whom had been vocal 
proponents of partnership-based models, had begun questioning this relatively rosy historical 
account, arguing that, in the context of the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century fur 
trade, capitalist corporations wielded considerably more power than their Amerindian trading 
partners. However, these scholars remained sensitive to the ethnohistorically influenced 
historiography, making it clear that Aboriginal peoples were bona fide actors even in this 
hostile environment.95 More recently, studies focusing on eighteenth and early-to-mid 
nineteenth-century Quebec have reinforced this interpretation by demonstrating that in 
eastern Canada, too, power in the fur trade was never as balanced as the partnership-based 
historiography suggests.96 
This concern with power relations is not unique to fur trade history. lndeed, most 
analyses of First Nations economic history underline imbalances in the Aboriginal ability to 
94 Arthur 1. Ray, "lndians as Consumers in the Eighteenth Century," in Carol M. Judd et Arthur 1. Ray 
(eds.), Old Trails and New Directions: Papers of the Third North American Fur Trade Conference, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1980, p. 255-71, Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, "Trade, 
Consumption, and the Native Economy: Lessons from York Factory, Hudson Bay," The Journal of 
Economic History, vol. 61, no. 4. (December 2001), p. 1037-64, and Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. 
Lewis, "Marketing in the Land of Hudson Bay: Indian Consumers and the Hudson's Bay Company, 
1670-1770," Enterprise & Society, vol. 3, no. 2 (June 2002), p. 285-317. 
95 Arthur 1. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1990, Cole Harris, "Towards a Geography of White Power in the Cordilleran Fur Trade," The 
Canadian GeographeriLe Géographe canadien, vol. 39, no. 2 (1995), p. 131-40, Frank Tough, "As 
Theil' Natural Resources Fai!": Native Peoples and the Economic History of Northern Manitoba, 
1870-1930, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1996, and Morantz, The White Man 's Gonna Getcha. 
96 In addition to Morantz, see Jacques Frenelle, "Les relations commerciales entre la Hudson's Bay 
Company et les Montagnais de Betsiamites au XIXe siècle (/821-1870)," Recherches amérindiennes 
au Québec, vol. 24, no. 3 (1994), p. 67-79, Claude Gélinas, La gestion de l'étranger. Les Atikamekw et 
la présence eurocanadienne en Haute-Mauricie, 1760-1870, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2000, Claude 
Gélinas, Entre l'assommoir et le godendart. Les Atikamekw et la conquête du Moyen-Nord québécois, 
1870-1940, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2003, and Sigfrid Tremblay, "La subsistance des Naskapis et les 
intérêts de la Compagnie: Une perspective territoriale sur le commerce des fourrures (1830-1870)," 
MA Thesis (History), Montreal, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2007. 
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exert force in the marketplace. Although still relatively underdeveloped, the historiography 
on wage work has begun to analyze First Nations' role in the development of industrial 
capitalism in a similar light to that which has traditionally been reserved for non-Aboriginal 
peoples. Of course, First Nations' primary l'ole in the North American economy did not 
originate with their labor power, as it generally did with other racialized cornmunities (both 
the dominant Euro-Canadians and subaltem groups such as those of African and Asian 
origin). As Patrick Wolfe rightly points out, the relationship between Natives and "their 
colonizers - as both parties to the relationship would presumably agree - centered on land.,,97 
In this sense, Europeans and their descendents sought control of Amerindian lands rather than 
Amerindian labor power. However, this observation is only valid to a point because it relies 
on the highly prejudicial definition of labor that colonists carried with them to the New 
World. According to John Lutz, "The argument was that the fishing, hunting, gathering, 
building, and even farming that Aboriginal Peoples did was not labour - at least not in a way 
that met the definition of classical economics. Such efforts did not sufficiently remove items 
from their 'state of nature.' European fishing, trapping, farming, and manufacturing, on the 
other hand, were considered to mix labour with nature and so were invoked as justification 
for making the land, waters, and resources European 'property.",98 Analyzing First Nations 
history in terms of labor, then, allows scholars to question some of the apparently natural 
foundations of the economic and political relations that characterize colonialism. 
The historiography on Aboriginal participation in wage work traces its origins to 
Rolf Knight's lndians al Work, an informai history of Aboriginal labor originally published 
in 1978 that attempted "to sketch in some of the forgotten components of working-class 
97 Patrick Wolfe, "Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race," The American 
Historical Review, vol. 106, no. 3 (June 2001), p. 866-905. 
98 John Sutton Lutz, Makûk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations, Vancouver, UBC Press, 
2008, p. 6-7. For an analysis of early colonists' perception of the incommensurability of Aboriginal 
forms ofwork with European notions oflabor, see James Axtell, "The Invasion Within: The Contest of 
Cultures in Colonial North America," in James Axtell, The European and the lndian: Essays in the 
Ethnohistory of Colonial North America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 48-50. 
47 
history in British Columbia." At the time, the historiography on both labor and First Nations 
ignored Amerindian wage work. Knight, reacting to both labor history's negligence of 
Aboriginal peoples and the cultural relativism of ethnohistory and anthropology, sought ta 
encourage revisionism in both historiographies by focusing on the sectors of the capitalist 
labor market traditionally analyzed in histories of work ("loggers, longshoremen, teamsters, 
cowboys, miners, fishermen and cannery workers")99 Thus, rather than expanding the 
definition of work to include those activities that colonial thought excluded from conceptions 
of labor, Knight made the case for the integration of Amerindians into the general Canadian 
history of wage work. And despite the slow response that his cali for histories of Aboriginal 
work received, Knight's focus on "traditional" forms of wage labor set the tone for the 
scholars whose wark has appeared over the past three decades. loo To its credit, lndians at 
Work does suggest that this conception of labor is problematic, something that a series of 
recent studies attempt to address by recasting work in ways that challenge both the 
historiography on wage labor and that on First Nations. Patricia C. Albers, in a reflection on 
the conceptual underpinnings of the historiography on Aboriginal work, questions the 
symbolic separation of "the work that is considered a 'real' expression of Native American 
99 Rolf Knight, lndians at Work: An Informai History of Native lndian Labour ln British Columbia 
1858-1930, Vancouver, New Star Books, [1978] 1996, p. ix and 3. 
100 For a review of the Canadian historiography on Aboriginal wage work, see Steven High, "Native 
Wage Labour and Independent Production during the 'Era of Irrelevance'," Labour/Le Travail, vol. 37 
(Spring 1996), p. 243-64. For studies that insert Amerindians into the historiography on wage labor, 
see Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack (eds.), Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical 
PerspeGlives, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1996, Robert B. Campbell, "Newlands, Old 
Lands: Native American Labor, Agrarian Ideology, and the Progressive-Era State in the Making of the 
Newlands Reclamation Project, 1902-1926," The Pacifie Historical Review, vol. 71, no. 2 (May 2002), 
p. 203-38, Brian Hosmer and Colleen O'Neill (eds.), Native Pathways: American /ndian Culture and 
Economie Development in the Twentieth Century, Boulder, University Press of Colorado, 2004, p. 
133-257, and Andrew Parnaby, "'The best men that ever worked the lumber': Aboriginal 
Longshoremen on Burrard Inlet, BC, 1863-1939," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 87, no. 1 (March 
2006), p. 53-78. 
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experience... from most other forms ofiabor."lol Several scholars, working both in the United 
States and Canada, have accepted this conceptual challenge, publishing empirical studies of 
Amerindian work that complicate the term's meaning, setting forms of traditional economic 
activity alongside employment in the capitalist Labor market. 102 However, as historian Robin 
Jarvis Brownlie argues, these studies have ail too often foregrounded Aboriginal agency at 
the cost of downplaying the coercive power of those who held capital. Indeed, Brownlie 
points to racism's restriction of employment options to remind us that individual choice was 
often an unattainable luxury for Amerindians. 103 
In addition to underlining the conceptual double standard that has often been 
applied to the study of labor, in recent decades the historiography has also begun focusing 
more intently on the structural imbalances that hinder Aboriginal access to economic success 
in more general terms. This historiographical cunent traces its origins to dependency and 
world system theories. Dependency theory emerged from studies written by Latin American 
and African scholars (most of whom were not historians) that analyzed the asymmetrical 
effects of capitalist production by which certain regions and groups benefited at the expense 
of others. I04 World-systems theory, most notably taking shape in the work of Immanuel 
101 Patricia C. Albers, "From Legend to Land to Labor: Changing Perspectives on Native American 
Work," in Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack (eds.), Native Americans and Wage Labor: 
Ethnohistorical Perspectives, Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1996, p. 248. 
102 Gail D. MacLeitch, "'Red' Labor: Iroquois Participation in the Atlantic Economy," Labor: Studies 
in Working-Class History of the Americas, vol. 1, no. 4 (2004), Colleen O'Neill, Working the Navajo 
Way: Labor and Culture in the Twentieth Cenlury, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2005, p. 69­
90, Paige Raibmon, "The Practice of Everyday Colonialism: Indigenous Women at Work in the Hop 
Fields and Tourist Industry of Puget Sound," Labor: Studies in Working-Class History of the 
Americas, vol. 3, no. 3 (2006), p. 23-56, and Lutz, Makûk. Although his study does not explicitly focus 
on the meaning of labor, Frank Tough's exploration of the economic history of First Nations in 
northem Manitoba demonstrates the validity of this literature by analyzing wage work alongside more 
"traditional" forms of Amerindian economic activity. Tough, "As Their Natural Resources Fail." 
103 Robin Jarvis Brownlie, "'Living the Same as White People': Mohawk and Anishnabe Women's 
Labour in Southern Ontario, 1920-1940," Labour/Le Travail, vol. 61 (Spring 2008), p. 43 [41-68]. 
104 On dependeney theory, see James A. Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependeney, and Power in the 
Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," International Organization, vol. 32 (Winter 
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Wallerstein, combined this approach with the historical analyses of Femand Braudel and 
other members of the French Annales school. 105 Scholars working in this tradition conceive 
of "worlds" on various scales, each with a center dominating to sorne extent one or several 
peripheries. Although generally employed to analyze economic activity, this approach has 
also been adapted to the study of political formations. J06 Richard White first applied 
dependency and world-systems theory to the history of Aboriginal market exchange, using 
them to analyze the ways in which colonialism, and the demographic and ecological changes 
it wrought, led to the economic and political subjugation of the Choctaw, Pawnee, and 
Navajo between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries. IO? Other scholars, including Denys 
Delâge and Brian Bosmer, demonstrated the versatility ofworld-systems analysis by adapting 
it to the study of the capitalistic market economy and Aboriginal peoples in widely divergent 
periods and regions. IOS Together, these studies folJow Braudel and Wallerstein in 
emphasizing the power of capital while questioning the lack of agency that world-systems 
and dependency theory accord Amerindians. Bosmer, for example, notes that, "dependency, 
1978), p. 13-43 and Raymond D. Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes toward 
Precision of Concept and Argument," international Organization, vol. 32 (Winter 1978), p. 51-78. 
A1though scholars have largely turned away from dependency theory in recent years, it continues to be 
used in certain contexts, most notably that of development theory. Ramon Grosfoguel, 
"Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America," Nepantla: Views from 
South, vol. 1, no. 2 (2000), p. 347-74. 
105 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the 
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century, New York, Academie Press, 1974, The Modern 
World-System il: Mercantilism and the Consolidation of the European World Economy, 1600-1750, 
New York, Academie Press, 1980, and Fernand Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, économie et 
capitalisme, XV'-XVIlf siècle, vol. 1, Les structures du quotidien, vol. 2, Les jeux de l'échange, and 
vol. 3, Le temps du monde, Paris, Armand Colin, 1979. 
106 For a description of world-systems theory, see Christopher Chase-Dunn and Peter Grimes, "World­
Systems Ana1ysis," Annual Review ofSociology, vol. 21 (1995), p. 387-417. 
10? White, The Roots ofDependency. 
108 Delâge, Le pays renversé and Brian C. Bosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence 
and innovation among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-i920, Lawrence, University Press of 
Kansas, 1999. 
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while ostensibly an effort at considering the 'other side' of the contact equation, often 
amounts to an analysis of white domination of Indians, not of how Indians reacted to 
challenging situations. ,,109 These studies, then, seek to advance the project of ethnohistory by 
arguing that Amerindians were capable of meaningful action in the capitalistic market, 
insisting that culture supplied both the motivation and the means through which agency 
flowed. 
' 
JO However, this approach has generated similar criticism to that directed at Richard 
White's second monograph, The Middle Ground, due to its perceived tendency to minimize 
the effects of unbalanced power relations. 1II 
In addition to employing dependency and world-systems theory, this historiography 
draws upon Karl Polanyi's The Great Transformation, the prototypical study of the transition 
to capitalistic market society. Polanyi asserts that the "great transformation" of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, by which industrializing nations subordinated social to economic 
relations through the adoption of the self-regulating market as society's primary 
organizational agency, remade ail social relations as monetary in nature. 112 Beginning in the 
1970s and continuing weil into the 1990s, historians, drawing on Polanyi as weil as 
Wallerstein and Braudel, fiercely debated the nature and the timing of the rural population's 
109 Hosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace, p. II. 
110 Of course, these studies do not make tbis poinl lo the same extent. Delâge, for example, places 
considerably more emphasis on the unbalanced power relations thal characterized the international 
economy of the seventeenth century tban he does on Aboriginal agency as nolably developed by White 
in The Middle Ground. 
1J 1 See, for example, Alice Littlefield, "Review of Brian C. Hosmer, American Indians in the 
Marketplace. Persistence and Innovation among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-1920, 
Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1999," Journal of Political Ecology: Case Studies in History 
and Society, vol. 7 (2000), http://jpe.library.arizona.edulVolume71V0Iume_7_l.html (13 January 
2011). 
112 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Boston, Beacon Press, [1944] 1957, p. 41-2. 
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"transition to capitalism" in the northeastem United States. 113 The echoes of this debate in the 
Canadian historiography provide a useful means of grounding the interplay of money and 
colonialism among First Nations. Scholars such as Gérard Bouchard and Béatrice Craig 
convincingly demonstrate that abstract notions of motivation drawn from orthodox economic 
theory fail to account for the activity of geographically and economically marginal 
individuals and conununities. 114 Rather than behaving as homo œconomicus, seeking to 
maximize profit without regard for ail non-economic factors, the Euro-Canadian colonists 
studied by Bouchard and Craig combine market savvy with distinctly non-capitalistic motives 
such as social reproduction. IIS Bouchard terms this strategy of using the capitalistic market 
place to encourage non-capitalistic social formations "co-integration," a concept that John 
Lutz adapts in his recent study of Aboriginal history in British Columbia. 116 Through the 
"moditional economy," Lutz explains that in the context of colonialism Amerindians pursued 
neither purely capitalistic nor purcly traditional economic activity. Instead, they continually 
113 For a summary of the American debate, see Michael Merril1, "Putting 'Capitalism' in its Place: A 
Review of Recent Literature," The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, vol. 52, no. 2 (April 
1995), p. 315-26. 
114 lt should be noted, however, that recent economic theory and recent contributions to the transition 
historiography reject the homo œconomieus model. As Lamoreaux notes, "Economic actors never 
make decisions solely on the basis of prices and quantities in the market; their choices are always 
shaped by their preferences and their perceptions of available options, which in turn are largely 
structured by the cultural systems in which they operate." Naomi R. Lamoreaux, "Rethinking the 
Transition to Capitalism in the Early American Northeast," The Journal ofAmeriean History, vol. 90, 
no. 2 (2003), p. 440. 
115 Gérard Bouchard, Quelques arpents d'Amérique: population, économie, famille au Saguenay, J838­
J97J, Montreal, Boréal, 1996 and Béatrice Craig, Baekwoods Consumers and Homespun Capitalists: 
The Rise of a Market Culture in Eastern Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2009. For 
recent studies that consider the effects of the political and economic reorganization of early nineteenth­
century Upper Canadian society caused by the transition to capitalism, see Albert Schrauwers, 
"Revolutions without a RevolutionalY Moment: Joint Stock Democracy & the Transition to Capitalism 
in Upper Canada," Canadian Historieal Review, vol. 89, no. 2 (June 2008), p. 223-55 and "The 
Gentlemanly Order & the Politics of Production in the Transition to Capitalism in the Home District, 
Upper Canada," Labour/Le Travail, vol. 65 (Spring 2010), p. 9-45. 
116 Gérard Bouchard, "Co-intégration et reproduction de la société rurale: pour un modèle saguenayen 
de la marginalité," Recherches sociographiques, vol. 29, no. 2-3 (1988), p. 283-310. 
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modified their traditional economy to meet their cultural needs while simultaneously seeking 
to profit from the capitalistic colonial market.! 17 
This study adopts aspects of each of these dominant approaches to the stlldy of 
Aboriginal economic histOlY. Although staple, dependency, and world systems theOlY have 
ail jllstifiably been targets for criticism, their insistence that the capitalist marketplace is 
favorable to the creation and maintenance of fllndamentally llnbalanced power relations is an 
important reminder of the force that large-scale economic activity can bring to bear. Indeed, 
this assertion is central to the present study's primary postulate: that by its very nature, 
money is a source of social, political, and economic inequality. However, this emphasis on 
the power of dominant capital formations has been appropriately tempered by ethnohistorical 
treatments of the fur trade and wage work that insist on the centrality of Aboriginal agency. 
While capitalist enterprise and preconceived western notions of the meaning of "labor" have 
certainly contributed to First Nations' economic marginalization, Amerindians remained both 
individually and collectively able to affect their own destiny throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As both Bouchard and Lutz remind us, scholars have often failed to 
recognize this agency largely as a result of the divergence between the reasons for market 
participation assumed by orthodox economic theory (which, in overly simplistic terms, is best 
described as the individual profit motive) and those underlying the activity of many 
marginalized groups. While similarly highlighting the cultural underpinnings of economic 
activity, Craig' s work further complicates traditional economic analysis by arguing against 
the existence of a single, unified "market," instead proposing that economic history should be 
written with an eye towards the multiple markets that exist within any economic system. 118 
These economic spaces include the family and the workplace, the local and the global, as 
weil as the formai and the informai, each of which features its own internai power dynamic 
and relates to the others according to a hierarchy of force principally corresponding to scale. 
117 Lutz, Makûk. For a similar analysis of the power of Indigenous cultural prerogatives to dictate 
participation in the capitalistic market, see O'Neill, Working the Navajo Way. 
118 Craig, Backwoods Consumers and Homespun Capitalists, esp. p. 3-22. 
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The conviction that economic activity is best understood in terms of a multiplicity 
of markets underlies this study's analytical approach and provides it with the means of tying 
money-use's economic to its political dimensions. Rather than assuming the single, unitary 
market of orthodox economic theory, the present dissertation traces currency through wage 
work and commercial hunting and trapping funded by European and Euro-Canadian capital 
as weil as through internai economic relations in Mashteuiatsh, Moose FactolY, and 
Wendake. The resulting analysis suggests that markets operating on different scales and 
involving different actors combined with similarly diverse political formations to influence 
the ways in which the Cree, Innu, and Huron wielded money in both political and economic 
contexts. As state-backed cUlTency circulated more freely in both the St. Lawrence Valley 
and the subarctic, sometimes as the result of clear state intervention, sometimes arising from 
more purely economic factors, capitalist enterprise in general, and large fur trade companies 
in pal1icular, slowly lost the implicitly political role they had previously played in many 
Aboriginal communities to the state. In this sense, then, this study argues that state formation, 
the spread of publicly-issued money, and the change in local markets that these first two 
factors contributed to creating led to the symbolic shift of authority over relations with First 
Nations from capital to the state. At the same time, however, it argues that Amerindians 
actively participated in the changing economic and political relations that money-use reveals, 
both encouraging changes to the monetary system and taking advantage of inconsistencies in 
state policy and practice in order to favor their own individual and collective well-being. This 
conviction that different scales of analysis elucidate both economic and political experience 
also explains why this study concentrates on three distinct Aboriginal communities. 
Wendake, Mashteuiatsh, and Moose Factory 
The present dissertation focuses on the history of three First Nations: the Moose 
Factory Cree, the Huron-Wendat of Wendake, and the Innu ofMashteuiatsh (Figure l.l). 
Although several scholars have analyzed aspects of each of these communities' history, the 
historiography pertaining to them remains smal\. With relatively few exceptions, this 
scholarship only tangentially concerns itself with issues of colonialism or unbalanced power 
relations, generally preferring to adopt the new Indian history's agency-centric analytical 
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framework. Furthermore, this historiography tends to treat political and economic 
phenomena, as weil as the history of each community, in isolation, thereby failing to 
foreground both comparison and the effects generated by the interaction of different sectors 
of human activity. Ultimately, this leads to an incomplete image of these Nations' history, 
particularly insofar as relations with Euro-Canadians during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries are concemed. 
.,-~I' 
,/ ) 
­Moose Facfory 
Mashteuialsh
­
Wendake ­
:. 'Fu 
Figure 1.1: Map of Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake (based on: Natural 
Resources Canada, "Aboriginal Peoples circa 1823," in The Atlas of Canada, 
http://atlas.nrcan.gc.ca/site/english/maps/historicallaboriginalpeoples/circa1823, (Il February 
20 Il)) 
The majority of work concerning the Huron actually relates to their inunediate 
ancestors, the Huron of Georgian Bay. Due in large part to the important effects of the wars 
in which the Huron took part and the dramatic nature of the resulting "fall of Huronia," 
scholars have concentrated on the first half of the seventeenth century - that is, the period 
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preceding their arrivaI in the region of Quebec City.119 Early work on the Huron, like that 
conceming other First Nations, adopted an approach that sought to determine the extent to 
which the Huron had "acculturated," while trying to document as many traditional practices 
as possible before they disappeared. 120 These studies generally neglected historical 
perspectives, preferring analyses of the Huron based in cultural anthropology. 
Since the 1990s, however, the body of historical literature on the Huron of 
Wendake has experienced slow but steady growth. Much of this recent work originated in 
legal disputes over Huron ancestral rights including that leading to the Supreme COUIt of 
Canada's 1990 Sioui decision. These disputes have given rise to the publication in the form of 
scholarly articles and books of reports that had initially been presented to the court in 
addition to several lengthy commentaries on Huron history and its ties to the contemporalY 
legal system. I21 While still accounting for an inordinate amount of the historiography, studies 
explicitly framed in legal terms have recently begun making way for analyses of Huron 
social, economic, and cultural histOlY.122 In this sense, the special issue of Recherches 
amérindiennes au Québec, published in 2000, on the Huron ofWendake has been particularly 
instrumental in expanding the horizons of this historiography. Although including one study 
119 For analyses of the Georgian Bay Huron see, Conrad Heidenreich, Huronia: A History and 
Geography of the Huron Indians, 1600-1650, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1971, Trigger, The 
Children of Aataentsic, Delâge, Le pays renversé, and Georges E. Sioui, Les Hurons-Wendat. Une 
civilisation méconnue, Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 1994. 
120 For two key articles published in 1901 and 1902, respectively, see Léon Gérin, "Le Huron de 
Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," in Denis Vaugeois (ed.), Les Hurons de Lorette, Sillery, 
QC, Septentrion, 1996, p. 21-41 and "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il s'est transformé," in Ibid, 
p. 42-60. See also, F.G. Speck, "Notes on the Material Culture of the Huron," American 
Anthropologist, New Series, vol. 13, no. 2 (April-June 1911), p. 208-28. 
121 For a post-trial take on the decision, see Denis Vaugeois, Lafln des alliances franco-indiennes. For 
four of the scholarly reports presented to the court (written by Alain Beaulieu, Denys Delâge, 
Cornelius Jaenen, and Marcel Trudel), see Vaugeois (ed.), Les Hurons de Lorette. 
122 For a work that remains locked in a legal perspective, largely leaving aside those aspects of Huron 
historical experience that do not c1early serve juridical ends, see Michel Lavoie, C'est ma seigneurie 
que je réclame. La lutte des Hurons de Lorette pour la seigneurie de Sillery, 1650-1900, Montreal, 
Boréal, 2010. 
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that, while not juridical in nature, grew from legal disputes (Alain Beaulieu' s study of Huron­
British political relations at the time of the Conquest), the issue also contained Denys 
Delâge's analysis of Huron commercial practice from the eighteenth through the early 
twentieth century, Patrick Brunel1e's study of Huron identity during the twentieth century, 
and the analyses of Huron territorial occupation with reference to hunting and trapping 
conducted by Jocelyn Tehatarongnantase Paul and Jean Tanguay.123 More recently both 
Andrew Nurse and Véronique Rozon have focused on interactions between the Huron and 
Euro-Canadians in terms of identity, providing analyses of both external and internai 
perceptions of what it meant to be Huron during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, while 
tying these perceptions to larger histories of political relations. 124 At the same time, recent 
work by Hugh Shewell and Michel Lavoie has also pointed to the importance of intercultural 
political relations, highlighting Huron activism's long histOly. 125 Together, this literature 
depicts a community that, while highly integrated into the social and economic landscape of 
French Canada, struggled to assert its status as an "authentic" First Nation while also meeting 
with persistent difficulties in its relations with Euro-Canadian legal and political authorities. 
Although Moose FactolY he Id a critical place in the fur trade of present-day 
northern Ontario and Quebec from its founding in 1673 through the mid-twentieth centulY, 
123 Beaulieu, "Les Hurons et la Conquête," Patrick Brunelle, "Les Hurons et l'émancipation: le 
maintien d'une identité distincte à Lorette au début du XXe siècle," ibid, p. 79-88, Denys Delâge, "La 
tradition de commerce chez les Hurons de Lorette-Wendake," ibid, p. 35-51, Jocelyn 
Tehatarongnantase Paul, "Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de Lorette," ibid, p. 5-20, and Jean 
Tanguay, "Les règles d'alliance et ['occupation huronne du territoire," ibid, p. 21-34. 
124 Andrew Nurse, '''But Now Things Have Changes': Marius Barbeau and the Politics of Amerindian 
Identity," Ethnohistory, vol. 48, no. 3 (Summer 2001), p. 433-72, Véronique Rozon, "Un dialogue 
identitaire: les Hurons de Lorette et les autres au XIX" siècle," M.A. Thesis (History), Montreal, 
Université du Québec à Montréal, 2005, and Rozon, "Pour une rét1exion sur l'identité huronne au 
XIXe siècle: une analyse de la thématique du 'dernier des Hurons' sous l'éclairage des théories de 
)'ethnicité," in Alain Beaulieu and Maxime Gohier (eds.), La recherche relative aux Autochtones: 
perspectives historiques et contemporaines, Montreal, Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la question 
territoriale autochtone, 2007, p. 223-61. 
125 Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism..." and Lavoie, C'est ma seigneurie que je 
réclame. 
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the historiography on the post and the Aboriginal peoples that frequented it pales in 
comparison to that which treats eastern James Bay.126 The only book-length study on the 
history of the western James Bay Cree, Muskekowuck Athinuwick by Victor Lytwyn, 
concentrates solely on the period prior to 1821, the date at which the HBC and the North 
West Company merged, effectively establishing a monopoly in the subarctic fur trade. 
Through company records, Lytwyn analyzes the cultural, economic, political, and 
environmental dimensions of Cree society during an era in which they had relatively little 
127
contact with Euro-Canadians. Beginning in this early period Moose Factory formed the 
hub of the HBC's activities in Hudson and James Bay and, as a result of the system of ri vers 
that allowed relatively easy travel to and from the post, also served as the most important 
locale in present-day northeastern Ontario prior to the recreation of the region's 
transportation network as a result of railway expansion in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. 128 John S. Long's research, which focuses on both missionaries and 
Treaty No. 9, represents the historiography's most sustained and nuanced treatment of both 
western James Bay and its Aboriginal inhabitants. This impressive body of work is of 
particular importance to the present dissertation as it examines in detail the interaction of 
extra-regional organizations (such as the Anglican Church and the provincial and federal 
states) and the Cree during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, describing several ways in 
which colonialism as a historical process unfolded in western James Bay while consistently 
underlining Aboriginal agency.129 However, Long's explicitly historical research, primarily 
126 For examples of lengthy studies dealing with the histolY of the Cree of eastern James Bay, see 
Francis and Morantz, Partners in Furs, Morantz, The White Man 's Gonna Getcha, and Carlson, Home 
is the Hunter. 
127 Victor P. Lytwyn, Muskekowuck Athinuwick: Original People of the Great Swampy Land, 
Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 2002. 
128 Kerry M. Abel, Changing Places: History, Community, and Identity in Northeastern Ontario, 
Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2006, p. 4 J-5 and 99. 
129 On the Cree-missionary encounter, see John S. Long, "Archdeacon Thomas Vincent of Moosonee 
and the Handicap of 'Métis' Racial Status," Canadian Journal of Native Studies, vol. 3, no. 1 (1983), 
p. 95-116, 'The Reverend George Bamley, Wesleyan Methodism, and the Fur Trade Company 
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founded in archivaI rather than field studies, forms an exception to the literature on the region 
and its First Nations, dominated by anthropologists and which, in its older fonn, privileges 
ethnographical analysis, emphasizing continuity rather than change. 130 Of course, several 
anthropological studies make use of fieldwork to focus on the effects of interethnic relations 
through time, adding vital perspective to purely archivaI research on Cree economic, social, 
and cultural practices. 131 In the case of the Moose Factory Cree, Regina Flannery's 
fascinating life history of Ellen Smallboy is the best example of this, suppJementing the 
Families of James Bay," Ontario History, vol. 77, no 1 (March 1985), p. 43-64, "John Horden, First 
Bishop of Moosonee: Diplomat and Man of Compromise," Journa/ ofthe Canadian Chureh Historiea/ 
Society, vol. 27, no. 2 (November 1985), p. 86-97, "Shaganash: Early Protestant Missionaries and the 
Adoption of Christianity by the Western James Bay Cree, 1840-1893," Ed.D. Dissertation, Toronto, 
University of Toronto, 1986, "The Reverend George Barnley and the James Bay Cree," Canadian 
Journa/ of Native Studies, vol. 6, no. 2 (1986), p. 313-31, "Budd's Native Contemporaries in James 
Bay: Men of 'Refined Feelings,' Representatives of 'the Whiteman's Civilization' and 'Real Bush 
Indians,'" Journa/ ofthe Canadian Church Historica/ Society, vol. 33, no. 1 (May 1991), p. 79-94. On 
Treaty No. 9, see John S. Long, "Treaty No. 9 and Fur Trade Company Families: Northeastern 
Ontario's Halfbreeds, Indians, Petitioners and Métis," in Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer S.H. Brown 
(eds.), The New Peop/es: Being and Becoming Métis in North America, Winnipeg, University of 
Manitoba Press, 1985, p. 137-62, "How the Commissioners Explained Treaty Number Nine to the 
Ojibway and Cree in 1905," Ontario History, vol. 98, no. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 1-29, and Treaty No. 9: 
Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905, Montreal and Kingston, 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2010. David CaIverley has also published an important study 
relating Treaty No. 9 to the HEC. Calverley, "The Impact of the Hudson's Bay Company on the 
Creation of Treaty Number Nine," Ontario History, vol. 98, no. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 30-5i. 
130 See, for example, John 1. Honigmann, "West Main Cree," in William C. Sturtevant (ed.), Handbook 
of North American lndians, June Helm (ed.), vol. 6: Subarctie, Washington D.C., Smithsonian 
Institution, 1981, p. 217-30. . 
131 John 1. Honigmann, "Incentives to Work in a Canadian Indian Community," Human Organization, 
vol. 8, no. 4 (FaU 1949), p. 23-8, John 1. Honigmann, "Attawapiskat - Blend of Traditions," 
Anthrop%gica, no. 6 (1958), p. 57-67, Richard 1. Preston, "Twentieth-Century Transformations of the 
West Coast Cree," in José Mailhot, et al. (eds.), Actes du dix-septième congrès des a/gonquinistes, 
Ottawa, Carleton University, 1986, p. 239-51, and Peter 1. George and Richard J. Preston, '''Going in 
Between': The Impact of European Technology on the Work Patterns of the West Main Cree of 
Northern Ontario," The Journa/ of Economie His tory, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1987), p. 447-60. For 
another study that, while not preoccupied with history, provides it a significant place in its analysis, see 
Jennifer M. Blythe, Peggy Martin Brizinski, and Sarah Preston, "'1 was Never Idle': Women and Work 
in Moosonee and Moose Factory," Research Program for TechnoJogy Assessment in Subarctic 
Ontario, Report No. 21, Hamilton, Ont., McMaster University, June 1985. 
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historiography's general description of the Cree with an intimate portrait of one woman's 
everyday life. 132 
Anthropological work, particularly that published by Julius Lips during the 1930s 
and 1940s, a1so provides critical perspective on the economic, social, political, and lega1 
practices of the Innu of Mashteuiatsh. J33 The well-known anthropological debate on the fur 
trade's effects on the stmcture of Aigonquian hunting territories, most notably the 
contributions of Frank Speck and Eleanor Leacock, also provides invaluable information on 
the organization of Innu society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 134 While a 
handful of studies analyze the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fur trade in explicitly historical terms, 
their focus is overwhelmingly on the monopoly fur trade that predates the period covered by 
this dissertation. 135 Two recent book-length studies examine aspects of the Innu 's historical 
lJ2 Regina FlannelY, Ellen Smallboy: Glimpses of a Cree Woman's Li/e, Montreal and Kingston, 
McGiIl-Queen's University Press, 1995. 
133 Julius E. Lips, "Public Opinion and Mutual Assistance among the Montagnais-Naskapi," American 
Anthropologist, vol. 39, no. 2 (April-June 1937), p. 222-8, and "Naskapi Law: (Lake St. John and Lake 
Mistassini Bands) Law and Order in a Hunting Society," Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, vol. 37, part 4 (December 1947), p. 379-490. See also Frank Speck's study of Innu ethics and 
J. Allan Burgesse's work on Innu conceptions of property, Frank G. Speck, "Ethical Attributes of the 
Labrador Indians," American Anthropologist, New Series, vol. 35, no. 4 (October-December 1933), p. 
559-94 and Burgesse, "Property Concepts of the Lac-St-Jean Montagnais," Primitive Man, vol. 18, 
nos. 1-2 (1945), p. 1-25. 
134 Frank G. Speck, 'The Family Hunting Band as the Basis of Algonkian Social Organization," 
American Anthropologist, vol. 17, no. 2 (April-June 1915), p. 289-305 and Eleanor Leacock, "The 
Montagnais 'Hunting Territory' and the Fur Trade," American Anthropologist, vol. 56, no. 5, part 2 
(1954), p. 1-59. For more recent perspectives on the debate, see Charles A. Bishop and Toby Morantz 
(eds.), "À qui appartient le castor? Les régimes fonciers algonquins du nord remis en cause / Who 
Owns the Beaver? Northem Algonquian Land Tenure Reconsidered," Anthropologica, New Series, 
vol. 28, no. 1-2 (1986). 
135 1. Allan Burgesse, "The Unwanted Post," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 
1947), p. 401-10, Jean-Paul Simard, "Onze annés de troubles dans les Postes du Roi," Saguenayensia, 
vol. 10, no. 1 (Janumy-February 1968), p. 2-5, Victor Tremblay, Le poste de Métabetchouan, 
Chicoutimi, Éditions science moderne, 1974, Michelle Guitard, Des fourntres pour le Roi au poste de 
Métabetchouan, Lac Saint-Jean, Quebec, Ministère des Affaires culturelles, 1984, Russel Bouchard, 
Le Saguenay des fourrures, 1534-1859: Histoire d'un monopole, Chicoutimi-Nord, Russel Bouchard, 
1989, and Lavoie, Le Domaine du roi. 
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relationship with Euro-Canadians; Jean-Paul Lacasse analyzes the relationship between the 
Innu, Euro-Canadians, and land in eastern Quebec and Labrador while Joëlle Gardette 
examines the "dialogue of cultures" between the Innu and Euro-Canadians since the 
seventeenth century.136 Both of these studies, however, pose certain problems in the context 
of the present disseliation. Although Lacasse firmly anchors his analysis in the material 
realities of the Innu 's ongoing struggle to exert more force in their relations with Euro­
Canadians and, in particular, to gain greater control over their territory, he does so through a 
juridical framework primarily interested in contemporary legal issues related to governance 
and intercultural cooperation. Gardette, for her pmi, engages in discursive analysis that, while 
of critical importance to Amerindian-Euro-Canadian relations (which she generally presents 
as constant through time), leads her to neglect colonialism's physical dimension and the 
material conditions that made Euro-Canadian discourse possible. Moreover, although 
ostensibly dedicated to an analysis of intercultural "dia log," the Innu half of the conversation 
is often absent. Of course, this is largely due to the relative scarcity of sources in which the 
Innu themselves "speak." In this sense, two recently published life histories of band members 
provide critical insight into twentieth-century Mashteuiatsh Innu life. 137 In addition to these 
works, a handful of other books give voice to Innu from both Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and 
elsewhere in eastem Quebec and Labrador, both through the life history of individual Innu 
and through the personal observations of members of several different bands. 138 Alain 
Beaulieu's and Stéphanie Béreau's forthcoming article on Indian Affairs' imposition of the 
band council system in Mashteuiatsh effectively counters the historiography's tendency to 
136 Jean-Paul Lacasse, Les Innus et le territoire: innu tipenitamun, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2004 and 
Joëlle Gardette, Les Innus et les Euro-Canadiens. Dialogue des cultures et rapport à l'Autre à travers 
le temps (XVl1e-XXe siècles), Québec, Presses de l'Université Laval, 2008. 
137 Hany Kurtness et Cami! Girard, La prise en charge: Témoignage d'un Montagnais, Chicoutimi, 
Les éditions JCL, 1997 and Anne-Marie Siméon el Camil Girard, Un monde autour de moi: 
Témoignage d'une Montagnaise, Chicoutimi, Les éditions JCL, 1997. 
138 Conseil des Atikamekw et des Montagnais, Montagnaises de parole: Eukuan Ume Ninan 
Etentamat, Quebec, Conseil des Atikamekw et des Montagnais, 1992 and Serge Bouchard, Récits de 
Mathieu Mestokosho, chasseur innu, 2nd ed., Montreal, Boréal, 2004. 
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formulate analyses of Indian policy either in terms of historical discourse or as a function of 
contemporary legal concems. Indeed, they demonstrate that through band councils the Innu 
and the state interacted in complex ways, leading the Innu to lose power in certain cases but 
also possibly strengthening the community's ability for collective action, thereby providing it 
with an effective means of exerting force vis-à-vis the state. 139 
Methodology 
This study combines "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches to the writing of 
histolY. Rather than focusing uniquely on "on-the-ground" lived experience or the political 
and economic superstmctures that framed such everyday existence, it seeks to delineate the 
connections that brought the two together, in the process manying discursive and material 
analysis. This approach emphasizes the need to understand the ways in which women and 
men actively engaged in shaping their lives in a world over which they had little control. I40 
At the same time, this approach allows multiple views of the same issue that account for the 
divergence of power between the state and transnational capital, on the one hand, and First 
Nations on the other. ln this sense, it attempts to avoid engaging discourse and practice 
naïvely by accepting the need to contextualize both in terms of the power relations 
characterizing Euro-Canadian and Amerindian societies during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. In her study of liberalism in turn-of-the-twentieth-century Quebec, Fernande Roy 
points to the necessity of grounding discourse in practical realities in this way. "L'analyse du 
discours libéral dans un contexte spécifique doit prendre en compte la situation du groupe 
139 Alain Beaulieu and Stéphanie Béreau, '" Voir par eux-mêmes à l'Administration de leurs propres 
affaires': Les Innus de Mashteuiatsh et l'implantation du Conseil de bande, 1881-1952," Revue 
d'histoire de l'Amérique française (forthcoming, persona1 communication). 
140 For a discussion of the twinned top-down and bottom-up approach, focusing on "the intersection 
and disjuncture between the public politics and daily lived realilies of race," see Jennifer M. Spear, 
Race, Sex, and Social Order in Early New Orleans, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009, 
p. 2-3 and 6. 
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émetteur dans la stmcture de pouvoir et donc celle des autres groupes sociaux et idéologies 
avec lesquels il entre en concurrence et avec lesquels il doit aussi composer.,,141 Thus, a 
twinned top-down and bottom-up, discursive and material analysis allows a nuanced 
understanding of the complex and changing relationships through which social power is 
exerted. 
The present dissertation grounds its analysis in a "bottom-llp" sludy of the changing 
material conditions of three Amerindian communities: Mashtelliatsh, Moose Factory, and 
Wendake. These three communities each experienced in historically distinct ways the 
interactions between money and colonialism. The Huron-Wendat, who first migrated to the 
Quebec City region in 1650-1, settled al the site of present-day Wendake in 1697. 142 By the 
beginning of the eighteenth centUlY, the Huron had beglln integrating a portion of their 
economic activity into the colonial market and by mid-cenhlry they maintained a material 
culture closely related to that of their Euro-Canadian neighbors. 143 Social integration 
accompanied its economic counterpart as the residents of Wendake increasingly married 
colonists, leading during the nineteenth century to conflict among the Huron and charges 
from both within and without the community of the failing purity of the Huron "race.,,144 
Despite this process of métissage, the Huron continued to main tain their identity as a distinct 
community throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean led semi­
nomadic lives, spending the majority of the year hunting, trapping, and gathering in the bush 
and a few weeks each summer conducting business at fur trade posts. Following legislation 
141 Roy, Progrès, harmonie, liberté, p. 57. 
142 On the Huron migration from the Great Lakes to Quebec Cily and their experience there through 
the end of the seventeenth century, see Trigger, The Chi/dren ofAataentsic, p. 801-20. 
143 Denys Delâge, "La tradition de commerce chez les Hurons de Lorette-Wendake," Recherches 
amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 30, no. 3 (2000), p. 36-41. 
144 Rozon, "Un dialogue identitaire." 
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passed by the Legislative Assembly of the Province of Canada in 1851, the Innu received two 
reserves on the shore of Lac St. Jean (at the mouths of the Peribonka and Métabetchouan 
Rivers) in 1853. 145 Three years later, however, they traded these reserves for another at 
Mashteuiatsh (Pointe Bleue), where by the following decade, in response to a request made 
by several Innu, the HBC had opened a post. Although the majority of community members 
continued to spend most of their lives in the bush, these changes inspired a graduai shift 
towards a sedentary existence that characterized the community by the mid-twentieth century. 
Moreover, while far less populous than Quebec City, the towns of Roberval and St. Félicien 
rapidly grew up next to Mashteuiatsh from the middle of the nineteenth century, creating 
close economic, social, and cultural ties between many Innu and the neighboring Euro­
Canadian population. The arrivaI of the railroad at Roberval from Quebec City in 1888 
increased this proximity, providing new opportunities for wage work to even those Innu who 
wished to continue spending much of their time in the bush (e.g. guiding tourists). 
The Cree of Moose Factory, on the other hand, experienced no day-to-day contact 
with a substantial Euro-Canadian population until the middle of the twentieth century. From 
1670 to 1870, authorities in Europe and the New World ascribed sovereignty over the region 
that drained into Hudson Bay (Rupert's Land) to the English Crown. Despite Great Britain's 
retention of formai authority, the monopoly trading rights to the region that it accorded the 
Hudson's Bay Company effectively made the chartered corporation the most substantial 
political and economic power in Rupert's Land. Moose Factory, a trading post founded by the 
company in southwestern James Bay in 1673, played an important role in the region as the 
hub of the HBC' s Hudson and James Bay transportation network through the early decades of 
the twentieth century. This encouraged the distinct geopolitical character of Rupert's Land 
and James Bay into the twentieth century. As one company employee observes, at Moose 
Factory during the 1910s "Travellers by canoe or snowshoe taking any of the river routes 
145 Fortin and Frenette, "L'acte de 1851. .. " 
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southward to Southern Ontario or Quebec always said they were 'going to Canada. ",146 
Indeed, this relative isolation lasted until the arrivai at Moosonee (a community situated on 
the mainland directly adjacent to Moose Factory Island) of the Temiskaming and Northem 
Ontario Railroad in 1932. Even after this point, many Cree continued to lead semi-nomadic 
lives, hunting and trapping in the bush during the winter and trading their catch at Moose 
Factory or Moosonee during the summer. In this sense, the bush rather than the trading post 
or any neighboring Euro-Canadian settlement structured Cree life throughout the period 
making Aboriginal experience in western James Bay distinct from that of Wendake and 
Mashteuiatsh. 147 
Thus, whereas the Huron-Wendat of Wendake lived in close proximity to a large 
Euro-Canadian population center (Quebec City) since the mid-seventeenth century, 
colonization of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean only began during the mid-nineteenth century, and 
Moose Factory hosted an extremely limited Euro-Canadian presence through the middle of 
the twentieth century. MOl'eover, during this period, only Wendake remained constantly 
within the limits of the same territorial jurisdiction (Lower Canada and later Quebec). Prior to 
the mid-nineteenth century, the whole of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fell outside of Lower 
Canada's standard system of land tenure, being leased by the crown along with monopoly 
rights to the region's fur trade to the highest bidder and off-limits to settlement. The Cree of 
western James Bay remained officially beyond the reach of federal and provincial authorities 
until 1905, when they signed Treaty No. 9, by which they entered into formai, political 
relations with both Canada and Ontario. Prior to this point, the HBC was the unique Euro­
Canadian political authority with which the Cree dealt, an authority that although no longer 
recognized by the state at the turn of the twentieth century gave it significant political power 
in the region well into the new century. Together, then, Wendake, Moose Factory, and 
Mashteuiatsh represent three distinct temporal and geographical forms of interaction with 
146 J.W. Anderson, Fur Trader's Story, Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1961, p. 18.
 
147 On the bush-centered lives of Cree in eastern James Bay, see Carlson, Home is the Hunter.
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colonialist states, each of which involved different geopolitical actors and differing levels of 
everyday "contact" with colonizers. These differences provide fertile grounds for analyzing 
money's role in the colonial encounter. 
These First Nations form useful case studies in other ways as well. Wendake's 
nineteenth and twentieth-century economy reflected general trends in contemporaneous, 
industrializing Canada. The Moose Factory Cree, on the other hand, practiced a relatively 
static fur trade economy typical of the Amerindian population of subarctic Canada throughout 
the period, with major changes arising only as railway infrastructure and state bureaucracy 
reached the settlement du ring the second quarter of the twentieth century. The Saguenay-Lac 
St. Jean Innu reflect an economic experience situated in between these two extremes, shifting 
from a semi-nomadic fur trade economy to one that emphasized agriculture, wage labor, and 
other more "permanent" means of participating in the capitalistic marketplace. Each of these 
three economic histories, like their political counterparts, then, represents larger trends in 
Aboriginal history. 
Of course, these cases also have limitations. Mashteuiatsh, Wendake, and Moose 
Factory aU remained small throughout the period, having in 1934, for example, populations 
of 776, 478, and 377 respectively. Thus, none of these First Nations compare with larger 
communities that have been the subject of considerably more scholarship, such as the Six 
Nations of Grand River who in 1934 had a population of 4,908. 148 As a result of the relatively 
small size of these three nations, moreover, certain phenomena that were central to Iife 
elsewhere are either absent or only appear on occasion in the historical record, the density of 
which is often directly related to the size of the population that it concerns. This c1early 
affects the present study in that only fragments of certain processes and practices appear in 
the archives, often making their reconstruction somewhat tentative. At the same time, 
focusing on communities located in distinct jurisdictional spaces (the provinces of Quebec 
and Ontario from the early twentieth century and before this within either the domain of the 
148 1ndian Affairs Annual Report, 1934, p. 43,46, and 48. 
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colonial state or the HBC) complicates the analysis somewhat and risks making extremely 
localized phenomena appear universal. In order to avoid this, at least to some extent, the 
present dissertation uses sources (both primary and secondary) that describe conditions 
among neighboring First Nations (such as the Fort Albany Cree and the Atikamekw of the 
Upper Saint Maurice). While this approach is certainly not peTfect, it provides an effective 
means of partially filling gaps in the documentary record while simultaneously guarding 
against unwarranted gcneralizations. 
This is in sorne sense, then, a comparative history since it concentrates on First 
Nations with distinct historical experiences living in regions in which the general process of 
economic and political colonialism unfolded in different although related ways. At the same 
time, it adopts a perspective similar to that taken by recent works in histoire croisée. This 
relatively new approach argues in favoT of the analysis of the entanglements betwcen the 
history of regions and peoples that have generally been treated in isolation. Drawing 
inspiration from postcolonial studies and producing analytical frameworks that resemble 
those of the new imperial history, histoire croisée seeks not to isolate and compare but to 
integrate, replacing the multiple sites of comparative history with a single overarching whole 
in which ideas, people, and business defy the national borders that have tended to encompass 
historical research. Jürgen Kocka argues that elements of comparative history and histoire 
croisée can be fruitfully combined by conceiving of "historical phenomena as units of 
comparison and, at the same time, as components of a larger whole.,,149 Although the present 
dissertation does not systematically employ either of these methodologies, it does draw 
inspiration from them, combining into a single analytical framework both communities that 
are rarely studied together and higher-level institutions (i.e. the state and private 
corporations). 
149 Jürgen Kocka, "Comparison and Beyond," His/ory and Theory, vol. 42, no. 1 (Febmary 2003), p. 
44. For an in-depth treatment of his/aire croisée, see Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmerman, 
"Beyond Comparison: His/aire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," His/ory and Theory, vol. 
45, no. 1 (February 2006), p. 30-50. 
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Thus, while approaching the history of money among First Nations from the 
bottom-up througb detailed studies of Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake, carefully 
comparing the distinct experiences of each throughout, this study also situates these three 
cases within larger analytical structures. The examination of money in the context of both 
capital and the state provides the environment for accomplishing this top-down approach. 
The chapters that follow analyze the development of the imperial, colonial, federal, and 
provincial states and their role in changing monetary conceptions and uses from above. In 
addition to a similar analysis of extra-regional capital (most often the HBC), this approach 
allows the development of a framework that stretches beyond the purely local, tying Cree, 
Huron, and Ionu history into larger patterns of interaction. At the same time, the comparison 
allowed by the study of local contexts and experiences complicates and provides texture to 
the larger story related through the analysis of the policy and actions of the state and capital. 
This dissertation also combines discursive and material analysis. Its primary 
sources of inspiration in this sense are Karl Marx and Michel Foucault. Although these 
thinkers' followers have conflicted more often than not, the emphasis that they convincingly 
place on different aspects of the same historical phenomena points to the complementarity of 
these approaches. The present study, then, follows the attempt of Geoff Eley and Keith Nield 
to reconcile postmodern (including Foucauldian) and Marxian historical analysis. 15o Eley and 
Nield argue that the conflict that has traditionally separated practitioners of these 
methodologies fosters a counterproductive and hostile atmosphere which blinds scholars to 
the usefulness of "opposing" forms of analysis. The academic debates to which this 
difference of opinion gives rise laJ'gely focus on the interplay of text and context and on the 
ability of historians to access real empirical events, with those scholars who subscribe to the 
most radical postmodem or discursive forms of analysis discounting the distinction between 
text and context as weil as the feasibility of empirical research. Ultimately, the proponents of 
pure discursive analysis assert that everything is text or discourse, calling into question nearly 
150 They do sa with respect la the concept of class. Geoff Eley and Keith Nield, The Future 0/ Class in 
History: What's Left o/the Social?, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 2007. 
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ail of the traditional historiography. However, even if one entirely accepts the tenets of the 
"strong textualism" advocated by Foucault and others, it would be difficult to refute the 
centrality to First Nations' history of certain material, contextual elements upon which 
Marxian historical analysis focuses (e.g. Aboriginal susceptibility to pathogens and 
sophisticated European militalY technology).151 On the other hand, discursive analysis' 
insistence that words and ideas shaped "realities" in the past is borne out by the results 
presented in the following chapters. Thus, rather than restricting itself to a pUl'ely 
Foucauldian discursive analysis or to an entirely structural or material Marxian approach, this 
dissertation combines them, proceeding from the conviction that ail historical processes 
contain both discursive and material elements and that neglecting either one or the other 
necessarily leads to a truncated understanding of history. 
Sources 
The present dissertation primarily bases its analysis on archivai collections, two of 
which are of particular importance: the Department of Indian Affairs fonds (RG 10) at Library 
and Archives Canada and the Hudson's Bay Company Archives (HBCA) held by the 
Archives of Manitoba. RGlO contains much of the documentation generated by Indian 
Affairs since its creation by the British imperial state in 1755. The majority of this material 
consists of correspondence between the Department's headquarters staff and its field agents 
and collaborators (e.g. the missionaries who resided on reserves in Lower Canada) as weil as 
Amerindians themselves. This source provides detailed information on moments of crisis 
such as conflicts, both those among band members and those between band members and 
various Euro-Canadians (e.g. Indian Affairs employees, missionaries, neighbors), while 
offering less information on day-to-day life. RGlO also contains, from the late nineteenth 
151 On "strong textualism," the reception of the ideas of Foucault and Derrida among historians, and 
the challenge of writing history that takes into account both postmodernism and more traditional 
historica1 methods, see Sau1 Cornell, "Sp1itling the Difference: TexlllaJism, Contextualism, and Post­
Modern History," American Studies, vol. 36, no. 1 (Spring 1995), p. 57-80. 
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century, several files specifically pertaining to the Wendake, Mashteuiatsh, and Moose 
Factory bands which include information on the implementation of departmental programs 
and the form and content of band council elections and meetings. Many of these files contain 
important information on on-reserve politics and the interaction of money, the state, and local 
actors. During the twentieth century, the Department engaged in a series of economic 
initiatives (e.g. fur preserves) and administrative collaborations with other state agencies (e.g. 
the Department of Pensions and National Health) that generated copious documentation also 
contained in RG 1O. In more precise terms, prior to RG 1O's 1872 reorganization into the Red 
and Black Series (conceming eastem and westem Canada respectively, both including files 
that relate to specifie reserve corrununities), the Department of Indian Affairs fonds was 
organized chronologieally, with documents pertaining to diverse regions intermingled. As a 
result, pre-Red Series RG 10 was eonsulted in order to locate records from this period relating 
to either the Huron or the Innu. '52 In addition, this study's documentary corpus includes 
copies of sorne documents from RG 10 which are held at the Archives de la Nation huronne­
wendat (ACNHW). A wide array of Red Series files pertaining to Wendake, Mashteuiatsh, or 
Moose Factory between the 1870s and the middle of the twentieth century were consulted in 
order to determine their content, with those having the most to do with monetary issues 
receiving in-depth treatment. Because money, poli tics, and the economy interacted in distinct 
ways in Moose Factory, Mashteuiatsh, and Wendake, often growing from a combination of 
local factors and the prerogatives of Indian Affairs' headquarters staff, the cases that this 
dissertation analyzes were frequently unique to one of the three contexts. As a result, this 
study ties these cases together through the light they cast on the political content of money­
use in the context of colonialism, despite the diverse array of specifie historical subjects that 
they imply (from Indian presents, through credit relations, to beaver preserves). 
This study employs published documents in addition ta these archivai sources. The 
largest single collection of these is the lndian AfJairs Annual Reports, published in 1864 and 
152 It should be noted that RG 10 contains no information on the Moose Factory Cree prior to the turn 
of the twentieth century. 
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yearly from 1868. However, this source is particularly problematic in that sorne of the 
numerical data it reports (that pertaining to on-reserve economic activity) often appears to 
have been entirely fabricated and because sections of it repeat the same information from 
year to year (frequently verbatim).153 Despite such deficiencies, the reports of lndian agents 
and other administrators paint a qualitatively rich portrait of First Nations' daily life across 
Canada. Moreover, the Annual Reports provide detailed quantitative data in the form of 
official govemmental accounts, critical to this study's analysis of several departmental 
programs. The Annual Reports also appear to provide faithful population figures into the 
1930s,154 while furnishing reliable figures on the amount of relief the Department distributed 
either from monies it held in tmst for bands or from its own funds. Analyzed together, these 
data permit a rough estimate of the amount of pel' capita on-reserve assistance furnished 
bands during both good and bad economic times. 
The lengthy reports of several state-conducted commissions of inquiry into Indian 
Affairs during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also furnish a great deal of information 
on the stmcture of the Department, the legal context within which it performed its duties, and 
the effects of policy on First Nations. Although Amerindian "voices" only appear 
occasionally in the pages of these reports, the words of administrators, polit icians, and other 
Euro-Canadian commentators provide valuabJe insight into colonial opinions of First 
Nations, often directly related to monetary issues. This dissertation also analyzes the text of 
laws that framed the state's relationship with Aboriginal peoples in order to better understand 
the extent to which Parliament participated in the extension of forms of monetary control. 
153 Despile the clear invention involved in providing numerical data on Aboriginal income, John Lutz 
argues that the Annual Reports provide important esLimates for determining the relative importance of 
different forms of income. Lutz, Makitk, p. 316-7. However, given that these estimates never provide 
information on the fonn of payment, they are not analyzed to any significant extent in the following 
chapters. 
154 However, certain cases form exceptions to this rule. See, for example, the discussion of Moose 
Factory's population and the signature of Treaty No. 9 in Chapter Six. 
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Among official published documents, treaties and land surrenders also provide a great deal of 
information on the power relations formed by state action in First Nations communities. 
The second major archivaI source on which this study draws is the HBCA. 
Although the company did not regularly trade with the Huron during the nineteenth and 
twentieth cenhlries, its policies and practices deeply affected the economic wellbeing of the 
Cree and Innu. Indeed, du ring much if not all of the period prior to 1950, the HBC constituted 
the primary trading partner of those residents of Mashteuiatsh and Moose Factory who 
engaged in the fur trade. The HBCA are divided into several sections; this dissertation 
concentrates its analysis on two of these: the records of the Governor and Committee (the 
company's official, London-based management) and those of the company's posts. The first 
of these sections is of palticular use because of the annual reports and accounts that the 
Winnipeg-based fur trade department sent to the Governor and Committee. These documents 
contain detailed numerical data on the amount of currency in use at the HBC's posts in 
addition to analyses of the company's activities in its differcnt districts, frequently including 
information on trade al particular posts and the opinions of company inspectors as to the best 
course of action for improving business (which, as will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapters, often included a monetary dimension). The post records provide far more 
detail on the company's day-to-day operations and on the Aboriginal peoples with whom it 
did business. These records are divided into several series, the following of which are 
analyzed below: post journals, correspondence books (sent), correspondence inward 
(received), account books, and reports on district. Each of these series provide different types 
of information: reports on district offer the most synthetic account of life and business at the 
post, journals and accounts furnish the greatest detail on First Nations, and correspondence 
generally concerns company policy and stlUcture. The present dissertation analyzes the 
archives left by several posts, both those that directly concern members of the Mashteuiatsh 
or Moose Factory First Nations (Chicoutimi, Lake St. John (Métabetchouan), Moose Factory, 
and Pointe Bleue (Mashteuiatsh)) as well as those that provide contexhlalization (Abitibi, 
Albany, and Mistassini). Together, these archivai series provide material for analyzing both 
the HBC's on-the-ground practice and its general policy with respect to Aboriginal money­
use and the fur trade overall. Moreover, given the extreme paucity of sources dealing with 
other fur traders, the HBCA provide one of the only means of accessing information on the 
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company's many competitors. Although rarely addressing the First Nations at the heart of the 
present study, several published first-hand accounts of the fur trade, generally written by 
former HBC employees, serve to add the depth of personal experience to the often dry, 
formai accounts held in official company archives. 
Although ail of these series were consulted m preparing the present study, the 
treatmcnt they received was not uniform largely due to their nature and content. For example, 
while the post journals held in the HBCA contain detailed information on daily life at the 
company's posts, much of this information has littie directly to do with money-use. Thus, 
post journals were treated after denser sources (e.g. correspondence, annual reports, and 
reports on district). The analysis that follows also only makes sparing use of the HBCs 
account books. This is primarily due to this source's density. Indeed, the accounts of a single 
trapper during any given year often occupy several pages. Although company employees kept 
these accounts in a given abstract currency depending on the period, it is often (although not 
always) impossible to determine from the accounts alone whether transactions included cash 
or not. As a result, rather than exhaustively analyzing the information contained in this 
source, the present dissertation concentrates on account books that describe periods of 
transition from one monetary system to another and on those entries that explicitly mention 
the presence of cash. Since this study is not an attempt to perform an exhaustive examination 
of Aboriginal consumption patterns or the fur trade's debt system (both of which several 
scholars have already masterfully done), a more in-depth analysis of this source was not 
considered necessary. 
The other major archivai sources on which this dissertation is based are preserved at 
the Archives du Conseil de la Nation huronne-wendat in Wendake and Bibliothèque et 
archives nationales du Québec (BANQ). Together, these two institutions hold the small, 
publicly accessible portion of a much larger collection of documents which constitute the 
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Picard Family fonds. 155 During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Picards were one 
of the wealthiest, best educated, and most politically influential families in Wendake. Family 
members held the post of Grand Chief and Indian agent while also working in a number of 
professions, primarily in the region of Quebec City, and employing other Huron in on-reserve 
manufacturing jobs. The Picards describe in detail much of this activity in their journals and 
conespondence, while their personal papers (including accounts, receipts, and contracts) 
provide a great deal of information on their business dealings and the credit and cash-based 
relations tying them to other Huron and to their Euro-Canadian neighbors. The portion of this 
collection held at the ACNHW contains three important records of daily life during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries: two joumals maintained by François Xavier "Paul" Picard 
Tahourenché and that of his grandson, Pierre Albert Picard. The first of these, kept by 
François Xavier Picard between 1837 and 1875, records his vision of important events in the 
wider world, while particularly focusing on his economic activities and political events 
involving community members. In addition, from 1840 to 1854, Picard maintained in a 
separate document (also referred to as his "journal") the Huron chiefs' accounts arising from 
their local management of resource-use on their Quarante Arpents reserve. These documents, 
then, provide a wealth of information on the economic and political life of mid-nineteenth­
century Wendake. Pierre Albert Picard's journal, which he kept between 1916 and 1920, is 
the product ofhis decision to record his daily activities and observations on Huron and Euro­
Canadian behavior following his election to the position Grand Chief at Wendake. 156 It 
appears clear that Picard felt it his duty to record his time in office for posterity. This 
document contains valuable information on the political issues within the community with 
which Picard concemed himself, his notions (and by extension those of the educated Huron 
155 Despite clear testamentary instructions to deliver the totality of this collection to the Huron of 
Wendake, many of the documents were soJd to private collectors thus preventing access to the largest 
source of Huron archival heritage. On this fonds and its history, see Jonathan Lainey, "Le fonds 
Famille Picard: un patrimoine documentaire d'exception," Revue de Bibliothèque et Archives 
nationales du Québec, no. 2 (2010), p. 94-105. 
156 This explains why Picard's journal ends in February 1920 when he lost his re-election bid to Ovide 
Sioui. 
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elite) of which events and changes in broader Canadian and international society were of 
importance, and his opinions of proper conduct, relating both to monetary and non-monetary 
affairs. The ACNHW also hold important documents relating to the political history of the 
reserve, most notably the "Huron council book" (Livre de conseils tenus au village des 
Hurons) kept by Maurice Bastien and providing the greatest detail on band council meetings 
at Wendake between 1919 and 1949. The Marguerite Vincent fonds also contains a number 
of documents providing valuable insight into on-rcserve economic relations and the political 
activities of certain Huron, particularly with respect to the federal government. 
Conclusion 
This study, through a detailed analysis of archivaI and published documents, seeks 
to analyze the political content of First Nations money-use in the context of nineteenth and 
twentieth-centUlyCanadian colonialism. It does so through a twinned top-down and bottom­
up, material and discursive analysis of archivai and published documents relating to Indian 
Affairs and the HBC as well as those concerning the Huron of Wendake, the Moose Factory 
Cree, and the Innu of Mashteuiatsh. Through this approach, it tests the hypothesis that money 
- an idea and an object that contributed (and continues to contribute) to the creation and 
maintenance of social, economic, and political inequality throughout the world - occupied a 
central role in the process through which the Canadian state grew and exerted increasing 
control over its growing territOlY and the Aboriginal population within its national borders. 
Ultimately, however, this study concludes that the history of Amerindian money-use in 
Quebec and Ontario calls for a more nuanced image of change than that for which this type of 
strong interpretation al1ows. Indeed, through its adoption of an analytical framework that 
emphasizes Aboriginal agency while simultaneously highlighting the power of state and 
capital, this dissertation argues that money provided a political and economic means of both 
circumscribing and empowering, often unintentionally, First Nations. This nuanced 
interpretation cal1s into question many of the historiography's most categorical assertions 
conceming the relationship between Amerindians, the state, and capital in Canada during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Before tuming to its historical analysis, this study will 
tirst consider the conceptual duo that forms its core (money and colonialism) and then 
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provide an analysis of money's nineteenth-century ideological and material content. In 
tandem with the preceding historiographical and methodological review, this approach 
provides critical context for the chapters that follow. 
Chapter 2
 
Money, European Expansion, and Conjectural History in the New
 
World
 
"Thus in the beginning al! the World was America, and more so 
than it is now; for no such thing as Money was any where known." 
John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment, 1690, section 49, p. 301 
John Locke, like many of his contemporaries and fol!owers, viewed the New 
World's Indigenous inhabitants as the living, breathing ancestors of contemporaneous 
Europeans. Locke, along with many ather early modern and modern thinkers, constructed a 
human history at the apex of which sat Europe. According to this "conjectural history," 
Amerindians provided access to the prehistory of numerous Westem institutions and 
practlces. 1 In this way, Western thinkers portrayed Aboriginal peoples as explicitly less 
developed than their European counterparts, thereby justifying the colonial project, which 
claimed to carry the light of civilization into the darkest recesses of the globe. Rather than 
constituting a moral argument in favar of imperial expansion, money provided an example of 
Europe's self-evident superiority. Maney, then, was not equivalent to religion: Europeans did 
not feel that its absence required any active intervention. Instead, they believed that the 
obvious superiority of precious-metal based currency of European origin wou Id lead it, once 
colonial economies had overcome the infrastructural and technical difficlilties of ensuring 
that qllality coin and paper circlilated in even their farthest-flung corners, to inevitably 
become the world's only monetalY system. 
1 On "conjectural history," the practice by which participants in the Scottish Enlightenment sought to 
speculatively reconstruct the past from the observation of societies in the present, see Mary Poovey, A 
History of the Modern Fact: Problems of Knowledge in Sciences of Wealth and Society, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1998, esp. Chapter Five, "From Conjectural History to Political 
Economy," p. 214-63. 
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This chapter addresses Locke's assertion through a consideration of the idea/object 
at the center of this study (money) and the environment in which it was used (colonialism), 
defining these heuristic and operational concepts in order to render them applicable 
throughout the whole of the present study. It then ties these two conceptual strands together 
through a reading of early modern and modern economic theory in respect to Indigenous 
peoples and money, thereby illustrating the theoretical baggage that Western institutions and 
individuals carried with them to British North America as weil as modern economics' 
colonial and evolutionary heritage. Although economic thought was far removed from the 
everyday preoccupations of the majority of North Americans during the nineteenth and 
twentieth cenhlries, the ways in which it participated in stmcturing colonialism and the 
social, economic, and political norms that arose from this historical process have proven to be 
anything but distant. The chapter ends with a cursory examination of Canadian monetary 
history prior to the mid-twentieth century. Taken as a who le, this chapter serves both to 
ground the analysis that follows and to provide the intellectual context within which the 
historical actors who appear therein lived and workcd. 
ColoniaIism 
Colonialism has profoundly shaped the contemporary world. The process by which 
merchants, missionaries, settlers, and soldiers carried European ideas, norms, and practices to 
every corner of the globe has provided our world with an incalculable social, economic, 
political, and cultural heritage. While the historical and anthropological literature frequently 
invokes this process, only a relatively small number of works, even among those explicitly 
dedicated to its shldy, attempt to define colonialism in any meaningful way2 This neglect 
decreases the term's clarity, intellectual purchase, and critical content. In order to take full 
2 For a similar observation with respect lo imperialism (aJong with a detailed discussion of the 
development of the constellation of concepts surrounding it), see Patrick Wolfe, "History and 
Imperialism: A Century of Theory, from Marx lo Postcolonialism," Ameriean His/orieal Review, vol. 
102, no. 2 (April 1997), p. 388-420. 
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advantage of colonialism's analytical potential, this section draws on several theoretical and 
historiographical visions of the concept in order to clearly define the term for use throughout 
the present dissertation. 
The term "colonialism" forms one part of a larger conceptual unit that includes 
"colony," "colonist," "colonial," "colonization," "empire," and "imperialism." Each of these 
concepts emphasizes colonial/imperial regimes' practice of connecting distant regions and 
peoples. However, colonialism, along with imperialism, makes explicit the conflict, violence, 
usurpation, and unequal power relations that these other terms only evoke elliptically 3 
Moreover, because it places emphasis on the contested control of land and resources, 
colonialism underscores the political nature of European, and later Euro-American, 
expansion. In other words, colonialism extrapolates from the local character of individual or 
collective action implied by its cognates in order to contextualize "on-the-ground" decisions 
in relation to distantly defined policy goals and socio-cultural prerogatives, ail the while 
foregrounding the unequal power relations at the core of the historical phenomenol1. 4 
In addition, colonialism explicitly highlights the a posteriori and nOimative nature 
of the "colonial project." On the one hand, the concept offers present-day scholars and 
students a mental structure within which to understand the historical processes by which 
J Although the Iiterature on colonial and imperial studies sometimes distinguishes between 
"imperialism" and "colonialism," this distinction is often purely semantic. ln general, the two concepts 
are differentiated based on the presence (colonialism) or absence (imperialism) of settlers originating 
in the imperial heartland, with the concept of imperialism sometimes extended to regions in which a 
given power is informally active (generally through capitalist enterprise). For an influential study that 
differentiates between imperialism and coloniaJism in this way, see Edward W. Said, Culture and 
lmperialism, New York, Vintage Books, 1993. However, given that both terms describe an extremely 
similar historical process featuring unequal power relations resulting from the imposition of external 
force, the present study makes no effort to differentiate between colonialism and imperialism. 
However, in the interest of clarity, colonialism rather than imperialism provides the preferred term 
throughout this dissertation. 
4 For a discussion of colonialism aJong these lines in the context of Native American history, see 
Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and u.s. Colonialism: From Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee, New 
York, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 1-9. 
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"normal" social, political, economlC, and cultural relations were transposed both across 
oceans and back through time. In this way, from both a contemporary and contemporaneous 
perspective, European action is rendered coherent (it formed part of a project) and natural 
(this is how the world is ordered). However, while European individuals and institutions 
certainly did not go about their business in the complete absence of any planning, the 
expectations that they carried to the New World - expectations rooted, for example, in 
European notions of gender and class - in no way represent more "natural" assumptions than 
those of their Amerindian counterparts. As such, the concept of colonialism underscores the 
inherently ethnocentric categories through which Europeans ordered their expcrience in the 
rest of the world and the ways in which those categories have come to structure both popular 
and academic understanding of the "colonial encounter."s 
The theoretical vision of colanialism employed in this dissertation owes its greatcst 
debt ta Michel Foucault's analysis of power relations developed in the first volume of the 
History of Sexuality.G Put in the simplest terms, it defines colonialism as the continually 
changing field of power relations within which colonizers (Europeans and their descendents) 
and colonized (Indigenous peoples)7 interacted during the period frequently referred to as 
"post-contact." To a certain extent, this definition casts colonial relations as elastic, 
permitting the historian to conceive of ail actors in any given situation as disposing of power, 
For discussions of the ways in which such "natural" categories challenge present-day historical 
scholarship, see Toby Morantz, "Plunder or Hmlliony? On Merging European and Native Views of 
Early Contact," in Germaine Warkentin and Carolyn Podruchny (eds.), Decentring the Renaissance: 
Canada and Europe in Multidisciplinary Perspective, 1500-1700, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 200 l, p. 48-67 and Sylvie Vincent, "Compatibilité apparente, incompatibilité réelle des versions 
autochtones et occidentales de l'histoire. L'exemple innu", Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 
32, no 2, 2002, p. 99-106. 
6 Michel Foucault, History of Sexuality, trans. by Robert Hurley, New York, Vintage Books, [1976] 
1990. 
7 Of course, it is necessary ta recall that "neither 'the colanizer' nor 'the colonized' represented an 
undifferentiated sociological or political reality, save in exceptional circumstances." Johri L. Comaroff 
and Jean Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. 2, The Dialectics of Modernity of a South 
African Frontier, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1997, p. 24. 
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sornetirnes III unexpected ways. Thus, in the abstract, it is equally conceivable that First 
Nations or Euro-Canadians rnigbt dominate a given situation (or that there may exist astate 
of equilibrium, preventing either of the groups from exerting control). Of course; this 
theoretical potential was rarely realized with such equity in the real world. Thus, it is 
important to recognize that while according to this model each actor wields some amount of 
power, and is therefore never entirely helpless, this power is not necessarily distributed 
equally.8 Furthermore, following this definition, the process of colonialism is ongoing. 9 
Although sorne prefer to use the related concepts of internai colony or the fourth world when 
describing First Nations, 1 feel that colonialism places the process in a more richly detailed 
historical and historiographical context as it more explicitly connects it to similar processes 
which played out elsewhere in the world and during different periods. 1o 
ln recent anthropological, literary, and historical scholarship (the interdisciplinary 
field generally referred to as post-colonial studies), the History of Sexuality is most often 
understood in telms of the discursive constitution of regimes of power - that is, in terms of 
power as embodied by language - as proposed by Foucault himself. This interpretation, the 
8 ln addition to Foucault, this definition of colonialism draws inspiration from Jean and John 
Comaroffs work on the history of missions in South Africa. They describe colonization, and therefore 
colonialism, "as a process of 'challenge and riposte' often mllch too complex to be captured in simple 
equations of dominance and resistance." In order to cope with this chaJienge, without losing 
themselves in a postmodernist sea of unmeaning, the Comaroffs temper the Foucauldian conception of 
free-ftoating and diffuse power with the Gramscian notion of hegemony, which stresses meaning that, 
from the actors' point of view, is apparently fixed, natural, or beyond human agency. Jean Comaroff 
and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and Revolution, vol. l, Christianity, Co Ion ialism, and 
Consciousness in South Africa, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 5 and 13-27. See also, 
Comaroff and Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, vol. 2, p. 14-29. 
9 Edward Said, who prefers the term imperialism to colonialism, makes a similar point. Said, Culture 
and Imperialism, p. 9. 
10 On internai colonialism, see Michael Hechter, Internai Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British 
National Development, 1536-1966, Berkeley, University ofCalifornia Press, 1975. On the concept of 
the fourth world, see George Manuel and Michael Posluns, The Fourth World: An Indian Reality, Don 
Mills, Ont., Collier-Macmillan Canada, 1974 and Anthony 1. Hall, The American Empire and the 
Fourth World: The Bowl with One Spoon, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-QlIeen's University Press, 
2003. 
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so-called linguistic tum, draws on linguistic and post-structuralist theory in order to privilege 
words and ideas over the material factors favored by generations of "positivist" scholars 
when chalting power relations such as those found, for example, at the heart of colonialism or 
capitalism. While discourse and perception have undeniably shaped historical experience, 
evacuating the material world in this way seems naïve at best. 
" 
In addition to having to cope 
with foreign languages and concepts, Aboriginal peoples in colonial settings also found 
themselves confronted by altered material realities. The present study centers on several such 
"real-world" changes. Colonial states, with the means at their disposai of shaping and 
controlling the land itself, provided one form of radical change; colonial economies, wielding 
similar, if less formai, powers, formed another. Fortunately, Foucault's, or, perhaps more 
fittingly, the Foucauldian, predilection for considering power in discursive terms in no way 
precludes applying his insight to such material phenomena. 12 
Il For a scathing critique of the linguistic turn and its effects on the political potential of history, see 
Bryan D. Palmer, Descent intu Discourse: The Reification of Language and the Writing of Social 
History, Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1990. Similar criticism is also found in the post­
colonial studies literature, although, as result of the field's debt to discW'sive analysis, this criticism 
tends to be far less severe. For example, Frederick Cooper asserts the necessity of contextualizing 
colonialism instead of simply "plucking stories" that prove a point from any colonial situation. 
"Colonial power, like any other, was an object of struggle and depended on the material, social, and 
cultural resources of those involved. Colonizer and coJonized are themselves far from immutable 
constructs, and such categories had to be reproduced by specific actions." Frederick Cooper, 
Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, Berkeley, University of California Press, 2005, 
p. 17. Explicitly Foucauldian discursive analyses have only recently beglm to appear in the 
Amerindian historiography. For an example of a discursive, narrative-centric analysis of Amerindian 
history, see Hans M. Carlson, Home is the Hunter: The James Bay Cree and their Land, Vancouver, 
UBC Press, 2008, p. 23. He writes: "European economic activity could go on for centuries within a 
largely Native narrative space; the missionary narrative could be controlled and made useful within the 
material reality of the hunt; an outside narrative of ownership, control, and sovereignty could exist 
apart from James Bay even as the hunt and its narrative continued because the lands of James Bay 
were deemed not useful. Only when these narrative lines converged was the effect revolutionary." 
12 As Patrick Wolfe astutely points out, "the fact that Michel Foucault appropriated the term 
•discourse' from linguistics should not lead us to forget that, in his hands, the concept encompassed 
institutional configurations as solid as the prison or the asylum. (As practices go, few can be more 
material than architecture.) Despite this, postcolonial writing has too often excluded historical, 
economic, and material factors." Wolfe, "His tory and Imperialism," p. 405-6. For a discussion of 
attempts by colonial scholars to push beyond Foucault's emphasis on discourse and FOllcault's 
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As discussed in the last chapter, this dissertation seeks to temper the 
historiography's emphasis on Aboriginal agency in economic and political relations with 
Euro-Canadians by foregrounding the concept of colonialism. Of course, this relatively neat, 
theoretical vision would be useless if not applicable to the concrete historical processes under 
consideration. 13 In order to be analytical1y effective, any given concept must possess some 
empirical basis. The sources consulted in the course of the research undeltaken in connection 
with this study portray over-bearing state agencies and employees alongside active 
Amerindians. These institutions and individuals, in addition to merchants, missionaries, 
settlers, and others, acted according to their own aspirations and desires. However, they did 
so within a social, political, economic, and cultural field which was structured and 
restructured by powerful processes and relations that at least colored, and sometimes 
overrode, personal and institutional prerogatives. Colonial ism, understood in these terms, 
al10ws us to simultaneously grasp individual agency and social momentum, with reference to 
both the colonizing and the colonized population. 
One final remark should be made about what archaeologists refer to as 
"acculturation models." The present study could lend itself to the implicit interpretation that 
one discrete cultural group, Aboriginal peoples, received from another distinct and bounded 
group, Europeans and their descendents living in North America, the practice of money-use 
as part of a process of col1ective rnovernent between cu Itural poles. In other words, one might 
conceivably conclude that Euro-Canadians "donated" money to Amerindians, thus causing 
this second group to lose in sorne sense an aspect of its predefined culture, in the process 
becorning more like the colonizing population. However, such an essentialist interpretation is 
entirely unfounded in that it refers to a mythical "pure" culture, that existed prior to contact, 
applicability to colonial situations in general, see Laura Ann Stoler, Race and the Education ofDesire: 
Foucault 's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things, Durham, NC, Duke University 
Press, 1995, p. 1-18. 
13 On several of the ahistorical approaches employed in post-colonial studies to historieal processes, 
see Cooper, Colonialism in Question, p. 17-22. 
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not only with Europeans, but with aIl other cultures, including those of neighboring 
Indigenous peoples. Refashioning archaeologist Stephen W. Silliman's questions as 
assertions, this study conceives of "change and continuity ... as the sorne process." In other 
words, the present dissertation argues that while money-use is one aspect of everyday life that 
underwent observable change as a result of colonialism, this change in no way spelled the 
demise of any portion of Huron-Wendat, Innu, or Cree culture. Rather, such change, perhaps 
as much as relative stasis in other practices, offered Aboriginal peoples "a way to remain 
Native in very changed and very conflicted circumstances.,,14 Furthermore, money, although 
European in origin, should not itself be thought of as somehow "European." Like any other 
object, its users ascribe to it meanings that are not inherent to money itself. 15 
Money 
Although money is among the contemporary world 's most mundane objects, its 
meaning and definition, after proving remarkably static prior to the tum of the twentieth 
century, have provided grounds for strident debate among scholars ever since. Present-day 
eeonomic theory ascribes to money three (or sometimes four) functions: a store of value, an 
abstract measure of value, and a means of exchange (which is sometimes distinguished from 
its function as a means of payment or settlement of debt). However, this list of essential 
functions constitutes the only consensus in an otherwise extremely contentious field of 
scholarly inquiry. The present study follows most closely the recent work of Geoffrey 
Ingham in order to present a conceptual vision of money as being first and foremost a social 
relationship based in both its ability to measure value and its function as transferable debt. 
14 Stephen W. Silliman, "Contact or Colonialism? Challenges in the Archaeology of Native North 
America," American Antiquity, vol. 70, no. 1 (January 2005), p. 66. 
15 For a study of meanings given to material objects in a colonial context, see Nicholas Thomas, 
Entangled Objects: Exchange, Material Culture, and Colonialism in the Pacifie, Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, 1991. 
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Such a definition directly contradicts the dominant monetary theOl-Y of orthodox (or 
mainstream) economics as pioneered by nearly every nineteenth-century economist of note. 
Classical political economy, via the commodity theory of money, employs "money" as 
convenient shorthand for "commodity accepted as a generalized medium of exchange." In 
this way, orthodox economics stresses money's exchange function, which is based, at least in 
the sophisticated economies of early modem and modern Europe, on money's function as a 
store of value, itself arising from money's precious metal content. Orthodox economic theory 
continued to support this view even as fiduciary money (promises to pay specified amounts 
of gold or silver bullion) replaced precious-metal coins as the backbone of the international 
monetary system during the nineteenth century.16 Moreover, this vision of money's nature 
Iying in its relationship to precious metals remained uncontested in the popular imagination 
through the functional end of the international gold standard during the Great Depression and 
the implementation of the Bretton Woods system at the tail end of World War II.'7 
Despite the absence of any direct relationship between metals and money, present­
day economic theory remains informed to a significant extent by classical political 
economy's emphasis on gold and silver. This debt is most obvious in main stream economics' 
insistence that money forms a "neutral veil" through which commodities can express their 
16 For an extended discussion of the commodity theory of money, see Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of 
Money, Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2004, p. 15-37. For an example of a foundational text in orthodox 
economic theory that promo tes the commodity theory, see Jean-Baptiste Say, Traité d'économie 
politique, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, [1803] 1972, p. 240-312. 
17 It is, of course, important to note that while Say and his immediate predecessors and contemporaries 
(most notably Adam Smith and David Ricardo) wrote during a period in which precious metals 
provided the theoretical basis for money's value, the global gold standard would not come into 
existence until the 1870s, when nearly every European nation as weil as the post-Civil War United 
States adopted the system. Of course, the international gold standard, like its national and regional 
predecessors (the gold, silver, and bi-metallic standards of the mid-nineteenth centllry), did not 
guarantee that circulating monetary media would possess any precious metal content whatsoever. 
Rather, these systems guaranteed payment of gold or silver in exchange for government-backed notes 
and coins. Barry 1. Eichengreen and Marc Flandreau, "Editor's Introduction," in Barry J. Eichengreen 
and Marc Flandreau (eds.), The Gold Standard in Theory and History, 2nd ed., New York, Routledge, 
1997, p. 1-30. 
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value. According to this model, money acts merely as a means of rendering barter more 
efficient and in no way influences exchange or the economic system as a whole beyond its 
simple existence as the universally sought conunodity. Among classical economists, John 
Stuart Mill provides what is perhaps the most striking example of this thesis, insisting that 
money only makes itself felt when malfunctioning. "There cannot, in short, be intrinsically a 
more insignificant thing, in the economy of society, than money; except in the character of a 
contrivance for sparing time and labour. It is a machine for doing quickly and commodiously, 
what wou Id be done, though less quickly and commodiously, without it: and like many other 
kinds of machinery, it only exerts a distinct and independent influence of its own when it gets 
out of order.,,18 By the \ate twentieth century Mi\l's assertion had become a truism for the 
majority of economists who perpetuated it by according no analytical l'ole to money in many 
of their most sophisticated mathematical models. 19 At the same time, and in spite of the 
obvious contradiction, many of the same economists argued with increasing fervor that 
central banks needed to enforce a strict equilibrium between monetary supply and demand in 
order to prevent the possibility of serious short-tenn economic damage posed by inflation. 
However, these economists, proponents of "quantity theory" or "monctarism," 
simultaneously held that money in no way influenced \ong-term economic prospects. In other 
words, although economists assigned no analytical importance to money, its control 
increasingly came to be seen as central to the maintenance ofeconomic stability.2o 
18 John Stuart Mill, Principles ofPolitical Economy, New York, Augustus M. Kelley, [1848] 1961, p. 
488. 
19 Of course not every mainstream economist of note has championed this theoretical definition. For an 
extremely influential argument that rejects the orthodox assertion thal money plays no l'ole in long­
term economic cycles, see John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money, London, Macmillan, [1936] 2007. 
20 Ingham, The Nature of Money, p. 8 and 28-31. The most influential of the quantily theorists or 
monetarists was Milton Friedman. For Friedman's macro-economic monetary theory, see Milton 
Friedman, The Optimum Quantity of Money and Other Essays, Chicago, Aldine Publishing, 1969. For 
the historical work that complemenled Friedman's monetary theory, see Milton Friedman and Anna 
Jacobson Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1963. 
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The commodity and quantity theories, however, do not provide the only means of 
understanding money's nature. Whereas orthodox economics emphasizes money's exchange 
function, while simultaneously proclaiming that it only exerts an influence on the economic 
system when it is out of alignment, another school of thought, which traces its lineage to 
Georg Simmel's The Philosophy of Money, considers money's nature to lie in its utility as a 
means of measuring and rendering intelligible abstract, socially-defined value. 21 ln other 
words, rather than emphasizing money's physical function as a medium of exchange or as a 
store of value, this theoretical perspective accentuates money's immaterial role as a unit of 
account. Thus, whether physical money-stuff participates in an exchange or not, the 
transaction is monetary if the parties to the exchange understand it in reference to an abstract 
measure of value. Geoffrey lngham makes this argument in great detail, in the process 
reformulating several of olthodox economics' favorite examples of "proto-monetary 
exchange" as, in fact, instances of monetary transactions based upon money's function as an 
abstract measure ofvalue. For example, lngham writes that Adam Smith's characterization of 
nail-based exchange in Scotland or similar trade patterns in Newfoundland based on dried 
cod (both during the eighteenth century) as forms of "primitive" monetary-exchange is 
incorrect because neither nails nor cod functioned as abstract measures of value. ln fact, 
Ingham argues, these cases provide examples of full-fledged monetary exchange because the 
commodities in question were used as a means of settling in-kind debt that had been 
contracted in terms of an abstract money of account (the pound), not in terms of cod or nails. 
ln lngham's words: "it was the unit of account that conferred the quality of 'moneyness' on 
the nails and cod, and not the converse. Divergences between the money of account in which 
21 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, lrans. by Tom Bouomore and David Frisby, Boston, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, [1900] 1978. Recent work claims lhat prior 10 Simmel Marx had laid the 
groundwork for this theoretical position because he argued that, "money is the universal equivalenl or 
independenl form of value." Costas Lapavistas, 'The Social Relations of Money as Universal 
Equivalent: A Response to Ingham," Economy and Society, vol. 34, no. 3 (August 2005), p. 400. 
However, Lapavistas continues to sitl.late money's true use in its value as an exchangeable good ralher 
than in the social relations in which it participates. See also Costas Lapavistas, "The Emergence of 
Money in Commodity Exchange, or Money as Monopolist of the Ability to Buy," Review ofPolitical 
Economy, vol. 17, no. 4 (October 2005), p. 549-69. 
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pnces are reckoned and the commodities by which debts are discharged \s historically 
cornmonplace. ,,22 
Sirnme1 and his intellectual heirs propose a monetary model that emphasizes 
conceptual abstraction over the material expediency posited by orthodox economics. The 
ultimate consequence of this model is the reformulation of money as being a primary means 
of social integration in that it provides the way in which economic actors establish 
relationships with one another. In other words, money allows diverse and otherwise 
unconnected individuals to cornmunicate using the same language of value to describe every 
saleable good and service.23 Moreover, following the introduction of money, these 
relationships are capable of traversing distances - geographical, social, cultural, and 
economic - that would otherwise fOlm insurmountable barriers.24 
Thus, rather than asserting that money is an entirely neutral object, of which actors 
make use only in the economic arena, scholars working in the Simmelian tradition argue that 
money is present in all areas of modem society. In place of the neutral veil of orthodox 
economic theory, these scholars conceive of money as a vector of economic, social, political, 
and cultural force?5 Michel Aglietta and André Orléan extend this argument to its logical 
22 Ingham, The Nature ofMoney, p. 34-5. 
23 Such "linguistic" analysis has been most convincingly demonstrated in Karl Polanyi, "The 
Semantics of Money-Uses," in George Dalton (ed.), Primitive, Archaic and Modern Economies: 
Essays of Karl Polanyi, Garden City, NY, Anchor Books, 1968, p. 175-203. Of course, not everything 
is marketable in every context. For an example of a study conducted in the tradition of Simmel that 
analyzes the difficulties of assigning monetary value to an object - in this case, human life - see 
Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, MoraIs and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United 
States, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979. 
24 Simmel, The Philosophy ofMoney, p. 78-9. 
25 Ingham most explicitly takes up this position through his attempt to "construct an adequate theOl'Y of 
the nature of money as a social phenomenon." Ingham, The Nature of Money, p. 10. For a study that 
emphasizes money's political character, see Eric Helleiner, The Making ofNational Money: Territorial 
Currencies in Historical Perspective, Ithaca, N.Y., Come li University Press, 2003. For the argument in 
favor of analyzing money as a social phenomenon, see Viviana A. Zelizer, The Social Meaning of 
Money, New York, Basic Books, 1994. 
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conclusion by inverting the classical economic equation that renders money meaningless in 
order to construct a monetary theory from which ail social relations spring. Based on the 
work of anthropologist René Girard, they argue that through mimicry individuals and 
institutions struggle for prestige and 'power in an inherently unbalanced socio-economic 
system. This competition, which is characteristic of modern, capitalist nations (what Aglietta 
and Orléan term "economic societies"), allows for an increase in the quantity of violence 
present ln society by channeling it away from individuals (in the fonn of murder) towards 
property (in the form of theft). Money is central to this altered form of violence: because it is 
quantifiable and ultimately exchangeable for any saleable good or service, money is the 
weapon of choice in economic societies 26 As violence is not directed at human beings but at 
their property, such societies are better able than others to effectively resist physically 
destructive conduct through the encouragement of market-based violence. This directed 
violence, then, gives economic societies an edge when competing with their non-economic 
counterparts.27 
The economic theory that attaches greater importance to money's function as an 
abstract measure of value finds its empirical basis in pre-modern and non-market forms of 
obligation and debt. The first historical societies for which records of monetal)' calculation 
are extant, those of the ancient Near East, attest to the existence of units of account that did 
not correspond to any physical, circulating media. Money served to assess rents and taxes 
essential to the region's command economy. Individuals paid these fees in kind, either in 
barley or silver, and secular and religious authorities subsequently redistributed them. In 
other words, money served to calculate the social obligations of landowners, laborers, clerics, 
26 Although Aglietta and Orléao do not cite it, this argument has its roots in Veblen's concept of 
conspicuous consumption. Thorsteio VebJen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, Mineola, NY, Dover 
Publications, [1899] 1994. 
27 Michel Aglietta and André Orléan, La violence de la monnaie, 2nd ed., Paris, Presses Universitaires 
de France, 1984. For a study that continues this work, while greatly adding to the earlier study's thesis, 
see Michel Aglietta and André Orléan, La monnaie: Entre violence et confiance, Paris, Éditions Odile 
Jacob, 2002. 
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and the nobility. Furthermore, the standard unit of account, the Mesopotamian shekel, did not 
conespond to any media valued for its precious metal content but, rather, formed the state­
established conelation between the value of silver and barley that structured the temples' and 
palaces' collection and redistribution of commodities. 28 
This debt-based system persisted after the creation of physical, circulating currency 
and remained in force in the capitalist economies of the early-modern and modern Atlantic 
World. In this context, monarchs and banks placed money, which the issuer promised to 
accept as payment (the monarch for taxes and the bank in repayment of loans), into 
circulation as transferable debt - that is, as a promise to pay that is exchangeable between any 
number of parties - in order to purchase goods and services. Thus, debt, like its counterpart 
credit, constitutes a social relationship by way of the claim that the holder possesses on the 
issuer. It also constitutes a political relationship in that the individual employing money must, 
even if unconsciously, accept the authority of the issuer. Money, then, is, in the words of 
Geoffrey Ingham, "assignable trust. In the face of real-world radical uncertainty, self­
fulfilling long-term trust is rooted in a social and political Iegitimacy whereby potentially 
personally untrustworthy strangers are able to participate in complex multilateral 
relationships. Historically, this has been the work of states.,,29 Thus, every individual who 
accepts money as payment subscribes to the "society" created through money's distribution 
and continued circulation. Because such societies function under the aegis of the state or 
some other relatively powerful institution (e.g. a monopolistic trading company), money 
reveals itself to be both a tool and a manifestation of sovereignty.30 
28 Ingham, The Nature ofMoney, p. 93-7. On pre-capitalist monetary forms generally, see ibid, p. 89­
106. 
29 Emphasis in original. ibid, p. 74. 
30 ibid, p. 10-2. On money's sovereign character, see Michel Aglietta and André Orléan (eds.), La 
monnaie souveraine, Paris, Éditions Odile Jacob, 1998, Bruce Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer 
to Monel': Metrological Reform in Pre-Confederation Canada," Social Studies ofScience, vol. 28, no. 
4 (August 1998), p. 547-70, and Helleiner, The Making ofNational Money. 
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This observation, once again, directly contradicts classical economic theory which 
considers political authority to be exogenous to the market. Following in the foots teps of 
Adam Smith, who postulated the existence of the market system as an entirely autonomous 
economic space (the "invisible hand"), practitioners of economics have long sought to banish 
politics from market analyses. According to orthodox economics, money exists as a "public 
good" created and maintained outside of the market system by an institution - the state - that 
lacks any meaningful economic role. 31 From this perspective, the state's unique economic 
function is to guarantee money's nominal value through the judicious use of its authority, 
embodied by the seal or stamp it places on circulating media. In this way, prior to the advent 
of fiduciary money, economic actors did not need to engage in the unwieldy process of 
determining the purity of each and every coin involved· in ail transactions because they could 
rely on the monarcb's or the state's reputation. In ether words, classical political economy 
asserted that the state, Iike money, simply provides a means of increasing the efficiency of 
market exchange.32 Orthodox economics, particularly its monetarist strain, continues to make 
this argument regardless of the disappearance of precious metals from the money supply.33 
Of course, by stamping money with its sovereign authority, the state created a 
highly visible symbol of its authority and legitimacy. Colonial sovereignty, then, follows not 
only the flag, as a common legal metaphor would have it, but also the currency. As Emily 
Gilbert remarks in reference to both privately (i.e. bank) and publicly-issued notes, "papel' 
money situated Canadian colonists within specific and intersecting personal, national, and 
imperial geographies.,,34 However, colonists were not alone in handling and interpreting these 
circulating symbols. Through money, Aboriginal peoples also experienced these "intersecting 
31 Ingham, The Nature of Money, p. 31. 
32 For an example drawn from c1assical political economy, Say, Traité d'économie politique, p. 244-5. 
33 Ingham, The Nature of Money, p. 28-31. 
34 Emily Gilbert, "'Ornamenting the Facade of Hel!': Iconography of 19th-Century Canadian Paper 
Money," Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, vol. 16, no. 1 (1998), p. 77. 
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geographies," in the process accepting and rnaking use of representations of the colonizer's 
political and economic power35 Thus, through the use of this syrnbolically charged 
technology of transferable debt, Amerindians actively engaged in the Foucauldian field of 
unequal social, political, and economic power relations characteristic of colonialism.36 
"Every Prudent Man"; Colonialism and the Polities of Economie Thought 
The process through which Aboriginal peoples came to be wards of the state has 
long been one of the focal points of the historiography on Amerindians. Although this 
literature focuses on political changes in the nineteenth century, sorne scholars have sought 
out the beginnings of this process either in earlier periods or in econornic exchange 
relations. 37 However, the historiography often fails to consider the inherently colonial nature 
of both Western thought in general and the theories that inforrned European action in North 
35 The Comaroffs propose: "To the extent that colonization effected a change in the state-of-being of 
'native' populations, it typically depended less on the formai apparatus of colonial states ... than on 
other agents of empire." Altough explicitly referring to individuals, this observation applies equally to 
objects such as money. Comaroff and Comaroff, OfRevelation and Revolution, vol. 2, p. 21. 
36 Ingham writes that, "money is not merely a useful technique, comparable to weights and measures; it 
also consists in social relations that are inherent!y relations of inequality and power." Ingham, The 
Nature ofMoney, p. 37. 
37 For an exarnple of an attempt to place beginnings of Amerindian subjugation long before the 
nineteenth century, see Alain Beaulieu, "'L'on n'a point d'ennemis plus grands que ces sauvages': 
L'alliance franco-innue revisitée (1603-1653)," Revue d'histoire de l 'Amérique française, vol. 61, no. 
3A (Winter-Spring 2008), p. 365-95. The economic historiography is dominaled by the debate over 
whether exchange relations led to Aboriginal dependence on Europeans, their sole source of 
manufactured goods. For studies grounded in dependency theory, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern 
World-System: Capitatist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the 
Sixteenth Century, New York, Academic Press, 1974 and Richard White, The Roots of Dependency: 
Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos, Lincoln, 
University of Nebraska Press, 1983. For a study that explicitly opposes the nolion that trade led to 
dependency, see Brian C. Bosmer, American Indians in the Marketplace: Persistence and Innovation 
among the Menominees and Metlakatlans, 1870-1920, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1999. 
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America more specifically?8 In an effort to complicate the historiography on First Nations' 
marginalization, as weil as to focus on the inherently biased bases of scholarly analysis, this 
section considers the ethnocentric assumptions at the core of monetary theory and their 
implications for "primitive peoples" the world over. In this way, it suggests that the imported 
theoretical vision of Aboriginal peoples and money formed the backdrop against which the 
process of colonialism described in the following chapters unfolded. 
This section draws on the insight of Mary Poovey and Jean-Michel Servet to 
discuss the "historical" analysis of the origins of money proffered by a group of participants 
in the Scottish Enlightenment who engaged in what Dugald Stewart termed "conjectural 
history." Poovey writes that the Scottish conjectural historians drew on the work of 
experimental natural philosophers in order to employ "the experimentalists' assumptions that 
sorne system organizes the phenomenal world and that human nature is universal to 
'conjecture' what they could not document. Such conjectures constitllte assertions that what 
one has not seen resembles what one can observe." Thus, by observing the contemporary 
world, conjectural historians felt themselves capable of describing processes that had gone 
undocumented by the historical record. In addition to producing histories of such periods and 
developments, this movement produced a series of abstractions conceptualized as being 
capable of acting in the world that were thus agents of historical change. Poovey describes 
one such abstraction: "as a historical agent, 'the human mind' could be inferred from its 
effects, many (though notall) of which had been documented by eyewitnesses who recorded 
particulars whose larger significance they did not understand." For the purposes of the 
present discussion, Adam Smith's "market system" provides the best example of a 
conjectural abstraction - although no historical observer had claimed to witness such a 
system in action, its existence and development COli Id be inferred from the information that 
38 For a study that examines the seventeenth and eighteenth-century theoretical underpinnings of 
European action in the New World (in this case those supporting French arbitration of Amerindian 
conflicts), see Maxime Gohier, Onontio le médiateur: La gestion des conflits amérindiens en Nouvelle­
France, 1603-1717, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2008. 
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such chroniclers had provided.39 Smith and his followers applied this same methodological 
approach, using both historical texts referring to Western society and contemporary accounts 
of Aboriginal peoples, to the task ofdescribing the development ofmoney. The results ofthis 
analysis informed both the image that colonists had of Amerindians as economic agents and 
orthodox monetary theory as still championed by many practitioners of present-day 
economlCs. 
The golden cow of monetary theory, today as in the past, is that money functiol1s 
first and foremost as a medium of exchange (or payment). As a resuIt, economic theory 
explains money's initial appearance and subsequent development as responding to the 
inefficiency of pre-monetary exchange - that is, from barter. In its simplest form, this 
evolutionary explanation of the rise of money (what Servet terms the "barter fable") asserts 
that following a period during which barter provided the only means of exchanging goods 
and services, humans realized that by accepting a single commodity not for its inherent value, 
but for its use as a medium of exchange they could greatly increase the efficiency of the 
marketplace. 4o Adam Smith, one of the most influential proponents of this model, writes: "In 
order to avoid the inconveniency of such situations, every prudent man in every period of 
society, after the first establishment of the division of labour, must naturally have 
endeavoured to manage his affairs in such a manner, as to have at ail times by him, besides 
the peculiar produce ofhis own industry, a certain quantity ofsome one commodity or other, 
such as he imagined few people would be likely to refuse in exchange for the produce of their 
own industry.,,41 In other words, the advent of the specialized commodity known as "money," 
predicated on the division of labor (itself based on "the disposition to truck, barter, and 
exchange"), brought unequivocal technical and social progress by allowing "prudent" 
39 Poovey, A History of the Modern Fact, p. 215-6. On Scottish conjectural historians and their 
relationship to political economics, see Ibid, p. 214-63. 
40 This critique of classical economics' description of barter as being the basis for money is presented 
in Jean-Michel Servet, "La fable du troc," Dix-huitième siècle, no. 26 (1994), p. 103-15. 
41 Adam Smith, Wealth ofNations, Amherst, NY, Prometheus Books, [1776J 1991, p. 29-30. 
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economic actors to meet and exchange "the different produces of their respective talents" 
without recourse to the ponderous system of barter.42 This vision, which asserts the primacy 
of exchange relations between individuals through the development of a monetary economy 
and the self-evident, labor-derived value of commodities, portrays the process of socialization 
as being inherently apolitical. In this way, the "invisible hand," not the prince or the state of 
pre-classical political economy (as presented most notably by Hobbes), regulates society. 
Thus, interested exchange between more or less sovereign individuals forms the functional 
core of society while the state is relegated to consecrating and perfecting previously existing 
instruments of exchange. The political project of classical economics is thus revealed to be 
the redefinition of the social order as being uniquely economic, thereby demoting the political 
to a role of secondary importance. 43 
However, the "barter fable" presented a more complicated evolutionary version of 
the development of money than this. As John Locke argued nearly a century before the 
publication of the Wealth of Nations, for a corrunodity to be accepted as a generalized 
medium of exchange, it had necessarily to be durable.44 In other words, without a medium of 
exchange that was not also a store of value, money could not exist, thereby damning 
42 Smith, Wealth ofNations, p. 23. Furthermore, the pillars of nineteenth-century c1assical economics 
continued to champion the idea that money developed more or Jess spontaneously as a meahs of 
correcting the inherent inefficiency of barter, in the process making it an economic truism. Say, Traité 
d'économie politique, David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, Mineola, 
NY, Dover, [1817] 2004, Thomas R. Malthus, Principles of Political Ecol1omy, 2nd ed., New York, 
Augustus M. Kelley, [1836] 1964, Mill, Principles ofPolitical Economy, and Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 
1, trans. by Ben Fowkes, Toronto, Penguin, [1867] 1976. 
43 Servet, "La fable du troc," p. 109-15. This political project persists in the monetarist movement as 
discussed above. For an extremely influential modern study that contends that a similar process by 
which the economic trumped the political took place in the context of nineteenth-centmy industrial 
capitalism and the liberal state, see Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, Boston, Beacon Press, 
[1944] 1962. 
44 "And thus came in the use of Money, sorne lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and 
that by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of 
Life." Emphasis in original. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, New York, Cambridge 
University Press, 1960 [1690], sect. 47, p. 300-1. 
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humanity to a state in which every individual sought only to meet her immediate needs, with 
no possibility of amassing material wealth. Moreover, Locke explicitly applied this logic ta 
the Americas, arguing that isolation, due to the absence of money that it entails, breeds a lack 
of industry. "For l ask, What would a Man value Ten Thousand, or an Hundred Thousand 
Acres of Excel1ent Land, ready cultivated, and wel1 stocked too with CaUle, in the middle of 
the in-land Parts of America, where he had no hopes of Commerce with other Parts of the 
World, to draw Money to him by the Sale of the Product?" Drawing upon the New World's 
lack of money, then, Locke concludes that at sorne point in the past "ail the World was 
America... for no such thing as Money was any where known.,,45 Thus, according to Locke, 
Europe had successful1y escaped the monetary prehistory in which the New World was still 
mired. Monetary theory, then, provided classical economics with a key exhibit proving 
Europe's superior level of sophistication.46 
Locke's intellectual heirs extended his analysis to argue that durability was, 
historical1y, insufficient. In addition to the use of "sorne one commodity or other" by 
"prudent men," Smith asserted that, "In aU countries, however, men seem at last to have been 
determined by irresistible reasons to give the preference, for this employment, to metals 
above every other commodity." Smith argued that metals' superiority lay in not only their 
imperishable, but also their infinitely divisible nature. Furthermore, although any metal could 
be used as money, Smith, again following Locke, noted that "al1 rich and commercial 
nations" employed gold and silver.47 Jean-Baptiste Say, the French political economist who 
45 Emphasis in original. Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment, sect. 48-9, p. 301. 
46 However, it should be noted that these seventeenth and eighteenth-century assertions of superior 
sophistication were not necessarill' synonl'mous with the disrespect of non-European societies that 
characterized the high-handed evolutionary thought of the Victorian era. On Smith's ability to balance 
his conviction that modern society constituted an improvement with his belief that non-Emopean 
societies were neither morally nor culturally inferior, see Jennifer Pitts, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of 
Imperial Liberalism in Sri/ain and France, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 25-58. 
47 Smith, Wealth ofNations, p. 30-1. Marx also makes the argument that "monel' is bl' nature gold and 
silver." Marx, Capital, vol. l, p. 183. Locke casts the monetary value of precious metals as arising 
from a tacit social agreement that falls bel'ond the scope of law and government. Locke, Two Treatises 
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first published bis Traité de l'économie politique in 1803, built on Smith's evolutionary 
perspective to argue that as economies developed or, in his words, became more "civilized" 
through greater specialization of labor, the need for commodity-money became ever more 
pressing.48 Classical economics argued that precious metals were the single commodity that 
could effectively take on such a monetary raie. John Stuart Mill wrote, "After the immediate 
necessities of life were satisfied, every one was eager to accumulate as great a store as 
possible of things at once costly and omamental; which were chiefly gold, silver, and jewels. 
These were the things which it most pleased every one to possess, and which there was most 
certainty of finding others willing to receive in exchange for any kind of produce." In other 
words, classical economics hcld that every economic actor sought to stockpile precious 
metals (and jewels).49 This assumption led to consternation on the part of Europeans when 
faced witb Aboriginal populations who in no way acted along these lines. In this way, 
Amerindians, who accumulated neither precious metals nor jewels and who possessed no pre­
contact monetary form recognized by Western economic thought, found themselves, through 
the interactions of theory and the practice of everyday colonialism, placed beyond the pale of 
the economic. In some sense, this blatantly ethnocentric vision has continued to the present 
day, both thraugh widely-held views on the pmi of the general NOlih American population 
of Government, sect. 50, p. 302. Say nuances this argument by stating that precious metals had not 
come to serve as money because of their intrinsic value or obvious convenience for the task, but 
because the most industrious and commercial nations had chosen to use them as money, which, in tum, 
prompted other countries to do likewise. Say, Traité d'économie politique, p. 243. Of course, both 
Locke and Smith simply added their voices to longstanding discussion of precious metals' monetary 
l'ole. For an analysis of an English debate from the 1620s during which precious metals' monetary role 
was discussed in the context of the elaboration of "the first theoretical model of a commercial system" 
(emphasis in original), see Poovey, A History ofthe Modern Fact, p. 66-88. 
48 Say, Traité d'économie politique, p. 239. 
49 Mill, Principles of Political Economy, p. 484-5. Mill goes on to write that, "gold and silver have 
been generally preferred by nations which were able to obtain them, either by industry, commerce, or 
conquest." While not explicit, this statement once again conveys the schema by which classical 
economists placed AboriginaJ peoples at a lower rung on the evolutionary ladder. Ibid, p. 485. On 
classical economics ties to evolutionary thought - particularly Malthus's l'ole in inspiring Darwin's 
theory of natural selection - see, E.G. Hundert, The Enlightenment 's Fable: Bernard Mandeville and 
the Discovery ofSociety, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 394-5. 
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and via the historiography's reluctance to consider certain aspects of Aboriginal economic 
experience. 50 
Thus, through a combination of monetary theOl)', the "barter fable," and precious 
metals, Smith and other classical economists constructed a theoretical mode] that placed 
"civilized" European economic and social institutions at the apex of human evolution. 51 
Through this model, Amerindians, who did not use precious metals as a means of exchange, 
came to be seen as economically and, by extension, socially and culturally inferior to their 
European colonizers. This postulate, along with its equivalents in religion, education, and so 
on, permitted Europeans and their descendents to claim that Western society formed the 
model to which ail other social groups should aspire, thereby providing the same basic 
assumption that underlies both the historie process by which Aboriginal peoples in Canada 
were remade as wards of the state and the modern construct of the "developing world".52 
Money in Canada to 1950 
Before proceeding to the core of the present dissertation's historical analysis, it is 
necessary to briefly sketch the monetary history of the region now known as Canada. In this 
way, this section moves from a purely theoretical portrait of money to one in which emphasis 
50 For a general critique of the historiography's portrayal of Amerindians and the economy, see Ronald 
L. Trosper, "That Other Discipline: Economies and American Indian History," in Colin G. Calloway 
(ed.), New Directions in American Indian History, Norman, University of Oklahoma press, 1988, p. 
199-222. For an excellent recent study that underlines the erasure of Aboriginal peoples from one key 
area of historical economic experience, wage labor, see John Sulton Lutz, Makilk: A New History of 
Aboriginal-White Relations, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008. 
51 Smith writes: "money has become in ail civilized nations the universal instrument of commerce." 
Smith, Wealth ofNations, p. 34. 
52 On the ethnocentricity of economics' monetary model, see Bernard Élie, Le régime monétaire 
canadien: Institutions, théories et politiques, Montreal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1998, 
p. 21. Of course, it is important to note that neither Smith nor his followers sought to subjugate 
Indigenous peoples tlU'ough economic theory. For the same argument made in reference to the Scottish 
Enlightenment (ofwhich Smith was a key thinker), see Poovey, A History ofthe Modern Fact, p. 24. 
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is placed on lived experience of money-use. This section will highlight the process by which 
the state, from the earliest period of sustained colonial mie, sought to institute and maintain 
homogenous political space through the unified economic space made possible by a single, 
not necessarily material currency. Abstract moneys of account, embodied in governmental 
edicts and local credit networks, served to unify the Canadian economy even in the absence 
of physical money-stuff. This section, then, provides an overview of the historiography's 
treatment of monetary issues in Canada while simultaneously describing the actual ways in 
which individual and institutional money-use developed prior to the mid-twentieth century. In 
this way, the theoretical insight of the preceding sections combines with historical studies' 
empirical observations in arder to create a concrete framework within which the issues 
described in the following chapters should be understood. 
New France 
The early-modern conf1ation of "money" with preciolls metals greatly inf1uenced 
French perception both in the metropole and the colonies. ln New France, as in ail North 
American colonies and in much of Western Europe at the time, a wide variety of coin of 
diverse national origins circulated.53 For example, a 1662 government ordinance mentions 
that seventeen different coins were used in the colony, if only to an extremely limited extent. 
ln spite of this official recognition, prior to the introduction in the same year of royal 
government and the expenditure that this brought with it, particularly in the form of cash 
salaries paid to regular troops stationed in the colony, very little coin, whether of French or 
other origin, seems to have been in circulation. 54 This relative scarcity and impressive 
heterogeneity of metallic currency would remain the mie throughout the French regime and 
53 On coin in Europe during the early modern period, see Fernand Braudel, Civilisation matérielle, 
économie et capitalisme, XV-XVllf siècle, vol. 1, Les structures du quotidien, Paris, Armand Colin, 
1979, p. 518-34. 
54 A.B. McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900, Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 32 
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well into the nineteenth century.55 Alongside these limited metallic monetary instruments, 
colonial officiais sporadically issued large quantities of paper currency. While this practice 
sought to provide the colonial state with funds from which to make the expenditure necessary 
for its continued existence - expenditure threatened by the penury of cash - it had the side 
effect of providing the local economy with an additional forro of circulating money. 56 
In order to avoid the constant shifts in their monetary frame of reference that this 
heterogeneous supply of foreign and domestic gold, silver, and copper coin, in addition to 
paper currency, would seem to necessitate, French settlers and colonial authorities employed 
these multiple if limited monetalY instmments by way of a single abstract measure of value: 
the livre. In other words, colonial residents employed each coin, whether French or 
otherwise, in terms of the official money of account. Moreover, since no single livre coin 
ever existed during the French regime, New France's state-sanctioned money was always 
purely abstract. 57 
Thus, merchants and habitants made use of this money of account both when 
employing physical money stuff and when engaging in credit-based exchange. In a cash-poor 
economy, creditldebit relations often serve to ensure the circulation of goods. The merchants 
of New France, through their account books, pursued monetized commerce with their clients 
by serving as local agents of redistribution. In idealized terms, habitants purchased goods 
throughout the year on credit from their local merchant, who recorded these transactions in 
55 Allan Greer writes of the merchant at the center of his study of socio-economic life in rural New 
France and Lower Canada: "Samuel Jacobs himself was very often without currency. When he did 
have money, it came in a variety of forms, gold and silver. of English, French, Portllguese, Spanish, 
and Spanish-American origin." Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant: Rural Society in Three Quebec 
Parishes, 1740-1840, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1985, p. 160. 
56 On paper currency in New France - the so-called card money - see McCullough, Money and 
E'(change in Canada, p. 35-40 and 44-52. 
57 The English system also lacked a one-pound coin during the period. Like an English pound, which 
shares a cornmon Carolingian (if not Roman) origin, one livre was divided into twenty sous or sols, 
each of which could be further divided into twelve deniers. MCCllllollgh, Money and Exchange in 
Canada, p. 29-30. 
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monetary notation in his ledger. Similarly, the merchant, as weil as other habitants, purchased 
goods and services from other local residents by according them the appropriate amount of 
credit (and if the purchase was made by a habitant, debiting his account). The habitants then 
paid for their purchases with their own produce (e.g. wheat, peas, eggs, or butter) not by 
handing it over to the merchant himself, but by giving it to those who had purchased the 
produce.58 By accepting cornrnodities in exchange for other cornrnodities based on a system 
of book debt expressed in monetary terms, the merchant in New France became the central 
cog in the monetized economy, in the abstract if not the physical sense. 59 By the end of the 
French regime, this mode! had becorne the mie, with the majority of habitants in at least one 
region possessing no cash while those who did for the most part held the seriously devalued, 
if not altogether worthless, card rnoney60 Thus, although credit restricted economic action in 
a way that cash in hand did not (credit not being as generally transferable as hard currency), 
both served the same basic monetary function. 
58 This idealized description is based on the early eighteenth-century activity of Montreal merchant 
Alexis Monière. Outfitting of voyageurs for the Montreal-based fur trade worked in more or less 
identical tenns (and Monière, who had himself been a voyageur, had several traders among his 
clients). Louise Dechêne, Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XVif siècle, Montreal, Boréal, 
[1974] 1988, p. 185-90 and 195-6. The model also appears to have functioned in a similar manner 
during New France's initial, "monopolized" period, with habitants trading agricultural produce and 
furs to the company in exchange for other goods. Adam Shortt, Adam ShorU's History of Canadian 
Curreney and Banking, 1600-1880, Totonto, The Canadian Bankers' Association, 1986, p. 110. For 
other examples of merchant-centered rural credit networks in New France see Greer, Peasant, Lord, 
and Merehant, esp. p. 140-76 and Sylvie Dépatie, "Commerce et crédit à l'île Jésus, 1734-75: Le rôle 
des marchands ruraux dans l'économie des campagnes montréalaises," Canadian Historieal Review, 
vol. 84, no. 2 (June 2003), p. 147-76. 
59 Of course, this system did not al ways work in such idealized terms. However, credit, even in cases 
of longstanding indebtedness, served to organize economic relations in a monetized manner. In such 
cases, merchants, by way of notarized con tracts with their clients, were legally entitled to have goods 
and lands seized for resale so that they could recover the amount of money owed to them. Dépatie, 
"Commerce et crédit à l'île Jésus," p. 150. 
60 This observation is based on thirty-nine estate inventories from three parishes in the Lower 
Richelieu valley for the period 1740-1769. Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merehant, p. 160. 
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In addition to paper and metallic currency and credit, the historiography has argued 
that several other objects functioned as money in northeastem North America during the 
period.61 However, in general these studies confuse "money" with "commodity," asselting 
that those goods that traded hands in the credit networks centered on New France's merchants 
were, in fact, money. Given that no record has been found of "savings" held in wheat or 
beaver skins, such arguments appear extremely suspect. 62 Moreover, with the exception of 
seigneurial rents, debts and payments were generally calculated in terms of the universal 
accounting currency, the livre, rather than in terrns ofany given commodity. In the context of 
the fur trade, however, beaver skins provide an important exception to this rule. Although 
they did not serve as physical, circulating cUlTency, pelts quickly came to provide the fur 
trade' s abstract measure of value. 63 
61 For a recent example, in which beaver and moose pelts, wheat, and wampum are portrayed as 
money, see Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, Un Québec moderne, 1760-1840: Essai d'histoire 
économique et sociale, Montreal, Éditions Hurtubise HMH, 2007, p. 200. 
62 Louise Dechêne writes: "Trois cents inventaires après décès nous ont démontré que personne 
n'accumule de fourrures. La thésaurisation du castor ou autres moyens d'échange, présenté par les 
historiens comme un trait caractéristique de cette société et qui repose sm des témoignages aussi 
fragiles, ne peut pas être retenue." Dechêne, Habitants et marchands ... , p. 135. In this way Dechêne 
explicitly refutes Adam Shortt who, writing in 1898, asserted that, in New France prior to royal rule, 
"there was one article of universal acceptance which answered ail the purposes of a medium of 
exchange, except for small currency, and that was the beaver skin." Shortt is correct, however, to point 
out that the fixed price at which the Company of One Hundred Associates purchased beaver skins 
made them an extremely stable commodity. Shortt, Adam Shorll 's History ... , p. 110. 
63 The beaver skin quickly became a reference of value for ail of the fur trade's participants, whether 
European or Aboriginal. By the Jate seventeenth century, the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) had 
formalized this system through the Made beaver, its in-house accounting currency that represented the 
value of one ideal beaver skin. This standard abstract measure of value wou Id continue to be used by 
the HBC and Amerindians in parts of Canada into the twentieth century. On the Made beaver, see E.E. 
Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwestto 1857, Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1967, p. 59, Arthur 
1. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands 
South west ofHudson Bay, 1660-1870, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, [1974] 1998, p. 61-2 and 
Arthur 1. Ray and Donald Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure ": An Economie Analysis of Relations 
Between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company Before 1763, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 1978, p. 54-5. 
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Because of the absence of circulating money in pre-contact nOltheastem NOlth 
America and the immateriality ofabstract measures of value, scholars know nothing ofpurely 
Aboriginal monetary fOlms. Students of Indigenous economic history tend to address this 
lacuna through the application of anthropological models of "primitive exchange" to pre- and 
immediate post-contact First Nations. Marcel Mauss's vision of gift exchange provides what 
is by far the most influential theoretical model in this sense. This model considers all 
economic interaction as occupying a discrete position along a continuum stretching from 
generalized reciprocity, or disinterested exchange, to negative reciprocity, or interested 
exchange.64 Although this model permits the conceptualization of exchange in Aboriginal 
North America by focusing on the material flow of goods in society, it remains silent insofar 
as money, whether abstract or material, is concerned. While Mauss and his followers argue 
that certain goods possess symbolic importance, those that apply this model to North America 
generally prove unable or unwilling to broach the means by which Amerindians judged and 
expressed the value of goods and services involved in such transactions. Thus, while many 
studies analyze the different social and cultural motivations underlying Native-newcomer 
exchange, none explore the conceptual means through which Aboriginal peoples evaluated 
goods and services prior to contact.65 
In spite of the lack of any analyses of pre-contact Aboriginal monetary practice, the 
historiography sometimes portrays wampum beads as being a form of "Indigenous money." 
However, Aboriginal peoples only began trading these beads following the anival of 
Europeans in North America. Moreover, before the seventeenth century, wampum beads did 
not, as they would during their "monetary" phase, circulate in the interior of the continent. 
64 Marcel Mauss, "Essai sur le don. Fonne et raison de J'échange dans les sociétés archaïques," in 
Marcel Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie, Paris, Quadrige/PUF, 2003, p. 271. For a more nuanced 
Maussian approach, see Marshall Sahlins, "On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange," in Marshall 
Sahlins, Stone Age Economies, Chicago, Aldine-Atherton, 1972, p. 191-6. 
65 For an example of this model employed in the North American context, see Denys Delâge, Le pays 
renversé: Amérindiens et Européens en Amérique du nord-est, 1600-1664, Montreal, Boréal Express, 
1985, p. 64-5. 
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Beginning in the early seventeenth century, this changed as European fur traders began 
purchasing increasing quantities of beads from coastal nations in order to trade them at a 
profit for furs in the interior. 66 Following this development, both New Netherland and New 
England, for a short period in the mid-seventeenth century, declared wampum to be legal 
tender, a policy which introduced the settler population to wampum-use to a far greater extent 
than in New France. 67 French colonists, in contrast, only made use ofbeads, whether made of 
shell or glass, by Amerindians or Europeans, in the context of the fur trade. 68 Regardless of 
whether wampum held special legal status or not, Amerindians accorded it extraordinary 
value. However, this value appears to have been one that corresponds most closely to 
contemporary European ideas of precious metals rather than money. Amerindians 
"consumed" many of the beads they received in trade through their use as adomment, their 
incorporation in diplomatie belts, and, ultimately, their burial alongside their owners. In these 
cases, beads ceased to circulate, sometimes definitively, thereby calling the il' use as physical 
money-stuff into question. 69 These practices simultaneously suggest that Amerindians prized 
wampum beads more for their symbolic representation of wealth than for their monetalY 
66 ''True'' wampum - that is, white and purple cylindrical beads manufactured from shells from the east 
coast of North America - was a product of the European arrivaI in the New World both because of the 
metal tools necessary to manufacture it and because of the capital importance of these beads to the 
interior fur trade of the seventeenth century. Jonathan C. Lainey, La "Monnaie des Sauvages": Les 
colliers de wampum d'hier à aujourd'hui, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2004, p. 12 and 20-2. 
67 Wampum was legal tender in the English colonies from 1637 to 1652 and in New Netherland 
between the mid-1630s and the end of the colony in 1664. Lynn Ceci, "The First Fiscal Crisis in New 
York," Economie Development and Culture Change, vol. 28, no. 4 (1980), p. 839-47. Ceci argues that 
the struggle between these imperial powers for the control of the wampum trade significantly 
contributed to New Netherland's demise. 
68 On the manufacture of beads in France and their l'ole in the fur trade in New France, see Laurier 
Turgeon, "Material CultuJe and Cross-Cultural Consumption: French Beads in North America, 1500­
1700," Studies in the Decorative Arts, vol. 9, no. 1 (Fall-Winter 2001-2), p. 85-107. On the 
manufacture of beads by the Algonquian residents of present-day New York, see Ceci, "The First 
Fiscal Crisis in New York," p. 839-41. 
69 Laurier Turgeon notes that, "almost ail beads circulating in North America ended up in burial sites... 
The act of intemment expressed the intention to withdraw beads from economic and social 
circulation..." Turgeon, "Material Culture and Cross-Cultural Consumption," p. 101-2. 
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value. In other words, Aboriginal society promoted the "conspicuous consumption" of beads 
over their use as a means of purchasing other commodities. Regardless, wampum as money 
did not outlast the seventeenth century, with the beaver skin assuming the place of abstract 
measure ofvalue in the fur trade by the early eighteenth century.70 
British North America 
British North America, much like New France, played host to circulating com 
minted by several foreign nations. Again, as French authorities had done, British colonial 
officiais introduced common moneys of account in order to make sense of the various forrns 
of circulating cash. Throughout the period, London retained the right to mint and set the 
precious metal content of British coins, white the colonies possessed and exercised the power 
to set official exchange rates. They did this by declaring the value of the principal coins in 
circulation in terms of the official money of account, which, in the majority of British North 
America for most of the period, was Halifax cUITency" (Hfx). However, two exceptions 
applied to this general rule: the colonial state rendered ail accounts to its imperial counterpart 
in pounds sterling (stg) and the military chest paid civilians and soldiers using its own 
accounting currency, Arrny Pay, that, for most of the period, was pegged to the value of the 
most common coin, the Spanish silver dollar, at a slightly lower rate than the Halifax 
71
system.
As in New France, authorities in British North America found it necessary, in order 
to pay the state's bills, to issue paper currency. Although merchants had issued small bills for 
use as change (bons) beginning in the l760s and commercial paper (e.g. bills of exchange 
70 In addition ta Ray's and Freeman's work on the use of the beaver as an accounting currency by the 
HBC, Lainey cites examples from the Catholic mission at Detroit in the 1740s where the beaver 
("castor"), rather than wampurn beads, serves as abstract measure of value. Lainey, La "Monnaie des 
Sauvages ", p. 23. 
71 Paquet et Wallot, Un Québec moderne, p. 20S. 
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and promissory notes) circulated widely in Canada in the same period and well into the 
nineteenth century,n the state only began issuing paper money, known as "army bills," 
during the War of 1812. In July 1812, the Executive Council of Lower Canada authorized the 
printing ofup to f250,000 Hfx in paper money in two denominations: $4 (or fI Hfx) and $25 
or larger. The Executive Council made these bills legal tender (Upper Canada followed suit 
in 1813), insured that the larger bills bore 4% interest, and declared that the money would be 
redeemable in coin at Quebec City at face value (or, in the case of larger denominations, in 
bills of exchange drawn on London if the govemment preferred). In 1813, Lower Canada 
doubled the number of bills it could issue while simultaneously introducing a greater variety 
of small denominations. Although the colonial government issued the army bi lis, and initially 
guaranteed the principal, it was only responsible for paying one-third of the interest on the 
larger bills with the rest being supplied by the military chest. This financial burden led the 
imperial state to terminate the system and by the end of 1817 it had withdrawn nearly ail of 
the bills from circulation.73 
However, the anny bill system had proven popular among the general population, 
often receiving credit in the immediate post-war period for the colony's economic prosperity. 
According to Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, such widespread acceptance of paper 
money represented nothing short of a revolution in the average colonial inhabitant's monetary 
experience. 74 While the French had employed circulating paper media successfully in 
peacetime in the St. Lawrence Valley during the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
card money's catastrophic depreciation during hostilities had left many habitants and 
merchants skeptical of its nominal value, thus reinforcing the common belief that quality 
72 Bons, although technically illegal, were tolerated by the state because they provided useful, although 
not universally loved, circulating media. Paquet et Wallot, Un Québec moderne, p. 203. Commercial 
paper circulated according to the recipient's perception of the issuer's creditworthiness. Curtis, "From 
the Moral Thermometer to Money," p. 552. 
73 On early, merchant-issued bons, see McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 71-2 and 76­
8. On army bills, see Ibid, p. 83-5. 
74 Paquet et Wallot, Un Québec moderne, p. 236-7. 
106 
currency must necessarily come in the fonn of precious-metal-based coin.7s Army bills, on 
the other hand, secured the population 's confidence thereby retaining their nominal value and 
in the process demonstrating that properly managed paper money could function just as 
effectively as specie. 
This atmosphere proved favorable to the foundation of a series of private, joint­
stock, note-issuing banks. Drawing inspiration from the United States and Great Britain, a 
group of Montreal merchants established the Bank of Montreal in November 1817. By the 
early 1820s, banks operated or were represented in Quebec City, Kingston, and York 
(Toronto), in addition to Montrea1.76 Canadians' acceptance of notes in place of metallic 
currency and army bills, in spite of sporadic bank failures, fueled chartered banks' rapid 
growth to Confederation.77 By the early 1820s, contemporary observers reported that 
individuaIs and the state acquitted much of their debt in paper money. The 1830s witnessed a 
boom in the circulation of bank notes in Upper and Lower Canada, with notes in circulation 
more than doubling in value in both provinces between 1829 and 1841.78 
As during the French regime, credit remained a vital resource for economic activity 
under British rule. In rural areas, merchants continued to provide loans to their customers for 
the purchase of real estate or the payment of laborers and seigneurial dues more as a means of 
encouraging habitants to purchase goods and sel! wheat at their store than in the hopes of 
turning a profit on interest charges. Furthermore, in spite of peasants' accumulation of small 
sums of money, the rural economy of Lower and Upper Canada appears to have continued to 
be based in money of account, with debts settled through payment in agricultural produce, 
7S E.P. Neufeld, The Financial System 01 Canada: lts Growth and Development, Toronto, Macmillan, 
1972, p. 37. 
76 On banks during the period, see McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 85-8. 
77 Neufeld, The Financial System olCanada, p. 88. 
78 McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 88 and 98-9. 
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rather than in circulating cUlTency until at least 1840.79 However, with the establishment of 
note-issuing banks in the late 1810s, these newcomers largely supplanted "merchant­
bankers," particularly in urban areas. 8ü On the other hand, in isolated rural areas, such as the 
Madawaska valley, expansion depended on such so-called merchant bankers because Euro­
Canadian colonists could not have hoped to clear land and to purchase stock, seed, 
equipment, and other necessities without a significant line of credit. Thus, in the nineteenth 
century's "frontier" regions, book credit, calculated in money of account, proved to be just as 
vital to the local economy as it had been in the St. Lawrence Valley of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries 8 \ 
Although chartered banks rapid1y came to dominate the Canadian monetary system, 
and a1though they continued to issue notes into the 1930s, the state began in the 1840s ta 
cUItai1 banks' monetary role. In 1847-8, the state made an aggressive incursion into the 
monetalY system through the issue of what amounted to paper currency in the form of 
interest-bearing debentures. These financial instruments, with values as low as $10 or f.2 lOs. 
Hfx, served to fund the Canadian state during the international and domestic [oan drought 
caused by the depression of the late 1840s; they also served as currency, with aver f.630,000 
Hfx in $10 and $20 debentures in circulation by May 1850. Despite their relative success, 
however, the United Canadas withdrew the debentures by the end of the year. 82 
79 Greer, Peasant, Lord, and Merchant, p. 160 and 207-8. Béatrice Craig notes that throughout most of 
the nineteenth century Madawaska farmers "settled most of their store accounts with commodities 
grown for the purpose, or with currency." Béatrice Craig, Backwoods Consumers and Homespun 
Capitalists: The Rise of a Market Culture in Eastern Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
2009, p. 17. 
80 Neufeld, The Financial System ofCanada, p. 71-2. 
81 Craig, Backwoods Consumers, p. 114. On credit in the fur trade, which will be discussed at greater 
length in the following chapters, see Toby Morantz, '''So Evil a Practice': A Look at the Debt System 
in the James Bay Fur Trade," in Rosemary E. Ommer (ed.), Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in 
Historical Perspective, Fredericton, Acadiensis Press, 1990, p. 203-22. 
82 McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 107. 
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Also in the 1840s, legislators and merchants began making attempts to adopt a 
decimal currency in the Canadas. The Currency Act of 1841 initiated this process by 
encouraging the circulation of United States gold and silver decimal coins. 83 However, as a 
result of the imperial will that the colonies adopt currencies based on the pound, 
decimalization made no concrete progress until the 1850s. In 1853, the legislature of the 
Province of Canada passed a compromise act that adopted the pound, dollar, shilling, pence, 
and cent as official units of Canadian currency.84 In 1857, a further piece of legislation 
effectively ended the use of the Halifax system and sterling notation in the colony by 
requiring that ail accounts submitted to the state, as weil as those kept intemally by the state 
itself, be in dollars and cents.85 This move towards decimalization again curtailed the banks' 
monetary role in that colonial officiais simultaneously received London's permission to mint 
decimal coins for the first time. These coins became legal tender on 10 December 1858.86 The 
Provincial Notes Act of 1866 further strengthened the colonial state's hand vis-à-vis the 
banks by authorizing the United Canadas to issue up to $8 million in provincial notes and to 
pay banks an annual sum of 5% of the value of the notes that they withdrew from circulation 
until 1870. However, the Dominion Notes Act of 1868 would supersede this law. 87 
Post-Confederation Canada 
The 1867 political unification of much of British North America led politicians and 
state officiais to devise a series of standardized practices and objects in order to symbolically 
83 Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer to Money," p. 553. 
84 McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. l06-9. 
85 Although this act allowed for accounts to contain an additional column in which amounts could be 
reported in sterling notation, it did not require that this column be completed. The act provided no 
space for noting amounts in Halifax currency. McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 110. 
86 McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 110. 
87 Élie, Le régime monétaire canadien, p. 146. 
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represent the newly created nation. Canada's increasingly unified currency occupied an 
important place among these symbols. In 1868, the Dominion Notes Act converted the paper 
currency of the Province of Canada into the new nation's monetary base by making bills 
redeemable for bull ion in Saint John and Halifax in addition to Montreal and Toronto. In 
1876, parliament extended the act to Prince Edward Island, Manitoba, and British Columbia 
and in 1886 did so again, this time with respect to the Northwest Territories, thereby ensuring 
that the national currency circulated throughout the totality of Canadian territory88 The 
circulation of foreign coin also proved problematic to those interested in promoting Canadian 
unity. Canada addressed this issue in the Uniform Currency Act (1871) which effectively 
removed ail foreign silver coins from circulation. At the same time, however, Canada 
rendered British goId sovereigns and United States gold eagle coins legal tender while 
neglecting to take action to remove foreign copper coins from circulation. Nevertheless, since 
very few goId coins circulated in Canada, the practical importance of making American and 
British coins legal tender appears to have been negligible. 89 This act also made already­
minted silver, copper, and bronze coins from the provinces of Quebec, Ontario, and New 
Brunswick legal tender throughout the country while abolishing Nova Scotia's unique 
monetary standard. Thus, by 1871 parliament had created a coherent monetary system for the 
totality of the new dominion. In other words, Canada possessed a uniform abstract and 
physical currency for the first time. 90 
After Confederation, the federal state followed the lead of its provincial predecessor 
by continuing to diminish the role of private banks in the Canadian monetary system. The 
Dominion Notes Act of 1868 limited the chaltered banks to issuing notes denominated in 
multiples of $4 and $5, while reserving for the federal government the issue of small bills in 
88 James Powell, A His/ory ofthe Canadian Dollar, Ottawa, Bank of Canada, 1999, p. 12. 
89 Helleiner, The Making of National Money, p. 32, 39, and 116. A variety of foreign copper coins of 
small denomination circulated weil into the twentieth century. 
90 Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer to Money," p. 554. 
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the amount of $0.25, $1, and $2. 91 However, prior to the outbreak of World War l, privately­
issued bank notes did not constitute legal tender - that is, Canadian residents were not legally 
obliged to accept them in payment. British, Arnerican, and Canadian gold coins as we]] as 
dominion notes served this raIe from the pre-Confederation period thraugh the final, official 
suspension of Canada's adherence to the international gold standard in 1933.92 The federal 
state ended private banks' raie in note printing with the creation of the Bank of Canada, 
which begao operations in 1935.93 
As io earlier periods, credit continued to play a central raie in the Canadian 
monetary system. However, in contrast to previous practice, credit increasingly came to be 
distributed by third parties in addition to merchants. Whereas banks had existed in British 
North America since the 1810s, their lending habits focused in the main 00 the regions' wel1­
to-do population, with most inhabitants of late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Canada 
(rural and urban, Indigeoous and non-Indigenous alike) relying on store credit accorded by 
merchants. 94 Beginning in the early twentieth century, a large number of organizations began 
appearing that specialized in providing credit to populations who had not previously had easy 
access to it (e.g. credit unions).95 However, prior to World War II the credit union movement 
91 Élie, Le régime monétaire canadien, p. 146. 
92 Belween 1914 and 1926, Canada was off the gold standard. During this period, bank notes had legal 
tender status. On legal tender and the gold standard from the mid-nineteenlh century through the Great 
Depression, see Powell, A History 01the Canadian Dol/ar, p. 14-25. 
93 On the creation of the Bank of Canada, see Michael D. Bordo and Angela Redish, "Why Did the 
Bank of Canada Emerge in 1935?" The Journal 01 Economie History, vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1987), p. 
405-17 and Powell, A HistOlY olthe Canadian Dol/ar, p. 27-9. 
94 For a loose description of the workings of store-credit in late nineteenth-century Montreal, see 
Bettina Bradbury, Working Families: Age. Gender, and Daily Survival in 1ndustrializing Montreal, 
Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1993, p. 106-7 and 161. On credit in the twentieth-cenlury fur trade, 
see Claude Gélinas, Entre l'assommoir et le godendart: Les Atikamekw et la conquête du Moyen-Nord 
québécois, /870-1940, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2003, p. 171-3 and Morantz, The White Man's Gonna 
Getcha, p. 112-7. 
95 For instance, an explosion in the number of cooperative groups specializing in loaning funds to 
members of particular immigrant communities took place during the tirst half ofthe twentieth century. 
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(the caisses populaires in Quebec) drew the mass of its relatively smal1 number of adherents 
from either the traditional petite bourgeoisie or the rising middle class, rather than from the 
ranks of the urban and nlral poor to which it was explicitly designed to cater. 96 Furthennore, 
with the exception of a smal1 number of wealthy individuals, this movement remained absent 
from Aboriginal Canada through the middle of the twentieth century. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has defined the present srudy's two central concepts (colonialism and 
money) before tracing them through the economic thought of classical political economists 
and the "on-the-ground" use of currency in Canada prior to 1950. Through money, defined as 
an inherently social measure of abstract value and a form of transferable debt based on the 
authority of a given region's dominant political power (whether the state or a private 
institution such as the Hudson's Bay Company), the fol1owing chapters grapple with Euro­
Canadian-Aboriginal interactions on several levels (e.g. economic, political, social) that 
scholars frequently treat in isolation. Moreover, money fumishes a concrete and conceptual 
See, for example, Sylvie Taschereau, "Les sociétés de prêts juives à Montréal, 1911-1945," Urban 
History Review/Revue d'histoire urbaine, vol. 33, no. 2 (Spring 2005), p. 3-16. Il is important to note, 
however, that most of the loan associations described by Taschereau specialized in providing fLmds to 
merchants and smal1 manufacturers, not to private individuals. However, organizations such as the 
Montreal Hebrew Free Loan Association did provide interest-free loans to "workers" as wel1 as small 
businessmen, artisans, and peddlers. 
96 Ronald Rudin writes: "the caisses faced difficulty in convincing the poorest members of Quebec 
society to join their movement until the eve of the Second World War." Ronald Rudin, ln Whose 
1nterest? Quebec's Caisses Populaires, 1900-1945, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 1990, p. xiii. See also Yvan Rousseau and Roger Levasseur, Du comptoir au réseau 
financier: L'expérience historique du Mouvement Desjardins dans la région du centre du Québec, 
1909-1970, Montreal, Boréal, 1995. On credit unions in the wider sweep of western Canadian politica1 
and economic history, see Alvin Finkel, The Social Credit Phenomenon in Alberta, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1989, lan MacPherson, "From the Secretary's Desk to Main Street: 
Change and Transition in the British Columbia Credit Union Movement, 1936-1960," Historical 
Papers/Communications historiques, vol. 22 (1987), p. 212-29, and lan MacPherson, "Sorne Fortune 
and a Little Fame: Co-Operatives as Ladders for Upward Mobility in the Canadian West," Journal of 
the West, vol. 43, no. 2 (Spring 2004), p. 36-43. 
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means of gauging the extent to which unequal power relations characterized nineteenth and 
twentieth-century Canadian colonialism in both material and discursive terms. Indeed, an 
analysis of money provides insight into both First Nations' socioeconomic status and 
Western preconceived notions conceming Indigenous peoples and their ability to handle cash. 
As the following chapters will demonstrate, these two distinct levels of experience fed into 
each other, shaping certain aspects of Aboriginal history throughout the period. It is 
important to note, however, that the Canadian monetary regime did not exist for Aboriginal 
peoples alone, but served to integrate them, alongside recent immigrants and Francophone 
and Anglophone North Americans, in the po!itical, social, and economic space of the colonies 
and, later, the Canadian nation-state. Thus, the extended attention devoted to the broader 
history of the monetary system in Canada has served to contextualize the following chapters' 
analysis while reminding readers that Amerindian money-use, like Amerindian history more 
broadly, did not take place in a vacuum, but was closely intertwined with the monetary 
experience of non-Aboriginal peoples. 
Nevel1heless, the concept of colonia!ism provides an ideal means of grasping the 
many particularities of historical money-use among First Nations. In the Canadian context, 
colonialism and money first interacted at the ideological and cultural leve!. Extrapolating 
from Locke, Adam Smith and his followers created an intellectual framework within which 
money was a uniquely Western phenomenon. These thinkers considered the absence of 
precious-metal-based currency as offering proof of the superiority of Europe's "developed" 
economies. Of course, this !ine of argument was teleological and specious: it proceeded from 
the belief that European societies were superior to their Aboriginal counterparts and thus the 
evidence offered did nothing more than "prove" these thinkers' initial premise. Regardless, it 
did aid in making the appropriation of N011h America and other parts of the globe appear 
"natura!." By way of conjectural history, orthodox economics held (and continues to hold) 
that Western monetary norrns provided the single model towards which ail societies tend. The 
economic thought of the Early Modem and Modern periods, then, was intimately bound to 
colonialism as it contributed a measure of intellectual justification to the project of imperial 
expansion and exploitation. 
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However, economic thought only accounts for a fraction of money's colonial role. 
At a much more basic level, the state's imposition ofan official money ofaccount, along with 
the latter-day circulation of material media explicitly embodying this abstract measure of 
value, served to unify economic space, thereby physically and conceptually creating coherent 
political space. This real-world process fed back into the ideological underpinnings of 
economic thought in order to reinforce and perpetuate the "natural order" of colonialism. The 
colonial and later federal states existed in North America because its agents proclaimed as 
much and because the signs of its existence (among them, money) circulated for ail to see. 
Despite this highly visible ability to legitimate Euro-Canadian political formations, however, 
money's role in more mundane contexts is less clear-cut. Indeed, although First Nations 
theoretically lost a great deal of power to the state and capital du ring the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, such change often failed to translate into practice as Amerindians proved 
capable of employing money to their advantage, both within the community and in 
interactions with powerful Euro-Canadian actors. The present study, then, distinguishes 
between the monetary power accorded First Nations at the discursive level (most often by the 
state) and the force they were able to exert through money-use in actual lived experience. In 
this way, it argues that theory (in the form of Indian or corporate policy) justified systemic 
inequalities while its practical implementation frequently produced results that undercut these 
same theoretical distinctions. 
Chapter 3 
Money, First Nations, and the State during the Nineteenth Century 
This chapter considers the interplay of money and formai politic relations between 
the state and First Nations from the 1820s to the tum of the twentieth century. It ana1yzes 
monetary debates as wel1 as Indian Affairs' policy and practice at the imperial, colonial, 
federal, and local levels in order to detail the power that various political actors exerted 
through money in Aboriginal Canada. As the nineteenth century unfolded, both the 
relationship between these different levels of govemment and the role ascribed to the state by 
mainstream Euro-Canadian political theory, discourse, and practice changed. Money, in both 
its physical and abstract forms, provides an excellent perch from which to study these 
changes. Indeed, this chapter argues that the development of the formai political relations and 
structures within which money played a role mirrored the phenomenal, although still highly 
limited, expansion of the state's theoretical prerogatives and material power during the 
century, even as its involvement in quotidian Aboriginal money-use remained marginal. 
The present chapter considers three distinct political scales. The first, analyzed 
primarily through the debate surrounding the proposed commutation of Indian presents, 
involves relations between the metropole and the colonies. Although the British Empire 
played a relatively minor role in the day-to-day administration of Indian affairs prior to the 
1860 transfer of authority in the matter to the colonies, the Colonial Office did involve itself 
in major policy decisions, in the process contributing to the maintenance and extension of the 
fundamentally unbalanced field of power relations characteristic of colonialism. The colonial 
and later federal states also actively participated in this process, although somewhat 
impotently at first. Beginning in the inunediate aftermath of the War of 1812, the Indian 
Department, then under imperial jurisdiction, saw its size and budget slashed. This overall 
retreat on the part of the institution continued through Confederation when, after the 
legislative and administrative reforms of the 1850s and 1860s, Indian Affairs emerged a 
much larger and significantly more powerful institution than it had been at any time since the 
early nineteenth century. The monetmy content of Indian policy reflects these changes, with 
the Department gaining legal prerogatives that theoretically allowed it to implement 
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significant surveillance of the everyday lives of First Nations during the final third of the 
nineteenth century. However, when translated into practice at the local level these theoretical 
changes had limited and sometimes incongruous effects. Indeed, although Mashteuiatsh and 
Wendake experienced relatively little state intervention into local monetary issues prior to the 
administrative changes of 1870s (mostly among the Huron and then only incidentally), the 
legal changes of the second half of the nineteenth century from which Indian Affairs drew its 
significantly increased authority did not lead to any major growth in state intervention III 
monetary matters among either the Innu or the Huron. 
This chapter, then, shifts from distant debates, through colonial and federal practice 
and policy, to local experience in order to demonstrate money's formaI and informaI political 
character in First Nations-state relations. In its final section, the chapter focuses solely on the 
Huron and Innu, not including the Moose Factory Cree due to the state's near total absence 
from James Bay prior to the early twentieth century. This approach, beginning in distant 
imperial networks of conununication and continuing through local conditions, allows for an 
analysis of the point to which money served as a vehicle of colonialism during the period. It 
also demonstrates the ways in which the combination of these different analytical scales 
provides perspective on processes that transcend each of them individually. In this chapter, 
then, money serves to vertically integrate the study of Ameridian experience of nineteenth­
century state formation, ultimateIy arguing that, insofar as monetary issues are concerned, the 
historiography has tended to exagerate the state's everyday influence over First Nations. 
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Annuai Presents, Money, and the "Improvident Indian," 1820s-1850s1 
In 1827, Earl Dalhousie, govemor-in-chief of British North America, asserted that 
the imperial policy of "making useful presents as payment" to First Nations originated in a 
desire "to avoid temptation.,,2 In doing so, Dalhousie portrayed Indian presents as a form of 
social assistance, thereby participating in a widespread nineteenth-century debate on the 
relationship between poverty and the improvidence of the poor that transcended Indian 
policy. By the end of the Victorian era, this debate had been at least temporarily carried by 
the infantilizing vision promoted by Dalhousie, which refused to recognize the ability of both 
Arnerindians and the poor more generally to manage their own financial affairs or even to 
handle cash 3 Although the historiography recognizes the existence of this "dogma of 
improvidence," no study has yet to examine its development with relation to Canada 's 
Aboriginal peoples. In fact, the only historical study devoted to state provision of social 
assistance to First Nations makes virtually no mention of the period preceding 
Confederation.4 This historiographical lacuna obscures both the origins of welfare provision 
to Aboriginal peoples in Canada and the developing ideology that informed state action with 
regard to the poor during the nineteenth century. 
1 For an earlier version of sorne of this section's arguments, see Brian Gettler, "L'argent, l'État et les 
Autochtones: la tentative gouvernementale de monétisation des relations dans les années 1820 et 
1830," in Alain Beaulieu and Maxime Gohier (eds.), Les actes du colloque: les Autochtones et l'État, 
Montreal, Chaire de recherche du Canada sur la question territoriale, 2008, p. 3-26. 
2 "Extract of a Despatch from Lord Dalhousie to Mr. Secretary Huskisson," 22 November 1827, in 
Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes (North America, New South Wales, Van Diemen's Land and British 
Guiana)... , London, 1834, p. 6. 
3 On the evolution of Canadian debate on poverty during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see 
Dennis Guest, The Emergence ofSocial Security in Canada, 3rd ed., Vancouver, UBC Press, 1997. In 
spite of this altered understanding of the roots of poverty, the state has remained extremely reticent to 
distribute cash to the impoverished to the present day. For an example of a program that managed to 
overcome much of this reticence in the mid-twentieth century (family allowances), see Dominique 
Marshall, Aux origines sociales de l'État-providence. Familles québécoises, obligation scolaire et 
allocationsfamiliales, 1940-1955, Montreal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1998. 
4 Hugh Shewell, "Enough to Keep Them Alive": lndian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 2004. 
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This section argues that the state's diverse and often conflicted discourse and 
practice with respect to monetary circulation contributed to an ongoing process by which all 
Amerindians were defined as being improvident by nature. It focuses on the distribution of 
presents by the British crown to its Aboriginal allies in the St. Lawrence Valley during a 
period of intense retrenchment in the Indian Department. The section pays particular attention 
to imperial and colonial policy debates with regard to Indian presents. These debates reveal 
much of the ideological apparatus that contributed to the formation and reforrnation of 
Canadian Indian policy over the period. Following Philip 1. Deloria, this section argues that 
ideology, which it seeks to access via officiai state discourse as articulated by high-ranking 
imperial and colonial administrators, has played an important role in constituting and 
maintaining the uneven power relations typical of North American colonialism to the present 
day.5 In more concrete terms, it describes the imperfect process through which ideas are 
enunciated and, ultimately, contribute to the reformation of "reality.,,6 Drawing on Clifford 
Geertz, this section argues that the ideology promoted by administrators during the period 
provided them with "the suasive images" through which the management of Aboriginal 
peoples and their resources cou Id "bc sensibly grasped" by contemporary Canadian public 
opinion.? It asserts, then, that this imagery, which dùring the nineteenth century became 
hegemonic in nature, contributed to justifying the growing theoretical powers that legislators 
5 Philip 1. Deloria, Indians in Unexpected Places, Lawrence, University of Kansas Press, 2004, p. 7-11. 
6 For a description of the state's role in imposing logical constmcts in the "real world," see James C. 
Scott, Seeing Like aState: How Certain Schemes ta Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1998. 
7 Although, Geertz is describing ideology's l'ole in the development of an aulonomous politics - that is, 
political systems not "firmly embedded in Edmund Burke's golden assemblage of 'ancienl opinions 
and rules of life'" - this point is entirely applicable to ideology's ability to justify and naturalize 
political action. Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System," in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology 
and Discontent, London, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964, p. 47-76. On "public opinion" and the ways 
in which this notion, born of the Kantian enlightenrnenl, came to establish itself as the primary means 
by which the state made authoritative decisions in British North America, see Jeffrey 1. McNairn, The 
Capacity ta Judge: Public Opinion and Deliberative Democracy in Upper Canada, 1791-1854, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2000. 
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accorded Indian Affairs during the second half of the century and beyond.8 In this sense, the 
"improvident Indian" that emerged from these debates paliicipated in the naturalization of the 
sociopolitical distinction between Aboriginal peoples and ail other Canadians upon which the 
Department ofIndian Affairs continues to base its legitimacy today. 
The figure of the "improvident Indian" is closely bound to several other common 
nineteenth-century representations, most notably that of the improvident poor. Victorian 
conunentators involved in debates on the nature of poverty evenhlally arrived at the 
consensus that recipients of social assistance naturally lacked foresight - that is, they were 
incapable of managing their money in a sensible and self-sustaining manner. 9 In Mariana 
Valverde's words, "there was a lingering suspicion that what many poor people needed was 
moral reform and not money."IO This conviction that the poor were improvident combined 
effectively with pre-existing stereotypes of Native peoples, particularly those of the colonial 
period ascribing indolence and heathenry to Amerindians. James Axtell writes that European 
conunentators were conunonly struck by the lack of industry perceived in the activities of 
Aboriginal men. As confinnation of their suspicions, Europeans pointed to men's enjoyment 
of the aristocratie leisure activity of the hunt while their wives, mothers, and daughters slaved 
in the fields. Of course, this observation was a product of idealized Western social norms that 
reserved for men the hard manuallabor of farming while preserving women in the "comfort" 
8 Jean and John Comaroff argue that hegemony "exists in reciprocal interdependence with ideology: it 
is that part of a dominant worldview which has been naluralized and, having hidden ilself in 
orthodoxy, no more appears as ideology at ail." Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and 
Revolution, vol. l, Christianity. Colonialism. and Consciousness in South Africa, Chicago, University 
of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 25. 
9 Gertrude Himmelfarb, The idea of Poverty: England in the Early Industrial Age, New York, Knopf, 
1984. 
10 Mariana Valverde, "The Mixed Social Economy as a Canadian Tradition," Studies in Political 
Economy, vol. 47 (Summer 1995), p. 41. 
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of domestic work." At the same time, Amerindians' lack of religious enlightenrnent 
encouraged generations of Europeans to view them as "pOOl' Indians," ignorant of the Gospel 
and in need of charity. 12 The figure of the improvident Indian also draws heavily on the 
conviction, born of Victorian evolutionary thought, that Amerindians were in the process of 
disappearing. 13 Rather than celebrating Native peoples' inherent virtue, as enlightenrnent 
thinkers had done via the "noble savage," nineteenth-century commentators tended to assume 
that First Nations were doomed to extinction due to the advance of industrialization and 
"superior" Western civilization. Thus, the Amerindian of the nineteenth century was not to be 
held up as a moral yard stick for a decrepit Europe, as had previously been the case, but was 
rather to be pitied as a being whose exploits, while glorious, were confined solely to the past 
and whose future was non-existent. 14 In other words, this discursive Amerindian, incapable of 
looking to the future, was literally improvident. 
This section concentrates on the fierce debate over the monetization of Indian 
presents that took place during the early nineteenth century. This debate, launched by a series 
of proposais put forward by the Colonial Office, centered on what was perhaps the state's 
premier l'ole in relations with Aboriginal peoples through the middle of the nineteenth 
Il James Axtell, "The Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America," in James 
Axtell, The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America, New 
York, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 39-86. 
12 Laura M. Stevens, The Poor Indians: British Missionaries, Native Americans, and Colonial 
Sensibility, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004. 
13 Fiona 1. Stafford, The Last of the Race: The Growth of a Myth from Milton to Darwin, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1994. For this argument applied to the Huron of Wendake, see Véronique Rozon, 
"Un dialogue identitaire: les Hurons de Lorette et les autres au XIXe siècle," M.A. Thesis (His tory), 
Montreal, Université du Québec à Montréal, 2005, p.77-89 and "Pour une réflexion sur l'identité 
huronne au XIXe siècle: une analyse de la thématique du 'dernier des Hurons' sous l'éclairage des 
théories de l'ethnicité,'' in Alain Beaulieu and Maxime Gohier (eds.), La recherche relative aux 
Autochtones: perspectives historiques et contemporaines, Montreal, Chaire de recherche du Canada 
sur la question territoriale autochtone, 2007, p. 223-61. 
14 On the noble savage, see Robert F. Berkhofer, Jr., The White Man 's Indian: Images ofthe American 
Indianfrom Columbus to the Present, New York, Vintage Books, 1979, p. 72-80. 
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century: the distribution of presents. This section concentrates on this issue because although 
other, more explicitly monetary proposais were made with regard to Canada's Aboriginal 
population during the period, the commutation of presents offers the longest and most 
detailed intra-state debate conceming Amerindians' ability to responsibly handle money.15 It 
also took place largely within the public eye as the imperial and colonial state rapidly 
published most of the official correspondence in which the debate took place. 16 After having 
preoccupied the officiais in London and the colonies who oversaw the Indian Department 
over a span of several decades, this debate on the wisdom of supplying cash to Amerindian 
communities contributed significantly to the growing Euro-Canadian tendency to represent 
Aboriginal peoples as incapable of participating in civil society on the same terms as theÎr 
non-Native neighbors. 
Thus, an analysis of this debate sheds light on the process by which the British and 
Canadian states took charge of Upper and Lower Canada's Aboriginal population during the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Through an examination of official correspondence 
conceming Indian presents, this section highlights the influence of discourse and 
representation on policy goals. However, it does not do mean to do so naïvely. Thus, the 
section does not proceed from the widespread historiographical assumption that Indian 
Affairs clearly spelled out its goals, whether accomplished or not, in its discourse. 17 However, 
15 The Bagot commissioners, in their Iist of recommendations offer a tantalizing suggestion: "That 
Institutions calculated to promote economy, such as Savings Banks, be established among them. It 
appears probable that Building Societies, similar to those existing in England, would be of much 
benefit to the Tribes." Unfortunately, this recommendation was neither implemented nor did it 
generate any appreciable amount of debate. "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," in 
Canada, Journals ofthe Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix T, Montreal, 1847. 
16 Furthermore, in Britain, at least, these publications were read by those outside of government who 
had an interest in lndian Affairs. A committee of the Aborigines Protection Society, for exampJe, 
referenced them in detail in its well-known 1839 report. Aborigines Protection Society, Report on the 
lndians ofUpper Canada, London, William Bali, Arnold, and Co., 1839. 
17 For the typically naive discourse-centric analysis, see John L. Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, 
Assimilation: An Outline History of Canada's Indian Policy," Western Canadian Journal of 
Anthropology, vol. 6, no. 2 (1976), p. 13-30. For a study of Indian Affairs' lack of success in 
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official discourse did affect adminish'ators' policy decisions in very real ways, largely as a 
result of its capacity to define what was and was not conceivable. This section argues that by 
way of the discursive redefinition of the Amerindian as being improvident by nature and thus 
in perpetuai need of the state's guidance and protection, high-ranking colonial administrators 
reinforced the Indian Department's position as the "guardian" of Canada's Aboriginal 
peoples, thereby promoting its continued institutional existence. 18 
The Nature ofIndian Presents 
By the 1820s, the policy of distributing presents occupied a historically important 
position in European-Aboriginal relations in North America. During the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, both the French and the British made extensive use of gifts in their 
diplomatie efforts aimed above ail at forming and maintaining military alliances with First 
Nations. 19 Within the specifie context of British North America, the distribution of Indian 
implementing its publicly stated policy goals, see 1.R. Miller, "Owen Glendower, Hotspur, and 
Canadian Indian Policy," Ethnohistory, vol. 37, no. 4 (Autumn 1990), p. 386-415. 
18 In her compelling study of institutional social agency, anthropologist Mary Douglas notes that in 
order "To acquire legitimacy, every kind of institution needs a formula that founds its rightness in 
reason and in nature." This legitimacy ultimately permits the institution to ensure its continued 
existence. In this case, colonial officiaIs founded Indian Affairs' legitimacy on its socially desirable 
and apparently humane goal of integrating Canada's Aboriginal peoples into the national body politic, 
thereby helping this segment of the population advance its lot in Iife to the level of that enjoyed by 
other Canadians. Douglas, How Institutions Think, Syracuse, NY, Syracuse University Press, 1986,45. 
Of course, Western discourse had long emphasized the Indian's improvident and indolent nature. 
However, the historical process presently under consideration differs in that it involved the state as a 
means of correcting this probJem for the first lime. On historical precedents for this vision, see 
Berkhofer, The White Man 's Indian. 
19 On the French system, see Catherine Desbarats, "The Cost of Early Canada's Native Alliances: 
Reality and Scarcity's Rhetoric," William & Mary Quarterly, vol. 52, no. 4 (I995), p. 609-630, Gilles 
Havard, Empire et métissages: Indiens et Français dans le Pays d'en Haut, 1660-1715, Sillery, QC and 
Paris, Septentrion and Presses de l'Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2003, and Cornelius 1. Jaenen, "The 
Role of Presents in the French-Amerindian Trade," in Duncan Cameron (ed.), Explorations in 
Canadian Econimc History: Essays in Honour o/Irene M Spry, Ottawa, University of Ottawa Press, 
1985, p. 231-50. On the importance of presents in the "materialization of speech" - that is, in proving 
speecb's veracity - during diplomatie negotiations in northeastern North America, see Jonathan C. 
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presents had attained an effectivcly unassailable position ln policy circles following 
"Pontiac 's Rebellion" - an uprising at least partially brought about by General Jeffery 
Arnherst's decision to abolish such presents following the end of the Seven Years' War. 20 
However, as a result of the virtual disappearance from North America of armed imperial 
rivalry after the War of 1812, British authorities increasingly called into question the 
continued distribution of Indian presents.2l Of course, Canada 's Aboriginal population did 
not necessarily share this belief that presents had become expendable. In fact, through much 
of the period Amerindians continued to interpret British presents as a sign of good faith 
necessary for a continued relationship.22 
However, these presents were not merely symbolic; they also formed a source of 
revenue for Canada's Aboriginal population du ring the period. A hypothetical Amerindian 
family of five receiving presents in Upper Canada in the early 1840s obtained rough1y seven 
percent of the value in goods of what Douglas McCalla reported the "average" farm in that 
Lainey, La "monnaie des sauvages ": Les colliers de wampum d'hier à aujourd'hui, Sillery, QC, 
Septentrion, 2004, p. 50-3. 
20 Greogory Evans Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations and the British Empire, 
Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002, p. 70-5 and Richard White, The Middle 
Ground: /ndians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, /650-/8/5, New York, 
Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 257-8 and 286-9. On the restoration of presents by the 
superintendent of the Northern Division of the British Imperial Indian Department, Sir William 
Johnson, in 1764, see ibid, p. 310. 
21 On the British system of presents after the War of 1812, see Catherine A. Sims, "Algonkian-British 
Relations in the Upper Great Lakes Region: Gathering to Give and to Receive Presents, 1815-1843," 
Ph.D. Dissertation (History), University of Western Ontario, 1992 and Anne Réthoré, "La fin d'un 
symbole d'alliance. Les Britanniques et la politique de distribution des présents aux Amérindiens, 
1815-1858," MA Thesis (History), Université de Rennes II and Université du Québec à Montréal, 
2000. 
22 For example, during an 1829 council with a British representative on the permanent settlement of his 
people near Sault Ste. Marie, Shingwaukonse stated: "if the British proved faithful to their Native 
allies and continued to supply presents, he and his band would consider moving permanently to the 
Canadian shore." Janet E. Chute, The Legacy of Shingwaukonse: A Century of Native Leadership, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1998. 
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province annually sold as produce during the 1830s and 1840s.23 Moreover, this percentage 
underestimates the value of presents in certain circumstances as some Amerindians received 
goods of greater value than did the members of this family. For instance, pensioners, 
recipients of what the Indian Department termed "full equipment," drew a greater value of 
goods than those who only received presents, strictly speaking ("common equipment"). Even 
among the latter class certain Amerindians, most notably chiefs, received presents of greater 
value. 24 These distinctions as ide, throughout the period all classes of Canada's Aboriginal 
population received their presents primarily in the form of cloth and other sewing materials, 
blankets, and ammunition, along with various other utilitarian objects (primarily farming and 
fishing implements).25 
23 The "average" Upper Canadian farm sold produce worth f45.5.8'1z Hfx. This figure was arrived at 
by averaging the mean sales per year of those farms reported by McCalla for the 1830s and 1840s with 
the exception of the farm that produced the greatest commercial revenue (nearly five times that of the 
next most profitable) and the farm that produced the least. Of course, as McCalla notes, there is little 
reason to believe that farrners sold much more than half of their produce during the period. Douglas 
McCalla, Planting the Province: The Economie History of Upper Canada, 1784-1870, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 1993, p. 84 and 271. The value of the hypothetical family's presents (O. 
7.6'1z Hfx) was based on the cost of presents distributed to each class of recipient in both provinces 
circa 1843. The family was made up of one warrior, one woman, and three children, one from each of 
the Indian Department's defined age groups (1-4 years old, 5-9, and 10-14 for girls or 10-15 for boys). 
Given that girls received more valuable presents than boys, 1 averaged the presents' value for each age 
group in order to arrive at three "genderless" children. Appendix no. 59 in Canada, "Report on the 
Affairs of the Indians in Canada," 1847. The conversion rates from sterling to Halifax currency (fl stg 
=' fl.l111 (f1.2.2YJ) Hfx) are from A.B. McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900, 
Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 292. 
24 Appendix no. 59 in Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," 1847. 
25 For a list of the goods distributed on Drummond Island, Upper Canada in 1820s, see Appendix no. 
60, in Ibid. For the goods distributed in Lower Canada in 1830, 1834, and 1836, see Appendix no. 57 
in Ibid. For the list of goods distributed in Upper Canada beginning in the summer of 1838, see 
Appendix no. 58 in Ibid. 
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Debates on Commutation du ring the 1820s and 1830s 
The first move on the part of the British imperial state in the nineteenth century to 
significantly alter the role of presents in its relationship with Canada's First Nations came 
irrunediately following the end of the War of 1812. As a result of the hostilities between 
Great Britain and the United States, annual imperial expenditure for the Indian Department, a 
large portion of which was dedicated to the system of presents aimed at securing and 
maintaining alliances with northeastern North America's Aboriginal peoples, had ballooned 
to over 200% of its pre-war level. In 1816, in an effort to return military spending to 
peacetime proportions, Lord Bathurst, the secretary of state for the colonies, ordered the 
Indian Department to reduce "the Indian Establishment to the footing upon which it stood in 
the Year 1811.,,26 By 1823, the Department had largely surpas'Sed this goal, cutting its annual 
expenditure to less than half of that made twelve years earlier,27 Although the Colonial Office 
and the Treasury sought further cuts in the Indian Department's budget, particularly in the 
area of Indian presents, imperial administrators took no concrete action in this direction until 
Viscount Goderich replaced Bathurst as colonial secretary in April 1827. 
In July of that year, Goderich sent a letter to the governor-in-chief of British North 
America, George Ramsay, the Earl of Dalhousie, requesting detailed information on "the 
precise expense of the Indian department, both in the salaries of officers, and in the amount of 
stores distributed to the Indians, with the view of effecting the reduction, and ultimately 
abolition of the establishment." Goderich further asked Dalhousie to direct 
the heads of the department... to confer with leaders or chiefs of the Indians, who 
are entitled to annual presents, either as subsidies to their tribes, being independent, 
or as rewards for past services as subjects, or as retaining fees in nature of half-pay 
to those who have been employed in arms, or lastly in payment of lands ceded to 
His Majesty's Government, and to negociate with them for the commutation of 
26 Quoted in John Sheridan Milloy, 'The Era of Civilization - British Policy for the Indians of Canada, 
1830-1860," Ph,D. Dissertation (History), Oxford, University of Oxford, 1978 p, 47. 
27 Ibid, p. 48. 
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such payments into money, such commutation to be fixed in British currency, and 
to be payable in the description of coin most agreeable to the chiefs. 
By seeking to convert Indian presents to monetary payments, in the ultimate goal of 
eliminating them altogether, the Colonial Office aimed to realize a "necessary measure of 
public economy and improvement" - that is, it sought to reduce the expenses of the British 
Empire. 28 
Dalhousie responded to Goderich 's instructions by asserting that the Amerindians 
under his charge would receive "with the utmost alarm" any proposai "to convert the 
payment of presents, or other tribute to them, in money." Dalhousie attributed this 
hypothetical reaction to what he considered to be the Aboriginal penchant for spending ail 
money that came into their possession on alcohol. In fact, he asserted that, "the system 
adopted in making useful presents as payment was intended expressly to avoid temptation." 
Dalhousie, then, rejected the notion that such an investigation was warranted, stating, "1 think 
the proposed measure fully fraught with mischief to the Indians, no saving nor advantage 
possible to Govemment, and the future consequences of it dangerous in the extreme.,,29 In 
spite of his opposition to the proposai, in June 1828, nearly a year after Goderich sent his 
instructions, the govemor general ordered Major-General Darling to compose a report on the 
state of Upper and Lower Canada's Amerindian population.3o 
Darling submitted his report at the end of July to Dalhousie who, in tum, sent it on to 
the new colonial secretary, Sir George Murray, the following October. While ignoring the 
question of commutation with regard to Lower Canada, Darling found that in Upper Canada 
the outright abolition of Indian presents or their commutation into money "wouId be received 
28 "Copy of a Despatch from Lord Goderich to Earl Dalhousie," 14 July 1827, in Great Britain, 
Aboriginal Tribes ... , p. 5. 
29 "Extract of a Despatch from Lord Dalhousie to Ml'. SecretaI)' Huskisson," 22 November 1827, in 
Ibid, p. 6. 
JO "Instructions to Major-General Darling... ," in "No. 5: Copy Despatch and Enclosures from Lord 
Dalhousie to Sir George Murray," 27 October 1828, in Ibid, p. 31. 
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with the utmost apprehension and alalm as to the further intentions of their great father." 
Moreover, he asserted that, "The Indian would receive no benefit whatever from a small sum 
of money put into his own hand, which he would find of little value, compared with his 
blanket and ammunition." Darling did feel, however, that "a sum of money, in lieu of a 
portion of the presents now given, might be annually laid out for them to advantage, in the 
purchase of... agricultural implements and common tools." The money used for such 
purchases, according to Darling's scheme, would be drawn from each band 's land cession 
payments. In order to provide precedent and prove its practicality, this proposai looked to Sir 
Peregrine Maitland's experiment in Amerindian "civilization," where, according to Darling, 
"One hundred pounds was so laid out in the case of the Mississaquas of the Credit River, and 
with the best effect.,,31 
Sir James Kempt, Dalhousie's successor as governor general, reiterated many of 
Darling's points in a letter to Murray sent in May 1829. Kempt asserted that before replacing 
presents with monetary payments, the government should be certain that the Amerindian 
population had advanced sufficiently to be able to use money wisely. "1 am of the opinion, 
however, that the Indians, when settled, would readily agree to the substitution of implements 
of husbandry, and seed, &c. for many of the gaudy and useless articles which now compose 
their presents and which are daily falling in their estimation; but until a material improvement 
takes place in the habits of the Indians, it would be unwise to place at their disposai any 
commutation in money for those presents, of which they would in ail probability make an 
improper use.,,32 Thus, in complete absence of any Amerindian input or, for that matter, any 
recognition that such input might be desirable, Kempt claimed that Canada's Aboriginal 
peoples wou Id happily accept presents in the form of agricultural goods. Simultaneously, 
JI "Enclosure No. 1," in "No. 5: Copy Despatch and Enclosures From Lord Dalhousie to Sir George 
Murray," 27 October 1828, in Ibid, p. 29. For more on Darling's report, see John Leslie, "Commissions 
of Inquiry into Indian Affairs in the Canadas, 1828-1858: Evolving a Corporate MemOlY for the Indian 
Department," Ottawa, Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 1985, p. 20-3. 
32 "No. 8: Copy of a Despatch from Sir 1. Kempt to Sir George Murray," 16 May 1829, in Great 
Britain, Aboriginal Tribes ... , p. 39. Emphasis in original. 
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Kempt argued that the state should make every effort to avoid placing money ln 
Amerindians' improvident hands. 
Of course, imperial and colonial administrators were not alone in conunenting on the 
proposed conunutation; Amerindians and missionaries also joined the fray. However, given 
the nature of the published correspondence in which commutation was discussed, it remains 
uncertain whether the Aboriginal point of view portrayed therein is in any way definitive. 
Ultimately, the documents under consideration reflect the opinions of the administrators who 
sent them. In other words, bureaucrats and politicians employed Amerindian "voices" in the 
official correspondence of the 1820s and 1830s to support their particular vision of 
conunutation and not to provide a free forum for Native self-expression.33 
This is not to suggest, however, that the opinions expressed by Amerindians in 
reference to the monetization of presents are somehow disingenuous. Thus, although an 
imperial administrator, colonial under-secretary Robert William Hay, made use of Chief John 
Asance's request that a portion of the Matchedash Bay Chippewas' presents be distributed in 
money in order to bolster the argument in favor of commutation, Asance's request clearly 
remains his own. In 1831, Methodist minister and member of the Credit River Mississauga 
band, Peter Jones, wrote to Goderich to offer "a short account of the Indian people of Upper 
Canada, to whom 1 belong.,,34 ln his letter, Jones briefly commented on the distribution of 
presents generally before conveying Asance's request. Jones wrote that Asance "wishes to 
have something always in his pockets and never be empty, so that when he gets hungry he 
may put his hands into his pockets and find something jingling to buy bread with.,,35 Thus, 
Asance refutes the colonial contention of Amerindian improvidence by arguing that 
33 This observation holds for Missionary voices as weil. On the difficuJties of reconslrucling an 
Aboriginal position concerning the conunutation of presents, see Gettler, "L'argent, l'État et les 
Autochtones." 
34 "Copy of a Letter from Mr. Peter Jones to Viscount Goderich," 26 Ju\y 1831, in Great Britain, 
Aboriginal Tribes... , p. 135. 
35 ibid, p. 136. 
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providing presents in monetary fonn would ultimately be of greater use in that they would 
allow their disceming recipients to purchase goods when necessary. 
Missionaries, who frequently presented themselves as spokesmen for Aboriginal 
peoples, took part in this debate on similar terms. For instance, in 1829 Reverend James 
Magrath, a Toronto missionary, sent a report concerning the state of the Mississauga village 
on the Credit River to Sir John Colbome, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada. This 
village, initially settled in the early 1820s under the aegis of Maitland's governrnentally­
sponsored civilization program, presented many nineteenth-century conunentators with the 
model through which Amerindians might be "raised up" to the Euro-Canadian level.3G In the 
first part of his report, completed in March 1828, Magrath commented that the Mississauga 
would prefer to receive their annuai presents in cash rather than in the fonn in which the 
Indian Departrnent had traditionally distributed them. "They say that the articles they get are 
generally unnecessary, as they cannot use or wear out those they receive in a year; they 
frequently dispose of many aliicles at a great loss, particularly the guns. If they received one­
half in cash they couId procure many necessaries which (as they are now settled) they stand 
in need of, on more reasonable terms than they could do with the presents." Magrath annexed 
to his report a short note written in January 1829 in which he, following the request of John 
Jones, Peter Jones's brother and the band's schoolmaster, reiterated the Mississauga's desire 
to receive a portion of their annual presents in currency. In making this request, Magrath 
commented, the Missis~augas ultimately aimed to purchase agricultural and fishing supplies. 
By highlighting the progress this First Nation had already made, then, the missionary refuted 
colonial administrators' assertion that Amerindians were incapable of managing their own 
financial affairs. Ultimately, this rhetorical approach explains why colonial authorities found 
36 For more on Maitland and the establishment of the Mississauga model-village on the Credit River, 
see Leslie, "Commissions oflnquiry ... ," p. 12-7. 
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Magrath's recommendation acceptable - although arguing for commutation, he also testified 
that the colonial "civilization" project had begun beaI'ing fruit. 3? 
Following a period of inaction, the imperial state once more began to pursue 
retrenchment in January 1836 when the British colonial secretary, Lord Glenelg, sent near­
identical letters to the govemor-in-chief of British North America, Archibald Acheson, the 
Earl of Gosford, and the lieutenant govemor of Upper Canada, Sir Francis Bond Head. 
Glenelg informed the two colonial administrators of a resolution that the Committee of the 
House of Commons on Military Expenditure in the Colonies had recently adopted calling for 
the reduction of spending on the part of the Indian Department. In particular, this resolution 
dealt with the expense incurred by the annual distribution of Indian presents in Upper and 
Lower Canada. The Committee inquired "whether any Arrangement might not be made to 
dispense with such Distribution in the future, or to commute the Presents for Money.,,38 
London, as it had done a decade earlier, sought to reduce the expenses incurred by 
the Indian Department with a view towards the institution 's eventual dissolution. Whereas 
Goderich had not specified a timetable for the Department's abolition in his directions to 
Dalhousie, Glenelg actively sought to reassure colonial administrators that no action would 
be taken immediately. Rather, he asserted that his interest lay in gaining more precise 
information conceming Canada's Aboriginal population so that the imperial state might 
37 In ail of the published correspondence under consideration, this is the only instance in which a 
colonial administrator forwarded the comments of a missionary or Amerindian in favor of 
commutation. Jones's request for cash, however, was mitigated by Magrath's assertion that the 
Mississauga were interested in obtaining agricultural and fishing supplies in place of "[t]hose trinkets 
and gaudy-coloured clothes which they formerly admired so much." Tbis ultimately allowed Kempt to 
recommend a change in the goods distributed as presents while stiJl opposing commutation. "Report of 
the State of the Indians on the River Credit...," in "Enclosure No. 1," in "No. 8: Copy of a Despatch 
from Sir 1. Kempt to Sir George Murray," in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes... , p. 43. 
38 Quoted in "No. 1: Copy ofa Despatch from Lord Glenelg to the Earl of Gosford," 14 January 1836, 
in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts ofCorrespondence Since 1st April 1835, between the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies and the Governors of the British North American Provinces, Respecting the 
Indians in those Provinces, London, 1839, p. 1. 
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eventually institute savings in a manner that wou Id avoid harming First Nations. "1 feel 
bound, after much Consideration, to express my Opinion that the Time is not yet arrived at 
which it would be possible, consistently with good Faith, altogether to discontinue the annual 
Presents to the Indians." Instead of being a right to which the colonies' Amerindian 
population was entitled, Glenelg described the system of Indian presents as being a custom 
that continued to exist in order to keep the Amerindians docile. "[I]t is sufficient to observe, 
that the custom has now existed during a long Series of Years; that even in the Absence of 
any original Obligation a prescriptive Title has thus been created; and that this Title has been 
practically admitted by ail who have been officially cognizanl of the Matter, and that ail agree 
in stating that its sudden Abrogation would lead to great Discontent among the Indians, and 
. perhaps to Consequences of a very serious Nature.,,39 
In addition to interviewing the chiefs with respect to the substitution of money for 
presents, Glenelg directed the two governors to inquire as to whether the Amerindians in 
question would "sanction the Application of at least a Portion of the Sums now expended in 
the Purchase of Stores and Presents to the Erection of Schoolhouses, the Purchase of 
elementary Books, and the Paymenl of resident Schoolmasters, for the benefit of the Indian 
Tribes.,,40 Here again Glenelg's primary motivation was clearly the lightening of the 
Treasury's fiscalload. 
The Colonial Office did not propose the conversion of presents to money merely on 
the strength of potential savings to the Imperial Treasury - Glenelg also countenanced the 
proposai in the argument that money might, in fact, be beneficial to Canada's Aboriginal 
population. He remarked that if Gosford or Head should find "that the Well-being of the 
Indians would be promoted by substituting an Equivalent in Money in lieu of the Articles at 
present issued," they should consider themselves "at liberty... to effect such a 
39 "No. 1: 'CopY ofa Despatch from Lord Glenelg to the Earl of Gosford,' 14 January 1836," in Ibid, p. 
1. 
40 Ibid, p. 3. 
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Corrunutation. ,,41 Thus, the Colonial Office sought to drape the mantel of Aboriginal 
improvement over its actions in Canada in much the same way as it did in other parts of the 
British Empire. 42 As a result of the Siavery Abolition Act of 1833, imperial officiais found 
themselves capable of calling upon Britain's clear humanitarian credentials even when 
pursuing goals, such as retrenchment, which may have been detrimental to colonial subjects' 
best interests.43 Glenelg, however, could not force authorities in Canada to carry out his will 
because Britain, in contrast to France and Spain, did not mIe her colonial periphery from the 
imperial core in absolute terms, but rather employed a form of govemment through which 
officiais in London collaborated with those in the colonies in formulating and implementing 
policy. Thus, the Colonial Office's approach in this instance is symptomatic of its treatment 
of colonial governance in general: it requested information while giving free rein to colonial 
authorities who might choose to implement London's favored policy of commutation.44 
Head responded to Glenelg's instmctions by initially ignoring them and by finally 
refusing to respect them. In August 1836, Head repolied that the colonial secretary's 
directions had reached him too late to be acted upon that summer. Thus, instead of relaying 
the information sought by Glenelg, Head wrote concerning his scheme to purchase the whole 
41 Ibid, p. 2. 
42 This move towards the use of British power to improve the lives of its subject peoples tirst gained 
currency in the Jate-eighteenth century in the context of projects aimed at encouraging moral reform 
and scientific education among India's Indigenous population. Andrew Porter, "Trusteeship, Anti­
Siavery, and Humanitarianism," in Andrew Porter (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, vol. 
3, The Nineteenth Century, New York, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 198-221. 
43 On the British Empire's abolition of slavery and the ability of authorities through official discourse 
to sympathize "with humanitarian goals even when disinclined or unable to promote them effectively," 
see Ibid, esp. p. 201-4. 
44 On British imperial governance during the nineteenth century, see Peter Burroughs, "Imperial 
Institutions and the Government of Empire," in Porter (ed.), The Oxford History ofthe British Empire, 
vol. 3, p. 170-97. 
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of Manitoulin Island as a reserve for "those Indians, who are now impeding the Progress of 
Civilization in Upper Canada.,,45 
Three months later, Head responded to Glenelg's instructions by supplying him with 
a memorandum on the state of Upper Canada's Amerindian population and its Indian 
Department. Rather than being a detailed report, this memorandum presents Head's personal 
impressions and observations. Instead of submitting the question of commutation to Upper 
Canada's Amerindian communities, the lieutenant govemor simply answered it himself. "1 
am not prepared to recommend that Money should at present be substituted for Presents to 
the resident Indians in this Province, - lst, Because 1 think, unless good Arrangements were 
previously made, the Indians, from their improvident Habits, would in many Places be left 
destitute; and, 2dly, Because, without due Precaution, a Money Delivery to so many Men, 
Women, and Children might possibly be attended by very great Impositions." In other words, 
Head felt, regardless of the fact he was "quite alive to the Advantage which we should gain 
by the Substitution of Money, if it could be properly effected," that cash payments might 
ultimately cost the imperial treasury more than they were worth. In the end, he declared that 
he would need "Another Year's Experience and Reflection" before being able to provide a 
46definitive response - one which he never sent.
In contrast to other administrators' refusaI to adhere to the Colonial Office's 
instructions, Gosford complied by ordering, in October 1836, a detailed inquiry into the state 
of Lower Canada's Aboriginal population and into the possibility of replacing Indian presents 
with cash payments. He submitted the results of the inquiry to Glenelg in a series of letters 
beginning in November 1836 and culminating, in July 1837, in a report that he had 
commissioned from a committee of the Executive Council of Lower Canada detailing the 
45 "No 31: Copy of a Despatch from Sir F.B. Head, K.C.H., ta Lord Glenelg," 20 August 1836, in Ibid, 
p.122. 
46 "No. 32: Copy of a Despatch from Sir F.B. Head, K.è.H., ta Lord Glenelg," 20 November 1836, in 
Ibid, p. 129. 
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majority of the Indian Department's activities ln the province and including an in-depth 
analysis of the proposed commutation. 
In order to comply with Glenelg's instructions, the Montreal and Quebec district 
superintendents of the Indian Department held councils with each of Lower Canada's settled 
Arnerindian bands on the subject of commutation during the summer of 1836. Although the 
records generated in cormection with these meetings are by no means lengthy, they permit an 
invaluable glimpse of how presents were viewed in the province's Aboriginal communities. 
Each of the six bands interviewed by James Hughes, the superintendent for the Montreal 
district of the Indian Department, as weil as the four bands in the Quebec district 
superintendency, under Louis Juchereau Duchesnay, categorically rejected the proposa1.47 
This refusai to accept monetary payments from the state arose from two major claims: first, 
that money given in lieu of presents would deprive the communities' weaker members of 
basic necessities in that it would permit those receiving the cash - the heads of household - to 
spend it on alcohol and, second, that presents formed a venerable compact between the 
Crown and Canada's First Nations that could not in good faith be altered. 
Each of the Amerindian bands queried asserted in more or less identical fashion the 
problems that the substitution of money for presents would cause. The reaction of the 
Nipissing, Algonquin, and Iroquois of Lake ofTwo Mountains (Kanesatake) is, in this sense, 
typical: 
Tell our Father we want no Money from him; most of our young Men and many of 
the old ones would make bad use ofit... Was our Father to give us Money instead of 
the Articles we now receive as our annual Presents, our Wives and Children would 
be naked and miserable, and we Men unable to procure a Livelihood for them. We 
47 The infonnation submitted by Juchereau Duchesnay is markedly less detailed than that given by 
Hughes. Whereas Hughes's reports averaged between one and two pages for each band interviewed, 
Duchesnay's report covers four bands in under half a page. For Hughes's reports, see Enclosures 7-10 
in "No. Il: Copy of a Despatch from the Earl of Gosford ta Lord G1enelg," 13 July 1837, in Ibid, p. 
41-6. For Duchesnay's report, see "Enclosure Il in No. Il,'' 22 August 1836, in Ibid, p. 46. 
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are sure our Father will find that we speak true, that he will listen to us, and 
continue the Issue of our Great Father's annual Bounty to us as heretofore48 
The Iroquois of Kahnawake went further than the other bands in arguing against 
commutation: they offered "proof' that such money would be wasted. The Iroquois's grand 
chief, Tekanasontie, depicted a scene that he had recently witnessed at the distribution of 
treaty annuities made by the United States at St. Regis, New York (Akwesasne). "The 
American Indians had upwards of 2,000 Dollars to receive. On that Day the Payment was 
made to us the Council-room was full of Tavem and Grog-shop Keepers, with their Account 
Books under their Arms, to receive our poor Brothers [sic] hard-eamed Money for nothing 
but Rum, which they had advanced them on Credit. Upwards of 1,000 Dollars were paid to 
these Rum Sellers.,,49 
While the interviewed bands unanimously asserted that commutation would threaten 
their most defenseless members, a series of different visions informed their claim that 
presents, as traditionally given, formed part of a long-standing compact between Britain and 
themselves. The interviewed Amerindians generally envisioned the state's distribution of 
presents as being rooted in one of two historical realities. During the summer of 1836, the 
Akwesasne Iroquois appears to have been the only group considering itself to have an 
absolu te and unquestionable right to the receipt of such presents. "Saro Oriwagati, the oldest 
Man and Chief of his Tribe (i.e. Ninety-four Years of Age)," argued this point of view on 
their behalf: "Father, 1 have outlived a great many Winters, and Three bloody Wars, in none 
of which did lever find cause to doubt the good and faithful intentions of my Great Father 
the King towards us his Indian Children; and l cannot believe that he now thinks of breaking 
that Promise of his Forefathers, which was guaranteed to us when l was a young Man: 
'Presents so long as we shall remain a tribe. ",50 In the eyes of the Iroquois, then, presents 
48 "Enclosure 9 in No. 11,'' in Ibid, p. 44. 
49 "Enclosure 10 in No. 11,'' in Ibid, p. 45. 
50 "Enclosure 7 in No. Il,'' in Ibid, p. 41. Emphasis in original. 
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were more than mere abjects furnished by the state - they symbolized a solemn and 
venerable pact between themselves and the British. As a result, presents could not rightly be 
replaced by money.51 
The Abenaki of Odanak exemplified the competing vIsion of Amerindian rights 
regarding British presents when they labeled the distribution of such gifts "a Sort of 
Remuneration for our past Services.,,52 This describes presents not as a right pertaining to 
Amerindians alone but as payment for services rendered. In other words, the Abenaki's 
conceptualization of presents, as weil as that of the Algonquin, Nipissing, and Iroquois of 
Kanesatake, and the Iroquois of Kahnawake, calls these objects' immutable nature, as 
asserted by the Iroquois of Akwesasne, into question. This contention indicates a fundamental 
difference in Amerindian strategy, if not thought, when faced with potential changes in 
British Indian presents. Nonetheless, every community interviewed by Hughes, while 
forcefully opposed to the substitution of money for presents, justified their claims to the 
"annual bounty" on historical grounds. The Algonquin, Nipissing, and Iroquois of 
Kanesatake even went so far as to cite pre-Conquest French presents as forming the basis 
from which the British system grew.53 
Although during the summer of 1836 these communities did not appear to consider 
presents an immutable right, two of them later altered their position in order to support that of 
the Akwesasne Iroquois. In February 1837, after the initial Indian Department interviews had 
51 Furthermore, the receipt of presents by individuals served to prove their standing as band members. 
For example, George de Lorimier, a resident of Kahnawake, claimed presents not for their economic 
but for their symbolic value. Duncan Napier, the Governor General's Indian Secretary at Quebec City, 
wrote that it would be ridiculous to believe that de Lorimier sought to receive presents for their 
material worth, suggesting that he instead did so "with a view to remove the objections to his 
becoming a candidate for the situation of a chief of the Iroquois tribe, and eventually perhaps to his 
acquiring the control and management of the seigniory of the Sault St Louis." Duncan C. Napier, 
"Observations on a letter from MI. George de Lorimier," 24 October 1837, LAC, RGIO, vol. 94, p. 
38701-4, reel C-11469. 
52 "Enclosure 8 in No. 11," in Ibid, p. 43. 
53 "Enclosure 9 in No. II," in Ibid, p. 44. 
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been concluded, three bands belonging to the Seven Nations, the inhabitants of Kahnawake 
and Kanesatake along with the Akwesasne Iroquois, sent a petition to Gosford protesting the 
Indian Department's decision to cease the distribution of presents to ail children born after 
May 1st of that year. The petition asserted not only that the French had begun the systematic 
distribution of presents, which the British then continued after the Conquest, but that these 
presents could never rightfully be terminated. "Mon père, ces présents (puisqu'on nous a 
appris à les nonuner ainsi) ne sont pas dans le fait des présents, c'est de la part du 
Gouvernement une dette sacrée promisé [sic] à nos pères par les Rois de France pour les 
indemniser des terres qu'ils leur ont abandonnées, et confirmée par les Rois d'Angleterre 
depuis la cession du pays, et jusqu'à présent ponctuellement payée et acquittée.,,54 Although 
the chiefs who signed the petition ultimately struck a conciliatory tone - begging rather than 
demanding that the presents be continued to their children - the mere assertion that the 
French had originally given presents as a means of paying in perpetuity for Amerindian land 
cessions underlines the highly symbolic and historical charge that these objects carried. 
The Indian Department also inquired as to whether Lower Canada's settled 
Amerindian conununities would be willing to utilize a portion of the monies spent on the 
purchase of presents in order to fund their children's education. Ail of the bands that 
55
considered this proposaI flatly rejected it for identical reasons. The Abenaki of Odanak 
responded to the question: "Brother, tell our Father, that... we are weil aware that they [the 
band's children] can but reap great Benefit from receiving an Education, but at the same time 
tell him, that the great Majority of the Abenaquois Tribe are so wretchedly poor, that they 
54 "Enclosure 17 in No. 11: A Son Excellence Archibald Comte de Gosford ... ," in Ibid, p. 62. 
55 James Hughes did not make any such inquiry to the Algonquins, Nipissings, and Iroquois of the 
Lake of the Two Mountains because the Sulpician Seminary ran the community's school and paid for 
ail of its expenses. "Enclosure 9 in No. Il," in Ibid, p. 44. Duchesnay rejected outright the 
applicability of the question to those Amerindians whose children did not already attend school. As 
those schools in operation already had funds, he saw no point in making inquiries. Duchesnay did, 
however, assert that, "they never would willingly contribute in any way towards paying Part of the 
Expenses of a Schoolmaster and other Expenses attending a School." "Enclosure II in No. 11," 22 
August 1836, in Ibid, p. 46. 
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have not the Means of paying for the Instruction of their Children; that the Presents they 
annua11y receive from their Great Father's Bounty are barely sufficient to protect them from 
the Cold.,,56 In other words, Lower Canada's settled Amerindian bands recognized 
education's value, but asserted that, due to their extreme poverty, they were completely 
incapable ofpaying for il. The Iroquois of Akwesasne, like Lower Canada's other Aboriginal 
communities, asserted that they were more than willing to accept education as long as it was 
publicly funded. "[W]e hope in this respect to be put on a Footing with our Brethren the 
White Skins, who, we are informed, have their Children educated at the public Expense. If 
Schools are established amongst us on such a Footing, we will cheerfu11y send our Children 
to them. ,,57 
Thus, contrary to earlier responses to the "commutation question" on the part of the 
colonial state, the Committee of Lower Canada's Executive Council based its conclusion to 
sorne extent on clearly demonstrated, rather than presumed, Amerindian opposition to the 
proposal. 58 In its final report, the committee concluded that cash payments should not be 
substituted for the traditional Indian presents and that the costs of Amerindian education 
could not justly be defrayed, in whole or in part, by the budget accorded to the presents' 
annual distribution. In arriving at its conclusion, the committee considered the legal nature of 
Indian presents evoked by ail of the bands with which the Indian Department held councils in 
1836. The committee's final report argued that, although cllstom prohibited the abolition or 
alteration of presents in the immediate future, the receipt of these goods in no way constituted 
an Aboriginal right. The committee even went so far as to claim that the system of presents 
then in place was in sorne sense responsible for creating and maintaining poverty in 
Amerindian communities. As a result, its members felt that Lower Canada's Aboriginal 
56 "Enclosure 8 in No. II," in Ibid, p. 43. 
57 "Enclosure 7 in No. Il," in Ibid, p. 42. 
58 "Enclosure in No. lI. To His Excellency the Earl of Gosford ... Report of a Cornmittee of the 
Executive Council...," 13 June 1837, in Ibid, p. 28. 
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population could rightly claim the continued distribution of presents. "[T]his System, by 
fostering their natural Improvidence, by estranging them from the ordinary Pursuits and 
Industry of civilized Life, and teaching them to consider themselves as under a special 
Tutelage of the Crown, and in dependence upon it, has further strengthened their Claim to a 
Continuance of it until they shall be raised above their helpless Condition to which it has 
mainly contributed to depress them. ,,59 For his part, Gosford agreed entirely with the 
committee's conclusions.60 
Commissions ofInquiry and Commutation, 1839-1858 
Following Gosford's examination of the form of Indian presents, four other 
independent, state-sanctioned commissions of inquiry took up the qUestion. The four 
commiSSIOns each built on the work of their predecessors - General Darling and the 
committee of the Executive Council of Lower Canada - and in so doing created what one 
historian has termed a "corporate memory" for the Indian Department upon which Indian 
Affairs continues to draw even today.61 Three of these four commissions rubber-stamped the 
findings of the committee of the Executive Council with respect to commutation62 and 
reinforced its vision of Amerindians as poverty-stricken wards of the imperial state. 
For instance, in 1839, Justice James Buchanan Macaulay, in his report on Indian 
Affairs in Upper Canada, reaffirmed both the committee's vision of Amerindians as naturally 
59 Ibid, p. 27-8. 
60 "No. Il: Copy of a Despatch from the Earl of Gosford ta Lord Glenelg," 13 Jllly 1837, in Ibid, p. 25. 
61 Leslie, "Commissions of lnqlliry... " On commissions of inquiry into various aspects of lndian 
Affairs throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Michel Lavoie, "Politique sur 
commande: Les effets des commissions d'enquête sur la politique publique et la politique indienne au 
Canada, 1828-1996," Recherches amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 37, no. 1 (2007), p. 5-23. 
62 While concemed with the question of altering the form in which the Crown distributed lndian 
presents, Committee No. 4, in its January 1840 report, made no mention whatsoever of commutation. 
139 
improvident and its conclusion that commutation could only end III grief, both for First 
Nations and for the state. 
1 concur with those who disapprove of a money commutation. It might (treating the 
presents as a dry matter of debt) be more convenient to pay in cash than in goods, 
but considering the motive and object, and, the weil known indiscretion and folly of 
the Indians no room is left for doubt on the subject. It is manifest that the money in 
itself can be of no benefit to them, it can only be useful to exchange for necessaries, 
and it may readily be supposed that if not enticed from the improvident holders with 
liquor excessive prices would be exacted from them for necessaries, of inferior 
quality, and undue advantages be taken ofthem in every way. Therefore as respects 
both commodity and prices and the real benefit and comfort of the receivers, the 
Government can best provide them with useful supplies such as clothing, 
implements ofhusbandry, fire arms, ammunition and food, in short almost anything 
but money.63 
In its report, submitted in 1844 and published in two parts in 1845 and 1847, the Bagot 
Commission reached a very similar conclusion, soundly rejccting commutation on the basis 
of the positions defended by previous colonial administrators. As Macaulay had done eight 
years earlier, the commissioners recommended changing the form of the presents, although 
this time, at least as far as Upper and Lower Canada's sedentary Amerindian bands were 
concerned, with a view towards "gradually extinguishing existing claims." Ultimately, the 
Bagot Commission recommended that the money spent on presents for these communities be 
converted into funding for industrial schools in Upper Canada (at Alderville and Mount 
Elgin) and for the purchase of agricultural equipment. 64 Although colonial authorities 
implemented these refonns, the Pennefather Commission, in its 1858 report, asserted that the 
63 "Report on Indian Affairs by J.B. Macaulay (typescript)," 1839, LAC, RG 10, vol. 11206, file 3, p. 
160-\. 
64 Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," 1847. 
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effort to redirect funds previously used to purchase presents in order to support education, "in 
some cases against [the bands'] will," had been a failure. 65 
Beyorid simply recommending against commutation, each commISSIOn of inquiry 
also emphasized thedeleterious effects that the system of presents had on First Nations, 
ultimately portraying the Amerindian as impoverished by definition. For instance, the Bagot 
Commission' s report echoes the conclusions of the 1836 committee by asserting that Indian 
presents maintained First Nations in a state of poverty because of the dependence on state aid 
that these goods created. "This reliance has doubtless had the effect of encouraging their 
natural indolence and improvidence; of keeping them a distinct people; of fostering their 
natura1 pride and consequent aversion to labour; and of creating an undue feeling of 
dependence upon the protection and bounty of the Crown." The Commissioners concluded 
that, "the majority of the Indians throughout the United Provinces, are still in such a state of 
actual destitution, and of incapacity to hold their place among the whites, that it would be 
inconsistent, both with justice and humanity, at present to withdraw such assistance from 
them.,,66 In its 1858 report, the Pennefather Commission similarly concluded that First 
Nations had become wholly dependent upon state assistance, explicitly supporting the 1836 
report in this regard. "The conclusions arrived at by the Executive Council of Lower Canada 
in their admirable Report to the Earl of Gosford in 1836, cannot we think be controverted. ­
They maintained that the position so taken up afforded unusual facilities for educating and 
improving the Aborigines, that the state of tutelage in which the latter were kept by the 
Crown taught them to look up to it, and to feel dependent upon it.,,67 
65 Canada, "Report of the Special Commissioners Appointed on the 8th of September, 1856, to 
Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," in Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, 
Appendix 21, Toronto, Stewart Derbishire and George Desbarats, 1858. 
66 Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," 1847. 
67 Canada, "Report of the Special Commissioners..." 
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The four post-1836 commissions of inquiry, like their predecessors, based their 
conclusions to a certain extent on the testimony of individuals familiar with the "Indian 
question." As a result, it is hardly surprising that these witnesses frequently expressed similar 
opinions to those put forward by the commissions' reports. For instance, the Bagot 
Commission's portrayal of presents as a form of relief provided to Canada's naturally 
impoverished Aboriginal population clearly draws on the opinions of those who provided the 
commission with evidence. The Indian Department's superintendent on Manitoulin Island, 
Thomas Gummersall Anderson, makes an exemplary assertion in this sense by claiming that 
if presents were withdrawn those bands under his charge "must consequently perish" because 
they "have no annuity as a resource; the game is almost entirely destroyed; they have scarcely 
any furs to offer the trader... and they gain only a precarious subsistence by fishing, trapping 
hares, and shooting a few wild fowl.,,68 In responding to the same commission, Samuel P. 
Jarvis, the chief superintendent of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, voiced this 
conviction even more forcefully when he proposed that the money used to purchase presents 
and "ail [Amerindian] funds, from whatever source derived," should be pooled in order to 
permit Indian Affairs to provide assistance whenever deemed necessary.69 In other words, 
Jarvis asserted that Indian Affairs' raison d'être should be the provision ofreliefto its wards. 
However, in opposition to the committee of the Executive Council, these latter-day 
commissions based their conclusions on little or no Aboriginal testimony. For instance, the 
Bagot Commission, while receiving submissions from most of the Indian agents and 
missionaries in the two Canadas, only consulted a single Amerindian, Peter Jones, and this in 
his capacity as Methodist minister to the Credit· River band. 70 Although also citing Reverend 
Jones as weil as several other Amerindians, Macaulay approached his task in an even less 
68 T.G. Anderson, 12 March 1843, Appendix no. 92 in Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in 
Canada," 1847. 
69 Samuel P. Jarvis ta the Commissioners on Indian Affairs, 30 Januaty 1843 in Appendix no. 16 in 
Ibid. 
70 Appendix no. 38 in Ibid. 
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inclusive manner, neglecting to visit a single First Nation or to solicit any Aboriginal input, 
instead concentrating uniquely on pre-existing official papers and correspondence furnished 
by Sir George Arthur, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada.71 Committee No. 4 carried 
out its investigation in similar fashion, concentrating on state documents as it was unable to 
examine "the present condition, morally and politically, of the different Tribes" due to "the 
remoteness of the sources of information," thereby effectively disallowing Aboriginal input.72 
The Pennefather Commission proceeded in more or less identical fashion as the Bagot 
Commission had done a decade earlier, collecting evidence from Euro-Canadian experts on 
the "Indian question" while failing to consider any Amerindian opinion or commentaly. 
Although they employed similar methods and expressed near-identical visions of 
Amerindian improvidence, the four post-1836 commissions proposed different means of 
altering or phasing out the state's distribution of Indian presents. Beyond supporting Jarvis's 
calI for the encouragement of civilization by way of the distribution of "shoes and trowsers," 
Committee No. 4 avoided making any concrete proposaI for changing the system. Rather, it 
recommended that a means of minimizing expenditure from parliamentalY funds be devised, 
particu1arly in reference to the high cost incurred in shipping the presents to their points of 
distribution. 73 In contrast, the Bagot Commission proposed sweeping changes, ultimately 
promoting assimilation as the preferred means of ending the distribution of Indian presents. 
The Commission's final report recommended that "a period sufficiently distant should be 
fixed, at which the bounty of the Crown in its present shape should cease, and the Indians 
now settled in the Province should be expected to fall into the ranks of the other subjects of 
Hel' Majesty." Ultimately, the commissioners proposed a form of "proto-enfranchisement," 
71 "Report on Indian Affairs by lB. Macaulay (typescript)," 1839, LAC, RG 10, vol. 11206, file 3, p. 1. 
72 "Report of Committee No. 4, on Indian Department," January 1840 in Appendix no. 1 in Canada, 
"Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," 1847. 
73 Ibid. Although the committee's report never mentions it, this suggests that it may have been at least 
partially in favor of the substitution of money for presents. Since the 1820s, the low shipping costs of 
cash in comparison to bulky Indian presents had been one of the chief arguments supporting 
commutation. 
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whereby Indian Affairs would grant land from the appropriate reserve to an individual who 
was ready to participate in colonial society on equal terms to those enjoyed by his Euro­
Canadian neighbors. "[U]pon Issue of this Patent ail further claims to share in the Presents 
[will] be relinquished; but that any title to share in an annuity or other property of the Tribe 
be retained. ,,74 
This points to the centrality to both First Nations and the state of the list of presents 
during the period preceding the transfer of responsibility for the Department from imperial to 
colonial authorities. Indeed, among those bands who did not receive annuities, receipt of 
presents often served as the sole marker of Indian "status" during the period, particularly in 
Lower Canada. However, as a result of legal changes made in the 1850s, the importance of 
presents in terms of both administration and political identity declined rapidly. As a result, 
authorities implemented the Bagot Conunission's reconunendation that presents be abolished 
altogether while failing to simultaneously eliminate Amerindians' separate administrative and 
legal status.75 In March 1851, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Grey, decreed that 
the distribution of presents would cease in 1858. In the words of the Pennefather 
Commission, Grey felt "that the graduai extinction of this vote would not conflict with any 
just claim on the palt of the Indians.,,76 Thus, when the distribution ofIndian presents came to 
an end in the late I850s, the state had never made any concrete attempt at commutation. 
Conclusion 
In spite of the state's refusai to ever implement commutation, an analysis of imperial 
and colonial discourse concerning First Nations sparked by this proposai offers insight into 
74 Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the lndians in Canada," 1847. 
75 See below for a discussion of these changes. 
76 Canada, "Report of the Special Commissioners... ," 1858. See a1so Milloy, "The Era ofCivilization," 
p. 311. 
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the development of a persistent and particularly pernicious stereotype that would come to 
provide much of the moral and political justification for the state's paternal involvement in 
the lives of its Aboriginal wards. This discourse ultimately contributed to the creation of legal 
mechanisms that theoretically denied Amerindians the ability to manage their own affairs, 
financial and otherwise, while simultaneously vesting renewed authority in Indian Affairs ­
authori ty that the imperial state had called into question through its post-War of 1812 cost­
cutting campaign.77 Thus, when Gosford and the corrunittee of the Executive Council 
portrayed presents as a form of state handouts to Ha Race of indigent People," they provided 
Indian Affairs with an argument in favor of its engagement in more invasive forms of 
bureaucratie control in Amerindian conununities. 78 Although this argument proved unable to 
perfectly preserve the Department's institutional integrity in the face of the massive imperial 
retrenchment of the early to mid-nineteenth century, it provided Indian Affairs with a 
particularly persuasive means of justifying its continued existence - a means that wou Id 
eventually contribute to its mid- to late-nineteenth-century renaissance. 
The historiography has placed very !ittle emphasis on this strain of imperial-colonial 
intercourse concerning Indian presents. Rather, the vast majority of studies have sought to 
understand thls debate as springing, on the one hand, from the imperial will to eut Indian 
Department expenditure and, on the other, from the colonial commitment to a po!icy of 
77 On the threat that fiscal reform posed to Indian Affairs' continued existence, see Milloy, "The Era of 
Civilization." Of course, retrenchment of this sort was in no way limited to the Indian Department or 
British North America but extended throughout the empire. Peter Burroughs writes: 'Throughout the 
century the opinion prevailed among politicians and commentators that, whatever the Empire's 
benefits, its administration and defence imposed unduly onerous burdens on the British Treasury 
which ought to be reduced. This conviction persisted even when Britain became affluent enough to 
afford such expenditure, so deepJy was the obsession with economy embedded in the Victorian 
political consciousness." Burroughs, "Imperial Institutions and the Government of Empire," p. 176. 
78 "Enclosure in No. Il. To His Excellency the Earl of Gosford ... Report of a Committee of the 
Executive Council...," 13 June 1837, in Great Britain, Copies or Extraets ofCorrespondence Since 1st 
April 1835... , p. 28. For control as the unacknowledged "real first principle of Indian policy," see 
Robin Jarvis Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: fndian Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance 
in Ontario, 1918-1939, Don Mills, Onl., Oxford University Press, 2003, p. xiv-xv. 
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conciliation with regard to Canada's Aboriginal peoples. The historiography depicts the 
proposed solution to the impasse - Colborne, Kempt, and later governors' promotion of 
Maitland's civilization scheme - as being motivated by the desire to avoid antagonizing the 
crown's traditional Native allies while simultaneously aiding the imperial treasury in its quest 
for retrenchment. 79 However, the positions adopted in this debate by administrators in Canada 
and Great Britain might equally be understood as having arisen from the conviction that 
monetary payments would increase rather than diminish the state's financial obligation to 
Canada's Aboriginal population - a population that authorities of the period increasingly 
treated as wards of the state. In other words, cash, as asserted by Dalhousie, Kempt, Head, 
and the conunittee of the Executive Council, as weil as by certain Amerindians, would be 
spent improvidently, thereby requiring the state to make additional expenditure in order to 
provide relief to the now totally destitute Aboriginal communities. Thus, colonial 
administrators seem to have been at least as influenced by widespread contemporary notions 
affirming the fundamentally improvident nature of the poor as they were by the Indian 
Department's commitment to its traditional Aboriginal allies. 80 
In at least one instance, these notions directly influenced Indian policy. BegilU1ing in 
1834, immediately prior to his appointment as lieutenant governor of Upper Canada in 
December 1835, Head occupied the position of assistant poor law commissioner for East 
Kent. 81 As a result, he impolted to the colony, and to relations with First Nations in 
particular, a vision directly born of the implementation of the most recent piece of legislation 
concerning poverty in the imperial heartland. In expressing his skepticism concerOing 
79 See Milloy, op. cit., p. 84-97. 
80 For a discussion of general nineteenth-century notions of poverty, see Himmelfarb, The Idea of 
Poverty. For poverty in the Canadian context, see Jean-Marie Fecteau, Un nouvel ordre des choses: La 
pauvreté, le crime, l'Étal au Québec. de la fin du XVlIr siècle à 1840, Outremonl, VLB, 1989 and La 
liberté du pauvre: Crime et pauvreté au XIX' siècle québécois, Montreal, VLB, 2004. 
81 S.F. Wise, "Sir Francis Bond Head," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, 
http://www.biographi.ca/009004-119.0 l-e.php?&id_nbr=5035&&PHPSESSID=7oaarOp3p6rg5f6gp8q 
hlkqfi5, (29 July 2009). 
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Aboriginal capacity to wisely employ money, Head echoed his own words, written on the 
other side of the Atlantic, charging that "Jittle shop-keepers" and "owners ... of beer-shops" 
profited "from that vast and hithelto unprotected mass of money, which has been collected 
nominally for the SUPPOlt of the pOOr.,,82 In other words, Head, like other colonial 
commentators, affirmed an innate Amerindian proclivity for spending their cash income on 
alcohol in terms drawn directly from discussions of the improvident pOOl', ultimately 
contributing to the failure of commutation to be implemented.83 
Of course, the outcome of this debate was far from a foregone conclusion. One could 
conceivably argue that had the imperial camp taken the day, cash payments in lieu of presents 
might have paved the way for full-fledged Amerindian participation in Canadian civil 
society. Instead, however, it seems likely that the colonial insistence on Aboriginal 
improvidence contributed to the evolution of Amerindians' speciallegal status, as eventually 
enshrined in the Indian Act of 1876. In other words, once the assertion that Amerindians were 
incapable of managing their own financial affairs had becorne dogma - a dogma largely 
elaborated in the course of imperial-colonial debates over the commutation ofIndian presents 
- the only option left to the state was to adopt a poJicy assigning itself the raie of the 
Aboriginal population's legal guardian. 
82 Francis Bond Head, "Report of Sir Francis Bond Head to the POOl' Law Commissioners for Engiand 
and Waies," 1 August 1835, in Great Britain, First Annual Report of the Poor Law Commissioners for 
England and Wales, London, W. Clowes and Sons, 1835, p. 166-7. 
83 In addition to being influenced by his time as assistant pOOl' commissioner, Head's Indian policy 
drew on the idealized romantic image of Upper Canada's Amerindian population as being 
simultaneously superior to Euro-Canadians and fatally vulnerable to the newcomers' vices. This vision 
Jed him to implement a policy of removal based in large part on that of the United States, a policy that 
was at odds with that favored in British North America which aimed to "civilize" Aboriginal peoples. 
Theodore Binnema and Kevin Hutchings, "The Emigrant and the Noble Savage: Sir Francis Bond 
Head's Romantic Approach to Aboriginal Policy in Upper Canada, 1836-1838," Journal ofCanadian 
Studies/Revue d'études canadiennes, vol. 39, no. 1 (Winter 2005), p. 115-38. 
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From Retrenchment to Expansion: The Unexpected Growth of Indian Affairs 
During the nineteenth century, officiais in the Indian Department developed two 
distinct attitudes with respect to Amerindian money-use. As physical, circulating currency 
became more widely available in British North America, those state officiais charged with the 
responsibility of maintaining relations with First Nations came to portray the use of money in 
the context of social assistance (in which they increasingly placed Indian presents) as a threat 
to the Department's publicly proclaimed goal of civilizing its Aboriginal wards while coming 
to see currency in other contexts, most notably that of treaty payments, in the absence of any 
similar sense of alarm. As the debate on commutation illustrates, both imperial and colonial 
officiaIs worried that cash offered Amerindians too much freedom. Because it allowed its 
holder the theoretical liberty of purchasing goods and services as she saw fit, money could 
only be entrusted to those individuals of sufficient learning and moral fiber to not expend it 
inappropriately. According to the Department, an organization firmly anchored in both the 
transatlantic debates on poverty and British North America's increasingly hegemonic "liberal 
order," Amerindians did not yet fit these criteria 84 In fact, during this period Euro-Canadian 
actors and institutions portrayed Aboriginal peoples in ever more formai and legalistic terms 
as being the "Other" against which the individual "Canadian" subject was at least partially 
defined. 85 In this context, authorities felt that both First Nations as collectivities and 
individual Amerindians could not yet be trusted to wield their moral sanction in order to 
84 On the "Iiberal order" and its role in nineteenth-century state formation, see lan McKay, 'The 
Liberal arder Framework: A Prospectus for a Reconnaissance of Canadian Bistory," Canadian 
Historical Review, vol. 81, no. 4 (December 2000), p. 617-45. For a skeptical analysis of the 
applicability of this framework to Aboriginal hislory, see Robin Jarvis Brownlie, "A Persistent 
Antagonism: Firsl Nations and the Liberal arder," in Jean-François Constant and Michel Ducharme, 
Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the Canadian Liberal Revolution, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 2009, p. 298-321. On the late nineteenth-century beliefthat Amerindians needed to be taught the 
core values of Iiberalism before being allowed to fully integrate Euro-Canadian society, see Shewell, 
"Enough ta Keep Them Alive ", p. 16-23. 
85 Of course, Amerindians had long provided Europeans and lheir New World descendents with a 
means of self-defmition. See, for example, Gilles Bavard, "'Les forcer à devenir Cytoyens': État, 
Sauvages et citoyenneté en Nouvelle-France (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècle)," Annales. Histoire, Sciences 
Sociales, vol. 64, no. 5 (December 2009), p. 7-40. 
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protect against the dangers of individual freedom, thus necessitating increasingly numerous 
fonns of individual political and economic education. In the same way, the Department and 
other colonial observers felt that individual Amerindians were not yet sufficiently prepared to 
protect their own liberties against the tyranny of the community that similarly needed state 
guidance in the establishment and surveillance of liberal forms of local government. In this 
sense, the political project of liberalism came to provide the Indian Department with a moral 
imperative requiring its intervention in the everyday lives of the Aboriginal peoples defined 
over the course of the second haIf of the nineteenth century as wards of the state. 86 
This intervention, which took the form of schools and reserves, treaty payments and 
bans on the consumption of alcohol, provided the state with the theoretical means of treating 
the "illness" it had created from the 18S0s through the legal codification of the individual 
Amerindian as an aliberal subject. In order that he (liberalism's concern was overwhelmingly 
placed on men) might become the liberal subject that Euro-Canadian society increasingly 
lauded throughout the period, the Amerindian had to be persuaded, increasingly by Indian 
Affairs, to abandon his anti-Iiberal community of origil1 in favor of Canadian society. 
However, because First Nations provided nineteenth and twentieth-century liberalism with an 
effective counterpoint against which to define itself, a program seeking the dissolution of 
"Indians" as a distinct segment of the population seems to have been logically doomed to 
failure. In other words, state authorities' constant insistence that Amerindians were not yet 
ready for full participation in Canada's economic, social, and politicallife served as a marker 
that, at least under tbe "Iiberal order," they never would be.87 
86 On nineteenth-cenlury liberalism's use of individual and cornmunity-based freedom as a bulwark 
against the excesses that freedom itself made possible, thereby bringing into existence the seemingly 
contradictory political project al10wing states to rule through freedom, see Patrick Joyce, The Rule of 
Freedom: Liberalism and the Modern City, New York, Verso, 2003. 
87 For liberalism's need for aJiberal groups - such as women and Aboriginal people - against which to 
define itself in the production of liberal society, see Adele Perry, "Women, Racialized People, and the 
Making of the Liberal Order in Northern North America," in Constant and Ducharme (eds.), 
Liberalism and Hegemony, p. 274-97. 
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Thus, the political climate of the second half of the nineteenth century provided the 
state with a seemingly infallible moral justification for its involvement in Aboriginal 
communities. However, the nearly half-century that preceded this period witnessed a 
prolonged and serious challenge on the part of both colonial and imperial officiaIs to the very 
existence of the Indian Department, the institution charged with overseeing relations with 
First Nations. Commutation provided imperial authorities with one avenue for potentially 
saving the treasury large sums of money. While it ultimately failed to substitute cash 
payments for presents, the Colonial Office did manage to make savings elsewhere, primarily 
by restricting the amount of presents distributed, but also by steadily reducing the Indian 
Department's workforce and the salaries of those employees that remained. Thus, while many 
commentators during the early to mid-nineteenth century felt it important to encourage the 
grand social engineering scheme through which Amerindians were to becorne full partners in 
colonial society, the Department's ever diminishing fiscal, human, and material base 
prevented it from playing a truly central l'ole in this project. However, Indian Affairs' 
diminished material base would not last; by the l870s, it had staged a dramatic return, 
thereafter continuing to grow in terms of manpower, reach, and ambition into the twentieth 
century. This renewed vigor in turn allowed the Department to engage in a series of practices 
undertaken in the name of many of the principles enunciated in an earlier era of shrinking 
budgets and relative institutional impotence. However, givcn Indian Affairs' increasingly 
hegemonic position within the field of Aboriginal "civilization" from the second half of the 
nineteenth century and the legal changes made to SUPPOlt and encourage the agency in 
carrying this project forward, these princip les were recast in more explicitly liberal terms. In 
order for an Amerindian to become "civilized," he now had to jettison any and ail formai 
affiliation with Aboriginal society while fulfilling preconditions for full participation in 
Canadian society that would be inaccessible to many (and perhaps most) of his neighbors of 
European descent. 
However, this explicitly liberal program functioned primarily, at least insofar as 
money-use was concemed, on the discursive rather than the material plane. Indeed, although 
the Department gained wide-reaching legal powers permitting it to involve itself in the day­
to-day lives of its Aboriginal wards to an unprecedented extent, it rarely employed these 
powers in practice. In this sense, the present section primarily provides an analysis of the 
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state's theoretical relationship with First Nations du ring the nineteenth century. The 
following section, which pursues Indian Affairs' policies with respect to money to the local 
level, counterbalances this discursive reading, pointing to the forces that complicated the 
implementation of administrative and legal theory "on the ground." This section, then, 
analyzes the ways in which retrenchment and later expansion affected the reach and ambition 
of Indian Affairs. Since the present dissertation is concemed above ail with the history of 
Aboriginal and not governmental money-use, thls analysis is undertaken to c1arify the state's 
l'ole in Amerindian monetary practice generally during the period. The section then tllrns to 
an analysis of several aspects of Canadian Indian policy relative to monetary matters, whether 
in the region covered by this study or elsewhere. In this way, it provides a history of Indian 
Affairs' and Indian policy's relation to money-use from a relatively broad, pan-Canadian 
perspective, focusing on Quebec and Ontario whenever appropriate. This will then allow a 
more coherent investigation of the nineteenth-century experience of money-use in 
Mashteuiatsh and Wendake in this chapter's final section. 
lnstitutional Change in lndian AfJairs 
The ongoing loss of personnel formed one of the main legacies of the wave of deep 
cuts in the Indian Department's budget provoked by imperial allthorities following the end of 
the War of 1812. In 1813, at the height of the Anglo-American conflict, the Indian 
Department in Lower Canada planned to employ forty individuals the following year.88 By 
1815, in the context of peacetime, the number of actual employees stood at twenty-four. 89 
This number continued to decline steadily through the late 1830s, when it bottomed-out at 
88 This number excludes the three pensions that the Department paid during the period. John Johnson, 
"Indian Department, Lower Canada, Proposed establishment for the year 1814," 2 November 1813, 
LAC, RGI0, vol. 627, p. 182948-50, reel C-13396. 
89 John Harvey, "Peace Establislunent of the Indian Department of Upper & Lower Canada," II July 
1815, LAC, ROIO, vol. 12, p. 10571-3, reel C-II001. 
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eleven.9o A similar process took place in the Upper Canadian Indian Department, with the 
number of personnel dropping to low levels in the 1830s before rebounding slightly the 
following decade. 91 In both colonies, the first wave of reductions came in the form of the 
elimination of commissioned officers who had served in the Department during the war 
years. Thereafter, departmental authorities dismissed most of non-administrative staff (e.g., 
blacksmiths, surgeons, and storekeepers). By the 1830s, the Indian Department mainly 
employed administrative personnel (superintendents and resident agents) and interpreters 
(who sometimes also perforrned administrative functions). In Lower Canada several 
schoolmasters and Catholic missionaries also drew departmental salaries during the period. 
90 In 1820, the Indian Departmenl had 21 employees in Lower Canada. ln 1825, this number had 
drapped ta 18. In 1829, it deelined again ta 17. In 1831, it had drapped again ta 15, the level at whieh 
it wauld stay until1837, when the number of employees was again redueed, this time to 13. Two years 
later it would drop again to Il, before rebounding to 13 during the mid-1840s. John Johnson, 
"Proposed Establishment Indian Department of Upper & Lower Canada, 1820," 15 November 1819, 
LAC, RG8, vol. 262, p. 349-50, reel C-2853, John Johnson, "Proposed Establishment Indian 
Department of Upper and Lower Canada for the Year 1825," 1 September 1824, LAC, RG 10, vol. 16, 
p. 12745-6, reel C-l1 003, "Enclosure no. 2: Establishment of the 1ndian Department in Lower Canada, 
for the Year 1829" and "Enclosure no. 3: Establishment of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, 
for the Year 1829" in "No. 8: Copy of a Despateh from Sir l Kempt to Sir George Murray," 16 May 
1829, in Great Britain, Aboriginal Tribes ... , p. 44-5, RJ. Routh, "Lower Canada, 1831, Aeeount of Pay 
and Lodging Money to the lndian Department," 10 May 1832, LAC, RG 10, vol. 84, p. 33290-1, reel 
C-11030, D.C. Napier, "Estimate of the Probable Expenditure of the Indian Department in Lower 
Canada for its Establishment and Pensions from the 1st of April 1838, to the 31st of Mareh 1839, 
inclusive," 31 Mareh 1838, LAC, RGIO, vol. 97, p. 39975-6, reel C-11470, RJ. Routh, "Aeeount of 
Pay and Lodging Money issued ta the Indian Department in Lower Canada from 1st October 1838 ta 
31st March 1839," 31 March 1839, LAC, RGIO, vol. 97, p. 40025-6, reel C-I 1470, and Canada, 
"Report on the Affairs of the Indiansin Canada," 1847. 
91 While no wartime numbers have been found, in 1815 the Upper Canadian department employed 34 
individua1s. By 1820, this number had dropped to 31. In 1825, the department had 17 employees, 
wbich would remain the case until 1833 when the number dropped to 10. In 1835, the number of 
employees in Upper Canada feH ta 9. The Upper Canadian department grew more quickly in the 1840s 
than its Lower Canadian counterpart, employing 15 individuals in 1840 and 19 in 1844. In addition ta 
the sources cited for Lower Canada, see RJ. Rauth, "Upper Canada, 1833, Accounl of Pay and 
Lodging Money ta the Indian Department," 24 March 1834, LAC, RG 10, vol. 88, p. 35175-6, reel C­
11466, D.C. Napier, "Establishment of the Indian Department in Upper and Lower Canada from the 
Ist of April 183510 the 31st of March 1836," 10 January 1835, LAC, RGI0, vol. 91, p. 37065-6, ree1 
C-11468, Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the lndians in Canada," 1847, and Robert S. Jameson, lB. 
Macaulay, and William Hepburn, "Report of Committee No. 4, on Indian Department," January 1840 
in Appendix no. 1 in Ibid. 
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While the prior' personnel were charged only with ensuring the education of their pupils, the 
latter received state-funded salaries because they effectively functioned as Indian agents in 
the communities in which they served.92 This practice contrasted with that of Upper Canada 
where, as a result of the network of well-organized and privately-financed missionary groups 
that took root in the colony in the 1820s, the Department employed only a single missionary 
and a single teacher prior to 1840. However, in both colonies the Department experienced a 
marked reduction in manpower through the mid-1840s. Furthermore, those employees that 
remained frequently found themselves impotent when faced with the tasks they were intended 
to perform. This difficulty arose from the constellation of state agencies - whether the 
Department of Crown Lands (in charge of surrendered lands), the Receiver General, the 
Army Commissariat (responsible for the supply of presents), or the imperial treasury - that 
collaborated in the day-to-day management of relations with First Nations. Imperial and 
colonial authorities outside the Department saw its extinction as inevitable and, as such, 
considered that other state institutions would ultimately assume responsibility for various 
aspects of Indian affairs. In spite of sorne centralization of administrative tasks, particularly 
those related to finance, as a result of the commissions of inquiry from the 1820s through the 
1840s, the Indian Department did not assume responsibility for nearly every aspect of 
relations with First Nations until its transfer from imperial to colonialjurisdiction in 1860.93 
92 Missionaries served as "temporary" Indian agents in Restigouche, Lorette, St. Francis, 
Caughnawaga, and St. Regis. D.C. Napier, "Second Enclosure in No. 9: Estimate of the Probable 
Expenditure of the Indian Department in Lower Canada for its Establishment and Pensions, from the 
Ist April 1837 to the 31st of March 1838, inclusive," 13 February 1837, in Great Britain, Copies or 
Extracts of Correspondence Since 1st April 1835... , p. 20. At the same lime, the secretary for Indian 
Affairs in Canada, Duncan Campbell Napier, wrote: "The Appointments of Roman Catholic 
Missionaries and Schoolmasters to the Indian Tribes ... [are] of a temporary Nature." D.C. Napier, 
"First Enclosure in No. 9: Return of the Length and Nature of the Services of the Officers and 
Inspectors of the Indian Department of Lower Canada (computed to the 31 st of March 1837 inclusive," 
13 February 1837, in Ibid. 
93 From this point, Indian Affairs became a "clientele" departmenl. Rather than focusing on a given 
aspect of the state's global responsibility with regard to its population or teITitory, it was dedicated to 
monopolizing the reJationship between the state and First Nations. JE. Hodgetts, Pioneer Public 
Service: An Administrative History ofthe United Canadas, 1841-1867, Toronto, University of Toronto 
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These cuts in personnel, however, did not arise purely as a result of the c~lIs of 
imperial officiaIs for reductions in the size and scope of the Indian Department. British 
humanitarians, through the Aborigines Protection Society, similarly viewed limited 
departmental personnel and expenditure in a positive light. This concordance of opinion arose 
chiefly from the Society's belief that the Indian Department of the 1830s existed first and 
foremost to distribute presents - either as dictated by diplomatie tradition or as a result of 
land purchases - to Canada's First Nations. Since, in its opinion, these presents, too often tied 
to outmoded and degrading ways of living, caused more harm than good among the 
Aboriginal population, the Society held that their form needed to be altered. However, given 
the limited lifespan of presents and of certain land payments, economy should be effected in 
the Indian Department's organization. In 1839, the Aborigines Protection Society's 
committee investigating Indian Affairs in Upper Canada recommended that, "The expences 
of the Indian department have been often noticed, past reductions may be followed up by 
farther diminution, and the grants themselves being in many instances limited to a specified 
term of years, it becomes a matter of first rate importance, that the payments whilst they are 
continued, should be administered with the most rigid economy." Thus, because it considered 
the Indian Department's primary function to be the distribution of presents and treaty 
payments to First Nations, the Society's committee believed, as did many humanitarians in 
the colonies as weil as in the metropole, that the institution would cease to exist once 
Amerindians no longer needed the support and protection of a legal guardian due to the sure 
success of "missionary settlements" in promoting "The introduction of civilized habits and 
bone ]ide conversion to christianity.,,94 In other words, the committee argued that the Indian 
Department, in concert with missionary groups, should be encouraged to pave the way for its 
Press, 1955, p. 213-5 and 219-225. On the politics behind the financial reorganization of the 
Department in the mid-1840s, as weil as the collaboration wi th other state agencies that the lndian 
Department necessarily undertook during the period, see David Shanahan, "Tory Bureaucrat as 
Victim: The Removal of Samuel Jarvis, 1842-47," Ontario History, vol. 95, no. 1 (Spring 2003), p. 38­
64. 
94 Aborigines Protection Society, Report on the fndians 01 Upper Canada, p. 28. 
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own obsolescence. The members of the committee developed this vision in reference to the 
Department's traditional role as the state's diplomatie representative among First Nations; 
while supporting the project of "civilization," its report did not place Indian Affairs in the 
legalistic, assimilationist, and liberal framework within which it would find itself reinvented 
during the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Partly as a result of lost manpower during this period, but also due to generalized 
reductions in salaI)', the Indian Department significantly eut its expenditure on personnel. 
After the brief distraction caused by Francis Bond Head's removal policy in Upper Canada, 
imperial concem with Indian Affairs tumed once more toward retrenchment by 1840. In 1844 
the Department spent n,2l3 less on salaries in Lower Canada than it had in 1829, making for 
a reduction of nearly 50% of its outlay in this category. However, in Upper Canada the Indian 
Department paid significantly more in salaries in 1844, raising its expenditure by f68l over 
the same period. Although this increase was far from negligible, the Upper Canadian 
Department bad actually eut its budget in the salaries paid for "traditional" posts, having 
added roughly f800 of an nuai expenditure in the early l840s in the establishment of 
tradesmen on Manitoulin Island, where it had begun more aggressively promoting 
"civi Iization.,,95 
In 1845, the Indian Department again shed a significant number of employees as a 
result of its major reorganization in line with the recommendations of the Bagot Commission. 
The Colonial Office placed responsibility for this reorganization in the hands of Charles 
Metcalfe, the govemor general. In accordance with the commjssioner's recommendations, 
Metcalfe appointed the civil secretary head of Indian Affairs, integrated the staff of the 
Department's headquarters office with that of the govemor, and replaced local agents with 
three visiting superintendents, one for Canada East and two for Canada West. 96 The Indian 
95 Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," 1847. 
96 Millay, "The Era of Civilization," p. 244-6 and 289-90. 
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Department simultaneously eut severallesser positions, inc1uding at least two interpreters in 
Canada East. 97 
The Civil Secretary retained the office of superintendent of Indian Affairs through 
the late 1850s. During this period, the Department continued to work in concert with several 
other colonial and imperial institutions in order to discharge its administrative 
responsibilities. However, according to the PenneJather Commission, which published its 
report in 1858, this system was severely flawed in that it caused First Nations to lose 
importance in the eyes of the Indian Department's institutional collaborators as a 1'esult of the 
time and energy spent dealing with their other charges. The commissioners argued that this 
neglect led to the failure of state programs aimed at erasing the differences between 
Arnerindians and Euro-Canadians. Although neither explicitly denouncing this piecemeal 
system no1' arguing in favor of a clientele Indian Department, the commission's report 
demonstrates its conviction that the management of Indian affairs required an overhaul while 
suggesting that a centralized agency might be the solution to the system's shortcomings. In 
th~ commissioners' view, the Indian Department needed to be maintained and, given 
continued imperial calls for economy, they therefore supported the transfe1' of authority ove1' 
First Nations from the imperial to the colonial state. Furthermore, the commissioners noted 
that when this change in jurisdiction took place, it wou Id provide the perfect opportunity for 
restructuring the Department once more. Although taking several years to implement, by 
1862 the Indian Department had been reconstituted as a branch within the Crown Lands 
Department, with a permanent bureaucratie head (the deputy supe1'intendent general ofIndian 
Affairs) reporting to a political official (the commissioner of Crown Lands who doubled as 
superintendent general of Indian Affairs) and virtual autonomy in the administration of the 
97 These two interpreters were Dominique Ducharme, based at Lac des Deux Montagnes, and Jacob 
Picard, based in Montreal. See Petition from Jacob Picard, Huron, to Charles TheophiJus Metcalfe, 10 
May 1845, LAC, RGIO, vol. 121, p. 5358-9, reel C-11480 and James Macaulay Higginson to Ducan 
C. Napier, 5 June 1845, LAC, RGIO, vol. 510, p. 347, reel C-13344. 
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various tasks newly subject to its centralized control.98 Thus, by the early 1860s, the Indian 
Department practically possessed a monopoly over the administration of the state's relations 
with First Nations. This situation created, for the first time, an administrative environment in 
which the state could theoretically assume the central role in the recreation of Amerindians in 
the Euro-Canadian mold. Moreover, Indian Affairs found itself in many ways invisible to the 
political mainstream as a result of Amerindians' exclusion from the franchise coupled with 
the agency's financial model, whereby the majority of funding for departmental programs 
came from revenue generated by the sale of Aboriginal lands and not from parliamentary 
grants. As a result, the Department long enjoyed isolation from electoral politics thereby 
allowing it to carry out its business far from the public eye and without any meaningful or 
sustained public criticism. 
Although bringing about major changes III other areas, Confederation had little 
short-term impact on the Indian Department. Beyond officially becoming a branch of the 
Department of the Secretary of State for the Provinces, Indian Affairs maintained the same 
bureaucratie structure and relative autonomy of its immediate pre-1867 predecessor. 
However, certain changes occasioned by the creation of the new nation of Canada - most 
notably the purchase of Rupert's Land from the Hudson 's Bay Company - led to the 
institution's rapid and unprecedented growth, both in terms of its geographical scope and its 
personnel. In fact, this growth had begun prior to Confederation. Figure 3.1 demonstrates that 
Indian Affairs' personnel dramatically increased in number from Confederation through the 
turn of the twentieth century. Although somewhat deceptive, because the figures for 1870 
exclude the Maritimes and British Columbia, the graduai expansion of headquarters staff as 
well as field employees in Quebec and Ontario was complemented by much more rapid 
expansion in personnel in Manitoba and the North-West caused by the provisions of the 
numbered treaties and the push of Indian Affairs' assimilationist structure into the region. 
Thus, after the minor growth immediately following Confederation and the signature of the 
98 Hodgetts, Pioneer Public Service, p. 222-3. 
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first seven numbered treaties, the Department rapidly expanded its presence in western 
Canada beginning in the 1880s. Although appearing to have radically decreased its number of 
employees in Ontario during the early 1870s, Indian Affairs' personnel size actually 
remained essentially unchanged in the region, the apparent difference arising from the 
Department's altered system of accounting for its employees (the 1870 numbers include 
"personnel" such as chiefs, councilors, and teachers who would later be removed from this 
category). The Department increased its numbers in Quebec and Ontario at a much slower 
rate than it did on the Prairies, during the 1880s adding "medical men" in Ontario and agents 
on those reserves in the two provinces from which they had been previously absent. This 
change in departmental personnel reflected the legal changes that Indian Affairs' mandate 
had undergone between the 1850s and 1870s. 
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Manetary Aspects ofIndian Palicy 
During the nineteenth century, officiais applied two complementary frames of 
reference when judging the appropriateness of money-use in the context of Canadian Indian 
policy. The first of these characterized money in negative terms, as offering too much 
freedom to a naturally improvident population. The second portrayed money as 
fundamentally neutral and, therefore, neither encouraged nor discouraged its use. As 
demonstrated above, officiais emp10yed both of these frames of reference in the debate on 
commutation. In other words, authorities neither unanimously condenmed nor supported 
money-use. Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, the same officials supported and 
opposed state payments to First Nations in monetary form on different occasions. Thus, 
Indian policy appears to have been shaped not by visions of money itself but by notions of 
what rights Aboriginal peoples possessed. This, then, reveals the centrality of the 
"improvident Indian": by agreeing that the imperial state distributed presents as a privilege 
rather than as a right, officiais in both the colonies and the metropole provided themselves 
with a means of discussing the form taken by presents. However, in cases where imperial or 
colonial authorities conceived of money as providing the essentialfarm of state payments to 
which First Nations were entitled by rights, these men offered little or no opposition to 
money-use. Treaty payments provide perhaps the best example of this second means of 
imagining money. 
Money's role in treaties and land sUiTenders, like its role e1sewhere in Indian policy 
and First Nations-state relations, changed over the period. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 
declared the imperial state to be the only actor capable of acquiring Amerindian lands in 
North America. Beginning at the tail end of the American Revolutionary War, British 
officiais occasionally purchased Aboriginal lands by way of one-time cash payments without 
any indication of the anxiety that would later color sorne state discourse on Amerindian 
money-use. 99 However, from the early 1790s through the Robinson Treaties of 1850, the 
99 For example, on 12 May 1781, four Chippewa chiefs received f5,OOO New York currency for the 
surrender Michilimackinac Island. Robert J. Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario, 1763-1862: 
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looBritish Empire acquired title to lands in Upper Canada by way of in-kind payments alone. 
Initially, state negotiators followed the blueprint provided by the surrenders of the 1780s ta 
purchase lands via the one-time only distribution of goods. Following the War of 1812, 
however, the imperial state began paying for the lands it purchased in annual installments or 
annuities provided to chiefs who then distributed the goods to individual band members. 'o, At 
the same time, the Indian Department began calculating land surrender payments in per capita 
terms. 102 Authorities effected the replacement of lump-sum payments by annuities in order ta 
promote departmental economy. Theoretically, annuities permitted the treasury to finance the 
acquisition of Amerindian lands from the payments made by settlers who purchased plots 
The Evolution of a System," Ph.D. Dissertation (History), Ottawa, Carleton University, 1983, p. 49 
and No. 1 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. l, Saskatoon, Fifth House Publishers, 
[1891] 1992, p. 1. Three years later, on 22 May 1784, Colonel John Butler, following Governor 
Haldimand's instructions, purchased nearly three million acres of land between Lake Erie and Lake 
Ontario from the Mississauga for fl,180.7.4 stg. This surrender was later amended to include an 
additional 3,450 acres that the Crown purchased for fi 00 Hfx. Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in 
Ontario," p. 67-8. For the original agreement, see No. 3, 7 December 1792 in Canada, Indian Treaties 
and Surrenders, vol. l, p. 5. For the amended version, see No. 3%,24 October 1795 in Ibid, p. 8-9. 
100 The British only purchased lands in Upper Canada during this period. For the first purchase in the 
"in-kind period," in which "the principal Village and War Chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippawa, 
Pottowatomy and Huron Indians [sic] Nations of Detroit" surrendered lands on Lake Erie for "the Sum 
of Twelve Hundred Pounds Currency of the Province of Quebec at Five Shillings pel' Spanish Dollar 
for Valuable Wares and Merchandise," see No. 2, 19 May 1790 in Canada, Indian Treaties and 
Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 1. 
101 Annuities were not an entirely novel form of treaty payment as British authorities had employed 
them in the Treaty of Halifax signed in 1752 with the Micmac. J.R. Miller, Lethal Legacy: Current 
Native Controversies in Canada, Toronto, MeCleliand & Stewart, 2004, p. 115. This form of payment 
had also been employed in the 1817 Selkirk Treaty in what is modern-day Manitoba. This agreement 
contained a clause requiring the payment of an annuaJ, in-kind quit rent - essentially an annuity. 
Arthur 1. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty and Benevolence: A HistOlY 01 Saskatchewan 
Treaties, Montreal and l(jngston, MeGill-Queen's University Press, 2000. 
102 Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario," p. 183-6. The first land cession completed on the basis 
of annuities, signed by the Mississauga and William Claus, the deputy superintendent general of Indian 
Affairs in Upper Canada, in November 1818, also ineluded pel' capita payments. The land surrender 
declared that, "Every man, woman and child [was] to receive [annuities] to the amount often dollars in 
goods at the Montreal priees." No. 20, 5 November 1818 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, 
vol. l, p. 49. 
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within the surrendered areas. Thus, London pursued this nove! policy in order to shift the 
financial burden of securing land cessions to the colonies by way of the Crown's territorial 
revenue. 
103 At roughly the same time, again most likely as a result of pressure for 
retrenchment, land surrenders began containing clauses that set a ceiling on annuity 
payments. This maximum figure corresponded to the total sum of pel' capita annuities 
required to pay the signatory band's population at the time of the surrender. In other words, 
imperial negotiators included a mechanism designed to potentially lighten the treasury's 
fiscalload should the band's population deciine, while being careful not to saddle the empire 
with promises of greater outlay should its population increase. 104 
With the exception of two provisional agreements, both of which the imperial 
treasury rejected, and one instance in which cash reimbursements were paid to Amerindians 
having made improvements on ceded lands, no treaty provided its Amerindian signatories 
with monetary compensation before 1850.\05 In this sense, the land cessions negotiated by 
103 Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario," p.173-4. 
104 In the J822 confirmation of a surrender initially made in J8 J9 by the Mississauga of the Bay of 
Quinte and Kingston region the f2.10.0 per capita, in-kind annuity was made contingent on the 
condition that "the number of persons entilled to receive the same shaH in no case exceed two hundred 
and fifty-seven persons, that being the number of persons c1aiming and inhabiting the said tract at the 
time of concluding the provisional agreement." No. 271., 22 November 1822 in Canada, Indian 
Treaties and Surrenders, vol. l, p. 65. See also Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario," p. 186-7. 
Surtees mistakenly states that this confirmation was recorded on 26 April 1825, the date of a 
provisional cession made by the Chippewa residing near London. No. 27'12, 26 April 1825 in Canada, 
Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. l, p. 65-7.. 
105 The first provisional agreement was reached in earJy Mareh 1819 with the Chippewa residing near 
London and stipulated that they were to reeeive "the yearly sum of six hundred pounds Province 
currency, one-half in specie and the other in goods at the Montreal priee." No. 21, 9 March 1819 in 
Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. 1, p. 49. The second involved the payment to the 
Chippewa of the Chenail Écarté and the Ausable and St. Clair Rivers of half of the fi ,375 annuity in 
cash in exchange for the "Huron Tract." Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario," p. 200. 
Unfortunately, the letter in which the Indian Department was told to renegotiate these agreements 
wilhout monetary payments does not offer a c1ear explanation for why the treasury rejected them. P. 
Maitland to Colonel Darling, 13 August 1820, LAC, RG8, vol. 263, p. 103, reel C-2854. For the 
instance in which cash was used to reimburse Amerindians for improvements to their lands, see No. 
47, 25 October 1836 in Canada, Indian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. l, p. 115-6. 
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William Benjamin Robinson with the Ojibwa inhabiting the north shores of Lakes Huron and 
Superior in the summer of 1850 reconfigured Canadian treaty practice. 106 Whereas du ring the 
preceding sixty years authorities had avoided making cash payments in exchange for lands, 
the Department sanctioned their use in 1850 in conjunction with the annuity system that it 
had developed in the context of the post-War of 1812 wave of retrenchment. While unclear 
why he offered monetary terms where earlier treaty negotiators did not, Robinson evidently 
acted under instructions from the superintendent general of Indian Affairs. 107 The treaties 
which resulted from his efforts, signed with the Lake Superior bands on 7 September and 
with those of the north shore of Lake Huron on 9 September, included a total of fA,OOO Hfx 
in gratuities (f2,000 per treaty) paid upon the agreements' signature and an annuity of f500, 
in the case of the Robinson Superior Treaty, and f600, for the beneficiaries of the Robinson 
Huron Treafy to be paid annually thereafter. 108 The Robinson Treaties, like earlier surrenders, 
allowed the state to reduce annual payments, but only if the population fell below two-thirds 
of its size ln 1850, at which time the overall annuity payment would "be diminished in 
proportion to their actual numbers." However, unlike earlier agreements, the Robinson 
Treaties stated that if revenue from the sale of surrendered lands permitted, annuities might 
106 For lhe lex.ls of the Robinson Treaties, see No. 60, 7 September 1850 (the Robinson Superior 
Treaty) and No. 61, 9 September 1850 (the Robinson Huron Treaty) in Canada, Indian Treaties and 
Surrenders, vol. l, p. 147-52. 
107 After having secured Ojibwa agreement to the lwo 1850 treaties, Robinson reporled to the 
superintendent general thal, "The whole amount given to me in AuguSl was f5,033 6s. 8d., of this swn 
their remains f800." ln other words, the officiais who had sent Robinson west provided him with cash 
prior to his departure. William B. Robinson, Report to Colonel Bruce, Superintendent-General of 
lndian Affairs, 24 September 1850, in Alexander Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the /ndians of 
Manitoba and the North-West Territories including the Negotiations on which they were based, 
Saskatoon, Fifth House Publishers, [1880J 1991, p. 21 
108 Given the size of Amerindian populations that adhered to each of lhe two agreements (1,240 for 
Lake Superior and 1,422 for Lake Huron), in 1850 the signatories of lhe Lake Superior treaty received 
slightly more per capita in gratuities (approximately f1.12.3 Hfx. or $6.45) than did those living 
adjacent to Lake Huron (fI.8.IY2 or $5.63). However, beginning in 1851, when the normal annuilies 
began, this order reversed itself with those Ojibwa living on the shores of Lake Superior receiving 
roughly fO.8. 31. Hfx or $1.61 while their Lake Huron counterparts were given roughly fO.8.5 Y4 or 
$1.69. 
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be increased to a maximum "of one pound provincial currency in any one year, or such 
further sum as Her Majesty may be graciously pleased to order." In other words, in contrast 
to earlier land cessions' strict avoidance of any possible increase in annuities, the Robinson 
Treaties provided a means for maintaining some semblance of a correlation between annuities 
and revenue from the sale of surrendered lands. Although initially amounting to less than half 
of this possible sum of fI pel' person, by the turn of the twentieth century annuities for the 
Robinson Treaties' signatory bands had increased to this level. 109 
The Robinson Treaties also maintained the Indian Department's standard practice 
of paying annuities to signatory bands' chiefs, who would then l'edistribute the monies to 
individual Amerindians. However, such payments did not simply provide a means of 
enforcing Indian Affairs' or any other Euro-Canadian institutions' will on First Nations 
through the maintenance of "puppet" leaders. For example, the mechanism for making 
annuity payments in these treaties allowed chiefs and not the Indian Depal'tment to define and 
enforce who was and who was not an Indian. During the negotiations, Robinson told those 
Métis who were present and wished to benefit from treaty payments: "1 came to treat with the 
chiefs who were present, that the money would be paid to them - and their receipt was 
sufficient for me - that when in their possession they might give as much or as !ittle to that 
class of claimants [the Métis] as they pleased. To this no one, not even their advisers, could 
object and 1 heard no more on the subject."IIO Furthermore, the chiefs who received payment 
presumably maintained the ability to distribute these monies in other ways than on a strictly 
109 The fact that members of Robinson signatory bands only received fi Hfx ($4) in annuities provided 
the federal and provincial officiaIs who negotiated Treaty No. 9 in 1905 with justification for offering 
$4 in annuities rather than $5, as was paid in the western Canadian numbered treaties. For the 
suggestion that a new treaty be made, with identical annuities to those provided by the Robinson 
Treaties - that is, $4 to every individual member of the signatory Firsl Nations - see, [?], 
Memorandum for Mr. Sifton, II August 1903, LAC, RGIO, vol. 3033, file 235,225, part l, reel C­
11314. 
J 10 Report of William B. Robinson to Colonel Bruce, 24 September 1850 in Morris, The Treaties of 
Canada ... , p. 20. 
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pel' capita basis, thereby providing Aboriginal leaders with a potent tool for use m local 
politics. 
The treaty securing Canada's 1862 purchase of title to the majority of Manitoulin 
Island, the site of the Amerindian colony created by Francis Bond Head nearly thirty years 
before, adhered to the Robinson Treaties' practice of paying annuities in cash, while 
deviating from the example set in these earlier agreements by directly basing annual 
payments on the revenue generated by the ceded lands, thereby guaranteeing that their 
amount would fluctuate from year to year. The treaty further deviated from earlier practice by 
providing annuities to individual band members, rather than making an annuai lump-SUffi 
payment to Aboriginal leaders. 111 State authorities would not adopt the first of these two 
changes in the post-Confederation numbered treaties negotiated with the First Nations of 
western and northern Canada, in which annuities reverted to fixed instead of fluctuating 
sums. However, the 1862 treaty's second innovation (the pel' capita distribution of annuities) 
would fmd its way into ail such agreements that Canada signed with Aboriginal peoples 
through the 1920s.11 2 This slight change in payment practice provided Tndian Affairs with 
political power at the price of Indigenous leaders who would no longer be able to control the 
flow of annuity funds to the same degree. However, the double share in interest that the treaty 
paid to chiefs did continue the departmental practice of reinforcing Aboriginal leaders' local 
political authority. Fol1owing the implementation of legislation in the late 1860s and 1870s 
that al10wed the state to intervene more aggressively in First Nations' internai poli tics, such 
III The Manitoulin Island Treaty provided each member of the signatory bands with one share of the 
total monies distributed annually with the exception of chiefs, who were 10 receive two shares. For the 
treaty text, see No. 94, 6 October 1862 in Canada, lndian Treaties and Surrenders, vol. l, p. 235-7. For 
a more in-depth analysis of the treaty, see Surtees, "Indian Land Cessions in Ontario," p. 258-68. 
112 Il should be noted, however, that officiais generally made payments resulting from later treaties ta 
heads of household. While no indication of this practice has been found with respect (0 the Manitoulin 
Island Treaty, given that this would later become standard practice and because male heads of 
household had also traditionally received presents from the Indian Department for their entire family, it 
would appear likely that interest monies were distributed along similar !ines under the 1862 agreement. 
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special treatment provided chiefs with material incentive for cooperating, at least to a certain 
extent, with Indian Affairs' policies and projects. 
ln the 1870s, following Canada's post-Confederation acquisition of Rupert's Land, 
the federal government embarked on a rapid succession of land negotiations with western 
Aboriginal peoples by which it secured title to the majority of the lands between northwestern 
Ontario and eastem British Columbia. Beginning at the turn of the twentieth century, Canada 
would ex tend the basic form and precepts of these agreements to First Nations living in 
northem regions that had yet to enter into any formai relationship with the state. During this 
period, federal authorities and treaty negotiators attempted to apply a single treaty model to 
ail Amerindian land surrenders. As in earlier treaties, this model had little or nothing to do 
with the quantity, quality, or market value of the ceded lands. In spite of their minor 
differences, ail eleven treaties negotiated during the period, in part because of their great 
similarity in annuity payments, created a population of idealized Aboriginal treaty signatories 
with whom the state could deal unifonnly. However, the bureaucratie practicality of having 
what amounted to a single treaty signed at different times with different First Nations could 
not prevent negotiators from departing from the standard text in the interest of economy. 
Regardless of these minor differences, the numbered treaties, by way of annuities and other 
tenns, coupled with Indian Affairs' rapid growth in the decades following Confederation 
provided the Department with a means of increasing its involvement in the everyday lives of 
Aboriginal signatories. 
The Robinson Treaties set the tone for ail land surrenders signed in Canada through 
the 1920s by providing cash payments to each member of every signatory band. Therefore, 
monetary annuities, framed by the treaty texts as a right, constituted one of the central 
elements of Indian policy during the period. Negotiators appear to have conceived of these 
annuities as being symbolic payment provided in exchange for goods (title to Aboriginal 
lands). In other words, these men did not think of treaty payments as handouts. Beginning 
with the Robinson Treaties, Euro-Canadian negotiators constantly emphasized the state's 
intention of allowing Amerindian signatories to continue pursuing their traditional means of 
supporting themselves in ceded regions, except where land-use on the part of new arrivais 
prohibited this, in the process relegating money to a symbolic rather than a material role. The 
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Robinson Treaties, for example, explicitly accorded the Ojibwa the right to hunt and fish, 
"saving and excepting only such portions of the said territory as may from time to time be 
sold or leased to individuals or companies of individuals, and occupied by them with the 
consent of the Provincial Government.,,113 More than fifty years later, federal negotiators 
continued to use this argument, although now explicitly underlining 
that the money which the Govemment was giving them was a gift, and did not 
expect them to be [de]pendent or live upon it, as they were not depriving them of 
any·of the means of which they have been in the habit of living upon heretofore, 
and added that they had the privilege of hunting and flshing as before, and that with 
the money and sorne other useful articles which the Government proposed to give 
them yearly, they would be in a better position to live than they were at the present 
time. 114 
Treaty negotiators, then, sought to convince First Nations that annuities functioned as a 
symbol providing perpetuaI recognition of their cession and not as a means through which the 
state would guarantee them a living. 
While negotiators, then, saw annuities as a right rather than a privilege, they were 
weil aware of the common stereotypes pOltraying Amerindians as improvident by nature. 
While not immune to such preconceived notions themselves, officiaIs believed that since cash 
annuities were insufficient to meet the needs of even the most modest of lifestyles, any 
"inappropriate" use of this money would mereiy cause discomfort and not destitution. While 
cash still posed potential risks to its Amerindian owners, the size of annuities mitigated such 
danger. After having negotiated the first two numbered treaties, commissioner Wemyss M. 
Simpson confidently asserted the ideal nature of these agreements' cash annuities precisely 
because they were insufficient to provide a living to their recipients. Simpson also hoped that 
113 This clause is contained in both the Lake Superior and Lake Huron treaties. No. 60, 7 September 
1850 (the Robinson Superior Treaty) and No. 61,9 September 1850 (the Robinson Huron Treaty) in 
Canada, Indian Trealies and Surrenders, vol. l, p. 147-52. 
114 Commissioner Thomas A. Borthwick, negotiating what would become Trealy No. 10, told the 
Barren Lands band this in 1907. "Memorandum, Re: Indians of Treaty No. 10," ca December 1907 
quoted in Ray, Miller, and Tough, Bounty and Benevolence, p. 185. 
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the small size of annuities would serve to instruct the Aboriginal population In the 
fundamentals of thrift. 
The system of annual payment in money 1 regard as a good one, because the 
recipient is enabled to purchase just what he requires when he can get it most 
cheaply, and it also enables him to buy articles at second hand, from settlers and 
others, that are quite as useful to him as are the same things when new. The sum of 
three dollars does not appear to be large enough to enable an Indian to provide for 
himself with many of his winter necessaries; but as he receives the same amount for 
his wife or wives, and for each of his children, the aggregate sum is usually 
sufficient to procure many comforts for his family which he would otherwise be 
compelled to deny himself. 115 
Thus, federal negotiators conceived of annuities, if employed properly, as providing 
Indigenous peoples with a means of obtaining goods (whether "comforts" or "winter 
necessaries") locally at lower priees than those available to the state. At the same time, 
Simpson argued that because annuities did not "enable an Indian to provide for himself," they 
served to reinforce his initiative rather than to create dependence. In this sense, he dismissed 
the possibility that annuities might be spent inappropriately, in the process legitimating the 
policy of making cash payments to treaty signatories. 
Although sorne officiaIs emphasized monetary annuities' potential benefits rather 
than the danger they may have posed, others inversed this critique. In May 1871, wben 
relaying his instructions ta the commissioners of what would become Treaties No. 1 and 2, 
secretary of state Joseph Howe wrote:"Another point to which 1 wisb to call your attention is 
tbe policy of restricting as much as possible the amount to be paid in money. It bas been 
represented to the Govemment that money is but little used by tbe Band witb whom you will 
negotiate, and that provisions and clothing are much more highly prized. There is a danger 
too that, shou1d money become plentiful among tbose people, traders will bring spirits into 
115 Wemyss M. Simpson to the Secretary ofState for the Provinces, 3 November 1871, in Morris, The 
Treaties ofCanada... , p. 43. 
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the settlement, and demoralize and destroy the Indians.,,116 The "danger" of entrusting cash to 
Amerindians remained on the minds of federal officiais throughout the period. For instance, 
lAJ. McKenna, an Indian Affairs employee and one of the Treaty No. 8 commissioners, and 
lA. Macrae, the Department of Indian Affairs' Inspector of Indian agencies, suggested that 
the state depart from monetary annuity payments during its 1899 treaty negotiations. 
McKenna noted that, "the Department's view appears to be that the paying of annuities to 
Indians has not produced desirable results." Ultimately, McKenna argued that the prospective 
Treaty No. 8 First Nations wou Id "not place much value on" annuity payments and that in 
northern regions they would be extremely costly.ll7 ContralY to McKenna's recommendation, 
Treaty No. 8 included monetary payments in line with those offered in Treaties No. 1 to 7. 
Thus, while weil aware of the hazards and drawbacks of cash annuities, federal officiais 
continued to employ them in the context of new treaties and adhesions to old agreements into 
the 1930s, underlining their centrality to these agreements. 
First Nations did not view annuities in the same way as gçwernment officiais, 
drawing mainly on the social, po1itica1, and economic practices established over the 
preceding centuries in the context of the fur trade in order to conceive of the relations they 
were creating with the Canadian state through treaty. Arthur l Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank 
Tough argue that as a result of the numbered treaties the federal state effectivcly replaced the 
HBC in western Canada. The allthors contend that the use of annuities in these agreements 
. should be understood in reference to the traditional fur-trade practice of winter olltfitting ­
that is, purchasing the goods and equipment necessary to carry a family through the win ter 
hunting season. Prior to the state's arrivai in the west, the obligation of supporting the 
Aboriginal population in poor years, when hunters were unable to pay off the debt that they 
had contracted, feU on the HBC. However, from the 1870s the state assumed this 
responsibility, thereby inserting Indian Affairs into a pre-existing set of social and economic 
116 Joseph Howe to W.M. Simpson, S.J. Dawson, and Robert Pether, 6 May 1871 in fndian Ajfairs 
Anl1ual Report, 1871, p. 6-7. 
117 Quoted in Ray, Miller, and Tough, Bounty and Benevolence, p. 162. 
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relations. 118 While Amerindians attempted to ensure that the state would provide sufficient 
income to guarantee them a living in the context of economic uncertainty and that it would 
come to their aid in times of need, officiais preferred to consider the Department's role, at 
least insofar as annuities were concemed, in terms of its responsibility for symbolica11y 
recal1ing the transfer effected by these agreements, thereby upholding the "honor of the 
crown" through the annual distribution of a sma11 amount of cash to every member of the 
bands having taken treaty. 
Of course, Aboriginal and official conceptions of treaty relations and money-use 
both, at least to sorne extent, informed and were informed by the provisions of the 
agreements themselves, making their analysis as central to the present discussion as the 
analysis of the discourse that surrounded them. The eleven numbered treaties, and adhesions 
thereto, signed between 1871 and 1930 contained nearly identical monetary clauses. Treaties 
No. 1 and 2 began the period by paying a11 Amerindians within the region they covered a $3 
gratuity in addition to ao aIUlUal payment of $3. However, fo11owing the signature of Treaty 
No. 3 in 1873, and Canada's admission that certain "outside promises" had been made during 
the negotiations of the first two numbered treaties, the federal govemment moved to align 
these agreements with the terms guaranteed by Treaty No. 3 - that is, beginning in 1875, ail 
Treaties No. 1 and 2 chiefs wouId receive $20 in annuity payments whereas a11 other band 
members would be paid $5 annual1y .119 Treaty No. 3, in addition to providing larger annual 
payments to band chiefs ($25), also guaranteed $15 in annuities to "each subordinate officer, 
oot exceeding three for each band." The 1873 treaty also paid significantly more in gratuities 
($12 per capita) than had the two earlier agreements. 120 Treaty No. 4, signed in the summer of 
1874, expanded on the terms contained in Treaty No. 3 by paying larger gratuities to both 
118 For this argument as applied ta Treaties No. 1 and 2, see Ray, Miller, and Tough, Bounty and 
Benevolence, p. 74. ln the context of Treaty No. 6, see Ibid, p. 147. 
119 For the original texts of Treaties No. 1 and 2, see Morris, The Treaties of Canada... , p. 313-20. For 
the revised versions, see Ibid, p. 338-42. 
120 For Treaty No. 3, see Ibid, p. 320-9. 
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headmen, "not exceeding four in each band," ($15) and chiefs ($25), while providing 
identical annuity payments to those accorded the year before. 121 With the exception of Treaty 
No. 9, which paid 1ess per capita both in annuities and gratuities than did all other post­
Confederation treaties, Treaties No. 5 to Il paid identical annuities to those afforded by 
Treaties No. 3 and 4. 122 The gratuities of these treaties, however, varied. Treaty No. 5 paid a 
$5 gratuity to ail band members regardless of rank, Treaties No. 6 and 7 paid identical 
gratuities to Treaties No. 3 and 4 ($12 per capita), and Treaties No. 8, 10, and Il adopted a 
graduated gratuity pay-scale whereby chiefs received $25, headman $22, and everyone else 
$12. 123 
In specifying the form and manner in which payments were to be made, the 
numbered treaties created a more or less homogenous system of annual monetary distribution 
among the signatory bands of western and northern Canada. Nearly half of these treaties (No. 
4, 7, 8,9, and II) specified that annual payments, "unless there be sorne exceptional reason, 
[are] to be paid to the heads of families for those belonging thereto.,,124 However, Morris's 
comments during Treaty No. 6 negotiations suggest that the heads of household most likely 
received payment for their family members even under those treaties that make no mention of 
how annuities or gratuities were to be paid. Morris told the assembled Plains Cree at Fort 
Carlton: "When the treaty is closed, if it be closed, we will make a present to every man, 
121 For Treaty No. 4, see Ibid, p. 330-8. 
122 Treaty No. 9 paid $8 gratuities and $4 annuilies ta ail members of the signatory bands, regardless of 
their political status within the community. For a more in-depth analysis of Treaty No. 9, see Chapters 
Five and Six. 
123 For the treaty texts, see Ibid, p. 342-50 (Treaty No. 5); Ibid, p. 351-67 (Treaty No. 6); Ibid, p. 368­
75 (Treaty No. 7); Canada, Treaty No. 8, Made June 21, 1899, and Adhesions, Reports, etc., Ottawa, 
Queen's Prin ter, [1899] 1966; Canada, The James Bay Treaty, Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) 
and Adhesions Made in 1929 and 1930, Ottawa, Queen's Prin ter, [1931] 1964; Canada, Treaty No. 10 
and Reports of Commissioners, Ottawa, Queen's Prin ter, [1907] 1966; and Canada, Treaty No. Il 
(June 27, 1921) and Adhesion (Ju!y 17, 1922) with Reports, etc., Ottawa, Queen's Printer, [1926] 
1957. 
124 This particular clause is from Treaty No. 7 in Morris, The Treaties ofCanada... , p. 370. 
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woman, and chi1d, of twelve dollars, the money being paid to the head of a family for his 
wife, and children not married.,,125 With the exception of Treaties No. 1 and 2, ail of the post­
Confederation treaties guaranteed annuity and gratuity payment in monetary forrn. Although 
it eventually paid them in cash, Canada reserved for itself in the text of the first two 
numbered treaties the right to decide the form in which treaty payments would be made: 
"such payment to be made in such articles as the Indians shall require of blankets, clothing, 
prints (assorted colors), twine or traps, at the current cost price in Montreal, or otherwise, if 
Hel' Majesty shaH deem the same desirable in the interests of her Indian people, in cash." 
The numbered treaties, following the example set by the individual interest 
payments made under the Manitoulin Island Treaty and to a lesser extent by the coarse 
population sUi-veys perforrned by state agents in the build-up to the Robinson Treaties, 
provided the state with a wealth of annually-updated information on the treaties' Amerindian 
signatories - information that it had not previously possessed.1 26 This drive by the state 
towards the constitution of more detailed information concerning the situation "on the 
ground" within its national boundaries was not exclusive to Indian Affairs, with the 
uniformization of population information throughout Canada as a whole taking place at the 
same time. This process, through which officiais created a centralized and standardized 
knowledge-based apparatus, constitutes one of the pillars of mid-to-Iate nineteenth-century 
state formation in Canada as in the United States and Western Europe. 127 In the case of First 
125 A.G. Jackes, "Narrative of the proceedings connected with the effecting of the treaties at Forts 
Carlton and Pitt...," in Ibid, p. 207. 
126 On the 1849 exploratory trip that generated preliminary information on the location and size of the 
Lake Superior and Lake Huron bands with whom the 1850 treaties were concluded, see Surtees, 
"Indian Land Cessions in Ontario," p. 242-7. Robinson combined this information with that gleaned in 
the course of his 1850 negotiations in order to construct a more complete portrait of the treaties' 
signatory population in order to enforce the agreements' clause concerning the bands' necessity of 
maintaining two-thirds of their numbers. 
127 For the "creation" of population in Canada, and its role as the "eyes of politics," see Bruce Curtis, 
The Politics of Population: State Formation, Statistics, and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875, 
Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2002. See also Bruce Curtis, "Révolution gouvernementale et 
savoir politique au Canada-Uni," Sociologie et sociétés, vol. 24, no. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 169-79. For 
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Nations, Canada's mid-to-Iate nineteenth-century treaties, the monetary payments that they 
guaranteed, and the detailed, individualized, and standardized annual record-keeping that 
they required provided the means through which the imperial and later federal state came to 
know (and to create) its Amerindian population. Furthermore, in contrast to both the 
Robinson and Manitoulin Island agreements, the numbered treaties determined who was and 
was not a band member. Thus, in spite of occasional requests on the part of Amerindians, 
those individuals that the state formally recognized as Métis were deemed ineligible to 
benefit from the treaties of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries - that is, they 
could not draw annuities and, as a result, were excluded from Canada's state-defined 
Amerindian population. 128 
The existence of this process of population creation is perhaps best illustrated by 
the flagrant lack of numerical information that the state possessed with regard to First Nations 
when undertaking treaty negotiations. After the signature of Treaty No. 4 at Qu'Appelle, the 
commissioners, because of faulty estimates of Amerindian numbers, twice requested 
additional funds from Winnipeg to complete treaty payment. 129 However, after this initial 
difficulty, treaty payments proceeded smoothly in following years as a result of the band lists 
that authorities drew up at the first year's payment table. FUlthermore, officiais clearly sought 
to increase their knowledge of the Aboriginal population beyond this point in that sorne of the 
treaty texts themselves specified that, "as soon as possible after the execution of this treaty, 
the prototypical historical study of state formation, see Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The Great 
Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, New York, Basil Blackwell, 1985. On stale 
formation generally in Canada during the period, see Allan Greer and Ian Radforth (eds.), Colonial 
Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1992. For a theoretical reading of this process, see Michel Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population. 
Cours au collège de France, 1977-1978, Paris, GallimarcIJSeuil, 2004, p. 69-77. 
128 On Amerindian attempts to include the Métis in the terms of Treaties No. 3 and 4, see J.R. Miller, 
Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 2009, p. 168 and 172. 
129 W.J. Christie and M.G. Dickieson to [the Secretary of State of Canada], '7 October 1875 in Morris, 
The Treaties ofCanada... , p. 85-7. 
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[authorities should] cause to be taken an accurate census of ail the Indians inhabiting the 
district above described.,,130 These censuses served to "create" the treaties' Amerindian 
population so that the state might "cause to be paid [the annuities] in cash at sorne suitable 
season to be duly notified to the Indians, and at a place or places to be appointed for that 
pUl-pose, within the territory ceded.,,13 1 Similarly, the payment of annuities also served to 
encourage Amerindian bands to settle on their reserves, thereby anchoring nomadic peoples 
to fixed geographic locales and thus further aiding the state in performing its administrative 
duties. During the Treaty No. 6 negotiations, "The Lieutenant-Governor [Morris] then met 
the few Chippewas who came forward, and told them that they must be paid at the place 
where they belonged, that they could not be paid at Fort Pitt.,,132 Thus, through the practice of 
annuity payments, the numbered treaties allowed the state to clearly define western and 
northem Amerindian bands while attaching them to specifie points on the map. In this way, 
federal bureaucrats could theoretically manage the state's day-to-day relations with First 
Nations in a manner that corresponded to contemporary ideals of scientific rationality. 
In the case of the numbered treaties, annuity payments again provided Indian 
Affairs with a means of maintaining a political structure that federal officiais had largely 
defined during treaty negotiations. Although negotiators clearly adopted this approach to 
facilitate the Departments' dealings with the numerous bands that had taken treaty by 
unilaterally imposing upon them a single form of governance, in at least one case, this is 
precisely what Amerindian treaty negotiators sought. During discussions preceding the 
signature of Treaty No. 6, the Plains Cree told Reverend George McDougall, "We would 
further ask that our chiefships be established by the Govemment. Of late years almost every 
trader sets up his own Chief and the result is we are broken up into little parties, and our best 
130 This clause is taken from Treaty No. 1 in Ibid, p. 315. 
131 This clause is from Treaty No. 4 in Ibid, p. 332. 
132 A.G. Jackes, "Narrative of the proceedings connected with the effecting of the treaties at Forts 
Carlton and Pitt... ," in Ibid, p. 223. 
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men are no longer respected.,,133 Thus, these Cree appear to have considered the federal 
state's external enforcement of Amerindian political structure as a means of preventing their 
community's dissolution at the hands of Euro-Canadian merchants. Thus, the supplementary 
payments that treaty chiefs and headmen received from the federal state each year served, in 
theory at least, to shore-up these individuals' authority thereby maintaining a cohesive 
"traditional" political unit while simultaneously serving Indian Affairs' interests through its 
ability to remove uncooperative leaders, who thereby lost the significant supplementary 
revenue from annuities they earned as chiefs or headmen. 
Despite the monetary annuities that characterized Canadian treaty policy after 1850, 
authorities continued to express, through laws, discourse, policy, and practice a profound 
unease with respect to Amerindian money-use. In 1851, the Legislative Assembly of the 
Province of Canada constituted the Lower Canada Indian Fund, in which it agreed to deposit 
up to fi ,000 Hfx annually, in order to pay for necessary expenditure on behalf of the 
Amerindians of Canada East. 134 However, it rapidly became clear that the state would not 
expend the entirety of these monies. Beginning during the period of retrenchment fo!lowing 
the War of 1812, the Department had adopted a parsimonious stance in relation to the use of 
state and band funds for the benefit of First Nations. This fiscal approach characterized 
Indian Affairs' financial policy wel1 into the twentieth century and explains why the Lower 
Canada fund remained underused. In 1852, for example, the Department spent less than .f400 
from this source. 135 By 30 June 1864, as a result of the continuation of the annual 
parliamentary grant at the same rate at which it had been established ($4,000 or .f l ,000 Hfx), 
interest on the fund's accumulated capital, and limited outlay, its balance had grown to 
133 George McDougall to Lieutenant-Governor Morris, 23 October 1875 in Ibid, p. 175. 
134 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Aulhorize the Setting Aparl of Lands for the Use of Certain lndian 
Tribes in Lower Canada," 14 & 15 Victoria, c. 106, p. 2096-7, 30 August 1851. 
135 Extracl from a Report of Executive Council, 29 December 1852, in Canada, Journaux du Conseil 
législatifde la province du Canada, vol. 16, Toronto, Le Leader, 1858, Appendix No. 13, n.p. 
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$35,350.01 (f8,837.10.6 Hfx).'36 By the end of the decade the fund had grown to 
approximately $42,000 before leaping to $120,841.93 in 1870. 137 
However, in spite of this annual excess of funds, Indian Affairs rapidly discounted 
the possibility of any cash distribution to individual Amerindians and does not appear to have 
ever reconsidered the issue. This points to a fundamental difference in departmental 
perception of parliamentary funds from those provided in connection with treaties. Whereas 
authorities viewed the latter as an indisputable right, they considered the former to be a 
privilege, arising from the state's "benevolence" rather than from any legal obligation. In 
1852, the superintendent general of Indian Affairs, Robert Bruce, opposed using the Lower 
Canada fund to make any generalized payment to individuals, employing a similar line of 
reasoning to that used by colonial officiaIs who had argued against the commutation of Indian 
presents in the 1820s and 1830s. Bruce estimated that the Aboriginal population of Canada 
East was somewhat superior to 5,000. As a result, he claimed that an annual payment to every 
Amerindian in the colony from these funds would be entirely useless since the $4,000 
parliamentary grant could not provide even $1 per person, per year. In commenting on 
Bruce's report, a committee of the Executive Council argued that the Indian Department 
should be encouraged to use the Lower Canada Indian Fund judiciously on a case-by-case 
basis in order to he1p "better" each of the co10ny's Aborigina1 communities according to its 
particu1ar needs. It added, following Bruce's suggestion, that Indian Affairs shou1d be 
permitted to preserve any unexpended balance for future use. 138 Thus, as in the case of Indian 
136 William Spragge, "Statement of the Receipts and Expenditure Account of the Several Indian Tribes 
and Funds... ," 14 January 1865, in Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1864, p. 17. 
137 "Statemenl of Receipts and Expenditures as Shewn on the Indian Books... ," 1 November 1869, in 
Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1869, p. 21 and CT. Walcott, "Statement of the Condition of the Indian 
Fund ... ," 21 February 1871, in Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1870, p. 17. Unfortunately, the cause of 
this massive growth is unclear. 
138 Although l have been unable to locate Bntce's report of 21 December 1852, the committee of the 
Executive Council provides a brief summary in its report written at the end of the same month. Extract 
from a Report of Executive Council, 29 December 1852, in Canada, Journaux du Conseil législatif de 
la province du Canada, vol. 16, Toronto, Le Leader, 1858, Appendix No. 13, n.p. 
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presents, colonial officiais felt that the funds set aside by the legislature should not be 
expended in small cash payments to individual Amerindians. Instead, they argued, the state 
should maintain control over the Lower Canada Indian Fund, expenditure from which was to 
be made solely at the superintendent general's discretion. In this way, the parliamentary grant 
came to be employed in accordance with departmental prerogatives and not Amerindian 
rights. 
Official insistence on the "judicious" use of funds remained in force through the 
end of the century. Whenever possible, the Department appears to have consciously supplied 
Amerindians with agricultural goods that were less easily exchangeable than cash. Policy­
makers clearly intended to "civilize" First Nations through this use of the funds that it held in 
trust either for individual bands or for a large segment of the Aboriginal population (as in the 
case of the Lower Canada Indian Fund). In 1886, John A. Macdonald, who doubled as Prime 
Minister and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, wrote of the Department's 
responsibility in expending funds provided by Parliament: 
The grant made by Parliament at its last session of $4,000 for the purchase of cattle 
and agricultural implements, to assist, in their farming operations, industrious and 
deserving members of Indian bands in the older Provinces who have no trust funds 
at their credit in the hands of the Government, was ta sorne extent drawn on for the 
purpose intended; but it requires great caution ta be exercised in the gift of such 
articles to prevent the same from being handed over to any but trustworthy Indians 
who would make a good use of and not sell them. This the Department has 
endeavored to do; and with each gift the recipient was duly notified that he was not 
to dispose of the articles given without the consent of the Department having been 
previously obtained. 139 
Macdonald's emphasis on trustworthiness points to authorities' beliefthat assistance ought to 
be rendered in kind. OfficiaIs argued in favor of close supervision of expenditure from public 
funds, something that would be impossible if the state supplied Aboriginal peoples with cash. 
Thus, the alarm generated by the prospect that Amerindians might sell these goods underlines 
139 lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1886, p. xii-xiii. 
176 
the state's use ofmonetary power (even in the absence of cash) to restrict Aboriginal options 
and to reinforce the distinction between funds whose form was left entirely to the discretion 
of officiais and those guaranteed to be provided in currency by the formai legal apparatus of 
land cessions. 
This departmental mistrust of money did not only concem cash; it also extended to 
credit relations. In 1891, Edgar Dewdney, the superintendent general of Indian Affairs, 
argued that, "there should be legislation prohibiting, under severe penalty, the giving of credit 
to Indians, except under special permission." Dewdney felt that indebtedness was inherent to 
Amerindians due to their general inability, and sometimes unwillingness, to repay those who 
supplied them with goods on credit. Furthermore, the superintendent general claimed that the 
dangers of debt increased with proximity to Euro-Canadian population centers. As a result, he 
wrote: "the prohibition would appear to be more necessary in the case of Indians of the older 
Provinces... than it is in that oflndians residing in the more recently acquired sections of the 
Dominion.,,'4o This emphasis on the necessity of preventing Amerindians from having easy 
access to credit was not novel in the 1890s. In fact, the Graduai Civilization Act of 1857 also 
placed a great deal of stress on debt. For an Indian to be enfranchised under this law, he had 
to be over twenty-one, able to "speak, read and write either the english or french language 
readi1y and weil," and "of good moral character and free from debt.,,141 Of course, the 
majority of Euro-Canadian colonists may have been unable to meet this particular 
constellation of requirements for full British North American citizenship had it been required 
of them. 142 Moreover, this proviso, like Dewdney's proposaI, appears to lack an 
understanding, either willfully or otherwise, of the building blocks of capitalism (the creation 
of capital frequently requiring borrowed capital). From the middle of the nineteenth century, 
140 lndian A./Jairs Annual Report. 1891, p. xvii- xviii. 
141 Canada, Statutes, "An Act ta Encourage the Graduai Civilization of the Indian Tribes in this 
Province, and to Amend the Laws Respecting Indians," 10 June 1857,20 Victoria, c. 26. Furthermore, 
this act only provided for the enfranchisement of men. 
142 Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation," p. 16. 
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then, Amerindians found the road to economic success theoretically barred by their supposed 
guardian - the Canadian state - as it frequently refused, through both general discourse and 
legislation, to afford them any but the most minor role in the monetary economy.143 
Indian Affairs had not always possessed the legal and political mandate that it did in 
the late nineteenth century allowing it such wide theoretical latitude when interfering in the 
everyday lives of Amerindians. Upon its creation in 1755, the Indian Department was 
expected to manage diplomatie and military relations with First Nations. In short order, it was 
also assigned the task of overseeing Aboriginal land surrenders declared by the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 to be the exclusive domain of the imperial state. Following the end of 
the War of 1812, the Department could no longer effectively justify its existence using the 
first of these two elements, even if it did continue to distribute the presents that had 
originated in the period Amerindian militmy importance. As a result, in addition to the 
provision of presents, Indian Affairs occupied itself with the operation of the treaty system 
that had developed under the aegis of the Royal Proclamation while, from the 1820s, funding 
and playing a relatively minor role in the public-private partnership that sought to "civilize" 
Amerindians. In the 1850s, colonial legislators began to displace the Royal Proclamation and 
the "civilization" project from their central l'ole in the legal and political framework 
underlying Aboriginal-state relations through new laws that defined the Department's raison 
d'être no longer in terms of the provision of presents and annuities but in terms of a clearly 
defined distinction between Amerindians and non-Aboriginal Canadians. 
At roughly the same time that colonial officiaIs reconstituted the Indian Department 
as an essentially autonomous branch of the Crown Lands Department, the colonial 
govemment began erecting the legislative framework that wou Id serve to provide Indian 
143 Historians have noted that lndian Affairs' agricultural policies displayed a similarly obstructionist 
character, particularly in western Canada. See Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve 
Farmers and Government Policy, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990 and 
Leo G. Waisberg and Tim E. Holzkamm, '''A Tendency to Discourage Them fi'om Cultivating': 
Ojibwa Agriculture and Indian Affairs Administration in Northwestem Ontario," Ethnohistory, vol. 40, 
no. 2 (Spring 1993), p. 175-211. 
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Affairs with legal authority over the lives of Aboriginal peoples far surpassing that of the 
preceding period. In 1850 and 1851, the Legislative Assembly of the Province Canada passed 
legislation meant to protect Aboriginallands in both Canada East and Canada West, defining 
in the process who was ."Indian" for the first time. 144 In 1857, the Assembly increased the 
Canadas' ability to directly intervene in the affairs of First Nations with the passage of the 
Graduai Civilization Act. This law aimed to erase the distinction between "Indians" and 
Euro-Canadians by enfranchising sufficiently "advanced" male Amerindians while providing 
them with tit1e to land from the reserve on which they lived and a portion of their band's 
funds along with any annual payments they would have otherwise received. 145 As John 
Milloy has pointed out, this law abandoned the tradition of pursuing "civilization" through 
the private-pu blic partnership that had been established by missionaries and state officiais in 
concert with Amerindians who favored Western education in the 1820s and 1830s for a state­
centric approach. 146 In other words, at the same time as the colonial state was preparing to 
144 Canada, Statutes, "An Act for the Better Protection of the Lands and Property of the Indians in 
Lower Canada," 13 & 14 Victoria, c. 42, 10 August 1850, p. 1247-8, Canada, Statutes, "An Act for the 
Protection of Indians in Upper Canada from Imposition, and the Property Occupied or Enjoyed by 
them from Trespass and Injury," 13 & 14 Victoria, c. 74, 10 August l850, p. 1409-12, and Canada, 
S/a/u/es, "An Act to Repeal in Part and to Amend an Act, Intituled, An Act for the Better Protection of 
the Lands and Property of the Indians in Lower Canada," 14 & 15 Victoria, c 59,13 August 1851, p. 
1898. 
145 Under this system, women's legal status accorded with that of their husband. Thus, if a man was 
enfranchised, his wife and chi1dren, both male and female, would also lose their Indian status. 
However, if any such female "Iineal descendant" married an Indian, she would become an Indian 
under this law. Canada, "An Act to Encourage the Graduai Civilization of the Indian Tribes ... " 
According to the tenets of Iiberalism and nineteenth-century common law, women's status was 
subordinate to that of their husband, father, or other male guardian. On marriage laws in Canada and 
other British colonial contexts, see Bettina Bradbury, "Colonial Comparisons: Rethinking Marriage, 
Civilization and Nation in Nineteenth-Century White SellIer Societies," in Phillip Buckner and R. 
Douglas Francis (eds.), Rediscovering the British World, Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 2005, 
p. 135-57. 
146 John S. Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts: Developmental Strategy and Constitutional Change," in 
J.R. Miller (ed.), Swee/ Promises: A Reader on Indian-White Relations in Canada, Toronto, University 
of Toronto Press, 1991, p. 148. It is important to note that while in 1857 the state took upon itself a 
much more central raie in the "civilization" (now, because of the new legal definitions, more rightly 
termed "assimilation") project, private groups such as missionary societies continued to play an active 
role alongside the Indian Departmenl. 
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take charge of the Indian Department, soon to be reconstituted as the sole governrnental 
agency responsible for relations with First Nations, legislators provided the Department with 
the legal tools necessary for transforrning its mandate from being the state's representative in 
the heterogeneous field of Aboriginal civilization to being the primary author of Amerindian 
assimilation into the Canadian body politic. 
The Enfranchisement Act of 1869 provided the Indian Department with 
dramatically expanded power over what couId now rightly be termed its wards while 
explicitly tying Indian status to the receipt of state funds. The passage of the act was to serve 
as the beginning of a new era in the definition of who was and was not an "Indian." Along 
with access to First Nations' reserves, "the division among the members of any tribe, band, or 
body of Indians, of any annuity money, interest money or rents" would now depend upon an 
individual's status in the eyes of the Department ofIndian Affairs. The act declared that, "no 
person of less than one fourth Indian blood, born after the passing of this Act, shall be 
deemed entitled to share in any annuity, interest or rents, after a certificate to that effect is 
given by the Chief or Chiefs of the band or tribe in Council, and sanctioned by the 
Superintendent General of Indian affairs." Furthermore, the act provided coercive measures 
designed to promote morally acceptable behavior. For example, it declared that any 
imprisoned individual would not receive such funds during the period of imprisonrnent and 
that Indian Affairs had the authority to use "any annuity or interests coming to such Indian" 
to defray "the legal costs incurred in procuring such conviction." The act also provided the 
Department with the power to withhold annuity or interest payments from "any person of 
Indian blood who may be proved to the satisfaction of the Superintendent General of Indian 
affairs to have been guilty of deserting his wife or child" in order to provide for the wellbeing 
of the deserted family members as weil as from any Amerindian not performing maintenance 
work on "roads, bridges, ditches and fences" for which he was responsible. The act, however, 
did not employ repressive monetary measures alone. For example, in addition to title to lands 
extracted from his band's reserve, an enfranchised male Amerindian, along with his wife or 
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widow and children, would continue to receive "the annuities and interest money and rents, 
of the tribe, band, or body of Indians to which they belonged."147 In this way, Parliament 
equipped the Department with even more extensive legal means than it had gained in 1857 
for promoting the assimilation of Amerindians into Canada's imagined, morally upstanding 
body poli tic. 
While the Enfranchisement Act, following the Graduai Civilization Act of 1857, set 
the stage for late nineteenth-century Indian policy, the Indian Act of 1876 consolidated the 
basic theoretical structure of Amerindian-Euro-Canadian relations that these earlier pieces of 
legislation set out while once more expanding state power. As its predecessors, the 1876 act 
was preoccupied with the relation between individual Amerindians, First Nations as distinct 
groups, and the general Canadian population into which the law's framers hoped the first two 
categories would shortly disappear. Money, again in the form of annuities or interest 
payments, played a prominent role alongside land in the legal definition of the distinct 
Aboriginal societies to which the law applied. Thus, the act defined "band" (its preferred term 
for officially recognized Amerindian collectivities) as: "any tribe, band or body of Indians 
who own or are interested in a reserve or in Indian lands in common, of which the legal title 
is vested in the Crown, or who share alike in the distribution of any annuities or interest 
moneys for which the Govemment of Canada is responsible.,,148 Flirthermore, the act 
declared that throllgh the state's monetary payments, the band cOlild expand its ranks to 
inclllde individuals, such as illegitimate children, who would otherwise be exclllded from 
Indian status. 149 As had been the case in the 1869 law, the framers of the Indian Act sought to 
147 Canada, Statutes, "An Act for the Graduai Enfranchisement of Indians, the Better Management of 
Iodian Affairs, and to Extend the Provisions of the Act 31st Victoria, Chapter 42," 22 June 1869,32 & 
33 Victoria, c. 6, s. 4, 5, 7, Il, and 16. 
148 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians," 12 April 1876, 
39 Victoria, c.l8,s.3,ss.1. 
149 "[A]ny illegitimate chi Id, unless having shared with the consent of the band in the distribution 
moneys of such band for a period exceeding two years, may, at any lime, be excluded from the 
membership thereof by the band, if such proceeding be sanctioned by the Superintendent-General." 
Ibid, s. 3, ss. 3. 
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avoid dissuading Amerindians from becoming enfranchised for financial reasons. As a result, 
"any Indian woman marrying any other than an Indian or a non-treaty Indian" would lose her 
status in the eyes of the law while continuing to receive "the annual or semi-annual 
distribution of [her] annuities, interest moneys and rents.,,150 The 1876 act once again used 
the threat of non-payment of annuities as a means of guaranteeing Amerindian cooperation in 
certain instances such as the performance of roadwork and as a form of punishment for 
crimes cOffiffiitted or for deserting his or her family.151 The Indian Act also employed the 
promise of cash payments to those individuals - Aboriginal or otherwise - who provided 
information concerning' the sale ofliquor to any Amerindian (which it made illegal).152 As the 
Enfranchisement Act had done, the 1876 law aimed to encourage the renunciatiol1 of Indian 
status by permitting the enfranchised individual to continue drawing the annuities, interest 
monies, and rents paid to their former band. 153 Furthermore, it moved beyond its predecessor 
by permittingthe payment of the enfranchised Indian's "share of the capital funds at the 
credit of the band, or his or her share of the principal of the annllities of the band" if "his or 
her exemplary good conduct and management of property, proves that he or she is qualified 
to receive his or her share of such moneys.,,154 Thus, while land remained the chief material 
concem of legislation concerning Amerindians, the Indian Act employed money as a means 
of defining those to whom it applied, encouraging them to willingly surrender their special 
legal status, and providing punitive measures against those who refused to cooperate with the 
150 Ibid. However, such women could, with the consent of her former band, opt out of this system by 
accepting a one-time payment of ten years' worth of such payments. 
151 Ibid, s, 24, 71, and 72. 
152 Under the Indian Act of 1876, half of the fines imposed upon conviction were to be paid to the 
informant of prosecutor and the other half were to be placed in "the fund for the benefit of that body of 
1ndians or non-treaty Indians, with respect ta one or more members of which the offence was 
committed." Ibid, s. 79. 
153 Ibid, s. 88. 
154 Ibid, s. 93. 
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general goals of Indian policy or the specifie instructions of the Indian Department or its 
employees. 
Depending upon the context, then, officiais conceived of money in a variety of 
ways during the nineteenth century. Whereas from 1850, they portrayed monetary payments 
as a right when stemming from land cessions, authorities framed both presents and various 
forms of assistance as privileges throughout the period and, as such, refused to monetize 
them, preferring to either send goods themselves or to provide funds to Indian agents or 
missionaries who would then purchase and distribute the necessary provisions. This is hardly 
surprising. Throughout the nineteenth century, the majority of Europeans and their 
descendants across the globe subscribed to the belief that money, when supplied as 
assistance, encouraged the natural improvidence of those who had the greatest need of it 
(whether this be the urban poor or Aboriginal peoples). This idea would not be overthrown, 
in Canada at least, until the Second World War, when the state, now far larger than it had 
been at any point in the nineteenth century, began providing cash welfare en masse. 155 Thus, 
officiais' insistence that departmental aid be distributed in kind owed more to structural and 
cultural forces than it did to any conscious decision. 
This division of acceptable forms of monetary payment had important 
consequences for the force the state could conceivably bring to bear on First Nations. 
Although treaties provided their Amerindian signatories with a steady, if limited flow of 
money, thereby furnishing them with a flexible means of exerting force, money's absence 
from every other aspect their relationship with the state subjected First Nations to a clear 
power imbalance. The state determined the form taken by the goods and services it supplied 
Amerindians, rather than providing them with money which would have allowed them to 
make such decisions themselves. At the same time, the Assembly of the Province of Canada 
began a process by which colonial and later federal lawmakers would pass legislation 
defining who was and was not an "Indian" in terms of individualized access to the resources 
155 On wartime changes to welfare, see Guest, The Emergence ofSocial Security in Canada, p. 103-33. 
183 
held in trust by the state. Thus, bands came to be identified with trust funds and enfranchised 
Amerindians became "true" liberal subjects through the unrestricted access that these laws 
granted them to their portion of band funds and reserve lands. Those who chose to reject 
assimilation into larger Canadian society, however, might potentially find themselves subject 
to ever-greater punitive measures linked to these same monetary sources. Concomitantly ta 
the changes made between the 1850s and 1870s to the legal framework within which Indian 
Affairs operated came the dramatic expansion of the agency's personnel and its 
corresponding ability to influence everyday life in Aboriginal communities. A redesigned 
Department replaced the extremely limited Indian Affairs infrastructure of the first half of the 
nineteenth century, in the process creating the "lndian" as a distinct and well-defined 
category of Canadian society. 
Beginning in the 1870s, then, the Department of Indian Affairs, now a true 
"clientele" agency, gained a previously inconceivable level of legal control over Amerindians 
as weil as the responsibility for remaking them as ideal liberal subjects. Although it 
introduced a slew afnew programs and services (such as boarding schools and model farms) 
in the late nineteenth century, the Department set about achieving assimilation in a 
surprisingly nonchalant manner. However, because of the confluence of this novel mandate 
and the changed politico-legal structure within which it operated, Indian Affairs came ta 
occupy a "natural" place in Canadian society. As such, the Department's discourse 
proclaiming its socially desirable and apparently humane goal of integrating Canada's 
Aboriginal peoples into the national body poli tic provided it with a powerful argument in 
favor of its awn legitimacy, regardless of its lack of results. '56 The changed legal and 
administrative environment of the late nineteenth century, then, did not necessarily translate 
into similarly altered material conditions on the ground. In order to determine the extent to 
which Indian Affairs proved capable of exerting actual monetary force during the period, the 
156 On legitimacy, see Douglas, How Institutions Think. On Indian Affairs' lack of success in 
implementing its publicly stated policy goals, see Miller, "Owen Glendower... " 
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following section descends from this high-Ievel analysis to concentrate on conditions ln 
Mashteuiatsh and Wendake. 
Indian Affairs, Money, and Politics in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake 
This section focuses on the monetalY interaction of Amerindians and the 
Department in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh during the nineteenth century. During the period 
of retrenchment and stabilization that lasted from the 1810s through Confederation, Indian 
Affairs played a relatively minor role in money-use in these two communities, due primarily 
to its near total absence in the case of Mashteuiatsh and its limited regulatory capacity in 
Wendake. However, even after the Department had assigned permanent agents to both 
reserves and had undertaken the administration of a wide array of their day-to-day affairs 
extending weil beyond anything it had previously done, money only occasionally provided 
cause for local intervention. While the Huron and Innu also only rarely sought to exert force 
through money-use, the monetary power relations in which they were involved proved 
extremely contentious on a handful of occasions. The 1840s in Wendake and the 1890s in 
both communities were periods during which monetary issues played a significant l'ole in 
local poli tics. At other times, state officiais and band authorities engaged money in a far less 
contentious manner, integrating it into the routine management of on-reserve affairs. In this 
sense, the analysis of money's political dimension (both in terms of the encouragement of 
money-use and the constraints placed thereon) reveals one aspect of the changing relationship 
between the state and local elected authorities during the period while simultaneously 
providing insight into the reasons for which certain aspects of intra-community poli tics 
proved contentious while others did not. It also reveals the extenl to which money played a 
critical role in maintaining or undercutting political authority in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. 
Indeed, the Department, band councils, and individual band members made use of money 
(both in its abstract and material form) in attempts to challenge rivais' claims to legitimacy 
and to assert their own authority. 
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lndian AjJairs' Administrative Presence in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh 
ln order to contextualize this section's analysis of Indian Affairs' actions with 
respect to Huron and Innu money-use, it is important to describe the agency's presence in 
Mashteuiatsh and Wendake. The Indian Department's profile in these two communities 
during the nineteenth century paralleled its general pattern of development across Canada. In 
the decades following the War of 1812, the Department decreased its presence in Wendake, 
at mid-century it entered the still remote Saguenay-Lac St. Jean region, and during the 1870s 
and 1880s it finally established a permanent agent in both conununities. In this way, Indian 
Affairs' institutional reach first diminished and later increased alongside the role assigned it 
by succeeding imperial and federal governments. In other words, beginning in the 1820s and 
extending through mid-century Indian Affairs progressively lost some of its earlier potential 
to affect money-use "on the ground" (had it wanted to do so). By the final quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the Department, benefiting from greater legal power, increased funding, 
and more numerous personnel, had begun exerting its influence over monetaIY matters in 
Wendake and Mashteuiatsh in novel ways, even if it remained absent from most of the local 
day-to-day relations founded upon money-use. 
Although having interacted with Europeans and their descendents ln the St. 
Lawrence Valley since at least 1650, the Huron's official relationship with the Indian 
Department began with the 1760 signature of the "Murray Treaty" which, among other 
things, guaranteed them safe conduct across British lines to La Jeune Lorette (Wendake).157 
However, this relationship did not translate into the posting of a permanent, departmental 
agent in the village until the 1880s. Prior to this point, Indian Affairs relied on a mixture of 
officiais charged with the supervision of several conununities and Catholic missionaries in 
order to manage relations with the Huron. During the 1820s, Louis de Salaberry served as 
deputy superintendent at Quebec, giving him responsibility for administering relations with 
Wendake. Upon Salaberry's 1828 death, Louis Juchereau Duchesnay succeeded him and 
157 Alain Beaulieu, "Les Hurons et la Conquête: un nouvel élairage sur le 'traité Murray'," Recherches 
amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 30, no. 3 (2000), p. 53-63. 
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remained in the post through his own death in 1838. 158 In that year, Indian Affairs altered its 
administrative structure, abolishing the deputy superintendent position at Quebec and making 
Duncan Campbell Napier the de facto head of the Indian Department in Lower Canada as 
secretary of Indian Affairs to the govemor general. By the late 1830s, therefore, the Indian 
Department had ceased to maintain even the semblanGe of dedicated representation at 
Wendake that it had done since Salaberry's tenure in office. In spite of this lack of fulltime 
representation, throughout the nineteenth century the village's resident Catholic missionary 
provided both the Huron and the Department with the services offered elsewhere by state 
officiais. In exchange for partial funding of his salary by Indian Affairs, the missionary kept 
authorities apprized of the state of the community and acted as an advocate for Huron 
interests in dealings with departmental and other state authorities. 
In contrast to the longstanding relationship between the state and the Huron, the 
Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and the North Shore of the St. Lawrence effectively existed 
beyond the purview of the Indian Department until the mid-1840s.' 59 However, the region 's 
rapid colonization led to the Innu "settling" the reserve at Pointe-Bleue. (Mashteuiatsh) 
beginning in the 1850s. As the Indian Department gained greater powers over its wards, the 
reserve slowly became home to a small sedentary group of Innu and other Amerindians 
(mainly Abenaki in origin).IGO During this period, as Euro-Canadian colonization displaced 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean's Aboriginal population, Mashteuiatsh also gained importance as the 
158 Céline Cyr, "Juchereau Duchesnay, Michel-Louis," in Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online, 
http://www.biographi.ca/( 18 May 2010). 
159 In 1845, following receipt of "a Petition from the Tribe of Indians known as MOllntaineers 
(Montagnais) of Tadousac and places thence downwards along the North Shore of the River and Gulf 
of St Lawrence commonly called the' Kings Posts, '" the Secretary of Indian Affairs wrote that he 
"could not discover among the records of the Indian Office, any notice or description of the 
Petitioners, and that they had not at any period been under the protection of the Indian Department." 
Ducan C. Napier to James Macauley Higginson, 30 June 1845, LAC, RG10, vol. 149, p. 86383-4, reel 
C-11494. 
160 For a report on the state of the reserve and its population in the early 1870s, sec L. Vankollghnet to 
the Sliperintendent General of Indian Affairs, 30 June 1873, LAC, RG 10, vol. 1906, file 2295, reel C­
11108. 
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region' s primary fur trade center. These changes created a permanent base, featuring the 
presence of state and HBC agents, to which Innu hunter-trappers retumed annually and where 
a small number of band members, particularly towards the tum of the twentieth century, 
established year-round residency in order to eam their living by farming, commerce, and a 
mixture of other activities. Through the application of legislation to Mashteuiatsh, the Indian 
Department and the Innu themselves reorganized the community's political structure, 
implementing an elected band council active in the management of the reserve's day-to-day 
affairs. In these ways, the Innu 's economic activity and political structure underwent major 
change that, in tum, significantly altered patterns of money-use. 
In 1844, the Innu of the North Shore petitioned the governor-general for the 
establishment of a reserve in the region of Pessamit. 161 This action led to authorization for the 
creation of the first reserve in the region the following year. 162 In 1847, the governor-general 
again received a petition, this time from the Innu living in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and on the 
North Shore. The petition clearly references established treaty policy and sets forth the case 
for compensation for Innu lands in line with that provided to Upper Canadian First Nations, 
based on the state's longstanding receipt of revenue from the region in the form of the lease 
to the King's Posts (the lessee heId monopoly rights over the fur trade in the region). 
Concretely, the Innu requested that "des endroits de territoire fertiles soient tracés et réservés 
pour eux sur les bords des grandes eaux dans les postes du pays où ils s'assemblent 
d'ordinaire" and that a portion of the funds generated by land sales and the King's Posts be 
provided them in order.to assist in the development of agriculture. Both the commissioner of 
Crown lands and the member of the Legislative Assembly of Province of Canada from the 
county of Saguenay recommended that the state pUl'sue this policy by setting aside reserves 
161 Petition from the Montagnais of the North Shore to Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, 9 August 1844, 
LAC, RG10, vol. 599, p. 47446-50, reel C-13380. 
162 E. Parent, Copy of a Rapport of a Corrunitte of the Executive Council, 1 October 1845, LAC, 
RG10, vol. 163, p. 95189, reel C-11501. 
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and providing annuity payments, whether in kind or in currency.163 The following year, the 
Innu renewed their requests in a hand-delivered petition to the govemor general. Once again, 
they appealed for reserves and the funds generated by the lease to the King's Posts as weil as 
164those resulting from the sale of lands and timber. These efforts, along with those made by 
timber merchants and Catholic missionaries, led to the passage of the 1851 law that 
constituted the Lower Canada Indian Fund and provided the legal mechanism for the creation 
of the several reserves throughout the province that would take place in 1853, including two 
165for the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean. However, the act did not accord any fixed allI1Ual 
payment from the funds generated by leasing the King's Posts and the sale of lands therein in 
fee-simple to colonists along the !incs rcquested by Innu petitions and recommended by the 
reports of the 1840s. 
In addition to contributing to the creation of reselves, Innu petitions played an 
important role in defining the sociopolitical entities that the Indian Department would later 
163 Although he does not explicitly argue for either monetary or in-kind payments, the representative 
for Saguenay writes on established treaty practice in Canada West in terms that do not advocate one 
mode of paymentover the other. "Depuis 1763, le Gouvernement adJ1érant à la Proclamation royal de 
la même année, n'a pas cru devoir déposséder les Sauvages de leurs terres sans entrer en arrangement 
avec eux et leur donner quelque indemnité. Cette indemnité était quelque fois donnée sous la forme de 
présens, mais plus fréquemment sous la forme de rentes annuelles fixes et permanentes payables à la 
tribu et aux descendants de la tribu à perpétuité soit en marchandises ou en argent à raison de dix 
piastres pour chaque membre de la Tribu." For a copy of the petition as weil as a report, in which the 
commissioner of Crown lands is quoted, on the petition, see M. de Sales Laterrière, Report on a 
Petition from the Innu of Saguenay ta Charles Murray Cathcart, n.d. [26 June 1847], LAC, RG 10, vol. 
122, p. 5789-6, reel C-11481. For another copy of the report, see M. de Sales Laterrière, Report on a 
Petition from the Innu of Saguenay to Charles Murray Cathcart, 26 June 1847, LAC, RG 10, vol. 606, 
p. 51060-3, reel C-13383. 
164 Petition from Innu of Saguenay-Lac SI. Jean to Lord Elgin, 7 Febnlray 1848, in Victor Tremblay, 
"Une délégation des Montagnais auprès de Lord Elgin," Sagnueyensia, vol. 2, no. 2 (March-April 
1968), p. 38-40. 
165 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Authorize the Setting Apart of Lands ... " On the reserves created by 
the act (one on the shores of the Peribonka River and the other on Lac SI. Jean at Métabetchouan) and 
the role of timber company employees and missionaries, see Gérard L. Fortin and Jacques Frenette, 
"L'acte de 1851 et la création de nouvelles réserves indiennes au Bas-Canada en 1853," Recherches 
amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 19, no. 1 (1989), p. 31-7. 
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administer as separate bands, thereby challenging the 1nnu's relatively fluid sense of 
corrununity. Thus, when the state set aside reserves in 1853, it participated in the reification 
of the two "branches" of the 1nnu: those residing in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean and those making 
their home on the North Shore of the St. Lawrence. 1nnu petitions also participated in the 
creation of formai relations with the state and, more particularly, the 1ndian Department. 
Unlike the First Nations of the upper St. Lawrence Valley and the Great Lakes, the 1nnu of 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean had no financial relationship with the Department in the 1840s. Prior 
ta the creation of reserves, the state set aside funds only in order to respond to occasional 
requests for relief and not to maintain any formai administrative infrastructure in the region. 
Furthermore, the agents involved in requesting and receiving these early payments were 
neither 1nnu nor state officiais. For example, in 1848 timber merchant Peter McLeod secured 
a one-time payment of;(450 in order to provide reliefto Saguenay-Lac St. Jean's Amerindian 
population. Oblate missionaries apparently aided in the distribution of these funds as weil as 
supporting McLeod when he again requested state assistance for destitute 1nnu in 1851. 166 ln 
the same year, Duncan Campbell Napier, the superintendent oflndian Affairs in Canada East, 
wrote: "the 1ndians of the Saguenay District have never been aeknowledged as the recipients 
of Her Majesty's Annual Bounty, or as having any claim to assistance from the funds of the 
1ndian Department of Canada East.,,167 By the early 1850s, this had changed, with 1ndian 
Affairs providing occasional funds first to Father C.F. Cazeau and, from 1854, to David E. 
Priee, the eldest son of timber magnate William Priee, who in tum provided relief to the 1nnu 
of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean in the state's name. 168 However, disagreement among Euro­
166 Gaston Carrière, Histoire documentaire de la Congrégation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie­
Immaculée dans l'Est du Canada, vol. 3, Ottawa, Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1961, p. 276-7. 
167 Duncan C. Napier to Robert Bruce, 26 November 1851, LAC, RG 10, vol. 192, p. 112463, reel C­
11514. 
168 T. Lee Terrill, Report to the Legislative Assembly of the United Canadas, 2 June 1857, in Canada, 
Appendice du quinzième volume des journaux de l'Assemblée législative de la Province du Canada, 26 
February to 10 June 1857, Toronto, 1. Perrault, 1857, Appendice (No. 55.), n.p. Price later wrote that 
Edmond Head charged him with providing supplies to the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean in 1854. 
David E. Priee to the Minister of the Interior, 18 November 1875, LAC, RG10, vol. 1973, file 5615, 
reel C-11125. 
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Canadians over the state's division of funds for relief expenditure among the Innu fueled 
conflict between Indian Affairs' infOimal agents in the region. Following the Department's 
decision to accord Price a portion of the funds originally earmarked for distribution by the 
Oblate missionary Flavien Durocher to the Innu of the North Shore alone, Durocher charged 
Price with being motivated purely by self-interest. In order to counter the altered division of 
funds, Durocher planned to conduct a census of the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, thereby 
hoping to demonstrate the numerical superiority of the North Shore's Amerindian 
population. 169 However, in spite of Durocher' s attempts to discredit him, Price continued to 
perform as voluntaty and unpaid Indian agent to the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean Innu through 
1872. 170 
By this time, the Department had begun looking to appoint a fulltime Indian agent 
to the reserve at Pointe Bleue. In that year, the federal government offered the position to a 
Huron, Paul Picard Tsawenhohi. Picard, however, declined the offer, suggesting that his 
Euro-Canadian brother-in-Iaw, Zéphirin Duhamel, be named in his place. In a somewhat 
striking example of the Huron's tendency to see themselves in a different light from other 
Amerindians, Picard claimed that Duhamel "pourra devenir un des plus fermes pionniers de 
la Colonisation sur le lac St. Jean.,,17l However, two years later the Department named the 
169 Durocher's complaints and plan for correcting the situation are laid out in a letter to the HBC's 
chief c1erk at Métabetchouan, George Munro Skene. F. Durocher to ML Skene, 6 February 1857, 
HBCA, B.III/c/l, reellM272. 
170 Furthermore, Price continued to distribllte aid on a volllntary basis to Innu living in the vicinity of 
Chicoutimi through the mid-1870s. David E. Price, Account Current with the Indian Department for 
Montagnais Indians, Upper Saguenay, 15 November 1875 LAC, RGIO, vol. 1973, file 5615, reel C­
11125. Following the receipt of this bill, the Department authorized Price to continue to spend up to 
$30 annually on relief for the Innu at Chicoutimi. Lawrence Vankougtmet, Note on David E. Price's 
Letter of 18 November 1875,29 November 1875, and [Lawrence Vankoughnet?] to David E. Price, 30 
November 1875 LAC, RG 10, vol. 1973, file 5615, reel C-11125. 
171 Paul Picard to Joseph Howe, 23 August 1870, LAC, RG 10, vol. 380, p. 11-4, reel C-9603. 
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man recornmended by David Priee, L.E. Otis, instead of Duhamel as Indian agent at 
Mashteuiatsh. 172 
Although the Indian Department initially approached a Huron to act as agent at 
Pointe Bleue in 1870, it would not appoint an agent in Wendake until the early 1880s. 
However, from this point through the middle of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs' local 
representative at Wendake was always a band member. This is in marked contrast to Indian 
Affairs' practice nearly everywhere else in Canada, underlining the Huron's unique status in 
the eyes of both the Department and Euro-Canadian society more generally.173 
Honoré Sioui first filled the Indian agent's office at Wendake, although he kft little 
trace in the archivai record and drew no salary from the Department. Following his death in 
1881, the village's Catholic missionary, Guillaume Giroux, argued that, "It is very desirable 
that the Department should pay or allow a fixcd salary to the agent, as he is sometimes 
obliged to lose time in the exercise of his charge, and as he has not always the means to 
submit to this loss." Sioui had been aided in conducting the business of the agency by an 
assistant, François Groslouis Sasccnio, who Giroux recommended be appointed agent. 174 
However, the Depaltment did not follow his advice, neither in terms of the candidate nor the 
pay, eventually according the post on an unpaid basis to Antoine Oscar Bastien. 175 
172 L.E. Otis to David Priee, 9 December 1872 and David E. Priee to Joseph Howe, 27 December 1872, 
LAC, RGIO, vol. 1879, file 1048, reel C-III05. 
173 Eisewhere, including for example Kahnawake, Indian agents "were English Canadian, French 
Canadian, Black, Scottish, Irish ... but seemingly never Indian." Cori Simpson, '''In the Eyes of the 
State': Memories of Indian Agents, Agency and Resistance in Kahnawake," M.A. Thesis (Canadian 
Studies and Indigenous Studies), Peterborough, Trent University, 2008, p. 22. 
174 The missionary refers to Francis Groslollis Jaiennio, which appears to be a mispelling. Guillaume 
Giroux, AnnuaI Report on the Lorette Agency, 29 September 1881, in lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 
1881, p. 18-9. 
175 Althollgh the Department initially named Bastien temporary and unpaid agent, it changed his status 
to permanent lndian agent when it accorded him a $150 salary in 1886. For Bastien's employment 
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Money, Presents, and Power in Wendake, 1840s-1860s 
Money played an important role in the central struggle of Wendake's political life 
in the l840s. During the decade preceding the Legislative Assembly' s definition of who was 
"Indian," community membership proved to be a contentious issue at Wendake. The conflict 
over who was and was not "Huron" tumed on control of communal resources and residency 
rights on the band' s three reserves. Although not the heart of the issue itself, money provided 
the band council 176 with a means of promoting its auihority and members of the relatively 
small faction that the chiefs labeled the "village rebels" with the ability to resist the council 's 
will. Indeed, money fumished these individuals with both the means and the motivation to do 
so as the cash revenue generated by the activities the chiefs forbade rendered the penalties 
that they imposed ineffectual. The council attempted to bypass this resistance through a 
locally administered fund serving to finance community events and Huron claims. Given that 
the chiefs managed this fund, the claims that the account underwrote were those supported by 
the council and their allies, serving to marginalize the political power of those who opposed 
the chiefs. Moreover, the manner in which the chiefs constituted this fund appears to have 
contributed to the conflict as throughout the period, the majority of money paid into the 
account for timber came from Euro-Canadians and not band members. This conflict, then, 
history, see [?J, "Memorandum concerning Antoine O. Bastien," n.d. [1900/02J, LAC, RG10, vol. 
2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
176 During the early to mid-nineteenth century, the band counciJ at Wendake was made up of six Huron 
chiefs. The tilles the chiefs used changed somewhat during the period, but the general structure of the 
council remained unaltered. For example, in 1832, the cOllncil consisted of one principal chief (grand 
che/), one second chief (deuxième che/), two council chiefs (chefs de conseil), and two warrior chiefs 
(chefs des guerriers), in 1842 the cOllncil consisted of one principal chief, two cOllncil chiefs, and three 
warrior chiefs, and in 1855 the council consisted of one principal chief, three cOllncil chiefs, and two 
warrior chiefs. See Petition from Nicolas Vincent et al. to Lord Aylmer, 1 July 1832, LAC, RG 10, vol. 
85, p. 33355, reel C-ll031, Nicolas Vincent el al. to [Duncan C. NapierJ, 20 October 1842, LAC, 
RGI0, vol. 597, p. 46474-5, ree! C-!3379, and Petition from the Hurons of Lorette to Sir Edmund 
Walker Head, Governor General of British North America, 31 March 1855, Archives de l'Archevêché 
de Québec, 62 CD, Village Huron, 1: 6 (ACNHW H-2-44). 
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illustrates both the force that groups and individuals could exert through money and the 
shortcomings associated with this technology when strategically deployed on the locallevel. 
The conflict also demonstrates the political preponderance of the Indian Department 
in Wendake. Before the Legislative Assembly provided a clear definition of who was and 
was not "Indian," the Department signified band membership throughout the St. Lawrence 
Valley through restrictions on reserve residency and the receipt of presents. Those individuals 
who did not satisfy Indian Affairs' criteria qualified for neither Indian presents nor on-reserve 
residency. While the British had banned Euro-Canadians from living in Amerindian villages 
since the late eighteenth century, the second means of indicating band membership in 
Wendake appears to have been a product of the 1840s and continued to inform local 
understandings of band membership through the mid-1850s. 177 However, other community 
members did not necessarily consider individuals who had lost their presents as outsiders. 
Thus, while the forfeiture of presents may have served as a deterrent in sorne cases, in others 
their economic value alone failed to compare to the money that individuals stood to earn by 
disregarding the council's decrees. In this context, both the chiefs' and Indian Affairs' power 
was limited. This section, then, complicates the earlier analysis of presents, demonstrating 
that while the Huron preferred to receive them when possible, presents never overrode ail 
other considerations. 
The Huron collectively held three reserves during the nineteenth century: the 
village of La Jeune Lorette (Wendake), Quarante Arpents in the neighboring seigneury of St. 
177 For the arder banning Euro-Canadian residence in Amerindian villages, see Guy Carleton, "arder 
ta Prevent the Selling of Strong Liquors ta the Indians in the Province Of Quebec.. ," 29 Marcb 1777, 
Great Britain, Privy Council, Judicial Commiltee, In the matter ofthe boundary between the Dominion 
of Canada and the Colony of Newfoundland in the Labrador Peninsula, between the Dominion of . 
Canada of the one part and the Colony of Newfoundland of the other part, London, W. Clowes and 
Sons Ltd., 1927, vol. 6, no. 1101. The civil secretary reissued this arder in 1839. Thomas L. Goldie, 
arder, 17 June 1839, LAC, RG10, vol. 99, p. 41327, reel C-11471. 
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Gabriel, and Rocmont in relatively distant Portneuf County. 178 During the period, Wendake 
was essentially an urban community and Rocmont was completely uninhabited. In 
comparison, the Huron cultivated part of Quarante Arpents while also using the reserve as a 
source of firewood for their own consumption. 179 In the early 1840s a handful of families 
decided to move to this reserve in order to be closer to their fields. 180 This contributed to the 
strained relations between certain individuals, both Huron and Euro-Canadian, and the band 
council that characterized the decade. By 1842, this tension had developed into an open 
struggle, primarily between the Huron chiefs and members of the Bastien family,'8J over the 
ability of local political authorities to dictate po!icy with regard to both land and resource-use 
and the presence of Euro-Canadians within the community .182 The chiefs had decided that no 
Huron should settle on Quarante Arpents and that no Euro-Canadian should reside on any of 
the band's reserves. In this way, the council moved along gendered and racial !ines in an 
attempt to consolidate its own political power through a local system of "customary" law, 
which very weil may have been of the chiefs' devising, regulating marriages between band 
members and non-Huron. This system, essentially identical to that which Canada would 
adopt in 1869 while being radically different fi"om traditional Iroquoian practice, permitted 
any non-Aboriginal woman who married a Huron to become a band member while expelling 
178 While the state only granted the Rocmont reserve in 1853, the Huron held the other two reserves 
during the whole of the nineteenth century. 
179 D.C. Napier, "Return of Indians under the Protection of the Indian Department of Lowe.r Canada," 
12 December 1836, in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts ofCorrespondence Since lst April 1835 ... , p. 
50-5. On Quarante Arpents' use as a source of firewood, see "Report of the Huron Chiefs concerning 
the extent oftheir lands," [12?] December 1803, LAC, RG 10, vol. 10, p. 9565, reel C-II 000. 
180 In 1845, for example, only two families resided there. Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians 
in Canada," in Journals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix EEE, Montreal, 
1844-1845. 
181 While some documents refer to the Sébastiens or Basquins, the family adopted Bastien as the 
preferred spelling. 
182 For a detailed study of this struggle, see Rozon, "Un dialogue identitaire," p. 133-46. 
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any Huron woman who married a non-Amerindian. 183 In theory, this system presented the 
chiefs with a means of limiting access to Huron resources by preventing any pretence of band 
membership on the part of male newcomers who might otherwise potentially become 
184political rivals. In addition to barring Euro-Canadian men from enjoying band membership, 
the chiefs also restricted reserve residency to Huron. By the 1840s, several Huron had begun 
renting homes
 in Wendake to Euro-Canadians in order to supplement their revenue from 
185
other activities. 
The chiefs, however, possessed only limited coercive power and were forced to rely 
on the state to enforce their decrees. The Indian Department did so by removing the names of 
Huron women
 who married Euro-Canadian men from the list of those entitled to receive 
annual presents and by suspending "the issue of Presents to Indians who resist the lawful 
commands of their particular Leaders or Grand Chiefs,,186 Although this practice allowed the 
council to define who was and was not Huron and to punish band members who refused to 
183 In 1842, the Huron chiefs asserted that the custom of denying band membership to women who 
married Canadians had been encouraged by Louis de Salaberry, a former Indian Deparlment 
superintendent who had died in 1828. The Huron Chiefs to Duncan C. Napier, 20 October 1842, LAC, 
RGIO, vol. 597, p. 46474-46475, reel C-13379 and Louis Juchereau Duchensay to the Huron Chiefs, 
25 March 1828, ACNHW P2-S I-A l, box B-I-l. On the 1869 act ("An Act for the graduaI 
enfranchisement of Indians...") declaring that Indian women married to non-Indian men forfeited their 
special status, see Milloy, "The Early Indian Acts..." According to the Pennefather report, this practice 
was already in use in Canada West by the late 1850s. Canada, "Report of the Special 
Commissioners ... " 
184 Rozon, "Un dialogue identitaire," p. 147-52. 
185 In 1845, the so-called "rebelles du village" claimed that due to losses in hunting and fishing 
income, they rented their property to eam a "faible revenu qui nous aide à bien vivre et nous sauver de 
la misère." Petition from Vincent Ferrier, et al., to Charles Theophilus Metcalf, 18 October 1845, 
LAC, RGIO, vol. 122, p. 5677-83, reel C-II480. 
186 On the removal ofwomen's names from the list ofthose entitled to presents, see Duncan C. Napier 
to the ChiefSecretary, 13 December 1842, LAC, RGIO, vol. 593, no. 51, reel C-13378 and 1. Royan, 
"Department Order," 15 July 1843, LAC, RGIO, vol. 141, p. 45528, reel C-11490. On those refusing 
to respect the council's decrees, see Duncan C. Napier to the Chief Secretary, 10 January 1844, LAC, 
RGIO, vol. 593, no. 52, reel C-13378. For the official order sanctioning this policy, see James M. 
Higginson to Duncan C. Napier, 3 February 1844, LAC, RGIO, vol. 599, p. 47169, reel C-13379. 
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respect its decrees, the chiefs required Indian Affairs to intervene on an annual basis in ardcr 
to reaffirm their authority. 
Withholding presents, however, proved to be less effective than the chiefs and the 
Indian Department had hoped. This lack of political success was primarily attributable to the 
econornic value of presents relative to that of the sources of income at the root of the conflict. 
For example, Isaac Bastien, who by 1843 had moved to Quarante Arpents to be close to his 
fields, continued to reside there through the mid-18S0s despite having lost his presents. 187 
Similarly, those who rented to Euro-Canadians, Baptiste and Marie Bastien and Marie's son 
Moyse Picard, also proved indifferent to their loss of presents as a result of the monetary 
income that renting furnished. Beginning in 1843, the Department withheld Marie Bastien's 
presents for refusing to adhere to the council's regulations. 188 Two years later, the chiefs 
asserted that she planned to continue her resistance: "elle va louer sa maison à une personne 
qui veut y tenir 'grocery'; elle dit que ce n'est pas pour une couverte et un peut [sic] de drap 
qu'elle refusera de belle argent [sic]." At the same time, the chiefs claimed that Baptiste 
Bastien managed to both receive presents and make money renting a house in Wendake. 
Bastien "a fait entré [sic] dans le Village le lendemain de la distribution des équipement [sic] 
un Canadien avec sa famille, dans la maison d'un de ses gendre [sic], qui est absent, et 
187 In 1843, the missionary at Lorette wrote that the families ofIsaac and Stanislas Bastien "paroissent 
avoir laissé le village des Huron pour s'établir sur et auprès des terres qu'ils cultivent depuis 
longtemps" on Quarant Arpents. Louis Thomas Fortier, "Certificat pour Isaac et Stanislas Bastien," 14 
November 1843, LAC, RGI0, vol. 598, p. 47030, reel C-13379. Bastien lived on Quarante Arpents at 
least through late 1847. François Boucher to Duncan C. Napier, 13 November 1847, LAC, RGI0, vol. 
603, p. 49236-7, reel C-13381. The chiefs continued ta deprive Bastien's wife, Josephte Zacharie, of 
presents through 1851, suggesting that the famil).' still resided on the reserve. Duncan C. Napier to 
James Bruce, 18 January 1851, LAC, RG 10, vol. 186, pl. l, p. 108184-5, reel C-11511. By 1854, the 
chiefs and Bastien had resolved their differences and jointly petitioned the governor general to restore 
Bastien and several others to the list of those community members at Wendake who had the right to 
Indian presents. However, this petition contains no indication of how the parties reached a seltlement 
or whether Bastien continued to reside on Quarante Arpents. Petition from Isaac Sébastien et al. to 
James Bruce Elgin, n.d. [September 1854?J, LAC, RGI0, vol. 212, p. 125676, reel C-11524. 
188 François Boucher to Duncan C. Napier, 10 November 1845, LAC, RGIO, vol. 601, p. 48492-8, reel 
C-13381. 
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ensuite est descendu avec sa famille au Saguenay, nous laissant dans le trouble, avec ce 
Canadien.,,189 Thus, members of the Bastien family defied the council's authority because the 
power accorded it by Indian Affairs could not rival the money that the "rebels" might make 
by renting real estate. While François Boucher, the Catholic missionary in Wendake, reported 
to the Department in 1846 that Marie Bastien and Moyse Picard "se sont soumis aux Chefs et 
ont promit [sic] de se conformer à la venir [sic] à l'ordre établit [sic] dans le village," three 
years later he wrote that the "rebels" continued to rent to Euro-Canadians. 190 Presents, then, 
provided insufficient force to guarantee local respect for the resolutions and the authority of 
the band council. 
The Huron chiefs, however, did not rely solely on the Indian Department to support 
their authority. Prior to the state's decision to withhold presents from those who transgressed 
local regulations, the council had created a system by which it would receive direct monetary 
payments from those who removed timber or other natural resources from Quarante Arpents 
or who made use of public lands in Wendake. Although this mechanism failed to generate 
massive receipts due to the refusai of the council's opponents to cooperate and the modest 
size of payments provided by its allies, the money it generated fumished the chiefs with an 
effective means of administering local affairs with greater liberty than they would later enjoy 
when the Indian Department he Id ail of the band's funds in tlust. 
Under this system, which was in operation from 1840 to 1854, the band council 
sold wood from Quarante Arpents to band members and Euro-Canadians and used the 
proceeds to constitute a special fund from which the chiefs made a wide variety of 
189 Extract, Huron Chiefs of La Jelme Lorette to [Duncan C. Napier?], 26 September 1845, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 601, p. 48359-61, reel C-13380. 
190 François Boucher to Duncan C. Napier, 7 July 1846, LAC, RG 10, vol. 603, p. 49159, reel C-13381 
and François Boucher to Duncan C. Napier, 20 November 1849, LAC, RG10, vol. 606, p. 51346, reel 
C-13383. 
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expenditure. 191 During the funds' lifetime, the sale of timber accounted for 60% of its total 
revenue of fI 19.6.9 Hfx, the majority of which was paid by non-Huron. l92 Euro-Canadians 
provided 91 % of the fund's timber revenue in 1840, 89% in 1846, and 76% in 1853. 193 Even 
in those years such as 1841 and 1848 when the Huron supplied aU or most of this revenue, 
they may have only acted as intermediaries, passing on the profits from sales they themselves 
conducted. 194 In 1850, for example, Elie Sioui and Zacharie Vincent (both of whom were 
band members) provided money for wood sales ("vente de bois"), while Mr. Couture (a non­
Huron) paid for wood ("bois") alone. 195 This commercial practice seems even more likely 
given complaints made at the end of the decade. In 1858, Elie Sioui, by then a member of the 
Huron council, charged Laurent Picard Atehratak, who had previously been a chief and who 
had paid for the vast majority of wood harvested from Quarante Arpents during the fund's 
lifetime, with seUing timber from the reserve despite repeated instructions to stop.196 The 
chiefs, then, appear ta have sold the vast majority of the timber harvested from the Quarante 
191 This section relies heavily on François Xavier (Paul) Picard Tahourenché, Journal (1840-1854), 
ACNHW P2-S1-AI, box B-I-I. 
192 The purpose of several of the en tries in the account book is not clearly indicated. Thus, only 45% of 
the funds' revenues arose explicitly from timber sales. However, given the individuals and the amounts 
involved in the 15% of unidentified transactions, it seems likely these payments were made for wood. 
Picard, Journal (1840-1854), ACNHW P2-S I-A l, box B-I-1. 
193 In 1840, Euro-Canadians paid .0.15 off4.2.2, in 1846 Euro-Canadians paid f8.14.8Y2 of the 
f9.16.7 total, and in 1853 they provided f4.13.6 of the fund's total income from wood of f6.2.6. 
Picard, Journal (1840-1854), ACNHW P2-SI-AI, box B-l-1. 
194 In 1841, the Huron paid 94% (0.19.4) of the total paid for wood (f8.9.1). In 1848, Laurent Picard 
paid 100% of the 0.12.9 that the fund received for wood. Picard, Journal (1840-1854), ACNHW P2­
SI-AI, box B-I-1. 
195 Picard, Journal (1840-1854), 12 and 26 October and 1 November 1850, ACNHW P2-SI-AI, box 
B-I-1. 
196 Sioui wrote: "D'autres, des Sauvages, tels que Thomas Bastien et Laurent Picard, vendent du bois 
sur les 40 Arp. malgré les défenses réitérées des chefs." Elie Scioui to Narcisse de Lorimier, 15 
December 1858, LAC, RGIO, vol. 246, p. 146494-5, reel C-12639. 
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Arpents reserve during the period to non-band members, in the process generating the largest 
part of its locally contralied funds. 
In addition to timber sales, the account received money from several other sources, 
most importantly the rentai of communal lands. Between 1840 and 1853, the fund earned a 
total of f21.13 .2, or 18% of its total revenue, from the renta] of the garden and enclosed yard 
adjoining Wendake's presbytery.197 The band account's other major source of revenue was 
the one-time payment of fI2.15.0, or nearly 11 % of ail monies received by the fund during 
the period, made in February 1848 by the road inspector of the parish of St. Ambroise for the 
right to open a road through Quarante Arpents. 198 
Although the amount of money held by the fund remained quite small over the 
period - its balance at the end of the calendar year never exceeded fI 0, and even dipped 
below zero in four of the five years from 1843 through 1847 - its existence permitted the 
band council to exert influence when promoting its agenda in ways that might not have 
otherwise been possible. The chiefs employed these funds for various public pm'poses, 
including the management of communal lands, maintenance of public buildings (e.g. the 
presbytery), support for community events, and the band's political activities with regard to 
the state and other First Nations. For example, in 1847, the band spent a total ofn.18.4 on 
expenses including fence and road maintenance, trips made by the chiefs for political 
purposes ta Quebec and Montreal, mass and religious art, and land surveying. 199 During its 
197 Following François Boucher's arrivai in Lorette, he rented the garden. Prior to Boucher's arrivai, 
Philippe Vincent, a future Chief, had rented the garden for one year. During the period, Thomas 
Plamondon, the Euro-Canadian husband of Adelaide Picard, and Philippe Vincent both rented the 
enclosed yard. Picard, Journal (1840-1854), ACNHW P2-S I-A l, box B-l-l. 
198 Picard, Journal (1840-1854), 14 February 1848, ACNHW P2-SI-AI, box B-I-1. The municipal 
council of St. Ambroise petitioned the 1ndian Department to open a road at lesser expense than that 
demanded by the Huron - "la jolie petite somme de quatre vingt livres courant" - in 1847. The issue 
was clearly settled at far less cost to St. Ambroise than this. Dominique Lefrançois to D. Campbell 
Napier, 13 March 1847, LAC, RGIO, vol. 604, p. 49632-3, reel C-13381. 
199 Picard, "Dépenses 1847," Journal (1840-1854), ACNHW P2-SI-AI, box B-I-1. 
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lifetime, the account also served to pay band members' legal expenses,200 to hire notaries to 
,
draw up petitions and "protests" on behalf of the council/o to fund the transportation of 
mediators to negotiate internai disputes in the community,202 to purchase provisions for band 
members presumably in need of assistance/03 and to finance a substantial number of 
politically motivated trips made by chiefs,z°4 
Thus, the chiefs had a vested interest in maintaining the productive capacity of the 
forest on Quarante Arpents. According to a former departmental employee, writing to explain 
the lack of wide-scale agricultural activity among the Huron, the band took this responsibility 
very seriously: "As fire-wood is a primai)' consideration with the Indians, the Hurons wish to 
save the little they possess for their descendants, [they] consequently do not clear much 
200 "A Isaac Bastien, pour son procès avec Frs Jean Bte." Picard, Journal (/840-1854),5 June 1843, 
ACNHW P2-SI-Al, box B-l-I. 
201 Picard, Journal (/840-1854), 6 June and 2 July 1843 and 16 February 1849, ACNHW P2-SI-AI, 
box B-I-\. Glackemeyer had drawn up a petition requesting aid on behalf of the Huron in 1839. 
Petition from the Huron of Lorette to John Colborne, II May 1839, LAC, RGIO, vol. 97, p. 40168-70, 
reel C-11470. 
202 In 1843, the council paid to transport Robert Symes, the deputy chief of police in Quebec City, to 
Wendake so that he could attempt to mediate the conflict between the chiefs and Stanislas Bastien 
who, along with Isaac Bastien, had moved to Quarante Arpents to be close to his fields by 1843. 
Picard, Journal (1840-1854), 8 October 1843, ACNHW P2-SI-AI, box B-I-I and Louis Thomas 
Fortier, "Certificat pour Isaac et Stanislas Bastien," 14 November 1843, LAC, RGIO, vol. 598, p. 
47030, reel C-13379. Given that Stanislas Bastien did not sign the October 1845 petition protesting 
against the council's allegedly despotic rule, this negotiation would appear to have been successful. 
Isaac Bastien, however, did sign the petition. Petition from Vincent Ferrier, et al., to Charles 
TheophiJus Metcalf, 18 October 1845, LAC, RGJO, vol. 122, p. 5677-83, reel C-11480. 
203 Picard, Journal (/840-1854),2 September and 21 October 1844, ACNHW P2-S I-AI, box B-I-I. 
204 For example, the fund paid f.6 in 1843 "Pour le voyage des Chefs André Romain et Michel Sioui, a 
Kingston," f.2.3.2Y2 in 1845 "pour un voyage à Montréal, de trois chefs, et une femme," and [5.7.512 
"pour aller au Sault St. Louis, au grand Conseil (Du Colonel Napier et Mr Vardon) du 13 Juillet 1846." 
Picard, Journal (1840-1854), 27 October 1843,26 July 1845, and 25 May 1846, ACNHW P2-SI-AI, 
box B-I-\. 
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land.,,20S However, even with such careful management, the fund always operated under the 
shadow of poaching - that is, the removal of timber or other resources without the approval 
of the band council. In 1843, the chiefs wrote that Euro-Canadians married to Huron women 
claimed to have the right to "prendre couper et enlever tous les bois qui leur sont 
nécessaires. ,,206 The council requested that govemor general Metcalfe declare this right 
inexistent, revealing its inability to control resource-use solely through locally levied and 
controlled fees. However, given the council's sale of wood to other non-Huron, this request 
also points to the chiefs' attempts to monopolize the control of on-reserve resources and the 
money that might potentially result. 
Following the disappearance of the locally-held band fund, the situation on the 
Quarante Arpents reserve appears to have deteriorated appreciably. In 1856, Louis Panet, a 
member of the Legislative Council, informed the Department that the Huron chiefs were 
experiencing a "great deal of trouble in preserving the Wood and Timber upon the 40 Arpents 
from being plundered by the Whites, and even by sorne Indians of the Village, who sell wood 
to the Whites to the great damage of the Community. Dilapidations of the Kind are going 
now at such rate that unless promptly checked, the whole wood must soon gO.,,207 By 1858, 
the situation had not improved, prompting the chiefs to write to the commissioner of Indian 
lands, Narcisse de Lorimier, complaining of at least four individuals who removed wood 
il1egally from Quarante Arpents without any fear of reprisaI. The chiefs asked de Lorimier to 
reopen legal proceedings against the widow of Jean Baptiste Bastien and her brother for 
20S "Appendix 14: Extracts of Evidence of Mr. Robert MeNab, formerly of the Indian Department, 
(having reference to the Tribes in Canada East)," in Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in 
Canada," 1847. 
206 Petition from Nicolas Vincent, el al. to Charles Theophilus Metcalfe, 26 August 1843, LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 598, p. 46916-8, reel C-13379 
207 Louis Panet to Duncan C. Napier, 4 March 1856, LAC, RG 10, voL 603, p. 49420, reel C-13381. 
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illegally cutting timber on the reserve and to order the former chief Laurent Picard Atehratak 
to stop cutting wood for sale?08 
This process resulted in an 1864 provincial law glvmg the Huron chiefs, under 
Indian Department supervision, the right to regulate timber harvesting on the Quarante 
Arpents reserve through a system of licenses. This law decreed that justices of the peace had 
the right to fine and jail both Huron and Euro-Canadians who cut, sell, or bought unlicensed 
wood and cou1d also force them to forfeit the value of the wood taken. It stipulated that, "the 
said fine and forfeiture shall belong one half to the informer and the other to the Indian Fund, 
such fund to be specially applied to the maintenance of the said tribe."Z09 Thus, by the early 
1860s, a formai legal mechanism overseen by the Department had replaced the council's 
informai, locally maintained means of managing their timber. However, although this law 
nominally guaranteed the authority of the band council and the financial wellbeing of the 
conununity, while replacing the locally administered system that had proven unable to hait 
the decline of Quarante Arpents' timber supply, it also affirmed the chiefs' reliance on the 
Indian Department, which might intercede at any moment to promote or counteract the 
council's agenda. Furthermore, the monies generated through the exploitation of the band's 
timber no longer flowed directly into Wendake, instead fueling the Huron fund held in trust 
by the Indian Department. Thus, when it lost control of the money generated by the band's 
natural resources, the Huron council simultaneously lost real decisional power. Rather than 
providing the chiefs with increased responsibility, Indian Affairs undercut their ability ta 
affect local politics by reserving ultimate authority for itself. Armed with a new raison d'être 
and novel legal prerogatives which, among other things, affirmed the Wendake council's 
Z08 The case had been dismissed because it was improperly filed. Elie Scioui to Narcisse de Lorimier, 
15 December 1858, LAC, RGIO, vol. 246, p. 146494-5, reel C-12639. The chiefs made similar 
complaints a year later against three Euro-Canadian farmers, each of whom they charged with timber 
poaching. [?], "Complaint of Simon Romain," 17 December 1859, LAC, RG 10, vol. 252, pt. 2, p. 
150540-1, reel C-12642. 
Z09 Canada, Statu/es, "An Act to enable the Huron Indians of La Jeune Lorette, to regulate the cutting 
of wood in their reserve," 30 June 1864,27-28 Victoria, c. 69, p. 323-4. 
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policy of striking Huron women married to outsiders from the band list, the Department 
pushed weil beyond its earlier use of presents in managing the affairs of the Huron, taking 
control of the band's funds, imposing fines on poachers, and extending monetary rewards ta 
inforrnants. In this way, then, Indian Affairs counteracted its officially praclaimed goal of 
ensuring its own disappearance in order to claim a central l'ole in the regulation of Huron 
l'esource-use and internai politics. 
Maney, the State, and Palitical Autharity, 1870s-1900s 
Although Indian Affairs' legal and administrative power grew during the final third 
of the nineteenth century, money played a relatively minor l'ole in the electoral politics of 
Mashteuiatsh and Wendake and the relationship of these communities with the state. This 
was due in part to the selective interest that the Department generally heId in these twa 
communities. Indeed, Indian Affairs concentrated on infrastructure and land management and 
sales during the period, areas of interaction that, while certainly not free from cash, required 
neither the use nor any significant discussion of money in the context of state-First Nations 
relations.21O Furthermore, as the next section will show, departmental officiais in Ottawa 
proved woefully uniforrned of the conduct of even their Indian agents, something which 
suggests an inability to involve itself in the sorts of quotidian relationships founded upon 
money. The lack of regular and sustained action on the part the Huron and Innu band councils 
before the 1890s also provides a reason for money's relatively minor raie on the local 
political scene. Although both Huron and Innu representatives regarded money as a 
potentially powerful political tool, the two bands' chiefs neither met often enough nor 
possessed sufficient authority under the Indian Act to employ money in ways that allowed 
them to deeply influence everyday life on the reserves. As a result, this section demonstrates 
210 Of course, the Department used the funds it received for the purchase of Huron and Innu lands to 
finance medical and educational services and infrastructural projects such as l'oad and wharf 
construction. However, in nearly every such case, Indian Affairs managed this financial system 
without involving Amerindian money-use in any way. 
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that the relative disinterest exhibited by Indian policy as articulated at the highest \evels 
minored on-the-ground practice in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. It also highlights the mixed 
results of attempts on the part of local officiais to make use of money as a means of 
reinforcing their autbority. 
Although it had long been an active player in local politics, following its 
involvement with money-use in the 1840s and 1850s, the Huron band council did not again 
explicitly involve itself in monetary issues until 1891 when it passed a series of strict 
regulations concerning disorderly conduct, whether committed by Amerindians or Euro­
Canadians. These mies drew their force from the Indian Act, which provided band councils 
with the power to enact rules concerning "The repression of intemperance and profligacy."ZII 
The council declared that any inebriated individual blaspheming, swearing, brawling, or 
causing public disorder in any other way would be brought before a justice of the peace for 
summary judgment. The regulations stated that anyone convicted wou Id be subject to a $5 
fine or eight days in jail for a first offence, a $10 fine or 15 days in jail for a second offence, 
or a $15 fine or twenty days in jail (or a combination of a $3 fine and five days in jail) for 
every subsequent offence. Similar penalties applied to anyone found to have caused disorder 
in or around Wendake's church during services. Und el' these rules, a chief cou Id appoint any 
band member temporary constable for the purpose of making an arrest. This individual would 
receive $2 in payment, however, should he refuse to serve as constable, he would be subject 
to a $5 fine. The chiefs could also require any band member to clean his or her yard on 
penalty of a $3 to $5 fine or' 8 days in jail and they could enforce the performance of 
roadwork with a $5 fine or eight days in jaiL The rules also imposed a $5 fine or fifteen days 
in jail for anyone keeping pigs in the village between 15 May and 15 October.212 Indian 
Affairs welcomed these rules as being in accord with the Indian Act, which in no way 
ZII Canada, Siaiules, "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians," 12 April 1876, 
39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 63, ss. 3. 
212 "Règles et règlements passés par les chefs du village Huron de la Jeune Lorette réunis en conseil 
tenu le 29 juillet," 21 September 1891, ACNHW. 
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prohibited the use of cash in maintaining the peace. Moreover, according to the Indian agent, 
these regulations greatly aided in repressing disorder in the village. 213 Thus, the band council 
made effective use of rrioney to impose its authority and to police the reserve. 
While Indian Affairs accepted the levying of fines by Wendake's band council for 
the maintenance of public order, it objected to Innu attempts to tax band members and 
merchants conducting business on the reserve. In 1895 the Mashteuiatsh band council passed 
a resolution declaring 
qu'une taxe de $5.00 soit imposée à tout chartier vivant en dehors de leur réserve et 
venant exercer leur métier sur la dite réserve et qu'une taxe [de] $1.00 soit aussi 
imposée aux autres chartiers Indiens résidant sur la dite réserve et que les dits 
chartiers dans l'un ou l'autre cas soient obligés de porter un numéro accordé par le 
Conseil. De plus que tout colporteur vendant des marchandises sèches, bijouteries, 
soient tenus de prendre une licence annuelle au conseil, au prix de $2.00, s'ils 
veulent commercer sur la dite réserve. 
At the same time, the council resolved to impose a twenty-cent tax on every family 
residing on the reserve in order to constitute a fund on which the band council might draw to 
administer its policies.214 Although these resolutions clearly demonstrate the council's 
intention to take responsibility for the internai affairs of the reserve, and in spite of the Indian 
agent's support for them, the Department refused to sanction the rules because the council 
had overstepped its authority under the Indian Act. 215 The Department noted the second of 
213 "The regulations, framed by the chiefs, in regard to cleanliness, and sanctioned by His Excellency 
the Governor General in Council on the 21st September, 1891, have also been weil observed. 
Temperance is improving and the many disorders which existed formerly have been considerably 
repressed:" Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 24 August 1892, in 1ndian 
AfJairs Annual Report. 1892, p. 31. 
214 Copy of the Pointe Bleue Band Council Minutes, 4 July 1895, LAC, RGIO, vol. 7151, file 377/3­
10, part 1, reel C-9685. 
215 L.E. Otis to Hayter Reed, 4 July 1895 and The Acting Deputy Superintendent General of Indian 
Affairs to L.E. Otis, 7 August 1895, LAC, RGIO, vol. 7151, file 377/3-10, part l, reel C-9685. For the 
list of issues on which band councils could pass resolutions, see Canada, Statutes, "The Indian Act," 
1886,49 Victoria, c. 43, s. 76. 
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these two resolutions would be lawful only if the Innu were to accept the provisions of the 
Indian Advancement Act of 1884.216 
Legislators had designed this act to alter the powers of those bands selected by 
Indian Affairs in order to provide them with training that would serve to facilitate their 
transition to municipal-style government. The "advanced" council's power to tax the real 
property of band members constituted one of the key provisions of the act. The law also 
provided the superintendent general and Indian agents with far greater powers to intervene in 
internai political affairs, including the power to depose elected officiais and to cali and 
supervise band meetings and elections. In this way, as John Tobias has noted, "the agent 
directed the political affairs of the band." Through amendments to the Indian Act in the 1880s 
and 1890s, the Department ultimately secured the greater powers originally provided by the 
1884 legislation without affording this act's extended authority to band councils.217 
While the band's councilors were "décontenancés" by Indian Affairs' refusai ta 
sanction their resolutions on taxation and licensing fees for traders, they acknowledged their 
willingness to accept the application of the Indian Advancement Act "pourvu qu'elle leur 
accorde des pouvoirs plus étendus en leur donnant les moyens d'avoir des revenus pour faire 
figure avec les dépenses car sans cela, leur Conseil leur servira à peu de chose et paralysera 
ainsi les efforts qu'ils font pour entrer dans une voie de civilisation et d'ordre.,,218 In other 
words, the band council recognized that without access to funds, which could only be 
guaranteed by obligatory monetary contributions of band members and others active on the 
reserve, it was doomed to ineffectual regulation of local conditions. Despite the Indian 
agent's support for 'the application of the Indian Advancement Act, the Department never 
216 Canada, Statutes, "The Indian Advancement Act," 19 April 1884,47 Victoria, c. 28. 
217 Tobias, "Protection, Civilization, Assimilation," p. 20. 
218 L.E. Otis to Hayter Reed, 15 August 1895, LAC, RGIO, vol. 7151, file 377/3-10, part l, reel C­
9685. 
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implemented it at Mashteuiatsh.219 The Innu council, then, failed to gain access to this source 
of funding, and as a result was confined to an essentially advisory role in the management of 
reserve affairs. 
However, even in this advisory role, the Innu and Huron councils proved adroit at 
altering practice to favor local monetary prerogatives. At approximately the same time that 
representatives of the federal government enshrined monetary annuity payments at the heart 
of Canadian treaty policy through the agreements negotiated with First Nations from 
nOlihwestem Ontario through eastern British Columbia, Indian Affairs began providing 
annual distributions from the interest on band funds to Aboriginal communities in Quebec 
that had not previously received any such payments. Although Ottawa may have initiated this 
practice as early as the late 1860s, no clear evidence of interest payments exists for the Innu 
of Mashteuiatsh or the Huron of Wendake prior to the fiscal year endirig 30 June 1874220 
Between 1 July 1873 and 30 June 1880, the Department made at least $349.95 in cash interest 
payments to the Innu.221 The Huron also received monetary interest payments from their band 
fund, although during a shorter period (between 1876 and 1880) and for a lesser amount 
($135.09).222 However, such payments formed only a minor source of revenue for both the 
Huron and the Innu: on average each Innu received $0.25 in interest annually, while every 
219 This was due to a combination of factors, including a failure to hold council eleclions and the 
replacement of the Indian agent. Alain Beaulieu and Stéphanie Béreau, '''Voir par eux-mêmes à 
l'Administration de leurs propres affaires': Les Innus de Mashteuialsh et l'implantation du Conseil de 
bande, 1881-1952," Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française (forthcoming, personal communication). 
220 Beginning in 1870-1871, the Department expended a portion of the interesl on the ftmds it heId in 
trust for the Innu of Mashteuiatsh. However, priaI' ta 1873, its annual reports did not clearly identify 
the nature of such expenditure, thereby making it impossible ta determine whether any interest 
payments were made. 
221 Indian Affairs Annual Reports, 1874-1879. The annual report for 1876 offers no detailed 
information concerning band accounts' expenditure and receipts. However, since the Department made 
interest payments in every other year in this period, it is likely that it did sa in 1875-6 as weil. 
222 Again, the Department's annual report for 1876 contains no detailed account information, making it 
possible that the Huron, too, received interest payments. 
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Huron received $0.16.223 On the other hand, this practice suggests that during the 1870s 
Indian Affairs viewed the funds it held in trust for First Nations in a distinct light from public 
monies provided by Parliament for the agency's operating expenses or for occasional relief. 
Officiais appear to have conceived of band funds, at least in the case of these two First 
Nations, as being just that - monies that the band might spend as it saw fit. This included the 
provision of small amounts of cash ta ail band members which, as we have already seen in 
the case of treaties, did not afford the state the same level of control as in-kind distributions. 
Although no information has been found on the manner in which the Indian 
Department initiated interest payments from band funds in the 1870s, the origins of a similar 
distribution at Wendake during the 1890s suggest that the chiefs most likely played a part. In 
1896, the council elicited a payment ta ail band members of a small sum of money from the 
interest on the band's capital fund. In February of that year, the chiefs unanimously passed a 
resolution declaring "That in future no money shall be paid out of the interest on the funds of 
the tribe to anyone whomsoever of the Hurons for any cause whatsoever; and that the interest 
on the said funds shall be distributed each year to ail the members in accordance with their 
right in the beginning of November in arder ta assist them in buying their wood for winter 
fuel.,,224 Later in 1896, the Huron received payment from their band fund which, despite the 
resolution's wording, would be the only such payment they received before the 1910s. As it 
had in the 1870s, the Department distributed a minuscule amount of money: the Indian agent 
provided $113 .52 to 284 Huron, with the vast majority (256) receiving $0.40 each, although a 
small number (17) received $0.41, $0.42, or $0.42 Yz and the agent paid each of the eleven 
members of Guillaume Sioui's family $0.36 4/11 (or $4 for the entire family).225 In order ta 
223 These amounts are based on the average population for both communities calculated from the 
figures reported in the same annual reports as those which provide the data on the sums paid. 
224 Copy of a resolution of the Huron Band Council, 10 February 1896, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2738, file 
144,620-6, reel C-12790. 
225 Pay-List ofInterest Distribution for the Year ended 31st December 1896, Huron Band, n.d. [1896], 
LAC, RG10, vol. 9803, ree1 C-728 (ACNHW E-3-54). 
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ensure accountability, the Indian agent, after having notified the band members by letter, 
distributed these funds to the heads household in the presence oftwo non-Huron witnesses. In 
acceptance of the money, the agent required each recipient "to sign three times, in three 
different books.,,226 However, this payment conflicted with Indian policy as developed under 
deputy superintendent general Hayter Reed. In December 1896, shortly after Clifford Sifton 
was appointed minister of the interior and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, Reed 
informed him of the Department's practice with regard to interest payments: "the money 
distributed as interest is a positive detenent to individual improvement amongst the Indians; 
they leam to depend too 1argely upon these payments, and frequently they squander them.,,227 
This shift in official thinking that portrayed band funds as more akin to money voted by 
Parliament than to annuities is instructive and explains why Indian Affairs did not implement 
the council's recommendation that such payments be made annually. NonetheJess, in 1896, at 
least, the Department proved amenable to providing the Huron with the individual monetary 
payments called for by local elected officiais. This supported the council's authority in 
Wendake while supplying the state with a wealth of population information on the Huron. 228 
The 1896 request that Indian Affairs distribute the interest on Huron funds provided 
dissidents with a platform from which to protest the actions of the council and the band's 
Indian agent. Although most Huron drew a portion of these monies, twenty-nine individuals, 
229 Themembers of six households belonging to the Sioui family, refused to accept payment.
226 Elizabeth Siaui to [Clifford] Siftan, 24 May 1897, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C­
11291. 
227 H. Reed to Sifton, 26 December 1896, LAC, RG 10, vol. 1119, p. 625-8 quoted in DJ. Hall, 
"Clifford Sifton and Canadian Indian Administration, 1896-1905," in Ian A.L. Getly and Antoine S. 
Lussier (eds.), As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian Native Studies, 
Vancouver, UBC Press, [1977] 1983, p. 129 [120-44]. 
228 Although not noted in the documentation generated by the distribution, the 1896 pay-list would 
become Indian Affairs' standard reference for establishing Huron band membership inta the 1910s. 
229 Those who "Refused accepting his share" were Joseph Sioui, Thomas Sioui, Elisé Sioui, Sr., 
Stanislas Sioui, Jr., Stanislas Sioui, Sr., and Elisé Sioui, fils. Pay-List of Interest Distribution for the 
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Siouis, most of whom resided on the Quarante Arpents reserve, c1ashed with the band 
counci1, the Indian agent, and Indian Affairs, claiming to be the only remaining "true Huron" 
and demanding control over the band 's resources as weIl as the expulsion of a host of band 
members whom they asserted were Canadiens and not Huron. Joseph Sioui's attempts to gain 
a pension from the band council provide a telling il1ustration both of these ongoing tensions 
and of the interconnectedness of money-use and politics. 
In 1895, the band council passed a resolution requesting the provision of $25 ID 
assistance to Sioui on account of a physical disability tl1at prevented him from eaming a 
living (he had lost an ann and two fingers in two separate accidents while working for the 
Quebec and Lac St. Jean Railroad in 1889).230 Although Indian Affairs granted these funds, 
the fol1owing year the band council refused to recommend Sioui's request that payments be 
continued on a monthly basis because "they consider that Joseph Sioui, although infirm, is far 
from being destitute. He is comfortably settled, keeps a horse and cows, cultivates a lot which 
produces enough to support himself and family.,,23 1 Following this rejection, Stanislas Sioui 
began repeated1y petitioning authorities in Ottawa to grant the pension regardless of the 
counci}'s objections. In a March 1896 letter to the governor general, he openly chal1enged the 
legitimacy of the band council: 
We do not see why the Department of Indian Affairs refers this question to the 
chiefs and to the general council of the band, seeing that two-thirds of the people of 
this tribe are French Canadians ... It is absolutely necessary that we should know by 
what authority the chiefs of this tribe interfere with Mr. Joseph Sioui's receiving a 
pension to be paid by the Department of Indian Affairs. If they are Huron Indians, 
let them prove the fact by their registers of genealogy and we shaH be satisfied; but 
Year ended 31st December 1896, Buron Band, n.d. [1896J, LAC, RGIO, vol. 9803, reel C-728 
(ACNHW E-3-54). 
230 Resolution of the Huron Band COlllcil, 25 May 1895 and Antoine O. Bastien to Bayter Reed, 27 
May 1895, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2738, file 144,620-6, reel C-12790. 
231 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 August 1895, in 1ndian AjJairs Annual 
Report, 1895, p. 32 and Antoine O. Bastien to Bayter Reed, 23 May 1896, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2837, file 
171,530, reel C-11284. 
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if on the contrary they cannot prove anything, let them be deposed from the position 
of chief to make room for those who sent a copy of the register of their ancestors. 232 
In order to appease the Siouis, the agent, Antoine O. Bastien, suggested that Joseph Sioui 
send a petition to Indian Affairs headquarters by which his supporters might request to "give 
up their share of interest on capital" in order to fund his pension. Bastien informed the deputy 
superintendent general: "1 prepared this petition for him, and sent it to him to get it signed. l 
have not seen either Sioui or his petition since. l therefore supposed that he had dropped his 
request and l have leamed that those who signed his first petition for a monthly allowance 
have formally declined to relinquish their share of interest.,,233 
Stanislas Sioui claimed that he and his "compatriots who refuse to recognize A.O. 
Bastien as agent for this tribe" did not accept the interest payment other band members 
received because they did not believe Bastien to be sincere when he invited Sioui "to go to 
his house and personally see the share of interest due me out of the funds of the Huron tribe." 
Thus, Sioui and his allies used the Huron's interest payments as yet another means of calling 
into question the authority of the band's officially recognized leaders. Before accepting any 
funds, Sioui asked the superintendent general to "be so kind as to tell us whether the Indian 
Department has really sent him this money to be distributed amongst the tribe.,,234 Elizabeth 
Sioui described the Sioui's position even more explicitly. The family refused to recognize 
Bastien and they had "dispensed with his services as Agent on the 8th April the petition 
respecting which you received. The Siouis are not disposed to accept their rents except from 
someone else than from the Agent or from the Government.,,235 As described below, this 
232 Stanislas Sioui ta Lord Aberdeen, Governor General of Canada, March 1896, LAC, RG 10, vol. 
2837, file 171,530, reel C-11284, 
233 Antoine O. Bastien ta Hayter Reed, 23 May 1896, LAC, RGIO, vol. '2837, file 171,530, reel C­
11284. 
234 Stanislas Sioui ta Clifford Siflon, May 1897, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
235 Elizabeth Sioui ta [Clifford] Sifton, 24 May 1897, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C­
11291. 
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conflict would again rear its head in the context of Indian Affairs' regulation of on-reserve 
consumption. 
In 1879, at roughly the same time that the state stopped making annual interest 
payments to the Innu and Huron, the Department began a relatively long-lasting work-for­
welfare program at Mashteuiatsh that broke with established practice by providing cash 
wages to participating band members. In that year, Ernest Cimon, the Conservative MP for 
Chicoutimi-Saguenay, wrote to John A. Macdonald, then serving as prime minister, minister 
of the interior, and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, in order to cali his 
attention to the distress which now prevails amongst the Indians of Lake St John. 
Those poor men have no more hunting grounds, on account of the rapid 
development of the colonisation in that part of the country, so that they are obliged 
to remain al! the year on the Reserve. Bence, the al!owance of the Government is 
now insufficient. 1 would humblysuggest that an additional sum of $500. be 
allowed them. This sum may be employed in inducing those Indians, during the 
summer, to work upon the opening of a road on the Indian Reserve, & so, in the 
meantime, while assisting them, this money would be utilised in facilitating the 
colonisation on the Indians' lands & giving value to them. 236 
On the recommendation of Lawrence Vankoughnet, the deputy superintendent general and 
the effective head of Indian Affairs, the Department instructed the Indian agent, L.E. Otis, ta 
carry Cimon's plan into action. Following the completion of roadwork, Otis was to rcturn ta 
the Department copies of its standard pay list for the Innu employed on the project, each of 
whom would then be paid by departmental check. 237 The agent implemented the project, 
spending the entire $500 budget allotted him. 238 The Department expended similar sums for 
236 Ernest Cimon to the Minister of the Interior, 1 May 1879, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2085, file 13,059, reel 
C-1l153. 
237 [Lawrence Vankoughnet] to L.E. Otis, Il July 1879, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2085, file 13,059, reel C­
11153. 
238 Vankoughnet wrote that, "the sum of $500 was expended on a road through said reserve [Pointe 
Bleue], Indian labor being employed in the construction thereof. The work done by them has been 
favorably reported of by their agent." L. Vankoughnet, Report of the Deputy Superintendent General 
oflndian Affairs, 31 December 1879, in Indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1879, p. 8. 
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roadwork from the Innu's band fund during the next several years, totaling $2,812.68 
between 1879 and 1886.239 Beginning in the late 1880s, the Department scaled back its 
efforts, expending far more modest sums on road maintenance on the reserve. 240 Thus, Indian 
Affairs created a relatively long-lasting work-for-welfare project, supplying the Innu with 
substantial cash payments from band funds. Although never in any sense dominating their 
economy, such roadwork projects provided the residents of Mashteuiatsh with supplementary 
monetary income. 241 This suggests that when the Department felt that such projects warranted 
expenditure and when the band had sufficient funds to coyer costs, officiais in Ottawa did not 
necessarily oppose welfare programs that provided monetary payments as long as they 
required sorne effort on the part of beneficiaries. 
However, the monetary payments made for roadwork in Mashteuiatsh (a project 
which was explicitly framed as a relief initiative) clashed with the established departmental 
practice of providing assistance in kind. 242 Although generally implied, Indian Affairs 
239 In the fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1879, the Deparlment spent $535.79 on roadwork, in 1880 it 
spent $499.94, and it spent $497.76 in 1881. Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1880, p. 183, 1881, part II, 
p. 66, and 1882, part Il, p. 71. After spending nothing in 1882, the Deparlment expended $896.81 on 
roadwork the following year, $364.83 in 1884, and $17.55 in 1885. Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 
1884, part II, p. 74, 1885, part Il, p. 72, and 1886, part Il, p. 76. 
240 During the fiscal year beginning on 1 July 1888, Indian Affairs spent $59.17 on road repairs.lndian 
AJJairs Annual Report, 1889, part II, p. 213. 
241 For example, Otis wrote about the situation in 1881: "The work on the road made by the 
Government, in the Township of [p. 16] Ouiatchouan, has sustained a good number of them who had 
not gone to the hunt. This kind of works has the double advantage of supplying them with bread and 
keeping them from idleness, which is demoralizing them and takes away all their energy." L.E. Otis, 
Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 24 September J881, in Indian AJJairs Annual Report. 1881, p. 15. 
However roadwork did not always receive the Department's blessing. In 1898 the council, with the 
agent's support, proposed that $200 be set aside from its funds to pay for roadwork on the reserve. 
Judging from the lack of any corresponding entry in Indian Affairs' accounts for 1898 and 1899, it 
seems unlikely that this request was accorded. For payments made from the Pointe Bleue, see Indian 
AJJairs Annual Report. 1898, p. G-93-4 and Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1899, p. G-95. 
242 For example, in 1880, the Indian agent at Mashteuiatsh wrote that, "The money received during the 
current year, has been disposed of for the assistance of the sick, widows, infirm and orphans, and for 
the purchase of seed grain." L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 13 September 1880, in 
Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1880, p. 32. 
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sometimes made this opposition explicit. In an 1895 letter to the Indian agent in Wendake, 
the deputy superintendent general stated the Department's unequivocal opposition to the 
provision of cash relief to a destitute widow, in the process invoking the specter of the 
improvident Indian: "if supplies to this amount were fumished the accollnts for the purchase 
of the same should be forwarded but if the cash was given to her (which 1 may here state is a 
method of fumishing relief not approved by the Department, for obvious reasons) receipts for 
the amounts are required.,,243 Thus, in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh at least, Indian Affairs 
distinguished between work framed as welfare and relief that carried no labor requirements 
when deciding whether to provide cash or provisions during the late nineteenth century. 
The Politics ofConsumption at the turn of the Twentieth Century 
During the late 1890s, issues pertaining to consumption informed the political scene 
in both Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. While Indian Affairs concentrated its action in this area 
on suppressing the sale of alcohol, the Huron and Innu band councils proved far more 
interested in the regulation of credit relations. 244 Whereas much of this chapter has focused on 
cash's role in poli tics, this section, then, concentrates" on abstract currency's role as credit and 
the impo11ance of this monetary form in the context of on-reserve consumption. Although the 
retailers who sold goods and services to the Huron and Innu at the turn of the century 
certainly accepted cash, they also often extended credit. However, merchants did not 
llniversally follow this practice, necessitating in the case of Mashtelliatsh the intervention of 
the band council. In Wendake, on the other hand, credit proved to be an important front of the 
ongoing struggle between the Indian agent (himself a band member) and several Huron who 
contested his and the band council's authority. Thus, money became a central issue in both 
243 [Bayter Reed], Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, to A.O. Bastien, 4 April 1895, 
LAC, RGIO, vol. 2738, file 144,620-6, reel C-12790. 
244 On the history of alcohol regulation among Canadian First Nations, see Robert A. Campbell, 
"Making Sober Citizens: The Legacy of Indigenous Alcohol Regulation in Canada, 1777-1985," 
Journal ofCanadian Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (Winter 2008), p. 105-26. 
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communities as the chiefs, band members, and Indian agents aU sought to exert influence on 
the local political scene. 
In the summer of 1897, the Innu band council passed a resolution requesting that 
the Department permit Charles Siméon, an Innu originally from Pessamit but living in Ste. 
Anne de Chicoutimi, to open a store on the reserve at Mashteuiatsh. It requested that Indian 
Affairs al10w the establishment of this store "seeing that that which already exists (Hudson 
Bay Co's) refuses undel' many circumstances to outfit with necessaries Indians when starting 
out on their land.,,245 Thus, the band council explicitly sought to encourage the new store in 
order to fill a need for credit that the HBC refused to meet. The Department undertook a rapid 
inquiry into the council 's request primarily to avoid antagonizing the HBC who, in the words 
of Indian Affairs' secretary, had "protested against sorne parties elsewhere being aUowed to 
trade with Indians for whose support in time of distress the Company has contributed largely 
and to whom many of the Indians are indebted for food, etc.,,246 PL. Marcotte, the Indian 
agent, replied to his superior that Siméon should be aUowed to operate his store because the 
. HBC's trading practices were highly damaging to the Innu's economic wel1being. "Theil' 
margin being so large and their selection of Customers so restrained that more than half of the 
Indians had to provide for the Winter supplies, last faU, with the Neighbouring towns, 
Roberval, St Prime and St Félicien. In my opinion, there is room here for two good stores 
without any conflict of interest. The Hudson's Bay Co might reduce her large profits in order 
to keep her good Customers and let the other to fight his way through the best he can." 
Moreover, Marcotte expanded on the council's argument by charging the HBC with price 
manipulation with a view towards preventing the Innu from reimbursing the debt they had 
245 Minutes of the Pointe Bleue Band Council Meeting of 9 August 1897, 10 August 1897, LAC, 
RGIO, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299. 
246 J.D. McLean ta P.L. Marcotte, 3 September 1897, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C­
11299. 
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taken on prior to leaving the reserve in the fall. 247 As a result of Marcotte's support, the 
Department followed the council's recommendation and allowed Siméon to open his store on 
the reserve. 248 This decision immediately added an important, although seasonal (Siméon 
closed his store during the winter when hunters were off-reserve), source of credit to the local 
economy. Indeed, in 1897 Siméon marketed a total of $3,000 to $4,000 in goods to the Innu, 
being roughly half of what the HBC would sell during the 1901-2 fiscal year249 While it is 
unclear how much of this merchandise Siméon sold on credit, it seems likely that the amount 
was fairly substantial given that he himself had a financial backer and because he had 
managed to recover the credit he had extended the previous year when visiting the reserve as 
a travelling salesman.250 
Credit also played a central raie in a major political dispute that took place in 
Wendake at the same time. This conflict had its roots in the long-lasting assertions on the part 
of members of the Sioui family that they were they only "true Huron" remaining. This clash 
crystallized most dramatically around the question of whether the Department would allow 
Antoine Oscar Bastien to maintain a store on the reserve. When Indian Affairs appointed him 
permanent Indian agent in 1886, it provided Bastien with an annual salary of $150, which, it 
increased to $200 the following year. In spite of this increase, his salalY remained weil below 
the $500 to $1,200 that an internaI report claimed Indian Affairs paid most of its agents. By 
1894, Bastien, "being married and with family," felt that his salalY provided insufficient 
247 P.L. Marcotte to [J.D. McLean], Secretary, Department of lndian Affairs, 8 September 1897, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299. 
248 J.D. McLean to P.L. Marcotte, 14 September 1897, LAC, RGI0, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C­
11299. 
249 P.L. Marcotte to [J.D. McLean], Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 8 September 1897, LAC, 
RG10, vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299. From June 1901 throgh May 1902, the HBC sold 
$8,664.01 in merchandise to the Innu. HBCA, A.76/15, f. 109, bob. 973. 
250 Siméon's financial backing came from Father Roussel, the priest at Ste. Anne de Chicoutimi. P.L. 
Marcotte to [J.D. McLean], Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 8 September 1897, LAC, RGI0, 
vol. 2924, file 189,841, reel C-11299. 
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support and to increase his incorne he opened "a grocery and sold goods on credit to Indians 
of Lorette." Although he received a second increase in salary to $300 in 1899, the agent 
continued to conduct his business in the village. The following year, when his activities came 
to the attention of Indian Affairs' headquarters in Ottawa, Bastien justified his actions by 
both referring to his family's needs and to those ofWendake's population in general. Bastien 
claimed to have opened his store because the Huron "often were in distress being without 
work and could not bunt on account of the prohibitive law of the Province of Quebec.,,251 By 
1900, members of the band owed Bastien nearly $1,500 for goods purchased on credit. 252 The 
agent had expected "to be well paid at the return of the Indians to their works." However, 
rather than leading to the windfall for which he had hoped, his retailing activities led him to 
court. Bastien sued Abraham Sioui and Felix Groslouis in the Circuit Court of Quebec for 
non-payment of debt so that he might, in tum, repay his own creditors who had taken legal 
action against him, also for unpaid debts. However, the Indian Act explicitly barred an Indian 
agent from conducting business with his wards unless Indian Affairs had first granted him a 
license, which it had not done. In order to overcome his own legal problems, Bastien asked 
the Department to provide him with payment of the amount owed him by band members 
"from their annuity money."m 
Indian Affairs refused to grant Bastien's request. Furthermore, although it had 
received evidence of the agent's commercial activities since early 1896 in the form of 
receipts of state-funded relief provided by Bastien' s store, Ottawa only took concrete steps to 
251 Memorandum conceming Antoine O. Bastien, n.d. [1900/02], LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 179,962, 
reel C-11291. 
252 Even though a departmental memorandum estimated this amount at nearly $1,000, the Hmon band 
council eventually asked that the Department reimburse Bastien $1,429.25. [?], Memorandum 
conceming Antoine O. Bastien, n.d. [1900/02] and lD. McLean, Memorandum to the Solicitor 
General, 8 June 1900, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
253 [?], Memorandum concerning Antoine O. Bastien, n.d. [1900/02], LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 
179,962, reel C-11291. Sioui later mentions that Bastien filed his suit against him and Groslouis in the 
Circuit Court of Quebec on 12 March 1900. Abraham Sioui to Lord Minto, Governor General of 
Canada, June 1900, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-1129 J. 
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close the operation when it became a matter of public comment.254 In February 1900, J.D. 
McLean, the secretary and primary day-to-day administrator of Indian Affairs, infonned 
Bastien that the Indian Act forbade "officiais or employees of the Department from trading 
with any Indian, or from selling him directly or indirectly, any goods or supplies.,,255 Bastien 
attempted to gain a permit, retroactive to 1894, allowing him both to escape the penalties 
imposed by the Indian Act and to continue his suit against Sioui and Gros Louis. 256 In a 
memorandum on the subject to the deputy minister, McLean wrote that, "although the law 
authorizing the granting of permits to enable them to do so, contemplates exceptional cases, 
the undersigned is certainly not of opinion that this case is one which should be made an 
exception." While MeLean professed incomprehension as to "why the Agent who is an 
Indian of the Band should not be able to live as such on a Reserve, on $300. a year," he 
recommended increasing Bastien's salary rather than permitting him to trade with his fellow 
Huron. McLean also rejected Bastien's request for a permit dating from 1894 on the grounds 
that there was no technical means of emitting a retroactive license. The secretary did note that 
reimbursement of individual debt from band funds was possible. "The Department when an 
account is properly presented and the Indian acknowledges the debt and consents to such 
being done not infrequently pays it, deducting sorne 25% from the Indian's share of 
distribution of annuities, until recouped." However, McLean fully admitted the naïveté of this 
statement given that payment could not legally be made from the band fund's capital and that 
the fund generated extremely limited interest: "the capital of the Band is so trifling that they 
cannot pay their doctor's salary and only one distribution of interest has been made in the 
254 For an example of $10 worth of relief provided by Bastien, in exchange for a check from Indian 
Affairs for the same amount, see Relief Account of François Grolouis, 20 January 1896, LAC, RGI0, 
vol. 2738, file 144,620-6, reel C-12790. 
255 J.D. McLean to A.O. Bastien, 7 February 1900, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
256 [Antoine O. Bastien] to Charles Fitzpatrick, 12 February 1900, LAC, RGIO, vol. 2883, file 179,962, 
reel C-11291. 
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past 15 years or SO.,,257 Furthermore, Felix Groslouis and Abraham Sioui appear to have 
constructed their defense around the Indian Act's prohibition of trade between agents and 
Amerindians in order to avoid having to repay their debt only after their lawyer had informed 
them of the clause's existence.258 Thus, the probability that either of them would have agreed 
to transfer any part of their interest payments - even if there had been any - to the agent 
would appear to have been nonexistent. 
Bastien protested his innocence based on the fact that the Department had never 
sent him a copy of the Indian Act. Furthermore, he claimed to have advanced credit for 
necessities alone. Bastien asserted: "1 ought to receive the assistance of the Department, as 1 
was altogether ignorant of this law, and as 1 acted charitably in the best faith in the world in 
making advances of provisions to both these families ... 1 am myself harassed by my creditors, 
sorne of whom have prosecuted and have obtained judgment against me, and others are still 
prosecuting me and 1 am obliged by these circumstances to give up trade and to think about 
leaving my country.,,259 Both the Indian agent and rank-and-file band members, then, may 
have been ignorant of the Indian Act's provisions, calling into question to a certain extent the 
influence that this law exerted over the everyday lives of Amerindians (at least in the 
particular context ofWendake). 
In March 1900, the Depaliment, employing the arguments that McLean had 
developed in his memorandum of the preceding month, rejected Bastien's requests?60 In 
257 J.D. McLean, Memorandum for the information of the Deputy Minister, 16 February 1900, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
258 McLean 1ater wrote: "It is probable that neither the Agent nor the Indians were aware that the store 
was on the Reserve in contravention of the law until this fact was pointed out by the lawyers when Mr. 
Bastien endeavoured to collect the money due him through the courts." J.D. McLean to CJ. Jones, 
Governor General's Secretary, 22 June 1900, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
259 Antoine O. Bastien to the Secretary, Deparlment of Indian Affairs, 19 February 1900, LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
260 J.D. McLean to A.O. Bastien, 20 March 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-] 1291. 
For the deputy superintendent general's opinion Ihat, "MI'. Bastien's request with regard to trading 
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May, Abraham Sioui, continuing his family's campaign against the agent, informed the 
govemor general that, "the Agent A.O. Bastien is going to take steps, if he has not already 
taken them, to get the Indian Dept. to see that he is paid for groceries sold by him to the 
Indians of this place. Now, according to Section 134 of the Indian Act, Agent A.O. Bastien 
has no right to trade with the Indians being an employee of the Indian Department. Moreover 
the payments that the Indians have made him since he has been trading with them have weil 
repaid the losses that he has suffered.,,261 However, by this point Indian Affairs, which 
considered the matter closed, had lost patience with the Siouis' attempts to have Bastien 
recalled. As such, McLean replied to Sioui that, "the Department has no sympathy whatever 
with those who would first take groceries from the Agent on credit and then attempt to evade 
paying for what they got, by pleading the provisions of the section quoted.,,262 This violent 
reaction and the Department's refusai to take any action against Bastien other than to dismiss 
his requests for a license and repayment of the debt owed him by certain Huron from band 
funds were predicated both on the continued complaints of the Siouis that Indian Affairs had 
determined were unfounded and on the fact that "None of the Indians made any complaint 
regarding the store on the Reserve, although it was in operation for over five years, until the 
Agent began to take action for the recovery of moneys due him by certain of the Indians. ,,263 
In June 1900, the Department rejected a "petition of the Lorette Indians, supported 
by their Missionary, Rev. Gui!. Giroux, and Mr. Prosper Marlet, asking that their 
indebtedness, amounting to $1429.25, to Agent Bastien, be paid from their funds." McLean 
wrote to the solicitor general that, "this band has to their credit at present $4680.50 capital 
with the Indians can be pennitted," see James A. Smart, Memorandum for Mr. McLean, 20 February 
1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
261 Abraham Sioui to Lord Minto, Governor General of Canada, May 1900, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2883, 
fIle 179,962, reel C-11291. 
262 lD. McLean to Abraham Sioui, 5 June 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
263 lD. McLean to C.J. Jones, Governor General's Secretary, 22 June 1900, LAC, RG10, vol. 2883, 
file 179,962, reel C-11291. 
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and $30.34 interest. Under the law as it stands now the capital funds of the band cannot be 
used for any such purpose and their interest fund is so small that it does not suffice to pay the 
ordinaty IUnning expenses of the band, such as medical attendance, fuel, material for schools, 
&c., &C.,,264 However, Bastien kept his post and, rather than being fined or punished in any 
way by the Department, received a $125 raise on 1 July 1900.265 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed money's role in relations between First Nations and the 
state during the nineteenth century through an examination of its theoretical content and 
practical use at three distinct political levels. In this context, money provides a window onto 
First Nations' experience of state formation while simultaneously offering a vantage point 
from which to consider the state's developing vision of Aboriginal peoples. From the 
theoretical constlUct of the "improvident Indian" partially developed by imperial and colonial 
commentators, through the logic of pan-Canadian Indian policy, to the ways in which 
Amerindians lived the implementation ofthis policy, money informed how the state imagined 
and interacted with First Nations and, thus, the form and extent to which colonialism 
intluenced the everyday lives of Aboriginal peoples. At the same time, money furnished 
chiefs and rank-and-file band members with an effective tool for exerting force in local 
poli tics and in their unbalanced relationship with imperial, colonial, and federal officiaIs. In 
this sense, money, whether abstract or material, contributed to colonialism, a process that 
264 J.D. McLean, Memorandum to the Solicitor General, 8 June 1900, LAC, RGI0, vol. 2883, file 
179,962, reel C-1l291. 
265 Beginning at this point, he made $425 per year.lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1901, part J, p. 169. 
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both empowered and subjugated Amerindians in much the same way as other seemingly 
mundane technologies. 266 
During the nineteenth century, money first played a major political role in the 
context of the commutation debates. Colonial officiais, drawing on a series of Western 
stereotypes tied to both Aboriginal peoples and the urban poor, defined Amerindians as being 
naturally improvident, an assertion that would continue to echo through state Indian policy 
and practice well into the next century. However, this claim did not banish money once and 
for all from state-First Nations relations. Indeed, from mid-century, imperial and later 
colonial and federal officiais founded one of the central pillars of Indian policy, treaties 
providing the crown with title to Aboriginal lands, on the payment of cash annuities. This 
was largely due to the distinction made between payment as right and payment as privilege, a 
division which drew on the same basic assumptions about the responsibility of the collective 
to the individual as charity and public assistance. Thus, whereas state officiais came to 
perceive treaty money as providing payment in a way that paralleled any other market 
transaction (thereby sanctioning cash's use), they considered funds held by the government, 
either in trust for individual bands or provided by Parliament, as necessitating greater 
oversight on the part of Indian Affairs, something which prohibited the distribution of 
currency from these sources in most cases. Moreover, authorities did not make this 
distinction at the policy level alone; they also implemented it in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake 
through interest payments and the in-kind provision of welfare. At the locallevel, money also 
served to support Indian Affairs' and band councils' political authority. Indeed, prior to the 
Department's late nineteenth-century expansion, money (in the form of the locally managed 
band fund) may even have provided the Huron chiefs with a more effective means of exerting 
political influence than their attempts to secure local cooperation through the state's 
imposition of coercive measures. By the final third of the century, and particularly during the 
266 For example, writing also played an important role in colonial power relations. Sean Hawkins, 
Writing and Colonialism in Northem Ghana: The Encounter between the LoDagaa and "The world on 
paper, " 1892-1991, Toronto, University ofToronto Press, 2002. 
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l890s, the limited monetary powers that the Indian Act provided band councils also furnished 
these bodies with a means, however circumscribed, of proclaiming their political authority. 
However, even during this period of greatly expanded legal power, the state never controlled 
ail aspects of local political affairs, something which the substantial consumer credit that its 
agent at Wendake provided the Huron makes abundantly c1ear. 
Although the state's monetary policy and practice with regard to First Nations 
remained relatively weak at the end of the nineteenth century, then, the process by which 
Indian Affairs came to monopolize the management of the state's relations with Aboriginal 
peoples during the period set the stage for the much more active approach that the institution 
would adopt beginning in the 1930s. Thus, this chapter has served to establish the basic 
parameters of the state's vision of money-use and monetary regulation that would continue ta 
inform its interactions with Aboriginal Canadians during the twentieth centuly. This chapter 
has also provided an essential complement to the next, which seeks to delineate the less 
formai, although no less political, power relations characteristic of the market society in 
which money played a significant role during the nineteenth century. Indeed, while money­
use in the context of private networks of labor and industry perhaps appear spontaneously 
less political, its effects would prove to be no less important for the ability of the Huron and 
Innu to exert force in their local relations and in those they maintained with extra-regional 
capital and the state. 
Chapter 4
 
Capital and Community in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake during the
 
Nineteenth Century
 
Although the developing legislative framework that governed the state's 
relationship with First Nations during the nineteenth century theoretically structured several 
aspects of Aboriginal money-use, Indian Affairs only rarely wielded material power in either 
Mashteuiatsh or Wendake. Moreover, when it did involve itself in concrete monetary issues, 
the state did not always do so in clear reference to its high-level discourse. However, Indian 
Affairs was never the sole extemal actor that engaged with money-use among Aboriginal 
peoples. Indeed, capital, whether multinational or local in scope, also participated in creating 
the monetary environment in which First Nations interacted among themselves and with their 
non-Indigenous neighbors. In addition to the state, then, this dissertation considers the role 
that capital played in Canadian colonialism. This chapter begins its analysis throllgh a 
description of the transformation of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean' s monetary space. During the 
middle decades of the nineteenth century, the region's rapid colonization initiated the process 
through which colonial and later federal currency replaced the monetary form developed by 
merchants and Amerindians in the fur trade over the preceding centuries. This contributed to 
a fundamental change in the region 's power relations by which extemally controlled fur trade 
companies, Saguenay-Lac St. Jean's predominant political and economic force through the 
1830s (and much later in sorne areas), were forced to conduct business using abstract and 
physical money that they did not fully contro!. However, the HBC, the main fur purchaser in 
the region from the 1830s, continued to purslle its policy of using book debt to restrict the 
Innu 's influence over fur trade relations. The remaining sections deal with monetary sources 
and forms of expenditure that escaped the highly circumscribed environment of the 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fur trade. They analyze the ways in which Huron and Innu eamed and 
borrowed money along with one particular way in which they spent it. This demonstrates one 
of the ways in which money was employed locally in both communities (charity, most often 
tied to the Catholic Church) while underlining the modest access to money that the majority 
of residents of both Wendake and Mashteuiatsh had during the century. Although these two 
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cornmunities shared both of these traits with most of their Euro-Canadian neighbors, certain 
structural factors to which only First Nations were subjected demonstrate the particular 
importance of colonialism in Aboriginal Canada, while also demanding that these factors be 
analyzed on the practical as weil as the theoretical levels. This chapter, then, serves to add 
nuance to the historiography's charcterization ofFirst Nations history by both acknowledging 
the economic and political process by which capital and the state contributed to rendering 
Amerindians peripheral to Canadian society and insisting that much of this marginalization 
was in large part discursive. 
Colonization and the End of Castor Currency in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean 
During the nineteenth century, the region composed of present-day Quebec and 
Ontario consisted of two distinct monetary spaces. The first - the steadily growing area 
inhabited by colonists of European origin - was home to official state currency offirst British 
and later Canadian origin. The second - the region in which fur traders and missionaries 
provided the primary permanent or semi-pelmanent Western presence - boasted a privately 
defined and maintained commercial currency based on the beaver pelt. The boundmy 
separating these two monetary spaces shifted during the period, with beaver currency having 
disappeared from much of the region by the early years of the twentieth century. While this 
change may at first appear inconsequential, the differing historical trajectories of these two 
"territorial currencies"j point to a much larger process: the extension of state authority over 
regions that had previously remained beyond its reach. Through monetary circulation, then, it 
becomes possible to determine the period at which the state replaced private enterprise as the 
primary institution serving to justify the control of remote regions. In this sense, the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries witnessed a process by which the colonial and later 
federal state assumed the pretension of territorial sovereignty that had previously been 
1 On "territorial currencies," see Eric Helleiner, The Making ofNational Money: Territorial Currencies 
in Historical Perspective, Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 2003. 
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asserted by the French and British Crowns through chartered companies such as the HBC. 
This section ties these political changes to alterations in the structure of the monetary system 
brought on by the advance of state-centered colonialism in subarctic Quebec while paying 
particular attention to the ways in which monetary space influenced the options to which 
actors had access. In order to do so, this section considers this process in relation to the 
Aboriginal population ofa particular geographical space (the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean), 
which experienced the substitution of the statc for the HBC as the pillar of its monetary 
system during the mid-to-Iate nineteenth century. In conjunction with the analysis of a similar 
process in tum-of-the-twentieth-century western James Bay provided in the following 
chapters, this section argues that currcncy replacement formed one of the visible ways 
through which the political community centered on the St. Lawrence Valley and the lower 
Great Lakes expanded to engulf the vast majority of the territory of which present-day 
Canada is comprised. 
During the mid-nineteenth century, the state in British North America, as in the 
United States and much of Western Europe, came to occupy an increasingly central raie in 
political and economic life. 2 In addition to its growing involvement in sectors such as 
education, policing, and transportation, the state also pursued monetary standardization, 
symbolically and functionally integrating colonial and later national markets and polities in 
the process. 3 However, rather than addressing regions, like the Canadian subarctic, already 
dominated by a single, centrally-enforced currency, the historiography on the state's role in 
2 For the prototypiea1 historieal study of state formation, see Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer, The 
Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution, New York, Basil BJaekwell, 1985. On 
state formation in the British North Ameriean eontext, see Allan Greer and Ian Radforth (eds.), 
Colonial Leviathan: State Formation in Mid-Nineteenth-Cenlury Canada, Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, 1992. 
3 For the Canadian eontext, see Bruee Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer to Money: Metrologieal 
Reform in Pre-Confederation Canada," Social Stl/dies ofScience, vol. 28, no. 4 (August 1998), p. 547­
70. See also, Robert Garson, "Counting Money: The US Dollar and Ameriean Nationhood, 1781­
1820," Journal of American Studies, vol. 35, no. 1 (2001), p. 2J-46 and Helleiner, The Making of 
National Money. 
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the development and spread of an exclusive monetary standard during the njneteenth century 
focuses on the phenomena in areas of relatively heavy colonization. Although the 
historiography emphasizes physical media, colonists in these regions had long made use of 
unitary abstract money (first the French livre, later Halifax currency, and finally the Canadian 
dollar) to evaluate the heterogeneous supply of coin in circulation.4 Indeed, under both the 
French and English regimes, authorities dictated the abstract terms in which colonial 
residents expressed value, symbolically umtmg the colonies both economically and 
poli6cally.5 Despite this abstract unification, colonists in the region continued to employ 
multiple forms of foreign and domestic cash (both coins and bank notes) through 1871, when 
Parliament passed the Uniform Currency Act, thereby effectively creating a single, 
consolidated system of abstract and physical currency in southern Canada for the first time. 6 
Although this constituted a major change in those regions that hosted a relatively 
large population of European origin, this was not the case in the Canadian subarctic in which 
a single abstract (and sometimes physical) currency had been widely used in the context of 
4 On the wide variety of coin in circulation, see Angela Redish, "Why Was Specie Scarce in Colonial 
Economies? An Analysis of the Canadian Currency, 1796-1830," Journal of Economie History, vol. 
44, no. 3, (Sept., 1984), p. 713-28. For a theoretical perspective that accentuates money's immaterial 
role as a unit of account in the place of the general emphasis that both the economic Iiterature and the 
historiography places on money's physical function as a medium of exchange or as a store of value, 
see Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature ofMoney, Malden, MA, Polity Press, 2004. 
5 On the French livre in Canada, see A.B. McCullough, Money and Exchange in Canada to 1900, 
Toronto, Dundurn Press, 1984, p. 29-30. On the implementation of Halifax currency following the 
Conquest, see Gilles Paquet and Jean-Pierre Wallot, Un Québec moderne, 1760-1840: Essai d'histoire 
économique et sociale, Montreal, Éditions Ht1l1ubise HMH, 2007, p. 208. In 1853, the legislature of 
the Province of Canada adopted the pound, dollar, shilling, pence, and cent as official units of 
currency. In 1857, it effectively ended the use of the Halifax system and sterling notation in the colony 
by requiring that ail accounts submitted to the state, as weil as those kept internally by the state itself, 
be in dollars and cents. McCullollgh, Money and Exchange in Canada, p. 106-10. 
6 Curtis, "From the Moral Thermometer to Money," p. 554. However, this law did make some foreign 
coin, notably British gold sovereigns and United States gold eagle coins, legal tender. Nevertheless, 
since very few gold coins circlliated in Canada, the practical importance of making American and 
British coins legal tender appears to have been negligible. A variety of foreign copper coins of small 
denomination also circulated weil into the twentieth century. Helleiner, The Making of National 
Money, p. 32, 39, and 116. 
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the fur trade since at least the late seventeenth century. This commercial activity grew from 
the collaboration of vastly diverse actors including Amerindian hunter-trappers and European 
elites (commercial as weil as aristocratie) and their employees. Shortly after European 
merchants had arrived on the shores of Hudson and James Bay during the late seventeenth 
century, transactions in the region came to be structured through the use of the beaver pelt as 
the standard of trade. The English, who, from 1670, traded in the subarctic under the auspices 
of the Hudson's Bay Company, referred to this standard, which expressed the theoretical 
value of a single prime beaver pelt, as the "made beaver.,,7 However, the beaver's abstract 
monetary role was not confined to the HBC's business; as a result of the generalized trade in 
beaver skins, the French in the Great Lakes also made use of such easily understood currency 
(the "castor") during the mid-eighteenth century8 Moreover, the castor survived the 
Conquest and was cauied far inland by voyageurs operating on behalf of the North West 
Company (NWC). By the early nineteenth century, then, the beaver had become the fur 
trade's abstract currency throughout northem North America. 
Given that individuals neither saved skins nor employed them when purchasing 
goods as they did with metallic and paper money, the beaver formed an abstract rather than a 
physical currency.9 Furthermore, according to Gordon Charles Davidson, the value of a 
beaver skin when used as money "differed considerably from the existing worth of the 
7Rich writes that as early as 1684, traders and hunter-trappers "made" aJ1 goods and furs into beaver in 
order to express their value, thereby providing the name for the Hudson's Bay. Company's abstract 
accounting currency: the made beaver. E.E. Rich, The Fur Trade and the Northwest ta 1857, Toronto, 
McClelland and Stewart, 1967, p. 59. 
8 Lainey notes that the beaver (the castor) served as an abstract measure of value at Detroit's Catholic 
mission in the 1740s. Jonathan C. Lainey, La "Monnaie des Sauvages ": Les colliers de wampum 
d'hier à aujourd'hui, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2004, p. 23. On the easily understandable nature of 
beaver currency, see Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, "Marketing in the Land of Hudson Bay: 
Indian Consumers and the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1770," Enlerprise & Society, vol. 3 (June 
2002), p. 291. 
9 Louise Dechêne, Habitants et marchands de Montréal au XVif siècle, Montreal, Boréal, [1974] 
1988, p. 135. 
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articles it represented."'o In other words, the value of the made beaver or castor was entirely 
independent of any actual skin, being situated in the relationship it expressed between furs, 
commodities, and people - a relationship that could span long periods of time. Although 
several scholars have remarked the existence of this monetary system, none has underlined its 
fundamental role in the creation and maintenance of the debt-based fur trade, an institution 
which has received far more attention. Il Indeed, without an abstract measure of value, the fur 
trade cou Id only function through "straight barter." Following the appearance of beaver 
currency, and the simultaneous constmction of permanent trading posts, Amerindians and 
merchants could begin to exchange goods against future promises to pay, recorded in the 
traders' ledgers and, in principle, agreed upon by ail parties to the transaction. Thus, this 
particular forro of money, like forts, provided the fur trade with the infrastructure necessalY 
to 'develop into an ongoing economic relationship between First Nations and international 
capital. 
This relationship,' however, was never entirely economlc; it was also eminently 
political. Indeed, from the late seventeenth century, commercial ventures such as the HBC, 
the Compagnie du Nord, the Compagnie de la Colonie, and the NWC struggled for the 
control of the fur trade throughout much of the Canadian subarctic. Most of these companies 
(with the notable exception of the NWC) did so on the basis of govemment-furnished 
monopolies theoretically allowing them to purchase pelts in the absence of competition. The 
10 In discussing John Franklin's account of the "trade around Cumberland House in 1819-1820," 
Davidson does nol use lhe term "money," preferring lo refer to beaver skins as "the standard of 
exchange." Gordon Charles Davidson, The North West Company, Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1918, p. 241-2. 
Il In addition to Rich, see also Arthur J. Ray, Indians in the Fur Trade: Their Role as Trappers, 
Hunters, and Middlemen in the Lands Southwest 01 Hudson Bay, 1660-1870, Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press, [1974] 1998, p. 61-2 and Arthur 1. Ray and Donald Freeman, "Give Us Good 
Measure ": An Economie Analysis 01 Relations Between the Indians and the Hudson's Bay Company 
Belore 1763, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1978, p. 54-5. On the debt system, see Toby 
Morantz, "'Sa Evil a Practice': A Look at the Debt System in the James Bay Fur Trade," in Rosemary 
E. Ommer (ed.), Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective, Fredericton, 
Acadiensis Press, 1990, p. 203-22. 
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HBC, notably, owed its existence to a 1670 royal charter that provided it with such monopoly 
rights over the entire Hudson Bay watershed. Thus, while its capital originated primarily in 
London, the HBC's political base also lay in the heart of the British Empire. 12 However, 
rather than importing the British Empire's standard money of account (the pound sterling) 
along with its trade goods, from its beginnings the company traded with First Nations using 
the made beaver. In sorne regions, HBC employees and Amerindians continued to make use 
of this form of money in their dealings instead of either imperial or national currencies well 
into the twentieth century. In this sense, the made beaver was as much a territorial currency 
as those developed by colonies and nation-states across the globe through the late nineteenth 
century as it allowed the HBC to mark the regions it controlled through a unique and locally­
intelligible means of expressing value. The process, then, by which beaver currency gave way 
before the Canadian monetary system represents more than the disappearance of a pre­
modem curiosity. Rather, it signais the way in which, over the course of the nineteenth 
century the liberal democratic state came to occupy an increasingly unassailable position as 
the only legitimate institutional expression of national political communities. 13 It also 
suggests the centrality of the HBC and other chartered companies in the assertion of 
sovereignty by European Crowns over much of the carly modern and modern world. 
During the whole of the nineteenth century, the fur trade throughout much of 
subarctic Canada was predicated on two interlocking institutions: the annual cycle and the 
debt system. In idealized terms, the Amerindian hunter-trapper arrived at the post of the HBC 
12 On the HBC's political character lhroughout North America, see John S. Galbraith, The Hudson's 
Bay Company as an Imperial Factor, 1821-1869, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1957. 
IJ For a compelling argument asserting the need to study the slate precisely because of this process and 
because of the inseparability of the various socio-political phenomena (e.g. sovereignty, war and 
diplomacy, administration and bureaucracy, the legal system, democracy or other means of accessing 
political power, and symbolic representations of collective identity) embodied by the state, see Jean­
Marie Fecteau, "Écrire l'histoire de l'État?" Bulletin d'histoire politique, vol. 5, no. 3 (Spring 2007), p. 
109-15. For an important recent contribution to the history of the Jiberal democratic state in Canada, 
see Jean-François Constant and Michel Ducharme (eds.), Liberalism and Hegemony: Debating the 
Canadian Liberal Revolution, Toronto, University of Toronlo Press, 2009. 
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or one of its competitors in late summer and purchased, on credit, the goods necessary ta 
cany out his family's winter hunt. At the beginning of the following summer, if not befare, 
the individual who had received credit retumed to the same post, selling his winter fur 
collection to the company in arder to settle his debt. ldeally, each hunter-trapper would repay 
the entire amount owed at the beginning of the summer, thus allowing the fur trade company 
ta tum a profit while maintaining the hunter-trapper's access to credit. 14 In practice, however, 
Amerindian hunter-trappers were rarely debt-free. 15 
The HBC sold goods to Amerindians and purchased furs using the made beaver 
while keeping its accounts with emplayees in pound sterling. '6 Although above al! abstract in 
nature, the fur trade companies' beaver currencies did occasionally circulate in physical 
form. 17 However, given their status as private proprietary currency this monetary form 
functioned first and foremost as a direct marker of the economic and political relationship 
between the fur trade company and its Aboriginal trading partners. Because such money, 
even if minted, was not necessarily acceptable anywhere beyond the posts of the company 
14 This "ideal" system did not necessarily function precisely in this manner. For example, the HBC 
post at Métabetchouan occasionally collected debts in the fall rather than al the beginning of the 
summer. In 1852, the post manager wrote: "Traded the hunts of Joseph Sr. & Joseph JUill. this 
forenoon the former paid his debt the latter nearly so... Simeonish[?] arrived in the evening and traded 
his hunt he paid his debt." Monday, 11 and Wednesday, 13 October 1852, HBCA, B.lll/a/4, f. 18v, 
reellM70. 
15 For instance, during the 1899 Outfit - that is, the fiscal year running from June 1899 through May 
1900 - the HBC post at Moose Factory recorded $3,673.73 in lInpaid Indian Debt. Appendix 7: 
Statement of Indian Debts, Outfit 1900, (Amended Copy), Moose Post, Inspection Report on Moose 
Factory, 4-11 Juil' and 12-18 August 190 l, HBCA, B.135/e/34, p. 24, reel IM1257. 
16 During the eighteenth century the company kept "men's accollnts" (those of theÎr employees in 
North America) in pounds sterling while it accounted for lrade with Amerindians in made beavers. Ray 
and Freeman, "Give Us Good Measure ", p. 88 and 92. 
17 For the Made Beaver's circulation via coin and stamped wooden sticks, see Charles A. Bishop, The 
Northem Ojibwa and the Fur Trade: An Historieal and Eeologieal Study, Toronto and Montreal, Holt, 
Reinhart and Winston, 1974, p. 82 and Larry Gingras, "Medals and Tokens of the HBC," The Beaver, 
vol. 48, no. 1 (sununer 1968), p. 36-43. On beaver tokens issued by the North West Company in 1820, 
see Hudson's Bay Company Archives, "HBCA Information Sheet: HBC Fur Trade Tokens," p. 2, 
http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/archives/hbca/info_sheetslindex.html (18 January 2010). 
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that issued it, within regions from which Euro-Canadian settlement was largely absent, it 
possessed a distinctly political character. Like the Canadian Dollar, then, the made beaver 
and the castor were territorial currencies in that their use constituted a geographical space 
from which other monetary forms were for the most part excluded. In this way, beaver 
currency participated in the organization of colonial space and relations in regions from 
which state-issued money was absent. 
Prior to the 1830s, the Lower Canadian state, as its French predecessor had done, 
restricted access to Saguenay-Lac St. Jean to merchants who had purchased the monopoly 
trading rights to the King's Posts. In the mid-seventeenth century, New France set aside the 
King's Posts or the King's Domain - the region corresponding roughly to modem Saguenay­
Lac St. Jean and including a portion of Charlevoix and the North Shore of the St. Lawrence­
as a reserve in which settlement not directly tied to the fur trade or missionary work was 
prohibited. Over the nearly two hundred years which followed, the state in both New France 
and British North America leased the exclusive right to trade in this region to a single 
individual or group at a time. 18 However, by the 1820s and 1830s, Lower Canada's 
colonization movement began looking to the region as a source of fertile and unclaimed 
lands, thereby providing a means of preventing the emigration of at least sorne of the 
province's booming French-speaking population. As a result, the first wave of colonialism in 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, which centered on the exploitation of the region 's fur-bearing species 
by its Aboriginal population for sale to Euro-Canadian merchants, gave way to a second 
wave, characterized above ail by settler colonization. Beginning in the late 1830s, French 
Canadians, primarily from the neighboring Charlevoix region, rapidly began colonizing the 
shores of the Saguenay River before continuing on to the lands surrounding Lac St. Jean 
beginning in the 1850s. Beyond settlement, this second period of colonialism was also 
characterized by a focus on forestry, largely directed by extra-regional capital, coupled with 
18 On the creation of and changes to the region known as the King's Posts, see Russel Bouchard, Le 
Saguenay des fourrures, 1534-1859: Histoire d'un monopole, Chicoutimi-Nord, Russel Bouchard, 
1989,p. 81-123 and 165-70. 
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locally-controlled subsistence agriculture. Thus, from the late 1830s, colonialism in 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean led to the arrivai and continued presence of a stationary Euro­
Canadian population and to the creation of local markets in which agricultural produce, as 
weil as furs and manufactured goods, exchanged hands. 19 
Although settler colonialism would come to dominate nineteenth-century Euro­
Canadian activity in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, at the beginning of the 1820s this was anything 
but a foregone conclusion. In comparison to other regions of importance to the fur trade in 
subarctic Canada, Saguenay-Lac St. Jean continued to play host to intense competition even 
after the 1821 fusion of the HBC and the NWC. At the time of the merger, the state continued 
both to forbid settlement in the region and to lease monopoly rights to its fur trade. Although 
the NWC held the lease to the King' s Domain through 1822, the HBC proved uninterested in 
renewing its rights following the merger of the two companies. As a result, a new rival (the 
King's Posts Company) was bom with John Goudie's 1822 purchase of a twenty-year lease 
to the region's fur resources. HBC management, however, quickly decided that the company 
had been mistaken in failing to pursue the lease with greater conviction and therefore, 
working from the margins of the King's Posts, it engaged its new competitor in a struggle for 
control of the region 's fur supply throughout the 1820s. This conflict ended in 1831, with the 
purchase by the HBC of the King's Posts Company's lease. 20 
Following its acquisition of the lease, the HBC enjoyed a decade during which it 
he Id monopoly rights to the region's fur trade. However, by the end of the 1830s, the Société 
de Vingt-et-Un had begun the formai colonization of the Saguenay River region. This group 
aimed to support itself through lumbering (farming being strictly forbidden by the HBC). In 
19 On the interconnectedness offorestry and agriculture during this period of "colonization proper," see 
Normand Séguin, "L'économie agro-forestière: genèse du développement au Saguenay au XIXe 
siècle," Revue d'histoire de ['Amérique française, vol. 29, no. 4 (1976), p. 559-65 and Gérard 
Bouchard, "Co-intégration et reproduction de la société rurale: pour un modèle saguenayen de la 
marginalité," Recherches sociographiques, vol. 29, no. 2-3 (1988), p. 283-310. 
20 Jean-Paul Simard, "Onze annés de troubles dans les Postes du Roi," Saguenayensia, vol. la, no. 1 
(January-February 1968), p. 2-5. 
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1842, William Priee purchased ail of the sawmills that the colonists of the Vingt-et-Un had 
built on the Saguenay, thereby creating for himself a virtual monopoly on forestry operations 
in the region. 21 Aiso in 1842, the HBC's exclusive rights to the King's Posts expired. 
Although the company renewed its lease, Lower Canadian authorities insisted on several 
important changes: while the HBC maintained exclusive rights to the region's fur trade, the 
government officially opened Saguenay-Lac St. Jean to colonization by providing the lega1 
means for settlers to acquire title to lands that they had "improved.,,22 Thus, by the early 
1840s the King's Posts ceased to be off-limits to Euro-Canadian colonization. This change, in 
turn, led to a radical reworking of the political and economic climate of Saguenay-Lac St. 
Jean. 
In the face of large-scale Euro-Canadian immigration, the HBC lost its 
predominance in the region, although, initially, to another capitalist enterprise rather than to 
the state. Beginning in the early 1840s, William Price and Company had joined the HBC as 
one of the two primary eapitalist enterprises operating in the Saguenay region. By 1851, the 
approximately 4,000 Euro-Canadians living along the banks of the river depended to various 
degrees on William Priee, whether for their income or their tools and provisions. In a manner 
reminiscent of the HBC's proprietary monetary system, William Price and Company issued 
bills, to a maximum value of fl, for use in paying wages and purchasing goods from the 
23
company's stores. At mid-eentury, the region's lumber companies also, like the HBC, 
advanced credit to their employees, later deducted from their wages, so that they might buy 
provisions. In other words, Euro-Canadian wage-earners, like Aboriginal hunter-trappers, 
21 Due to the important role played by one of William Price's associates, Alexis Tremblay, in the 
formation and management of the Société de Vingt-et-Un, Dechêne speculates that Price may have in 
fact underwritten the group's activities precisely in the hopes of creating for himself such a monopoly. 
Louise Dechêne, "Les entreprises de William Price (1810-1850): scieries et chantiers," Saguenayensia, 
vol. 12, no. 4 (July-August 1970), p. 82-5. See also Camil Girard and Normand Perron, Histoire du 
Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, Quebec, Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1995, p. 120-1. 
22 Girard and Perron, Histoire du Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean, p. 119. 
23 Dechêne, "Les entreprises de William Priee... ," p. 85. 
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found themselves locked into a cycle of non-transferable debt which diminished their access 
to more universally acceptable fOlms of cash. William Price and Company reinforced this 
system by extending mortgages on their employees' lots in exchange for credit at the 
company store. Despite not owning their lands outright, as a result of either having failed to 
pay the full purchase price or illegally occupying lands, forestly workers were thus doubly 
beholden to the region's large timber merchants, chief among them William Price.24 A state­
commissioned report on the Saguenay region, written in 1850, asserted that timber companies 
were able to exercise this stranglehold on the local economy precisely because of a lack of 
public economic infrastructure (including state-issued currency). "Le colon du Saguenay est 
dans une situation exceptionnelle. À une distance considérable de tous les marchés, il ne 
trouve dans le territoire qu'il habite aucun moyen de se procurer, par la vente de ses 
modiques produits s'il en a, l'argent dont il a besoin.,,25 Thus, by the middle years of the 
nineteenth century, the monetalY system of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean was dominated by private 
currency, both physical and abstract, issued by two major commercial entities. 
Despite the increasing centrality of Price and Company to the region's money 
supply, the HBC continued to control the majority of the currency used by the Aboriginal 
population. Between the seventeenth century and the 1840s, Innu hunter-trappers emp10yed 
this money at the handful of trading posts scattered throughout the region. From its 
24 In 1850, astate sUIveyor sent to the region reported that, "Les employés des chantiers reçoivent en 
échange de leur travail des marchandises et des provisions. Les propriétaires de ces chantiers avancent 
bien libéralement à tous les colons ce dont ils ont besoin; mais ce qu'ils achètent, ils le prennent à 
crédit, ils s'endettent, et comment trouveront-ils le moyen de payer? Aujourd'hui la plus grande partie 
des habitans du Saguenay sont endettés chez les marchands au montant de la valeur de leurs terres qui, 
quoiqu'elles soient la propriété de la Couronne, sont cependant hypothéquées en faveur des créanciers 
des colons. Sans les magasins de Messieurs Price et Compie, la plus grande partie de la population du 
Saguenay mourrait de faim." Jacques Crémazie, "Rapport spécial sur le Saguenay," 20 February 1850, 
in Camil Girard (ed.), Le Saguenay-Lac-Saint-Jean en 1850: Rapport spécial de Jacques Crémazie, 
Electronic version, Jonquière: Les Éditions Sagamie/Québec, [1988] 2007, p. 34, 
http://c1assiques.uqac.ca/collection_histoire_SLSJ/girard_camil/SLSJ_en_1850/SLSJ_en_1850.html 
(19 January 2010). 
25 Ibid. 
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acquisition of the lease to the King's Posts through the end of the nineteenth century, the 
HBC operated a total of four posts in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean: Ashuapmouchouan, 
Chicoutimi, Métabetchouan (or Lake St. John), and Pointe Bleue (Mashteuiatsh). As a result 
of internaI competition within the HBC and, in the case of Chicoutimi, the massive influx of 
Euro-Canadians, the first two posts rapidly lost impOltance to the Innu economy.26 Although 
Métabetchouan remained open until 1879, Mashteuiatsh quickly became the center of the 
HBC's operations in the region following its establishment in 1866.27 This final post owed its 
longevity (it would continue to operate through the middle of the twentieth century) to the 
fact that it was situated on the reserve at Pointe Bleue, making it convenient for the HBC's 
Innu trading partners. 28 
As elsewhere in the Canadian subarctic, the fur trade in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean 
relied on a beaver-based currency of account at the beginning of the period. Due to the 
26 Métabetchouan provided competition to Chicoutimi while the company's post at Mistassini did the 
same for Ashuapmouchouan. The HBC closed this second post, approximately 90 miles up the 
Ashuapmouchouan River From Lac SI. Jean, in 1850 due to its small clientele (it served no more than 
eight families). For the post's history, see J. Allan Burgesse, 'The Unwanted Post," Canadian 
Historieal Review, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1947), p. 401-10. As early as 1831, a company employee 
described Chicoutimi as "a very pleasant and comfortable place, but trifling in the fur trade." Richard 
Rae to James Bargrave, 18 October 1831, in G.P. de T. Glazebrook (ed.), The Hargrave 
Correspondence, 1821-1843, Toronto, Champlain Society, 1938, p. 78-9. By 1851, the post had 
become primariiy dedicated to the transshipment of merchandise to and From interior posts and in 1856 
the HBC abandoned the post. Although it reopened Chicoutimi in 1863, the post had by that time long 
since lost the major role that it had previously played in the Innu economy. Bouchard, Le Saguenay des 
fourrures, p. 229-30. 
27 On Métabetchouan, see Michelle Guitard, Des foz/l'nlres pour le Roi au poste de Métabetehouan, 
Lac Saint-Jean, Quebec, Ministère des Affaires cullurelles, 1984. 
28 In fact, the company established the post in direct response to a petition it received from eight Innu 
men asking the HBC to open a post on their new reserve because "the present Post at Metebatchouan is 
too far from the Rivers, on the north side of the Lake, that many of us are accustomed to hunt in and 
especially during win ter; when the navigation is closed the present Post is very difficult to access and 
for many of us who leave our families in the woods to come down for a supply of provisions it takes us 
a long time to reach Metebatchouan." Luke Simeon, et al., to Edward Hopkins, 12 October 1866, 
LAC, RGlO, vol. 10263, file 377/32-2-5-7, reel T-7555. The Department of Indian Affairs accorded 
the HEC permission to open a post on 6 December 1866. Newton Flanagan to James Bisset, 20 March 
1876, ibid. 
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historie and contemporaneous French presence in the region, upon its merger with the 
Northwest Company the HBC referred to this money as the castor rather than as the made 
beaver. 29 Although the company's records are unclear, it would appear that at mid-century the 
Innu and the HBC traded at Métabetchouan based on a system of book debits and credits 
from which circulating media of exchange were absent. In spite of transactions that appear to 
be "pure barter," the exchange of furs for provisions alongside the sale of furs towards the 
repayment of book debt suggeststhat the Innu and the HBC evaluated ail exchange, 
\'egardless of its specifie form, in monetary terms. 30 Writing in 1857, David E. Priee, the 
eldest son and a partner of William Price in addition to being the self-appointed Indian agent 
for the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, notcd that the HBC continued to use the castor 
cunency at its Métabetchouan post. Through its accounting practices and this purely abstract 
monetary form, the company established creditor-debtor relations with its clientele, thereby 
encouraging the sale offurs and the pUl'chase ofmerchandise. 31 Price asserted that this system 
29 At the time of the merger, the HBC drew up a series of lists using the castor currency to express the 
amount of debt owed the company by Innu hunters at the King's Posts. For examples from posts in the 
Lac St. Jean region, see K.K. Murchison[?], "List of debts due by Indians who frequent 
Ashwabmouson to the Hudson's Bay Company, 1822," 3 October 1822, HBCA, E.20/l, f. 213-4, l'eel 
4M 127 and Charles Jordan, "List of the debts due by the Indians at the Post on Lake Saint Johns," 7 
October 1822, in Ibid, f. 215. 
30 For example, the Métabetchouan post journal contains the following entries pertaining to "barter": 
"A canoe arrived in the afternoon from Ashwn. they left immediately with 3 Bags of Flour & Y2 
Cuvt.[?] Shot[?]." Monday, 8 October 1849, HBCA, B.l1I/aJ2, f. 23v, reel 1M70 and "Pierre Chemish 
traded a Beaver & Lynx Skin for Flour and left." Thursday, 5 February 1852, HBCA, B.l1I/a/4, f. 9v, 
reel IM70. However, the journals a1so note debt-based exchange: "Traded the hunts of Joseph Sr. & 
Joseph JUill. this forenoon the former paid his debt the latter nearly so." Monday Il October 1852, 
HBCA, B.IIl/a/4, f. 18v, reel 1M70, "Simeonish[?] arrived in the evening and traded his hunt he paid 
his debt." Wednesday 13 October 1852, HBCA, B.IIl/a/4, f. 18v, reel IM70, and "Agapie & Son 
Laurent arrived last evening they traded their hunts this morning, both paid their debts, they left 
inunediately afterwards." Thursday, 19 May 1853, HBCA, B.III/a/4, f. 27v, reel 1M70. 
31 "Many owe large amounts to the Company, others less, and some of the best hunters have large 
amounts at their credits." David E. Price to [?], 14 November 1857, Appendix No. II in Canada, 
"Report of the Special Commissioners Appoioted on the 8th of September, 1856, to Investigate 1ndian 
Affairs in Canada," in Joumals of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix 21, Toronto, 
Stewart Derbishire and George Desbarats, 1858. 
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of carrying on its business allowed the HBC to fleece its Innu trading partners through the 
conscious manipulation of the value of its in-house currency. 
The Company here trade by 'castors' which they change in value to suit their own 
purposes, from six pence to 2s. 6d., so that no one but the Clerk knows what he 
values them at; as for instance, one day a 'castor' represents Y. lb. of powder and 
next day 1 lb. The Indian sel1s his furs for so many castors, and more he gets the 
more value he fancies he has obtained for his furs, but as the value of the castor is 
changed to suit the Company's purpose the pOOl' Indian is 'taken-in' without his 
being aware of it. 
Apparently because of the castor's proprietary nature and the power that this provided HBC 
employees when selling merchandise and purchasing furs, Price asserted that this technique 
for encouraging monopolistic over free market exchange prevented the Innu from leaming to 
appreciate "real" money: "They do not know the value of money but in few instances.,,32 
Although the HBC proved resilient in its use of the made beaver in Saguenay-Lac 
St. Jean, settlement challenged its dominance in the region and, therefore, its ability to 
maintain a proprietary system of money. In contrast to earlier periods, competition in the 
mid-nineteenth century did not come from rival fur companies but from independent 
colonists, who either themselves trapped furs or acted as middlemen, and the region's large 
timber interests, particularly William Price and Company.)) Unlike the situation in Rupert's 
Land, the HBC did oot possess a monopoly on exporting furs from Canada, which made their 
operations in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean vulnerable to both small and large competitors who 
could sell to either the merchant-furriers of Quebec City and Montreal or to the HBC itsele4 
This competition, however, most frequently operated as a sideline to other economic 
32 Ibid. 
33 For example, an 1849 govemment report notes that the HBC "compIain that the Lumberers, as weIl 
as the settIers carry on an extensive trade with the Indians to the great prejudice of the Compy & the 
demoraIization of the Indians." T.B., "Hudson's Bay Compy at the King's Posts," 5 September 1849, 
BANQ-Q, Ministère des Terres et forêts, E 21/5, 2Bü8-14ÜIA, Report Book, no. l, C.E., September 
1847 to May 1851, #294, p. 263-4. 
34 Guitard, Des fourrures pour le Roi ... , p. 155-7 and 191. 
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activities practiced by individuals or companies, providing them with benefits at virtually no 
35
additional COSt. 
Such pressure, whether from colonists or timber companies, altered the form of the 
HBC's monetary regime. Unsurprisingly, this system first underwent complete 
transformation at Chicoutimi. By 1849, if not before, the post at Chicoutimi began keeping its 
books in Halifax (provincial) currency suggesting that state-backed money had replaced its 
private counterpart in the trade along the Saguenay.36 By the late 1850s, in accord with the 
general movement towards the use of decimal currency in the Canadas, the HBC had 
switched monetary notation once again at the post, this time in favor of the dollar system.}? 
The company's post at Métabetchouan began accepting cash on a limited basis, apparently 
from Euro-Canadians alone, beginning in the mid-1840s. 38 However, the post records clearly 
35 However, in at least one instance, William Price and Company dedicated resources in order to 
directly challenge the HBC's trade with the Innu. In 1853, the company sent an Abenaki named Pierre 
Antoine to open a trading post on the shores of Lac St. Jean at the mouth of the Ashuapmouchouan 
RiveL "Pierre[?] Antoine an Abenakie Indian who is empd. by 1 believe MI. Price to trade with the 
Indians arrived this forenoon at ML Prices Establishment upon opposite side of the River, with a Barge 
belonging to that Establishment full of Goods, Provs. &c." Tuesday, 1 November 1853, HBCA, 
B.IIl/a/4, f. 331', reel lM70. "Pierre Antoine started his [?] for the entrance of the River 
Ashuapn.[Ashuapmushuan] where 1 understand he is to winter and to cheat the Ashun. Indians as 
much as he possibly can." Saturday, 5 November 1853 in Ibid. Unfortunately, no detailed records 
conceming this foray into the fur trade have been found and therefore it is impossible to determine its 
monetary impact. Regardless, the competition offered by Price and Company proved to be short-lived 
and by 1863 it had becorne one of the HBC's main clients at Métabetchouan. Guitard, Des fourntres 
pour le Roi ... , p. 191-2. 
36 Halifax currency employed pound notation. "Day Book," HBCA, B.36/b/l, f. 7-26, reel IM175. 
Although primarily dedicated to the Euro-Canadian trade by this period, sorne Innu hunter-trappers 
(e.g. Bazil Jr., Patapish, and François Lake St. Johns) traded at Chicoutimi. Thus, the changed 
monetary system affected the Innu. 
37 Because of the document's informai nature - it appears to have been used as a means of keeping 
daily accounts before transferring the numbers to formai account books and thus generally only lists 
the day and the mon th (without the year) - the Chicoutimi "Day Book" does not make entirely clear 
when this change took place. However, by 1859, the post had changed to dollar notation. "Day Book," 
HBCA, B.36/b/I, f. 20v-26, reellMl75. 
38 The post's Day Book lists a handful of cash sales made during August 1845. However, given the 
post's standard practice of listing the name of Innu hunter-trappers for ail transactions in which they 
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state neither the quantity nor the specifie use the HBC made ofmoney.39 While the HBC had 
begun occasionally making small cash payments at Métabetchouan by the second half of the 
1850s, this money went to Euro-Canadians alone prior to the early 1860s.40 
While the HBC, recognizing non-proprietary money as a threat to its standing in the 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean fur trade, attempted to restrict the use of abstract and physical 
cunency that it did not itself control for as long as possible, the Innu, also aware of money's 
potential power, sought to increase their access to cash. Despite the HBC's preeminent raie in 
the region from the 1830s, Amerind ians actively contributed to the downfall of the castor 
monetary system. This is particularly obvious in the use of abstract accounting currency. 
Beginning in the mid-1840s, the HBC post at Métabetchouan kept Innu accounts either in 
castor or in Halifax currency. The hunter-trappers appear to have decided themselves which 
money of account was used as each individual's sales and purchases were always recorded in 
the same units.41 Through the 1850s, the number of Innu trading in provincial currency 
were involved, these sales were most likely made to non-Natives. 2,3,6, and 15 August 1845, HBCA, 
B.lli/d/l,reel IM506, f. 37v-38v and 40r-41r. Furthermore, the post's ledger for Outfits 1846 and 
1847, giving individualized accounts for a1l hunter-trappers (whether Aboriginal or Euro-Canadian) 
trading at Métabetchouan, makes no mention of Innu cash purchases. HBCA, B.I 11/d/2, reel 1MS06. 
By 1849, among its regular compliment of hunter-trappers, the HBC made cash sales to Euro­
Canadians alone. See for example, the purchases made by Joseph Verreaux, 6 June 1849, HBCA, 
B.l11/d/3, reel IM506, f. 20r. 
39 In 1854, the post manager wrote: "1 started this morning for Chicoutimi, to bring up the Cash left 
there by Mr. Stewart." Thursday, 6 April 1854, HBCA, B.lll/a/4, f. 39v, ree.1 IM70. 
40 The HBC paid cash to Moyse Beaulieu, a French Canadian, in 1856 and 1857. 27 October 1856 and 
15 August 1857, HBCA, B.ll1/d/lla, f. 41' and Sr reellM506. 
41 For example, du ring Outfits 1846 and 1847, the transactions made by Agapie Sr. and Laurent 
Agapie were always recorded in pound notation whereas the transactions of nearly every other Innu 
were kept in Made Beaver. HBCA, B.ll1/d/2, reel IM506. However, one account book, which 
contains Iists of "lndian balances" and "Freemen's balances" at the beginning of Outfits 1847 through 
1849 at Métabetchouan, lists Agapie Sr.'s and Laurent Agapie's balances in dollar notation, suggesting 
that these Innu may have traded in either Halifax currency, dollars, or both. HBCA, B.IIl/d/5, reel 
1M506, f. 101', 201', and 30r. Ali of the "freemen" - that is, Euro-Canadians - traded in provincial 
currency rather than either the castor or dollars. Ibid, f. 10v, 20v, and 30v. 
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slowly grew, until, by the begilliling of the following decade, the HBC accounted for ail of its 
business in the region in dollars.42 
Begilliling at this point the HBC provided the Illilu economy with a significant 
amount of cash. In 1862, only two years after what was apparently the first monetary 
payment made to an Innu at Métabetchouan, Etienne Jourdain received $30 from the HBC, or 
one-quarter of what the average Innu hunter-trapper earned annually from the company 
whether in goods or in currency.43 From the middle of the 1860s through at 1east the midd1e 
of the 1870s, the amount of money that an "average" Illilu hunter-trapper might make 
annually from the HBC varied wi1d1y, but in genera1 remained relatively small, ranging from 
slightly more than $2 to $13. However, once the outliers are removed from the data set,44 this 
"average" individual eamed roughly $8 in cash annually, a1though this sum might double in a 
good year.45 However, this method of analysis obscures as much as it illuminates. For 
example, the higher average cash payments that the HBC made in 1872 when compared to 
other outfits during the early 1870s was primarily due to several individuals receiving greater 
42 The first accounting entries in dollars from the Métabetchouan post "Day Book" date to 1856. 
HBCA, B.III/dilla, reel IM506. However, systematic accounting in decimal currency alone at the 
post did not begin until 1860. HBCA, B.III/di12a, reel IM506. 
43 30 December 1862, HBCA, B.III/dlI5b, f.25r reel IM507. The aIUlual average income, $120, is 
that of the Innu trading at Pointe Bleue during the HBC's 1866 and 1867 outfits. HBCA, B.329/d/l, 
reel IM575. The first trace found of an Innu having been paid in cash by the HBC at Métabetchouan is 
from December 1860, when the company paid Bazil Junior $1 for furs. 28 December 1860, HBCA, 
B.lll/dlI2b, reel IM507, f. 15r. The following year François Jourdain received $2 for furs and, in 
1863, the HBC paid Luke $1 in cash. 7 July 1861, HBCA, B.IIl/d/l2a, f. 93v, reel IM507 and 1 
November 1863, HBCA, B.1Il/dlI4b, f. 105v, reel IM507. 
44 For example, in Outfit 1866, the HBC paid Etienne a total of $97.03 in cash for his furs. Although 
he also earned a relatively substantial amount of currency during the foJlowing year ($30), the size of 
the payment he received in 1866 was certainly anomalous. HBCA, B.329/clJl, reel IM575. In order to 
diminish the standard deviation, thereby augmenting the reliability of resulting average, the highest 
and lowest sums of currency earned by any Innu during the outfits in question (1866, 1867, and 1870 
through 1873) were not used when calculating the average. 
45 The "standard" years for which data has been analyzed include 1867, 1870, 1871, and 1873. The 
average significantly increased to approx imately $11 in 1872 and rose to roughly $15 in 1866. HBCA, 
B.329/dll, reellM575 and 8.329/dl5, IM575. 
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amounts in cunency than in other years. The highest eamer in 1872, Prospère Cleary, eamed 
nearly twice as much in monetary payments as he did for Outfits 1870, 1871, and 1873 
combined.46 In addition to C1eary, three other Innu hunter-trappers (François Jourdain, Peter 
of Ashuapmouchouan, and Charles Canot) made significantly more in cash payments in 1872 
than in any other year. However, by the late 1880s, one joumalist visiting the region 
(admittedly without having actually seen any Innu trade at the HBC post) claimed that, "the 
amount of good hard cash each Indian handles in the course of a year would hardly be 
enough to set up a safe-deposit company in business.,,47 This suggests that despite the 
relative1y good years that certain hunter-trappers experienced in the 1870s, most Innu drew 
only minor amounts of cash from their fur catch through the end of the 1880s. 
Even after the impOltation of the Canadian currency system, however, Saguenay­
Lac St. Jean's population continued to make use of local, informai debt - whether 
transferable or not. In addition to its official, state-issued physical form (notes and coins), the 
Canadian dollar circulated as drafts and "bons" - that is, handwritten and signed notes 
48
acknowledging a monetary obligation on the part of the issuer to the holder. The HBC used 
this method of payment as it had traditionally used book debt to earn profit from both the 
purchase of furs and the sale goods. However, the frequency with which the HBC issued 
49
circulating credit in the form of bons appears to have diminished during the period. At the 
same time, the company occasionally collaborated with William Price and Company, by then 
46 In 1872, the HBC paid Cleary $135.65, whereas he made a total of $83.80 in the other three years. 
HBCA, B.329/clJ5, IM575. 
47 William Drysdale, "Montagnais Indian Life," New York Times, 25 August 1889, n.p. 
48 For the HBC, drafts provided a simple means of providing payment for individuals elsewhere than at 
a local post. For examp1e, the post manager at K1étabetchouan ordered payment of a surveyor at 
Chicoutimi. Simon Ross, Draft for $30.00 for P. Dumais, 5 January 1876, HBCA, B.36/zl2, f. 4, reel 
IM1657. For other examples of drafts and "bons" from the mid-1870s, see HBCA, B.36/zl2, reel 
lM 1657. For a list of drafts drawn at Métabetchouan on Chicoutimi, sorne payable to Innu, see HBCA, 
B.III/d/4, reel IM506, f. 44v-45v. 
49 For a rare example of this form of payment, made for $34.16 to Charles Robertson in 1861 see, 29 
May 1861, HBCA, B.II1/clJI2a, f. 63v, ree11M507. 
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one of the HBC's chief clients in the region, perhaps in order to prevent its llU1u trading 
partners from paying cash to the company's rivais. 50 Thus, at least during the 1860s and 
1870s, private forms of transferable debt continued to provide the HBC with an effective 
means oflimiting the llU1u's ability to conduct business elsewhere than at its posts. 
Of course, the HBC also continued to employ purely abstl'act, book-based money in 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean. This preference for cl'editing llU1u accounts rather than purchasing 
furs with cash arose, as it did throughout the subarctic, from two overlapping factors. First, 
through the use of a pure system of book credits and debits, the HBC stood to make a profit 
both on its fur purchases and its sale of goods and provisions. Second, the HBC recognized 
that the use of freely circulating and universally accepted monetary instruments threatened its 
position in that Amerindian hunter-trappers armed with cash might take their consumer 
business elsewhere. 51 However, because of the uncel'tain nature ofhunts from one year to the 
next, the HBC was never capable of imposing a pure credit-for-furs system. If the company 
wished to prevent Amerindians from tuming to the competition while keeping them hunting 
for saleable furs rather than for sul'vival, especially following poor years when a hunter's 
retums alone would not permit him to outfit for the following season, it was often forced to 
se1l goods on credit. In spite of its dual desil'e to conduct trade using only abstract monetary 
means and to l'etain its clientele, the HBC frequently felt that the dangers of allowing its 
Aboriginal clients to purchase merchandise on credit (unpaid debt and the corresponding 
50 In 1868, the company paid Priee & Co. $10, subtracting the amount from that Ihe HBC owed 
Thomas Bacon. Il November 1868, HBCA, B.329/c1/17, f. 9r, reel IM575. By 1863, Priee and 
Company had become one of the HBC's main clients al Métabetchouan. Guitard, Des fournires pour 
le Roi... , p. 191-2. 
51 This practice aimed al the maxirnization of "overplus" - that is, the difference between the HBC's 
official valuation of furs, on the one hand, and provisions and goods, on the other. By selling 
rnerchandise at higher rates than those given in official HBC instructions, along with the purchase of 
furs at lower priees, managers could add to their post's profits. With the advent of cash payments, 
Amerindian hunter-trappers were no longer captive consumers. As a result, the HBC lost, at least to 
sorne extent, one of its traditional forms of profit. On overplus, see Ray and Freeman, "Give Us Good 
Measure", p. 52, 66-7, 93-5, and 203-17. 
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drain on profitability) outweighed the benefits (increased profits due to a captive clientele).52 
Even though the Innu were, in the words of their Indian agent, "honorable in paying their 
debts," the company had stopped extending credit at its Lac St. Jean posts by the late 1870s.53 
James Bissett, the HBCs chief factor at Montreal, asserted that because the company no 
longer needed to underwrite unpaid advances, it could "afford to sell goods cheaper than 
when giving them out on credit.,,54 Although this change in policy proved untenable and had 
been definitively abandoned by the end of the following decade, the HBCs practice of 
refusing credit most likely played a pali in the decision of certain Innu to employ cash when 
paying for a portion of the merchandise they purchased at Mashteuiatsh. 55 However, such 
cash expenditure remained marginal, most likely because the Innu sought hard currency in 
order to make purchases from retailers who, unlike the HBC, did not deal in book 
credits/debits. 
By the 1880s, the company's managers realized that currency had become a 
permanent part of its business with the Innu. From this point, the question changed from 
52 Although the HBC had always viewed credit as "a necessary evil," they were rarely able to 
discontinue it completely. For a brief discussion of credit in a region bordering Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, 
see Daniel Francis and Toby Morantz, Partners in Furs: A History of the Fur Trade in Eastern lames 
Bay, 1600-1870, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1983, p. 51-3 and 123-4. 
53 L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 26 October 1878, in 1ndian AlJairs Annual Report, 
1878, p. 35. This comment echoes another, made over twenty years earlier, by David Priee: "they [the 
Innu] are generally striclly honest that they return with their furs to the trading posts, where they 
received advances." David E. Priee to [?], 14 November 1857, Appendix No. Il in Canada, lournals 
of the Legislative Assembly, Sessional Papers, Appendix 21, "Report of the Special Commissioners 
Appointed on the 8th of September, 1856, to Investigate Indian Affairs in Canada," Toronto, Stewart 
Derbishire and George Desbarats, 1858. 
54 James Bissett to Newton Flanagan, 22 September 1879, HBCA, B.llllc/2, reel IMBn. 
55 The earliest cash sales found at Pointe Bleue date [rom 1883. For examples, see the sales made in 
June 1883 to Oid Philip, David Philip, Charles Jourdain, Charles Robertson, George Metabeg, and 
Bazil Ousinithlon HBCA, B.329/a/2, reellMlO18, f. 211'-261'. 
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56
whether to use money to how best to control it. By the end of that decade, the HBC had 
once more begun extending credit to Innu hunter-trappers at Mashteuiatsh. Moreover, the 
company provided a pOition of this credit in cash, something that it had not previously done. 
In 1890, the inspector for the HBC's Saguenay District described the potentially hazardous 
outcome of this system. He asserted that cash advances to the Innu constituted a very real risk 
to the company's bottom-line, "especially in this District where such inducements are held 
out [by competitors] to Indians to be dishonest." However, he agreed with the post manager 
at Mashteuiatsh who felt that, "the effect of abolishing ail cash advances to Indians would be 
disastrous, and l have no doubt that to a celtain extent he is right, as they are bound to have 
cash, and if not supplied will keep back furs to obtain it from others.,,57 
This policy was clearly directed at securing Innu trade in what was proving to be a 
particularly challenging environment for the company. By the 1890s, colonization on the 
shores of Lac St. Jean had significantly increased the size of the region's Euro-Canadian 
population. The growth of towns in the inunediate vicinity of Mashteuiatsh created new 
outlets for sale of furs, apparently raising priees and injecting large amounts of money into 
the Innu economy.58 At the same time, retailers in these towns proved eager to sel! 
merchandise to Amerindians in exchange for cash. In 1898, lB. Ross, an HBC employee in 
the Saguenay district, informed the company's Pointe Bleue manager that, "the Indians on 
their way to this Post dispose of a great many furs for cash to the storekeepers.,,59 The HBC 
responded to its local cash-paying competition by dramatically increasing the amount of 
56 For a discussion of how to make the company's priees at Mashteuiatsh more competitive, thereby 
theoretically diminishing the amount of cash necessary in order to purchase furs, see lA. Wilson, 
"Post Report - Pointe Bleue," 18 October 1889, HBCA, B.329/e/2, reel lM 1258. 
57 P. McKenzie, "Inspection Report: Pointe Bleue Post, Saguenay District," 21 April 1890, HBCA, 
B.329/e/3, p. 14, reel IM1258. Emphasis in original. 
58 Unfortunately, none of these new fur traders left records of their activities. As a result, it is necessary 
to rely on statements made by HBC emp10yees which rare1y contain any quantitative information. 
59 Sunday, 29 May 1898, HBCA, B.329/a/4, ree11M1019, f. 9v. 
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currency it employed when purchasing furs from the Innu. On 31 May 1901 alone, the HBC 
post at Pointe Bleue paid Innu hunter-trappers at least $255.32 in cash (and perhaps as much 
as $389.14).60 
Thus, wide-scale colonization In Saguenay-Lac St. Jean altered the region' s 
monetary landscape by introducing new trading partners and currencies, while 
simultaneously pushing the HBC to retreat in the face of a booming settler population. As a 
result, the Innu integrated their economic activity into the networks imported and created by 
their new Euro-Canadian neighbors, in the process diminishing the economic and politica1 
power of the HBC. The slow creation of infrastructure - the markets and roads that were still 
largely lacking at mid-century - brought about changes in the region's monetary system. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, the Innu had free access to the Canadian dollar, both in its 
physical and abstract fonus, making use of it with both the HBC and its competitors. In this 
way, the Saguenay-Lac St. Jean Innu were no longer beholden to the company in the same 
way as they had previously been, thereby gaining at least a measure of economic and political 
independence. However, during the same period that the HBC's hold on the region and its 
Aboriginal population slipped, the state, primarily through the Department of Indian Affairs, 
became increasingly involved in the everyday lives of the Innu. G1 Thus, the shift from one 
monetary regime to another underscores the changing ways in which the British Empire and 
the young nation of Canada managed the territOlY to which they laid c1aim along with its 
inhabitants. 
GO The lower number represents the total number of cash payments made by the HBC where the 
recipient is clearly identified. The additional $133.82 included in the higher figure is the sum of cash 
payments made on the same day where the recipient is not identified. The HBC records identify six 
Innu as having shared the $255.32.31 May 1901, HBCA, B.329/a/4, reel IMIOI9, f. 25r-27r. 
61 For a study of the state's increasingly important raie in lnnu life, see Alain Beaulieu and Stéphanie 
Béreau, "'Voir par eux-mêmes à l'Administration de leurs propres affaires': Les Innus de 
Mashteuiatsh et l'implantation du Conseil de bande, 1881-1952," Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique 
française (forthcoming, personal communication). 
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Money-Use and Socioeconomic Stratification: The "Moditional Economy" and Class 
Formation in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh 
This section examines the process through which the socioeconomic landscape and 
money-use developed in tandem in nineteenth-century Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. Whereas 
the historiography, influenced to a greater extent by anthropology than sociology, emphasizes 
social cohesion while downp!aying stratification in Aboriginal Canada, this section argues 
that, particularly in the case of the Huron, the nineteenth century was transformative period 
for Amerindian communities as they underwent socioeconomic change that approximated 
those concurrently taking place among urban Euro-Canadians. It also claims that the local 
implementation of state policy directly contributed to sorne of these changes, particularly as a 
result of the legislative regulation of credit relations. However, the state did not dictate aU 
economic aspects of reserve Iife and, in fact, often proved oblivious to the ways in which 
market activity truly affected local money-use. While departmental officiais maintained the 
stereotype of Amerindian improvidence, nineteenth-century Innu and Huron, like their Euro­
Canadian neighbors, actively sought to improve their lives through economic activity. Again 
like their neighbors, Amerindians modified traditional activities in a variety of unique ways 
to participate in what John Lutz terms the "moditional economy.,,62 Lutz argues that 
Aboriginal economies in the post-contact era were neither purely capitalist or traditional nor 
were they a random assembly of elements that corresponded to one of these two logics alone. 
Rather, Amerindians engaged in activities that scholars have tended to label "Aboriginal" or 
"Western" by adhering to changing cultural prerogatives that favored social reproduction.63 
This section, then, claims that the state's discourse with regard to the unitary "improvident 
Indian" was largely divorced from the historical experience of the Huron and Innu during the 
62 For a well-known study that bath influenced Lutz and treats the Saguenay region during the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Gérard Bouchard, Quelques arpents d'Amérique: population, 
économieJamille au Saguenay, 1838-1971, Montreal, Boréal, 1996. 
63 John Sutton Lutz, Makûk: A New History of Aboriginal-White Relations, Vancouver, UBC Press, 
2008. 
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nineteenth century. Indeed, rather than being dependent on state assistance, the vast majority 
of the population ofthese two First Nations procured their living through market activity. 
"A love ofwork appears to befully developed": The Mixed Economy ofMoney Making 
This section addresses the various ways in which the Huron and Innu earned 
income during the nineteenth century in order to situate state discourse with respect to actual 
money-use. It concentrates on the local level, arguing that while high-Ievel debates, policy, 
and legislation partially structured money-use, the analysis of day-to-day income acquisition 
provides an effective means of comparing this discourse to material experience. Ultimately, 
this section argues that the officia] depiction of Aboriginal peoples as inherently improvident 
fails to account for the wide array of economic activities in which community members 
participated while earning revenue for themselves and their families. Furthermore, it 
underlines the incommensurability of authorities' discourse through its analysis of official 
sources that document the hard work in which Amerindians engaged. In ]893, for example, 
the Indian agent at Mashteuiatsh described for his superiors in Ottawa the variety of market 
activities in which the Innu participated: "Some of them till the land, while others 
manufacture canoes, which are in great demand at the fishing places. Sorne are also employed 
in the saw-mills of Roberval, but they generally prefer to engage as guides with the 
spolismen whenever they have the chance.,,64 While such mixed means of earning income did 
not necessarily favor capital accumulation, they did allow the Innu (and those Huron who 
similarly combined diverse sources of revenue) to maintain their sense of community while 
SUppoliing themselves materially. At the same time, this description also clearly demonstrates 
the energy Amerindians employed while participating in the market economy, underlining the 
extent to which the Departrnent's discourse diverged from its wards' experience. 
64 L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 26 August 1893, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 
1893, p. 33. 
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While, as discusscd in the preceding section, the Innu earned the vast majority of 
their revenue, monetary or otherwise, during the nineteenth century from the fur trade, the 
Huron economy grew increasingly dependent on proto-industrial production during the 
period. This burgeoning sector of the economy, dominated by the manufacture and sale of 
"souvenir art" and utilitarian goods based on traditional Aboriginal design, lay at the heart of 
Wendake's socioeconomic stratification.65 Although the Huron, like other First Nations, had 
long produced such objects for their own use, by the end of the nineteenth century 
commercialization had propelled this activity to the fore front of Wendake's economy, in the 
process creating important class divisions between a small economic elite and a much larger 
working class. Members of two Huron familics, the PicardslVincents and the Bastiens, 
operated this industry, earning impressive amounts of money whiJe elevating their social 
standing among community members and the well-to-do residents of Quebec City alike. At 
the same time, these families provided a major source of employment to other band members. 
However, this sector of employment, whose health depended on regional, national, and 
international markets, proved volatile, and the increasing frequency of massive layoffs as the 
century advanced contributed to periodic hardship among workers and their families. 
In the 1820s, this sector of the Huron economy produced a large quantity of goods 
which a guidebook published at the beginning of the following decade described as "bows 
and arrows, and moccasins very neatly finished by the Squaws.,,66 In 1836, the commissary 
general reported to the governor general of British North America that the Huron's "chief 
Employment consists in the Manufacture of Mocassins, Snow Shoes, &c. for the Quebec 
65 The term "souvenir art" is from Ruth B. Phillips, Trading ldentities: The Souvenir in Native North 
.(lmerican Art from the Northeast, 1700-1900, Seattle and Montréal, University of Washington Press 
and McGill-Queen's University Press, 1998. 
66 Appendix A in Lower Canada, Journal of the House of Assembly, Lower Canada, Quebec, John 
Neilson, 1824, n.p. and [James Pattison Cockburn], Quebec and its Environs: Being a Picturesque 
Guide to the Stranger, Quebec, n.p., 1831, p. 19. 
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Market, and in hunting and fishing.,,67 By the 1840s, if not before, Marguerite Vincent 
La8inonkié and her husband Paul Picard Honda80nhont, along with their nephew Philippe 
Vincent Téonouathasta and son François Xavier "Paul" Picard Tahourenché, had begun the 
first large-scale manufacturing business in the community.68 During the 1840s, the Picards 
69
conducted a profitable business with the British military and civilians alike. Among their 
customers, the Picards counted members of the colony's ruling elite, including Lord and 
Lady Elgin, the govemor's brother and military secretary, Robert Bruce, and the British 
70
anny's commander of Canada's eastem district, General Charles Stephen Gore. This 
patronage was made possible by Wendake's proximity to Quebec City, the Picards' high 
social standing, and their ability to receive these individuals in a style fitting their rank. 71 
During the 1850s, the Picards promoted and sold their goods at industrial exhibitions in 
67 R.J. Routh to the Earl of Gosford, 28 April 1836, in Great Britain, Copies or Extracts of 
Correspondence Since lst Aprili835.. , p. 39. Louis Juchereau Duchesnay echoed this comment later 
the same year when he wrote: "At Lorette, their principal means are in making & embrodering with 
camel hair and porcupine quills, shoes, mitts, [?] and many other articles; in making snow-shoes, 
hunting to a small extent and sorne in cultivating vegetable gardens & small tracts of land." Louis 
Juchereau Duchesnay, "Answers to Queries," 19 November 1836, LAC, RG 10, vol. 92, p. 37645-51, 
reel C-11468. 
68 Delâge, "La tradition de commerce ... ," p. 46. 
69 The Picards sold the army snowshoes manufactured by their employees. "Payé pour les raquettes du 
Gouvernement le 28 avril 1842 par le Commissaire Millikin." François Xavier (Paul) Picard 
Tahourenché, Journal (1837-1875),28 April 1842, ACNHW. A later entry in the same journal refers 
to "ML Millikin Commissaire Général." 17 July 1845 in ibid. For an example of sales made by 
François Xavier Picard, see François-Xavier Picard, Vente de l'été 1846, 1 November 1846[?], 
BANQ-Q, P883, S2, File 7. 
70 [Paul Picard?], List of debts owed to Paul Picard and Philippe Vincent, 29 March 1849[?], BANQ­
Q, P883, SI, File 1. 
71 Among Quebec City's elite, François Xavier Picard was known for his hospitality. As a result, he 
frequently received prestigious residents of the city in his home. "Reçu la visite du Lord, et Lady Elgin 
Colonel Bruce, sa dame, Capt HamiltonL] un autre Monsieur[,] Lord & Lady Warncliff[,] Lady 
Hamilton, et Lady Bruce, en ma demeure, le 24 Juin 1852, jour de la St. Jean Baptiste." François 
Xavier (Paul) Picard Tahourenché, Journal (J 837-1875),24 June 1852, ACNHW. 
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Quebec City and Montreal and at the Exposition Universelle in Paris.72 By the early 1870s, 
the period during which Philippe Vincent's son (also named Philippe) assumed responsibility 
for operations,73 the family proved able to ship 1,700 pairs ofmoccasins to a single customer. 
While such sales did not involve astronomical sums of money (in this case, each pair of 
women's moccasins sold for $0.10 whereas men's moccasins cost the buyer $0.13 per pair) 
the volume of this particular transaction and the acknowledgment that another item (men's 
overcoats) cost the same as the previous year suggest that the size of this exchange was not 
unusua1. 74 
Like the Picards, the Bastien family also successfully managed the manufacture of 
moccasins, snowshoes, and other "traditional" Amerindian goods. The firm that, by the 
1920s, would be known as Bastien Brothers began operations in Wendake under Maurice 
Bastien in 1876.75 At this early date, Bastien manufactured snowshoes alone. According to 
sociologist Léon Gérin, Bastien's son, Maurice Bastien Ahgnionlen "the second," had taken 
over the prospering business by the time of Gérin's visit to the Huron village in the 1890s. 
"Le petit atelier de fabrication de raquettes que lui avait transmis son père s'est 
singulièrement développé et diversifié entre ses mains." In addition to snowshoes, the 
Bastiens manufactured moccasins and tanned hides. 76 Although the family's business would 
72 The industrial exhibitions held in Quebec City and Montreal were held 1850 and the Paris exhibition 
took place in 1855. François Xavier (Paul) Picard Tahourenché, Journal (1837-1875), n.d. [September 
1851], ACNHW and Thomas Sterry Hunt, Le Canada et l'Exposition universelle de 1855, Toronto, 
n.p., 1856, p. 204-6. 
73 Philippe Vincent Téonouathasta died in J870. Delâge, "La tradition de commerce ... ," p. 46. 
However, by the mid-1880s, if not before, Vincent's son ran the business. Guillaume Giroux, Annual 
Report on the Agency at Lorette, n.d., in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1884, p. 35. 
74 François Xavier Picard to [?], 15 February 1872, BANQ-Q, P883, S2, File 7. 
7S The brochure con tains an error when it states that Maurice Bastien was "the Only Manufacturer in 
Indian Lorette in 1826." Tt should instead read "1926," the year in which it was printed. Bastien 
Brothers, Brochure: "The Cali ofIndian Lorette," n.d. [1926], ACNHW, E-4-66. 
76 Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 34-5. 
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later develop to sell its products through international wholesalers, during the late nineteenth 
century, Caroline Bastien, Maurice Bastien Ahgnionlen's daughter, traveled to the United 
States herself to sell the company's wares in the 1880s.77 
By the middle of the decade, the Picard (now headed by Philippe Vincent) and 
Bastien families had been joined by François Groslouis Sascenio in the manufacture of 
moccasins and snowshoes. 78 During these years, Wendake's missionary claimed that, "The 
trade in moccasins and snow shoes has made great advances, and has contributed to the 
prosperity of the village.,,79 However, by the end of the decade, Euro-Canadian competition 
in "Indian industries" had begun to adversely affect manufacturing in Wendake.80 By the 
rniddle of the 1890s, the Huron Indian agent, Antoine O. Bastien, reported that the industry's 
continued struggles, the result of a 50% drop in priees caused by a "depression in trade" and 
intense competition, 
forced sorne families to try a venture in the American republic. Fortunately, 
however, the demands of Ontario and the west have raised the state of affairs a 
little; the village was threatened with a regular emigration. This disaster was 
prevented through the efforts of some courageous men of the tribe, notably ML 
77 Maurice Bastien to L. W. Vankoughnet, Il July 1880, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2116, file 22,0 10, reel C­
11161. Until the very end of the nineteenth century, this practice had the added benefil of allowing the 
Bastiens to avoid paying import duties as a result of Caroline's Indian status. 
78 Guillaume Giroux, Annual Report on the Agency at Lorette, n.d., in Indian Ajfairs Annual Report. 
1884, p. 35-6. 
79 Guillaume Giroux, AnnuaJ Report on the Lorette Agency, 20 August 1883, Indian Ajfairs Annual 
Report, 1883, p. 28. 
80 In his 1888 annual report, the Indian agent wrote: "Trade, which until lately was prosperous, has 
now considerably decreased, and the lndians are consequently not in such good circumstances. The 
competition entered into by the whites in Indian industries has been the cause, to a certain extent, of 
this state of things." Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 August 1888, in 
Indian Ajfairs Annual Report, 1888, p. 28. Thomas Sioui, an inveterate political opponent of Bastien, 
echoed this sentiment: "depuis quelques annés[sic] les blancs se sont adonnés à la fabrication de tous 
ces articles et enlevé complètement cette industrie aux Sauvages qui ont perdu ainsi ce moyen de 
gagner leur vie." Petition from Thomas Tsioui, et al. to Lord Stanley de Preston, Governor General of 
Canada, 26 August 1889, LAC, RG la, vol. 6825, file 495-8-1, pt. 1, reel C-8545. 
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Maurice Bastien, jr., who, to the detriment of his own business, with the sole object 
of assisting his compatriots, continued to give work to farnilies in the village and to 
prevent their leaving the country.81 
The Indian agent considered the prospects of a lasting revival in the industry grim because 
"half of it has now passed into the hands of speculators, who trade on the margin of 
abatement on these articles which, however, do not lose any of their quality or actual 
value.,,82 During this period the most serious threat to the Huron industry appears to have 
come from Euro-Canadian tanneries that, along with Bastien, dominated the supply of raw 
materials for moccasin and snowshoe production. By the turn of the century, Cloutier, a 
Canadien who had married a widow from the Sioui family, and Henry Ross, a merchant of 
Scottish origin who had recently acquired Philippe Vincent's business, constituted the 
Huron's primary competition in tanning, as weil as snowshoe and moccasin manufacturing. 
However, Bastien owned by far the largest such operation in Wendake.83 
At the very end of the 1890s, the industry experienced a dramatic rebirth as a result 
of the demand for snowshoes and moccasins brought about by the Klondike gold rush. In 
1898, the Indian agent at Wendake claimed that, "there are manufactured in the Huron 
village, no less than seven thousand pairs of snowshoes, and at least twelve thousand dozen 
pairs of moccasins, representing a general business of from $70,000 to $75,000.,,84 Léon 
Gérin agreed, estimating that in the late nineteenth century the industry in Wendake used 
10,000 to 15,000 hides each year in the production of approximately 140,000 pairs of 
81 Of course, this report may have been overly flatteling with regard to Maurice Bastien Ahgnionlen, 
given that he was the agent's brother. Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 
August 1895, in indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1895, p. 31-2. 
82 ibid. See also Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 16 July 1896, in 1ndian 
AfJairs Annual Report, 1896, p. 42. 
83 During the 1890s, three tanneries operated either within Wendake or in its immediate vicinity. Two 
of them were owned by Euro-Canadians (Ross and Cloutier) and the third was owned by Maurice 
Bastien Ahgnionlen. Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 33-5. 
84 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 22 July 1898, in indian AfJairs Annual 
Report, 1898, p. 45. 
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moccasms and 7,000 paIrS of snowshoes.85 In comparison, one of the largest shoe 
manufacturers in the province, Ames-Holden of Montreal, produced two million pairs of 
shoes annually in 1921.86 Thus, the roughly 150,000 pairs of moccasins that the agent 
claimed Wendake produced during the Klondike boom years woul.d appear to have placed 
Huron manufacturers in the company of the province's largest footwear firms during the late 
nineteenth century. Bastien produced the largest quantity of snowshoes and moccasins (over 
half of the total value according to the Indian agent) while Philippe Vincent's company (the 
former Picard operation, purchased by Henry Ross following Vincent's December 1897 
death) also manufactured a large amount. 
White Huron entrepreneurs apparently made large profits from their products, their 
employees earned significantly less income. Despite this unsurprising discrepancy, 
wageworkers in Wendake appear to have earned more than at least sorne of their Euro­
Canadian neighbors. During the 1890s, the women who produced moccasins for any one of 
the companies in Wendake eamed between $0.25 and $0.30 for every dozen pairs they 
completed. Thus, according to Gérin, they were able to make between $0.30 and $0.50 per 
day when working entirely by hand or twice as much when employing a sewing machine. As 
a result of this difference in income, many Huron women had invested in this technology by 
the tum of the twentieth century.87 However, white the Klondike boom in moccasin and 
snowshoe production provided jobs and insured the continued existence of "the mother 
industry of our village of Lorette," the Indian agent wrote that this upturn increased neither 
the workers' wages nor the owners' profits to any meaningful extent.88 Regardless, the wages 
85 Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 36-7. 
86 John Dickinson and Brian Young, A Short History of Quebec, 4th ed., Montreal and Kingston, 
McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008, p. 214-5. 
87 Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 34. 
88 Bastien explains this by pointing out "the considerable rise in the value of leather and raw skins; for 
example, the raw skins which formerly were worth from $4 to $5 per 100 lbs. have risen to from $9 to 
$10." Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 22 July 1898, in Indian AfJairs Annual 
Report, 1898, p. 45. 
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eamed by the companies' employees proved significant enough to entice French Canadians 
from neighboring St. Ambroise Parish to join the Huron in producing moccasins, although 
only two had acquired the skills needed to manufacture snowshoes. Thus, by the t\.lm of the 
twentieth century, Gérin felt that a new factory system had supplanted the older putting-out 
model in the production of Huron "artisanal" goods, in the process significantly altering the 
village's work environment. "À l'ancien petit atelier familial s'est substitué l'atelier collectif 
sous la direction de patrons étrangers à la famille ouvrière.,,89 In other words, a new, class­
based hierarchy had replaced the older, informai system of production. 
In strictly monetary terms, the Indian agent claimed that this newfound growth 
greatly benefited the Huron. At the height of the Klondike boom, Bastien reported that, 
During the past year, thanks to the improvement in the local industry, the Huron 
tribe has enjoyed a condition superior to that of the last few years. Money has 
circulated more than usual, but the lack of work du ring the last few years placed a 
good many in distress, and forced them to run into debt for maintenance and 
provisions which they have not yet liquidated. l have observed that generally they 
have acted with strict economy in order to retrieve the past, and to be ready to face 
the possibilities of the future. A love of work appears to be fully developed, and 
assures the advancement both intellectually and materially of the Huron tribe. 90 
Of course, at least sorne of those Huron who were "forced ... to run into debt" borrowed from 
Bastien as a rcsult of his illicit on-reserve retailing activity. Regardkss, this manufacturing 
gold rush proved short-lived, with the agent writing the following year that, "The enthusiasm 
of last year, which made these Indians imagine that their suceess would continue, partieularly 
blinded their foresight, and this year, compared with last year, the making of snowshoes and 
moccasins was nearly nil.,,91 This underlines the increasing centrality of moccasin and 
89 Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 37. 
90 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 22 July 1898, in lndian A//airs Annual 
Report, 1898, p. 45. 
91 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 July 1899, in lndian Affairs Annual 
Report, 1899, p. 50. 
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snowshoe manufacturing to the reserve economy and the very real damage to general Huron 
wellbeing that any downturn in this industry could inflict. 
In addition to moccasins and snowshoes, the Huron also manufactured, on a 
markedly smaller scale and with less economic impact, "fancy wares" for sale in Wendake, to 
wholesalers in urban areas, and to tourists in the northeastern United States and at the 
"watering holes" along the lower St. Lawrence (e.g. Malbaie, Cacouna, and Rivière du 
Loup)92 Although its recovery lagged behind that of Wendake' s production and sale of 
moccasins and snowshoes, the souvenir art industry also rebounded by the end of the 
nineteenth centUlY. In the same year that the more industrial production reaped the rewards of 
the Klondike, the Indian agent at Wendake wrote that souvenir art manufacturing "was not so 
remunerative, and the opinion at the end of the season was that it will be stilliess so this year. 
The squaws, who work in ash wood and sweet hay, not having had time during the winter to 
prepare as large a supply as usual, went to the watering places without much stock in hand." 
While hard economic times negatively affected this industry, it also suffered as a result of the 
United States' decision to revoke Canadian Amerindians' immunity from customs fees, in the 
process imposing a "ruinous duty on these articles.,m In spite of these obstacles, the Huron 
labor that had been eliminated by the massive post-Yukon decrease in snowshoe and 
moccasin production contributed to the following year's threefold increase in revenue from 
the sale of "fancy wares." According to the Indian agent, this happy coincidence, along with 
the newly introduced production of canvas canoes, saved Wendake's economy from what 
would have otherwise been a devastating loss of revenue. "Had it not been for the 
introduction into the village of a new work, the making of canvas canoes, many families 
would have found themselves in discouraging want.,,94 Regardless, throughout the period this 
92 Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 32. 
93 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 22 July 1898, in lndian AfJairs Annual 
Report, 1898, p. 45. 
94 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 July 1899, in lndian AJJairs Annual 
Report. 1899, p. 50. 
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industry supplied markedly less incorne to the Huron than the production of moccasins and 
snowshoes. 
White rnanufacturing of "traditional" goods provided the majority of Wendake's 
residents with monetary income during the nineteenth century, not ail community members 
benefitted from this development to the same extent. As a result, this industry contributed to 
significant socioeconomic stratification. For example, the money generated by manufacturing 
provided the members of the Bastien and PicardNincent families with the means of elevating 
their social status through access to education and white-cailar jobs. For example, Prosper 
Vincent, one of Philippe Vincent Téonouathasta's sons, became a Catholic priest in 1870 and 
had become a vicar by the turn of the twentieth century.95 In 1876, the provincial Department 
of Colonization and Mines hired Paul Picard, the son of François Xavier Picard Tahourenché, 
as a draughtsman and surveyor, a position that he held through at least 1888.96 At the same 
time, Picard exercised the office of notary public.97 Also during the 1880s, Picard 
occasionally worked as a consultant for the federal Department of Justice. In 1885, he 
received $3 per day for the time he provided information ("renseignements"), $4 per day 
when called upon testify in court, and $10 for a detailed map of the former seigneuries in the 
region of Quebec City.98 This form of upward social mobility appears to have been restricted 
to members ofthose families that dominated Wendake's manufacturing sector. 
95 Léon Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il s'est transformé," in Denis Vaugeois (ed.), Les 
Hurons de Lorette, Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 1996, p. 55. 
96 According to his application for life insurance, Picard had been employed by Quebec as 
"Government Employee Draughtsman" since 1876. Paul Picard, Application for a Policy, Union 
Mutual Life Insu rance Company, 26 April 1888, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 7. 
97 Madame Veuve P. Picard to 1. Prévost, 12 September 1905, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, File 5. Picard's 
profession is listed as "Notaire" in Copie d'une convention de vente remerée de Paul Picard à Cyrille 
Tessier, 6 June 1888, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, file 3. 
98 ln total, the Department of Justice paid Picard $79.50 for his consulting work and services as an 
expert witness. H. Cyria Pelletier, Moneys Owed to Paul Picard by the Department of Justice, n.d. [20 
July 1886] and George W. Burbidge to Paul Picard, 27 July 1886, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 14. 
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Although manufacturing dominated Wendake's economy during the nineteenth 
century, the Huron were always able to earn revenue from other activities as weil. For 
example, conununity members continued to hunt and trap through the tum of the twentieth 
century even if their work in this sector generated much less revenue and occupied far fewer 
community members than among the Innu. Between the 1820s and the end of the century, 
nearly every male band member participated in at least one of the two seasonal hunts (autunm 
or spring) and many fished during the sununer, although not necessarily in the hopes of 
selling their catch. However, as time went by the number of Huron who earned the majority 
of their income from hunting or trapping decreased. Between 1871 and 1891, the percentage 
of adult male community members who declared hunting to be their primary occupation fell 
from 37.5% to 14%, largely as a result ofslumping fur prices. 99 Wendake's primary industry, 
the production of moccasins and snowshoes, appears to have absorbed the majority of these 
men into its workforce. By this point, Huron hunter-trappers sold their skins, almost certainly 
for cash alone, directly to the furriers of Quebec City, including Laliberté, Renfrew, Pâquet, 
and Vermette. Several Huron also engaged in the moose hunt in order to supply artisans in 
Wendake with their valuable hides, aga in most likely receiving payment in hard currency.lOO 
99 Jocelyn Tehatarongnantase Paul, "Le terrItoIre de chasse des Hurons de Lorette," Recherches 
amérindiennes au Québec, vol. 30, no. 3 (2000), p. 8. This percentage actually grew between 1871 and 
1881, when it stood at 42%. However, the fur market dropped substantially during the 1880s. In 1888, 
the Indian agent wrote: "They have had very !ittle success this year in hunting and fishing; beaver has 
been very scarce and it is the most profitable fur. Marten and mink, however, have been plentiful, but 
the price at which the fur of those animais is sold is very low." Antoine o. Bastien, Report on the 
Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 August 1888, in lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1888, p. 28. Beginning in 
1889 and continuing through the mid-1890s, fur priees rebounded and those Huron engaged in hunting 
and trapping had a series of successful years. Regardless, this did not lead to the reconversion of the 
Huron economy to hunting and trapping. Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 
August 1889, in lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1889, part 1, p. 36, Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the 
Jeune Lorette Agency, 29 August 1891, in lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1891, p. 31, Antoine O. 
Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 24 August 1892, in lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1892, 
p. 32, Antoine o. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 6 September 1893, in lndian Affairs 
Annual Report, 1893, p. 34, and Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 31 August 
1894, in 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report. 1894, p. 30. 
100 However, because of the animal's virtual disappearance from the regions adjacent to the village, 
hunters were forced to trave1 to New Brunswick and Maine in their pursuit. Léon Gérin, "Le Huron de 
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Nevertheless, even during years of relative abundance, the Huron were, in the words of their 
agent, ''unable by these occupations to provide the necessaries of life for their families."lol 
In addition to unfavorable market conditions for the sale of furs, the 1880s and 
1890s proved to be a difficult period for those Huron who sought to eam a living from the 
bush as a result of the construction of the Quebec and Lake St. John Railway, the creation of 
numerous game clubs with exclusive hunting and fishing rights in the region between 
Wendake and Mashteuiatsh, and the establishment of the provincial Parc des Laurentides. In 
1896, agent Bastien reported to his superiors in Ottawa that, "Nearly ail the lakes where they 
were accustomed to fish freely have been put under license by the provincial govemment. 
The establishment of the National Park has deprived them of the liberty of hunting as they 
please, and if one should attempt to break the law he would render himself liable to be 
severely punished and to lose his ammunition and hunting outfit.,,102 By 1900, several Huron 
had been brought before "Dame Justice" for their hunting and trapping activities in the Parc 
des Laurentides and the lands reserved for game clubs in the region. Although the courts 
declined to impose the monetaty fines and imprisonment within its power, they did so only 
on the condition that the Huron "not retum.,,103 Thus, by the tum of the twentieth centuty, 
low priees, the loss of easy access to game in proximity to Wendake, and an increasingly 
menacing regulatory regime had combined to dramatically reduce the importance of hunting 
and trapping to the Huron economy. Despite these challenges, certain individuals continued 
Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," in Denis Vaugeois (ed.), Les Hurons de Loretle, Sillery, 
QC, Septentrion, 1996, p. 30. 
101 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 August 1895, in Indian Affairs Annual 
Report, 1895, p. 31. 
102 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 16 Ju1y 1896, in 1ndian Affairs Annual 
Report, 1896, p. 42. 
103 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 10 August 1900, in Indian Affairs Annual 
Report, 1900, p. 51. See also, Paul, "Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de Lorette," p. 9. 
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to practice this occupation In conjunction with other activities weil into the twentieth 
century.I04 
Both before and after the turn of the twentieth century, these Huron did so by 
combining their own personal and relatively small-scale hunting and trapping operations with 
paid employment guiding tourists on hunting and fishing excursions in the region north of 
Quebec City. lOS According to Jocelyn Tehatarongnantase Paul, guiding Euro-Canadian spOl1 
hunters and fishermen first provided the community with a source of monetary income at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century .106 By the late 1880s, the Indian agent claimed that those 
Huron who served as guides to sportsmen obtained a higher standard of living than those who 
continued to support themselves primarily by hunting. IO? By the middle of the following 
decade, a majority of Huron men found employment as guides, making good wages in the 
process. "At certain seasons of the year, especially during winter, it is nothing unusual to see 
three-quarters of our men accompanying gentlemen. They then eam on an average $1.25 a 
104 Ibid. 
105 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 August 1888, in Indian Affairs Annual 
Report. 1888, p. 28. 
106 Paul, citing Gérin, writes: "les officiers de la garnison britannique de même que des bourgeois de 
Québec et certains riches 'sportsmen' étrangers utilisaient abondamment les Hurons à titre de guides 
tant pour la pêche que pour la chasse au gros gibier [... ] Cette activité lucrative rapportait au début du 
XIX" siècle plusieurs milliers de dollars de revenus." Paul, "Le territoire de chasse des Hurons de 
Lorette," p. 9. However, Paul mistakenly attributes the "plusieurs milliers de dollars de revenus" made 
by Huron guides to the early nineteenth century, suggesting that he overestimated the profltability of 
guiding during this early period. Gérin referred to the Huron of the late nineteenth century when he 
wrote that guiding sportsmen assured them of "plusieurs mille dollars de revenu chaque année." Gérin, 
"Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 31. For an example of Huron guiding 
during the early 1870s, see "Les causes célèbres. Le coup de fusil sans témoin. Comment le guide 
indien Gros-Louis fut assassiné et dévalisé en revenant à travers bois à Lorette," in La Patrie, 
Montréal, vol. 46, no. 47, n.d. [1871], p. 26. 
107 "Some of our best hunters were hired to serve as guides to American sportsmen, and their condition 
was materially improved thereby." Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 26 
August 1889, in Indian Affairs Annual Report. 1889, part l, p. 36. 
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day, clear of all expenses.,,108 The profitability of this sector, particularly in comparison ta 
hunting and trapping, continued through the turn of the twentieth century.109 
The construction of the Quebec and Lake St. John Railway also greatly influenced 
hum economic fortunes. The railroad provided easy access to Lac St. Jean, where the Innu 
occupied a privileged position when seeking employment guiding Euro-American sportsmen 
in the region. In 1889, an American joumalist heartily recornmended Lac St. Jean to his 
readers: "The water is full offish, the woods are full ofgame, and 100 miles around it, in any 
direction, you can go and stand where no white man ever stood before." Here the visiting 
sportsmen could hire Innu "guides, [for] $1.50 a day; [and] foreman guides, capable of 
heading a party and taking full charge, [for] $2.50 a day."IIO Following the construction of 
the railway, then, the Innu made wages guiding tourists comparable to those earned by their 
Huron counterparts. 
While the opening of the railway certainly offered Amerindians opportunities for 
earning cash, state authorities feared that the increased presence of Euro-Canadian and Euro­
American sportsmen in the region wauld dis tract the Innu from farming, the Department of 
Indian Affairs' preferred method of promoting "civilization." In 1890, Edgar Dewdney, the 
minister ofthe interior and superintendent general ofIndian Affairs, wrote that, 
lOS Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 16 July 1896, in Indian AjJairs Annual 
Report, 1896, p. 42. In 190 1, Gérin reported that Huron guides, in particular Daniel and Xavier 
Groslouis, earned the same amount pel' day ($1.25) in addition to provisions, tobacco, and whisky. 
Gérin, "Le Huron de Lorette. À quels égards il est resté sauvage," p. 31. 
109 Gérin writes: "Directement, la pêche et la chasse procurent aux Hurons des recettes à peine 
supérieures à celles que fournit la culture; mais indirectement, par l'exercice du métier de guide, elles 
leur assurent plusieurs mille dollars de revenu chaque année. Le guide indien accompagne les partis de 
'sportmen' aux lieux de chasse et de pêche, ou encore les arpenteurs officiels dans leurs voyages 
d'exploration. Il reçoit pour ses services 1.25 dollar (à peu près 6 fr. 50) par jour, sans compter les 
vivres, le tabac et le whisky pendant toute la durée du voyage. C'est l'occupation favorite de Daniel 
Gros-Louis, de son frère Xavier et de nombre d'autres Hurons." Ibid. 
110 "ln the Canadian Wilds: The Hudson's Bay Company's Country. The Lake St. John Wilderness, the 
Montagnais lridians, and the Great Ouananiche Fishing," New York Times, 4 August 1889, n.p. 
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The Montagnais of Lac St. Jean have been brought more into contact with the world 
outside of their reserve since the construction of the Quebec and Lake St. John 
Railway; but it is questionable whether they will be benefited thereby either morally 
or materially. The advent to the locality of so many strangers attracted by the lovely 
scenery of Lac St. Jean is calculated to di vert their minds from giving their attention 
to cultivating the soil, which wouId be ultimately of more pennanent value to them 
than the few dollars picked up by them from transient tourists, who employ them as 
guides and boatmen. III 
In this way, Dewdney, as generations of officiais had donc beforc him, portrayed the Innu as 
improvident by nature and thus as being particularly susceptible to the exchangeability of 
cunency, especially if it eould be had through employment that he considered to be easy for 
Amerindians. Aecording to such reasoning, if Aboriginal peoples did not need to toil for their 
income, they would not put it to appropriately "sober" ends - that is, they would expend such 
literally "easy money" on alcohol and other useless or harmful goods, preventing themselves 
from benefiting "either morally or materially" from their income. Dewdney impl1citly drew 
this connection by claiming that, presumably because of the arrivai by train of so many 
newcomers in the region, "Theil' intemperance in the use of intoxicants has already become 
of more frequent occurrence, and it is feared that this vice, with ail its attendant misery, will 
increase among them rather than decrease.,,112 Despite their clearly exhibited work ethic, 
III Indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1890, p. xxiii. It is important to note that Dewdney drew on the 
annual report of L.E. Otis, the Indian agent at Pointe Bleue in making this c1aim. However, Dewdney 
went much further in asserting the deleterious effects of the arrivaI of so many Euro-Canadians in the 
region. Otis, while also emphasizing the railway's negative effects, also claimed that the Innu were 
still making progress in terms of agriculture. "The employment of the lndians as guides by the 
strangers who visit our watering and fishing places, retards to a certain extent their advancement in 
agriculture. Theil' progress in this particular branch is slow. Nevertheless, some improvement is 
noticeable." L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake SI. John and Chicoutimi Agency, 23 August 1890, in Indian 
AfJairs Annual Report, 1890, p. 101. 
112 Indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1890, p. xxiii. Dewdney once more based his c1aim on Otis's report. 
However, in this instance, Otis was also quite c1ear that the arrivai of so many Euro-Canadians 
inf1uenced the Innu negatively. "The great facility for travelling which we now have is causing a 
change in the habits of our once peaceful Indians. Intemperance, the great evil of our day, has made its 
appearance on the reserve, and the disturbances resulting therefrom are at times very difficult to 
subdue." L.E. Otis, Report on the Lake St. John and Chicoutimi Agency, 23 August 1890, in Indian 
AfJairs Annual Report, 1890, p. 101. . 
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then, officiais in Ottawa continued to assert that the Department's guidance and protection 
were necessary in arder to prevent the Innu from indulging their improvident predisposition, 
Regardless of official rhetoric, farming proved marginal to both the Huron and Innu 
economies during the nineteenth century, In 1889, a journalist visiting Mashteuiatsh wrote 
that, "The Government has given them a reservation of several hundred acres of land at 
Pointe Bleue, but they do not cultivate much of it, so they told me, and 1 could not see any 
evidence of cultivation at all."ll3 In the place of farming, many Innu preferred to rent their 
lands in order to supplement their hunting, trapping, and guiding income, According to an 
1896 newspaper article, "Their farms are usually rented upon shares to some white or half­
breed habitant, while the owner devotes his time to hunting or guiding, They do not take 
naturally to farrning, and rarely follow it, taking the farms only as a source of a small 
income.,,114 During the first-half of the nineteenth century, some Huron gained a portion of 
their revenue from farrning, although none pursued agriculture on a full-time basis,1I5 
However, like the Innu, several Huron employed Euro-Canadian laborers in their fields, thus 
making it clear that they sought to employ ail the resources at their disposai in order to earn a 
living,116 Of course, most contemporaneous Euro-Canadian cornmentators viewed this most 
basic forrn of capitalist accumulation (the use of capital and alienated labol' power in order to 
increase one's own capital) when exhibited by Amel'indians as symptomatic of the 
113 William Drysda1e, "Montagnais Indian Life," New York Times, 25 August 1889, n,p. 
114 Eugene McCarthy, "The Montagnais lndians: Their Language, Spoke, Written, and Sign," New 
York Times, 17 May 1896, n,p, 
115 ln 1836, Napier reported that, "none of them [the Huron] derive the whole of their Support from 
Agriculture," D,C. Napier, "Return of lndians under the Protection of the Indian Department of Lower 
Canada," 12 December 1836, in Great Britain, Copies or EXlracls of Correspondence Since 1si April 
1835.., London, 1839, p. 54, 
116 Canada, "Report on the Affairs of the Indians in Canada," Journals of Ihe Legislalive Assembly, 
Sessional Papers, Appendix EEE, Montreal, 1844-1845, n,p .. 
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characteristic Aboriginal trait of laziness. 117 Thus, Dewdney's comments on the dangers of 
"easy money" applied to ail Amerindians who pursued income without following the model 
of peasant farming so dear to lndian Affairs and other Euro-Canadian commentators. 118 
During the nineteenth century, then, the Huron and hUlU actively pursued cash 
through a variety of economic activities. They did so in ways that corresponded with local 
prerogatives and conditions instead of subscribing to lndian Affairs' moral and theoretical 
framework. ln fact, this willingness to participate in a variety of economic sectors underlines 
the significant gap separating the Department's "improvident lndian" and actual lnnu and 
Huron, an observation which is clearly supported by the agency's own data. 119 Despite the 
mixed nature of their economy, members of both communities relied on a single industry 
above ail others: the fur trade and allied activities in the case of Mashteuiatsh and the 
manufacture of moccasins, snowshoes, and tourist art in Wendake. 120 This ensured that both 
individuals and their communities were particularly vulnerable to any changes that these 
sectors of activity might undergo and to any decisions on the part of major capital interests 
117 For an excellent anaJysis of the historicaJ construction of the stereotype of the "Jazy 1ndian," see 
Lutz, Makûk, p. 31-47. 
118 For a study of official state policy that sought to encourage peasant farming (subsistence agriculture 
practiced without the aid of modern machinery) in western Canada during the late nineteenth century 
see, Sarah Carter, Lost Harvests: Prairie Indian Reserve Farmers and Government Policy, Montreal 
and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990. 
119 In addition to the cases presented above, this gap is also reflected by the Department's relief 
expenditure. In 1884-5, it spent $75 ($0.26 per capita) providing "seed,'grain, and relief' to the Huron 
and $400 ($1 per capita) on the Innu. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1900, part Il, p. 99-100. However, 
given the general disinterest both bands exhibited in agriculture, the purchase of seed inflates these 
figures in the absence of any real advantage to either community. In 1894-5, it spent a total of $88 
from Huron band funds in order to provide social assistance ($63 in "relief grants" to Cyprien Vincent 
and $25 ($0.06 per capita) on "relief for sundry destitute Indians") while spending nothing from the 
Mashteuiatsh band fund. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1895, part II, p. 65 and 68. By the 1899-1900 
fiscal year, these numbers had grown slightly, with the Department supplying $148.57 ($0.33 per 
capita) in "supplies to destitute" in Wendake and $113($0.25 per capita) in such relief in Mashteuiatsh. 
Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1900, part J, p. 6. 
120 Althougb the Innu economy actually diversified substantiaJly during the century, the fur trade 
remained Mashteuiatsh's single greatest source of revenue in 1900. 
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affecting the fonu in which they made payment or the size of their workforce. When crises 
alTived, the Huron and Innu continued their developing strategy of seeking income elsewhere. 
While this mixed approach to earning income meant that only a few individuals managed to 
gain substantial monetary power in either community, those who did enjoyed a relatively 
high level of security and wielded significant power by the tum of the twentieth century. This 
emerging class structure proved to be the legacy of on-the-ground money-use in Wendake. 121 
Indeed, while external capital continued to significantly influence Mashteuiatsh's economy, 
ensuring that the majority of Innu found themselves economically beholden in one way or 
another to Euro-Canadians, the Huron economy developed to favor the emergence of a local 
entrepreneurial elite. An analysis of the reserve's credit market makes apparent the monetary 
force that a handful of families exerted at Wendake by the end of the nineteenth century, 
thereby revealing a central aspect of class formation. 
Credit Relations at Wendake 
As the nineteenth century advanced, the state's legal regime increasingly limited 
First Nations' theoretical ability to participate in certain market activities. In addition to the 
well-known bans that it imposed on the purchase of alcohol, Parliament restrained Aboriginal 
access to credit. This development emerged at a time when Amerindians were experiencing 
increasing difficulties in obtaining advances from Euro-Canadian capital. Indeed, with the 
exception of those individuals who secured extremely limited credit from major fur trade 
companies, only the most well-heeled band members could count on receiving monetary 
Joans from Euro-Canadians. This section analyzes the changes that Wendake's credit market 
underwent du ring the nineteenth century, demonstrating the importance of wealth as a 
precondition to securing loans of any meaningful size. During the period, then, money 
attracted money in Wendake, thereby contributing to the process of class fOlmation already 
described in the context of manufacturing while also underlining contradictions in the state's 
121 For an analysis of a similar process in Mashteuiatsh, see Chapler Seven. 
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discourse and practice in Aboriginal Canada. Indeed, while Indian Affairs continued to 
portray Amerindians as improvident by nature, it furnished a legal environment conducive to 
the management of increasing sums of money by a small segment of the Huron population. 
The Indian Act, passed in 1876, formally banned the seizure of the "real or personal 
property of any Indian or non-treaty Indian within Canada, except on real or personal 
property subject to taxation." Despite this restriction, the law did permit merchants to recover 
the specifie merchandise sold to Amerindians in the case of failure to pay debt. 122 This 
restriction, when combined with reserve lands' status as Crown property, meant that 
Amerindians could not make use of their lands or other on-reserve property as collateral in 
order to secure loans, effectively preventing most of them from borrowing any substantial 
amount of money. The Huron were weil aware of the very real structural limitations that this 
placed on their economic activity. In 1895, Antoine O. Bastien described the difficulties 
faced by the band members who attempted to make a living from farming: 
On the Quarante Arpents Reserve there are only about a hundred acres under 
cultivation this year, and these were worked by six Huron families. These families 
are in a difficult position. Although the land is suitable for cultivation, these 
farmers, not being able to make the improvements required for careful and 
profitable cultivation, not being able either to borrow or mortgage, get very little 
return from their land and are obliged to tum to expedients and work at day labour 
to support their families. 123 
Even before the passage of the Indian Act, however, many Amerindians enjoyed 
only limited access to credit, with those who did benefit from loans generally doing sa 
through informai agreements that often only provided small amounts of currency. Both 
before and after the institution of formai restrictions, the Huron managed to develop and 
maintain such informai credit networks, both among themselves and with their Euro­
122 Canada, Statutes, "An Act ta Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians," 12 April 1876, 
39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 66. 
123 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 15 August 1895, in Indian AJJairs Annual 
Report, 1895, p. 32. 
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Canadian neighbors. Although very few personal records belonging to individual Huron 
persist, those of the Picard family suggest that, at least within the wealthy circles of 
Indigenous society, informai creditor-debtor relations provided an effective means by which 
individuals could secure loans while simultaneously guaranteeing the circulation of a certain 
quantity of goods and services in the relatively cash-poor local economy. These relationships, 
such as that lasting from 1866 to 1875 which involved François Xavier Picard Tahourenché 
and Noël Otesse Zacharie,124 two Huron heads of household, could be quite longstanding. 
Although up to $104.84 of the total value of exchange between the two men of $135.94 
consisted in sorne form of cash payment, Picard and Zacharie themselves almost never 
exchanged currency, doing so only to a maximum sum of $42.50. 125 The majority of the 
items included in the account consist of payments destined for one of the two men but made 
to the other, purchases made by one on behalf of the other, rent from, or monetary transfers to 
members of their respective families ($85.94). Payment for goods represented only a small 
proportion of the total exchange, both in tenDS of their number and size (two payments, one 
for wood and the other for flour, for a total of $7.50). The remaining sum ($42.50) consisted 
of direct payments between the two men. Thus, although the account demonstrates 
widespread use of cash among the Huron, it also verifies the importance of local and informai 
credit relations in the monetary economy. Without such relations, because of the absence of 
large-scale lenders such as banks or credit unions from Wcndake during the nineteenth 
century, a large proportion of the exchange that took place within and without the community 
would not have been possible. In this way, relationships such as that formed by Picard and 
Zacharie allowed the circulation of goods and services even if those 100king to purchase them 
did not have the cash to do so. 
124 The name "Noël Otesse" is taken from François Xavier Picard's account which serves as the basis 
for this paragraph's analysis. François Xavier Picard, Account with Noël Otesse, n.d. [after 
1875/05/21], BANQ-Q, P883, S2, File 4. However, the 1879 census of the Huron of Jeune Lorette lists 
the individual as "Noel Hotesse (Zacharie)." For the census, see "Recensement des Hurons de la Jeune 
Lorette," 19 February 1879, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-01. 
125 Both of these cash totals may have been significantly smaller if the $36 that the account lists 
Zacharie owing Picard on 5 December 1871 consisted of pre-existing debt rather a cash payment. 
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François Xavier Picard and his son, Paul, also benefitted from abstract currency as 
credit when establishing and maintaining relations with local Euro-Canadian merchants and 
tradesmen. Between 1862 and 1880, François Xavier maintained this sort of debtor-creditor 
rclationship with Léon Racine, a French Canadian blacksmith. Picard paid for a great deal of 
work with a combination of cash and hay for Racine's Iivestock. In addition to the production 
of his forge, Racine occasionally provided Picard with cash. 126 Similarly, Henry Ross, the 
owner of general stores in St. Ambroise and Wendake, sold Paul Picard food, clothing, 
household items, and firewood on credit. In November 1885, Picard carried a balance at 
Ross's store of $26.27. By September 1888, Picard's outstanding debt had grown to 
$107.42. 127 However, Picard dealt with Ross as his father had with Zacharie and Racine ­
that is, by keeping clear accounts of his transactions without exchanging large amounts of 
cun"ency. In this instance, Paul Picard paid $85 of his debt to Ross through the five-year 
rentai of a field ($80) and the sale of pipes ($5). Thus, in November 1888, Picard's 
outstanding balance only amounted to $22.42. 128 Over the next several years, Picard and Ross 
continued to conduct their business in this manner: Ross occasionally rendered an account of 
the goods Picard had purchased and credited him $16 every year for the rentai ofhis field. 129 
Picard and Ross appear to have brought this credit-based relationship to an end in 1894 when 
126 For this account, see Léon Racine, Compte de Monsieur Paul Picard pour la forge depuis l'année 
1862, n.d., Léon Racine, "Monsieur Paul Picard compte pour la forge," 15 July 1875 to 15 January 
1880, François Xavier Picard, Account with Léon Racine, 20 September 1875, and François Xavier 
Picard, Note, 17 December 1880, BANQ-Q, P883, S2, File 4. 
127 This amount represents the sum of Picard's two accounts with Ross, this first which concerns 
primarily foodstuffs and household and the second which includes wood alone. Although one of the 
two accounts is dated 9 May 1888, its final entry is clearly given as 14 September 1888. Paul Picard's 
Account with Henry Ross, General Store, 9 May 1888 and Paul Picard's Account wilh Henry Ross, 18 
October 1888, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 2. 
128 Paul Picard's Account with Henry Ross, 15 November 1888, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 2. 
129 Paul Picard's Account with Henry Ross, 6 November 1890, Paul Picard's Account with Henry 
Ross, 15 October 1892, Paul Picard's Account with Henry Ross, 16 December 1892, Paul Picard's 
Account with Henry Ross, 2 November 1893, and Paul Picard's Account with Henry Ross, 25 
September 1894, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 2. 
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Eva Ross, presumably Henry's daughter, paid Picard the balance due ta him on account of 
the rentai of his field. 13O As demonstrated by Antoine O. Bastien's provision of goods on 
credit ta band members of relatively modest means such as the Siouis, this form of merchant­
provided consumer credit was widespread in late nineteenth-century Wendake. 
Beyond consumer credit, Paul Picard also sought and secured loans that were not 
directly tied to merchants or tradesmen. However, his residence on the reserve at Wendake 
complicated this means of accessing money since he could not use his home or the lot that he 
occupied as collateral. Given his socioeconomic status, though, Picard held several abjects of 
significant market value which he could pawn (using the legal mechanism of a contract of 
vente à faculté de rémére') ta raise funds. In June 1888, Picard, in exchange for $50 in cash 
provided by Cyrille Tessier, agreed to repurchase within the following six months at 8% 
interest a manuscript French-Huron dictionary, a silver medal minted in 1840 bearing the 
image of Queen Victoria, another silver medal bearing the image of George III, three other 
medals respectively stamped "Dublin (1565 ou 1865) New York, 1853, [and] Prince Albert 
1851," and two wampum belts. 13\ In May 1900, Picard again pawned a silver medal for $15 
ta Tessier, which he agreed to repurchase at 6% interest within the following twelve 
months. 132 However, with the exception of the dictionary, which he again sold in 1896 (this 
time ta the Séminaire de Québec), Picard does not appear ta have repurchased any of these 
items. 133 In 1923, Picard 's son Pierre Albert requested information from Indian Affairs 
conceming the legality of the first of these two transactions "with the faculty of redemption" 
along with another that took place in 1890, given that they involved the sale of "presents." He 
130 Paul Picard's Account with Henry Ross, 25 September 1894, BANQ-Q, P883, S3, File 2. 
\3\ Copie d'une convention de vente remerée de Paul Picard à Cyrille Tessier, 6 June 1888, BANQ-Q, 
P882, S2, file 3. 
132 Copie d'une convention de vente remerée de Paul Picard à Cyrille Tessier, 1 May 1900, BANQ-Q, 
P882, S2, file 3. 
133 Picard exchanged the dictionary in 1896 in order to pay his debt of $217 .83 to the Séminaire for the 
tuition of his son Pierre Albert. Lainey, La "Monnaie des Sauvages ", p. 125. 
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asked: "Are there any precedents to the knowledge of the Department, when such sales were 
annul1ed and such presents recovered according to law?,,134 The secretary of Indian Affairs 
responded that, "the prohibition against selling 'presents' as referred to in Section 105 (1) of 
the Indian Act to any persons or Indian other than an Indian of such band, is apparently 
confined to the Provinces of Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan or Alberta or the 
Territories, so that there would be no legal objection to an Indian of the Lorette Band in the 
Province of Quebec disposing of presents which were his own.,,135 
Jonathan Lainey suggests that Picard's practice of pawning these goods might be 
understood as a consequence of the financial straits in which he found himself following the 
death of his father, François Xavier. The principal cause of Picard 's monetary troubles would 
appear to have been the court case Picard v. Picard, which turned on a dispute between 
himself and his two sisters (and their Euro-Canadian husbands) concerning the inheritance 
from their father of lands situated beyond the bounds of the reserve at Wendake and the rights 
of the three children to sell them. This litigation occupied the family and the courts for a 
decade during the 1880s and 1890s and proved extremely costly to Picard, who eventually 
136lost his house in the village to Henry O'Sullivan, the husband of his sister Claire. Paul 
Picard's financial difficulties, however, were not the result of the trial alone because, as his 
son later admitted, he "indulged greatly in alcoholic liquors.,,137 Moreover, Picard, like other 
members of the Huron elite, needed money in order ta ensure an acceptable level of 
education for his children. His sons Louis Ormond and Pierre Albert attended Christian 
Brothers' Commercial Academy whereas his daughter Clémentine received an education at 
134 Pierre Albert Picard to J.D. McLean, 2 April 1923, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 8. 
135 J.D. McLean to PA Picard, 9 April 1923, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 8. 
136 Lainey, La "Monnaie des Sauvages ", p. 124-5. 
137 Pierre Albert Picard to J.o. McLean, 2 April 1923, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 8. 
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the Ursuline convent in Quebec City.138 Picard's health also failed during the 1890s, causing 
him to request an increase in his $25 per-month pension from the Province of Quebec's 
commissioner of colonization and mines. His difficulty in maintaining sufficient income also 
caused him to fall behind on his dues to the Chamber of Notaries, the organization that 
regulated his profession in Quebec. 139 
Thus, Picard's case is clearly exceptional in terms of its scale and his own desire to 
maintain a certain socioeconomic standing. However, it remains instructive in that it 
demonstrates the difficulties faced by Amerindians who sought access to borrowed capital. 
Indeed, since Picard could not use his on-reserve real property to secure loans from outside 
financial institutions, his only option was to pawn the valuable objects in his possession, 
hoping that he might be able to repay their sale priee along with interest charges in the 
relatively short periods specified in the contracts he signed. Obviously, only certain band 
members held such valuable objects, placing the ability to borrow any significant sum beyond 
the reach of most Huron. In this sense, the Indian Act created a situation in which only those 
who possessed valuable l110veable property might secure off-reserve loans, propelty which 
local elites tended to accumulate. Thus, the importance of the consumer credit which agent 
Bastien offered becomes apparent: it provided one of the sole ways by which lower class 
Huron might secure access to greater amounts of money than that generated by their work­
related income alone. Despite its illegality, then, the credit that Bastien provided other band 
members appears in many ways to have been a direct result of the articles in the Indian Act 
that guaranteed the "protection" of on-reserve property. 
138 Receipt from Christian Brothers' Commercial Academy 10 O. Picard, 4 April 1899, ACNHW, P2­
S3-AI5, File B-2-17 and Bill from the Religieuses Ursulines de Québec for Monsieur Picard, 8 June 
1899, ACNHW, P2-S2-A2, File B-I-5. 
139 L' L "M . d S "126amey, a onnme es auvages ,p. . 
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Huron and Innu Charitable Donations 
Although the documentary record only contains occasional traces of charitable 
donations made by the Huron and Innu, members of both communities appear to have 
expended a great deal of currency in support of charitable causes, most importantly those tied 
to the Catholic Church, suggesting that the investment of even their relatively small income 
in charity provided members of both bands with important returns (in the form of either 
increased social capital or the satisfaction of supporting their faith's local infrastructure). In 
1858, shortly after having begun to make use of cash with the HBC, the Innu provided the 
visiting Oblate missionary with f.127 with which he was to renovate the small chapel at 
Métabetchouan. 14o Five years later, Flavien Durocher, the Oblate missionary most active 
among the Lac St. Jean Innu during the nineteenth century, reported on a hunter-trapper who 
turned to the Catholic faith and sought literally to pay for his sins. "Ce bon Antoine, le 
meilleur des chasseurs du lac, le bénoni 141 des traiteurs, voulut racheter son péché par 
l'aumône; à la collecte que je fis à la fin de la Mission pour la chapelle, il me donna, en 
billets de banque, la somme de 30 piastres.,,142 Moreover, Antoine was not alone; between 
1860 and 1863, the "quarante ou cinquante familles du lac" contributed more than $1,200 to 
143the renovation of their chapel at Métabetchouan. In other words, each year from 1860 
through 1863 the Innu provided the church with roughly the equivalent of what they earned 
144in cash from the HBC. 
140 Gaston Carrière, Histoire documentaire de la Congrégation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie­
Immaculée dans l'Est du Canada, vol. 3, Ottawa, Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1961, p. 281. 
141 "Benoni" is a Hebrew ward meaning "son of my sorrow" or "son of my pain." 
142 Quoted in Gaston Carrière, Histoire documentaire de la Congrégation des Missionnaires Oblats de 
Marie-Immaculée dans l'Est du Canada, vol. 8, Ottawa, Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1969, p. 
1l3. 
143 Ibid. 
144 This annual average ($297.50) is based on the total cash the HEC paid the Innu at Pointe Bleue 
during Outfits 1866, 1867, and 1870 through 1873. HBCA, B.329/d/l, reel IM575 and B.329/d/5, 
IM575. 
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During the 1820s and 1830s, as weil as the 1860s, the Huron also actively funded 
the Catholic Church. In their case, band members coordinated the collection of funds needed, 
in the first instance, to renovate the village' s chapel and, during the 1860s, to reconstlllct it 
following a fire. During both episodes, the Huron combined private and public funds in order 
to achieve their goal. While the first effort relied overwhelmingly on funds provided by the 
state (the only non-state monies expended, f8.10.11 of a total of f230.15.4 Hfx, originated 
from a single, private, non-Huron donation), community members in the 1860s either paid or 
raised in the form of charitable contributions a much larger portion of the necessary funds 
($804 of the $1004 total), with the rest being provided by the Department ofIndian Affairs. 145 
The Huron socioeconomic elite also engaged in a series of charitable activities. In 
June and July 1880, for example, a number of local women, "Under the Distinguished 
Patronage of His Excellency the Lieutenant-Governor, of Madame Robitaille and of the 
Reverend Messire F. Boucher, Curé of St. Ambroise," organized bazaars on two consecutive 
Sundays in Wendake in order to raise money for the village's chapel and school. '46 The 
Quebec Daily Telegraph encouraged the city's residents to attend because "Perhaps no c1ass 
of our mixed population deserves more encouragement than does that which keeps watch and 
ward over the Falls of Lorette." It noted that, "the visitor to Lorette is ever agreeably 
surprised to find among the daughters of the Red Children of the Forest, ladies of cultivated 
tastes and habits. These latter now appeal and with confidence to ail their friends in and about 
Quebec to assist them in the yet greater improvement and development of their race.,,147 Also 
145 On the renovations made in the 1830s, see Louis Juchereau Duchesnay ta Duncan C. Napier, 17 
October 1833, LAC, RGIO, vol. 87, p. 34714, reel C-11466 and Thomas Cooke, Receipt for Louis 
Juchereau Duchesnay, 27 September 1833, LAC, RG 10, vol. 87, p. 34672, reel C-11466. On the 1860s 
reconstmction, see François Boucher ta W. Spragge, 7 July 1865, LAC, RG 10, vol. 306, p. 205732, 
reel C-12678 and William Spragge, "Report from the Indian Department On an application from the 
Lorette Indians for aid ta re-erect their Church wich has been destroyed by Fire," 4 August 1865, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 722, p. 66-7, reel C-13412. 
146 "Bazaar at La Jeune Lorette," Quebec Daily Telegraph, 7 May 1880, n.p. 
147 "Bazaar at lndian Lorette," Quebec Daily Telegraph, 2 July 1880, n.p. 
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in July 1880, the Huron staged a concert including musicians from Quebec City and Ottawa 
as weil as "Several Tableaux- Vivants" and an "Indian war dance," again in order to aid 
Wendake's chapel and school. 148 In the 1890s, the Huron banded together by subscription to 
purchase the "brass instruments required for the formation of a choir. The seventeen 
instruments purchased, which constitute a fairly complete choir, cost more than $200, on 
account of which they have already paid by subscription a fairly large amount. They naturally 
count on new subscriptions to pay the balance and to provide for repairs.,,149 Wendake's 
socioeconomic elite, then, organized events and charity drives in order to collect cash for the 
support of community-based initiatives in ways befitting their standing in the village. 
Members of the Huron economic and political elite also engaged in charitable 
activities aimed at the alleviation of economic hardship among other First Nations. In 1895, 
the Huron provided an Innu family [rom Tadoussac, who had arrived in Wendake "destitute 
and despairing, without provisions or clothes," with "$20 in cash, clothing for a year and 
provisions for himself and family for several months." The Huron band council met with 
their agent and voted relief expenditure for the family from band funds. Maurice Bastien, the 
grand chief and the main manufacturer in Wendake, even managed to secure free "passage 
for the family on the Quebec & Lake St. John Railway .,,150 Thus, while the council dispensed 
the funds used, Wendake's "upper class" piloted this charitable project to fruition. 
This practice highlights several important socioeconomic factors in Mashteuiatsh 
and Wendake. First, the Catholic Church exerted great influence in both communities during 
the period, drawing for its support a large portion of Innu and Huron monetary revenue. 
Second, as in the case of the financial sector, class played an important role in charitable 
activity in Wendake. Bourgeois women and wealthy manufacturers took charge of these 
148 "Grand Concert at Lorette," Quebec Daily Telegraph, 8 July J880, n.p. 
149 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 22 July 1898, in Indian AfJairs Annual 
Report, 1898, p. 45. 
150 "Indian Family Made Happy," Quebec Standard Budget, 31 August 1895, n.p. 
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effOlts, whether designed to aid the Church or families in need. This, of course, is hardly 
surprising - those who had money occupied a privileged position from which to donate and 
raise more.\51 Moreover, money reinforced the social standing of those who employed it 
charitably. In the particular cases examined above, then, social and monetary capital 
overlapped, contributing to the process of socioeconomic stratification that would continue, 
especially in Wendake, during the twentieth century. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has described the ways in which money participated in structuring the 
economies of Wendake and Mashteuiatsh during the nineteenth century. Cash and credit­
based relationships tied community members to extra-regional capital while also linking them 
amongst themselves. These relationships distributed power unequally between ail involved, 
with money literally lending greater force to certain individuals and organizations than ta 
others. However, this power was never unassailable, as the turn towards public currency in 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean demonstrates. This process of social and economic recreation in 
Mashteuiatsh and Wendake transformed the communities' internai and external relations and 
contributed to similar changes that wauld take place during the twentieth century. 
The momentous change that the monetary regime of the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. 
Jean underwent constituted one of the period's most important transformations. In the early 
nineteenth century, fur trade companies dominated both the region's economic and political 
landscape. As a result, they were able to maintain a relatively c1osed, abstract monetary 
system, thereby structuring their exchange relations with Amerindians. The economics of 
monopoly coupled with a private, abstract monetary system allowed the fur trade companies 
151 Similar phenornena existed among contemporaneous Euro-Canadians. See, for exarnple, the 
description of Olivier Berthelet's charitable contributions in Huguette Lapointe-Roy, Charité bien 
ordonnée: Le premier réseau de lutte contre la pauvreté à Montréal au 19" siècle, Montreal, Boréal, 
1987, p. 112-23. 
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to alter priees in an effort to maximize profits on both the purchase of furs and the sale of 
goods. While the fur trade companies remained able to dictate many of the conditions under 
which exchange took place, the advent of public, state-backed forms of transferable debt (e.g. 
the Canadian dollar) altered this situation by enabling the Innu to take their business 
elsewhere. Indeed, as the graduai adoption between the mid-1840s and the early 1860s of 
state-backed accounting cunency on the part of ail Amerindians trading with the HBC in 
Saguenay-Lac St. Jean demonstrates, the Innu understood the power that the control of the 
monetary system afforded the company. Through their active promotion of state cUITency in 
the region, however, First Nations unwittingly encouraged the definition of Saguenay-Lac St. 
Jean as Canadian rather than Aboriginal space. This change in monetary regime, then, should 
not be conceived of as being entirely liberating because, while national cunency provided 
Amerindians with a modicum of economic leverage, it neither prevented the HBC from 
continuing its traditional attcmpts to lock its Aboriginal trading partners into creditor-debtor 
relations based on abstract money of account nor did it free the region from the influence of 
frequently overbearing external political authority. 
In Wendake, the interplay of money, politics, and the economy likewise produced 
ambiguous results during the period. Here, the process of class formation began remaking 
internai relations along similar lines to those of contemporaneous Euro-Canadian society, 
particularly during the second half of the nineteenth century. The economic and social 
fortunes of two families in particular, the PicardsNincents and the Bastiens, improved 
markedly during the period and money provided members of both with access to financial 
services, education, jobs, and social clout that were unavailable to the "average" Huron. At 
the same time, however, these families' economic success contributed to the success of the 
community as a whole, providing employment (and cash wages) to a large number of reserve 
residents, thereby maintaining Huron families in Wendake who may have otherwise sought 
employment elsewhere. Nevertheless, the community's internai stmcture changed over the 
period, as the state altered local forms of governance and as the economy propelled the 
Bastiens and the Picards to the forefront of Huron society. These dual processes, one 
typically political and the other typically economic, wrought important changes in local 
governrnent, the financial sector, and the labor market that would continue to influence day­
to-day experience in Wendake through the middle of the twentieth century. 
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Currency, then, in no way guaranteed Aboriginal "freedom," either in the face of 
the state or capitalist enterprise. However, it did not necessarily enslave Amerindians either. 
In both its abstract and physical forms, money theoretically served to tie the Huron and Innu 
into the contractual and legalistic relational forms typical of Western society, contributing to 
their apparent marginalization. Despite the legislative restrictions placed on the seizure of on­
reserve property (precluding its use as collateral when borrowing funds), throughout the 
period members of both bands had access to modest amounts of unsecured consumer credit, 
from either fellow reserve residents or off-reserve capital or entrepreneurs. Furthermore, at 
least among Wendake's socioeconomic elite, certain individuals made use of movable 
propelty in order to circumvent such restrictions. During the first half of the twentieth century 
local credit markets would continue to grow in both size and complexity, demonstrating, in a 
similar vein to that explored by the previous chapter's analysis of agent Bastien 's store, the 
extent to which the state's legislative regimc, when implemented in practice, created local 
conditions that diverged markedly from what a strictly discursive analysis would suggest. 
This divergence between theory and practice, then, is central to the political history of 
Aboriginal money-use. 
Chapter 5
 
Private Capital and National Currency: Monetary Policy and
 
Money-Use in the Fur Trade, 1900-1940s
 
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the Canadian fur trade 
boomed as Canadian, American, and European capital, taking advantage of developments in 
teclmology and infrastructure, financed the activities of new actors who entered the Canadian 
north in search of pelts to meet growing demand for luxury furs in northwestern Europe and 
North America. 1 In James Bay and Lac St. Jean this process led to the alTiva! of Revillon 
Frères, the French fur company whose business practices closely resembled those of the 
HBC, along with a host of independent fur buyers. The fierce 'Competition which resulted 
drove up priees paid to Amerindian trappers whiJe favoring the widespread use of cash. HBC 
executives responded through policies which attempted to dictate the terms by which cash, 
credit, and barter would be employed by their subordinates. With the company's market share 
under threat from small cash buyers, the HBC's upper management, perceiving in unpaid 
debt a major drain on profitability, attempted to force as much of the company's busin~ss as 
possible into ready/barter (where goods and furs were traded directly without the use of 
credit/debit). However, this policy proved unsuccessful and the HBC, having abandoned its 
attempts to control the fur trade through abstract money, found itself increasingly unable to 
restrict the use of the Canadian dollar, whether as a medium of exchange (cash) or a measure 
of value (credit/debit). In this way, the company's sway over money-use declined as the fur 
trade increasingly escaped its controi. 
This chapter traces the changes that both corporate monetary policy and money-use 
underwent in the fur trade during the first half of the twentieth centl.lry. WhiJe focusing on the 
HBC, it also analyzes Revillon Frères' relationship to money as weil as that of sma]] 
1 Arthur 1. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the lndustrial Age, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1990, p. 50-95. 
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independent traders, ail the while paying particular attention to the northern Quebec and 
Ontario fur trade. 1t begins with a general summary of the HBC's monetary practice and 
policy prior to its major competitor's decision to purchase furs directly from Aboriginal 
trappers before turning to the changes in the subarctic fur trade caused by Revillon Frères. 
The chapter then analyzes the downfall of the HBC's private monetary system (the made 
beaver) in western James Bay, a result of increased competition and state intervention in the 
form of Treaty No. 9. This change fundamentally altered James Bay's political and economic 
landscape as it symbolically and materially undid the ties that bound the Cree to the HBC and 
replaced them with connections to the region's newly dominant power: the Canadian state. 
The rest of the chapter focuses on the evolving relationship between cash and credit. 1t argues 
that this conceptual tandem provided the grounds for the high-Ievel internaI debate that 
reshaped the HBC's commercial policy with regard to Amerindian trappers during the 
transitional period in the fur trade that, according to Arthur 1. Ray, witnessed the end of 
company paternalism. 
Ultimately, the present chapter argues that the changes that James Bay's monetary 
system underwent at the tum of the century form a key chapter in Canada's assertion of 
sovereignty over the subarctic. Although the federal and provincial states only gradually 
expanded their involvement in the lives of First Nations in far northem Ontario beyond the 
annual payment of treaty annuities, the currency that they introduced to the region in this way 
marked it as part of the political space centered on Ottawa, thereby symbolically removing it 
from the authority of a single private enterprise. This development, then, had its roots in the 
1870 transfer of Rupert's Land from the HBC to Canada and continued beyond the mid­
twentieth century through the exceedingly deliberate process by which civil servants and state 
services arrived in far northern Ontario. The disappearance of the made beaver and the 
HBC's ultimate sunender ofresponsibility for relief provision, then, serve to demonstrate the 
retreat of private enterprise's political power in western James Bay. At the same time, the 
company continued to suffer losses to its ability to exert economic force in other regions of 
the subarctic as a resuIt of significantly increased competition (much of which succeeded 
precisely because of money-use). This chapter's description of fur trade capital's decline in 
political dominance in western James Bay and Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, then, paves the way 
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for the following chapter's analysis of the state's changing raie in money-use during the first 
half of the twentieth century. 
The End of the Made Beaver at Moose Factory 
At the turn of the twentieth century, the HBC operated an extensive and 
heterogeneous network of posts that stretched from relatively large centers of Euro-Canadian 
population in the south to the remote corners of the high arctic. This diverse and fur-flung 
trading empire required the maintenance of two distinct systems of exchange: the first, 
illustrated by re1ative1y remote posts such as Moose Factory, continued to function primari1y 
along traditional hnes thraugh book credits and debits and the second, of which Mashteuiatsh 
pravides an examp1e, was influenced by "hne" conditions, including generahzed use of cash, 
relative1y large numbers of white trappers, and extreme1y active competition? These distinct 
conditions point to money's centrality in the fur trade. Indeed, the c1ear preference on the part 
of HBC management for the pm'suit of trade in the absence of both the materia1 and abstract 
Canadian dollar demonstrates the importance that these men ascribed to the control of the 
money supp1y. Although the company had a1ready abandoned beaver currency in Saguenay­
Lac St. Jean, it had no intention of doing so farther north. However, deve10pments during the 
first years of the twentieth century gave the HBC little choice in the matter and by 1905 their 
private monetary system had entirely collapsed in western James Bay. This section traces this 
monetary sea change by concentrating on the historical experience of the Moose Factory 
Cree. 
2 Ibid, p. 225. 
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Credit and the Centrality ofMoney to the Fur Trade 
In 1900, the debt system and the annual cycle lay at the core of the fur trade in 
western James Bay. In this context, the HBC and Amerindian hunter-trappers continued to 
express value in terms ofbeaver currency, as they had done in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean during 
the first half of the nineteenth century. In western James Bay, then, the control that the 
company exercised over the money-supply, which consisted primarily of its private abstract 
and physical currency (the made beaver), allowed it to exert significant force in dealings with 
its Cree trading partners, tying their economic well-being to this unequivocal symbol of the 
HBC's sovereignty and political power. 3 
Although made beaver coins and notes circulated in HBC-controlled territory into 
the twentieth century, post employees and Amerindian hunter-trappers most often used this 
currency in its abstract form. The made beaver allowed fur trade participants to set priees for 
furs and merchandise. Because this function supplied traders and trappers alike with the 
ability to quantify the creditldebit that defined their relationships, it formed the precondition 
for the provision of advances and their repayment. HBC management, however, constantly 
questioned the wisdom of extending credit to Amerindians, a segment of the population that 
it, like many bureaucrats in Indian Affairs, considered inherently improvident. While this 
vision was widespread in the company's ranlcs, the conclusion that credit should be abolished 
never constituted consensus. Indeed, a large number of the HBC's post managers viewed the 
provision of goods on credit as the only means of preventing the advent of a purely cash­
based business that would cripple the company's control over the fur trade. This proved to be 
a major issue because while the HBC could not guarantee the repayment of debt by trappers, 
the provision of cash promised to reduce profits generated by a combination of the low priees 
the company paid for furs and the high priees it charged for merchandise. In other words, the 
HBC treated the goods it supplied Amerindians as loans, with the difference in market and 
company priees being equivalent to interest. Post and district managers felt that credit alone 
3 For a more detailed examination of these issues in the context of nineteenlh-century Saguenay-Lac 
St. Jean, see Chapter Four. 
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allowed the company to structure its operations in this way. Although the HBC's corporate 
leaders agreed that such profit margins were worth protecting, they generally argued in favor 
of a retum to a barter-based system and the elimination of credit. However, post managers 
and those executives who had held positions at the company's trading posts believed that the 
on-the-ground implementation of this policy, which sought to retain the company's sizeable 
profit on the sale of goods while limiting its capital outlay in the form of what were 
effectively unsecured loans to employees (trappers), would decimate the company's retums 
as, in their view, Amerindians wouId abandon the HBC if it offered neither credit nor 
competitive priees. However, under the monopoly conditions that the company enjoyed in 
western James Bay at the tum of the century, credit generated the vast majority of its sales at 
Moose Factory.4 
Company Money at Moose Factory at the turn o/the Twentieth Century 
While the made beaver formed the monetary backbone of the James Bay region at 
the end of the nineteenth century, thc HBC only employed this currency in dealings with the 
Cree.5 When conducting business with individuals of European descent, the HBC used both 
the Canadian dollar and the pound sterling by way of one of three instruments of exchange: 
cash, letters of credit, and personal checks drawn on European or southern Canadian banks. 
Travelers visiting James Bay and Euro-Canadians stationed there (other than those employed 
by the HBC) generally made use of the latter two in place of cash. Although denominated in 
national currency, the HBC treated these methods of payment as book credit, supplying 
goods to a maximum of the amount for which the letter or check was made whiJe apparently 
4 ln 1901, for example, the post made $7,676.20, or nearly 85% of its total sales, on credit. The 
remaining sales were split between cash ($807.47) and barter ($576.86). Trading Account, Moose 
Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfit 190 l, HBCA, A.76!l5, f. 92, reel 973. 
5 For examples of the Made beaver's use at Moose Factory, see George McKenzie to An. [Allan] 
Nicolson, 18 August 1901, HBCA, B.135/b!58, f. 5r-Ilr, reel IMI122 and Monday 17 March 1902, 
HBCA, B.135!a!I89, f. 29r, ree11M1012. 
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refusing to provide cash for any unspent amount. 6 On occasion, the HBC allowed Euro­
Canadian visitors to the region to purchase merchandise on credit, only later seeking 
repayment. This method of purchasing goods, however, contravened standard practice and 
seerns to have been restricted to those individuals affiliated with trusted, most probably state 
or religious organizations.7 Thus, while individuals of European descent calculated their 
purchases in the region in Canadian or British currency, they generally did so within the 
c10sed circuit of HBC posts. Of course, at the turn of the twentieth centmy, the company's 
stores held a monopoly in both theOlY and practice in western James Bay, thereby permitting 
it to dictate restrictive trading terms even to those who bad ready access to hard currency. 
Sorne cash, however, did circulate in western James Bay and provided the final 
method of payment accepted at Moose Factory. Nevertheless, the HBC tightly controlled its 
use in the region, only accepting it from the company's ernployees in its sales sbops at Fort 
Albany and Moose Factory, preferring to conduct its local business uniquely in terrns of the 
6 For an example of the use of 1etters of credit, see W.K. Broughton to the Commissioner, 20 July 
1901, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file l, document 243, reel IMII20. Sister A. Felix wrote a check for $20, 
drawn on the Old Lowell National Bank, to the HBC on 30 April 1904. Remittance to Winnipeg on 
account of James Bay District Outfit 1904, 20 July 1904, HBCA, B.135/b/57 vol. 2, reel 1M122, f. 
341 Br. No record of any unspent funds from letters of credit being pa id to the holder in cash has been 
found. 
7 For example, in 1901 the census enumerator, who was also a Catholic priest, made a total of $39.53 
in purchases at Albany, Moose Factory, and New Post. The officer in charge of the Southern 
Department forwarded the bill to Winnipeg for collection. W.K. Broughton to the Commissioner, 20 
July 190 l, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file 1, document 244, reel 1M1120. The Anglican Mission at Moose 
Factory as well as the Canadian Geological Survey also purchased supplies or services on credit. W.K. 
Brougbton to the Commissioner, 14 August 1901, in Ibid, document 247 and W.K. Broughton to the 
Commissioner, 14 August 1901, in Ibid, document 248. A letter written several months earlier, most 
Iikely by Broughton, states that, "No travellers have thus far been supplied beyond the amounts of their 
Credit Letters in the Department." [W.K. Broughton?] to the Commissioner, 29 January 190 l, in Ibid, 
document 168. The following year, the new head of the James Bay District sent a letter to Winnipeg 
after the refusai of bank draft stating: "1 shall [be] careful in future that nothing is supplied without the 
draft or letter of credit." George McKenzie to [the Commissioner], 28 January 1902, HBCA, 
B.135/b/56, file 2, document 293, ree11M1120. 
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made beaver.8 In fact, the HBC tended to distribute cash only to those individuals who were 
leaving the region. For instance, in June 1902, the HBC eliminated twelve Moose Factory 
servants from its payroll in order to lower the post's expenses. However, the HBC's James 
Bay district manager, George McKenzie, predicted that because these men were "deeply in 
debt to the Company ... on arrivai at the front [the railway, theyJ will find themselves totally 
destitute." As a solution, McKenzie had suggested several months earlier "to give each party 
say a ten Dollar Bill as a bonus. Even this would be a saving in order to get l'id of them.,,9 
Thus, the HBC had no difficulty placing state-issued currency into circulation as long as its 
ultimate use took place beyond the bounds of James Bay, thereby preserving its political and 
economic dominance of the region. 
In spite of this will to power on the part of the HBC, the Cree did have access to a 
certain amount of cash. This currency originated primarily from two sources: small 
independent traders active on the edge of the James Bay region (generally along the railway) 
and HBC posts in these same peripheral areas that, given the much larger Euro-Canadian 
population, were unable to control the money supply, By the early years of the twentieth 
century, the railroad offered the Cree a relatively accessible alternative to trading their furs at 
the company's posts in western James Bay.IO At the time, HBC management was weil aware 
8 "The business at ail Posts in the Southern Department, with the exception of Albany and Moose 
Factory where there are Sales Shops for the Company's employees, is confined entirely to the Fur 
Trade which is conducted throughout on the MB system," Moose Factory Post Report, 31 December 
1895, HBCA, B,135/e/32, p. 1, reel IM1257. 
9 [George McKenzie?] to the Commissioner, District Affairs, 31 January 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/56, 
file 2, document [307B], reel IMI 120, For the names of the dismissed servants, see Thursday, 5 June 
1902, HBCA, B,135/a/189, f. 35v, reellMl012. 
10 In 1906, Alex Milne, the manager of the HBC's James Bay district, noted with sorne wonder that the 
trip from "the !ine," in this case from Missanabie, to Moose Factory took a mere nine days by canoe. 
Alex Milne to Mr. Ware, 30 September 1906, HBCA, A.11/48, p. 225, reel 725. By 1910, J.W. 
Anderson reports that the railway had become even more accessible, even if "Cochrane was still sorne 
two hundred miles upstream from Moose Factory, an eight-to-ten-day arduous journey by canoe, 
though the five-day downstream trip was somewhat easier." J.W, Anderson, Fur Trader's Story, 
Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1961, p, 17. 
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of the threat that the railway's proximity posed to Moose Factory's business and generally 
attempted to combat the problem by making the price of furs and merchandise at Moose 
Factory "approximate that at the line.,,11 The company also resOlted to subterfuge in an 
attempt to obtain more furs for itself, in the process providing the Cree with a small amount 
of cash. In 1901, Alex Milne, the HBC's inspector for the Southern Department, wrote: 
"Three trusted Servants of the Company have been of recent years under instmctions to, 
quietly as if for themselves, buy up odd furs held by the Indians with the purpose of sending 
or taking them inland. Last Qutfit 25 Qtters at $8.00, 1 Fisher $5.00 and 1 Bear $5.00 were 
secured in this way.,,12 Although not explicitly noted in this description, the HBC most Iikely 
purchased these furs using cash, given that the amounts listed are in dollars - as opposed to 
the still current made beaver - and that the success of this approach to purchasing furs 
depended on it maintaining an illicit appearance. However, because of the relatively 
insignificant amount paid in this manner, the clandestine purchase of furs by the HBC would 
appear to have had an extremely Iimited impact on both the Cree's access to money and their 
general economic condition. 13 
In spite of itself, the HBC did in at least one instance encourage the use of cash 
among the Cree of Moose Factory on a larger scale. Rather than being a result of external 
competition or any company policy aimed at buying furs on the "black market," such 
encouragement came from a neighboring post's practice of purchasing furs with currency 
from Aboriginal hunter-trappers. Although initially reluctant to do so, the HBC had been 
using money to purchase furs at its Montreal Department post on Lake Abitibi since at least 
Il Alex Milne, "Inspection Report on Moose Factory," 4-11 July and 12-18 August 1901, HBCA, 
B.135/e/34, p. 10, reel 1M 1257. 
12 Ibid, p. 6. 
13 ln the same year, the HBC post at Moose Factory paid the Cree a total of $2,572.76 (4,677 % MB) 
for furs and labor. Thus the $18 spent purchasing furs on the "black market" represents a mere 0.7% of 
the total spent by the company. Ibid, p. 24. 
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the late 1880s.1 4 As a result of this intra-company competition, Milne wrote in 1901 that, "It 
may then be advisable to start a cash tariffhere [at Moose Factory], the profit to be sought on 
the goods rather than on the furs. One of the two best hunters appears to have gone to Abitibi 
Post last year, attracted by the cash tariff there, and the other, it is feared, may follow his 
example this winter.,,15 Despite this recornmendation, the HBC maintained the use of the 
made beaver in James Bay. Regardless, within the following five years beaver currency 
would collapse under the dual weight of intense competition in the region's fur trade and the 
state's annual payment oftreaty money to every Cree resident ofMoose Factory.16 
The Monetary Weight ofCompetition: Revillon Frères' Arrival at Moose Factory 
The first major challenge to the made beaver's continued existence 111 western 
James Bay came from Revillon Frères, the HBC's major competitor in the region from the 
beginning of the twentieth century through the 1930s.1 7 In the hopes of lowering its costs in 
the acquisition of pelts, the French furrier decided to expand its operations by opening a 
string of posts throughout the Canadian north during the early years of the twentieth 
14 HBCA, Rl/e/IO, p. 5, ree1IMI254. The HBC divided its fur trade business during the period into 
several distinct, regionally-defined departments. Because each departmenl was somewhat autonomous, 
their particular policies sometimes led them to clash in "frontier regions" such as that separating 
Moose Factory from Lake Abitibi. 
15 Alex Milne, "Inspection Report on Moose Factory," 4-11 Ju1y and 12-18 August 1901, HBCA, 
B.135/e/34, p. 7, ree11M1257. 
16 Ray describes the HBC's failed effort to introduce a similar company-cenlric monetary system in 
1918 elsewhere in Ontario. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the industrial Age, p. 108.1 have found 
no evidence that similar measures were taken at Moose Factory. 
17 While Revillon Frères remained active in the region through its final sale to the HBC in 1936, the 
English company had actually purchased a controlling stake in Revillon's fur business in 1926. On the 
HBC's acquisition of Revillon Frères Trading Co. Lld., see Lynda Harris, "Revillon Frères Trading 
Company Limited: Fur Traders of the North, 1901-1936," n.p., Ministry of Culture and Recreation for 
the Minislly of Natural Resources, Northern Region, Ontario, 1976, p. 65-82. 
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century.18 Revillon Frères' operations at Moose Factory contributed to the rapid downfall of 
the HBC's monetary hegemony in western James Bay. The first of the French company's 
employees in the region established themselves, apparently without formally requesting state 
permission to do so, adjacent to the HBC post at the mouth of the Moose River in the summer 
of 1902. 19 Here they set up a temporary trading post while awaiting the delivery of building 
materials, supplies, and staff that were to arrive during the following summer. However, as a 
result of Revillon's supply ship running aground near Fort George, only its crew arrived, 
without provisions, and were forced to travel inland via the Moose and Abitibi Rivers in a bid 
to leave what had become, due to their presence, an undersupplied James Bay.20 
Thus, although competition arrived in James Bay in 1902, because of the disastrous 
attempt to supply its well-financed and ambitious operations, Revillon Frères required several 
years before being able to trade with the Cree in a similar manner to that practiced by the 
HBC. This state of affairs directly affected the region's monetary system. The HBC's post 
records clearly demonstrate that while prior to the arrivai of competition in the region in 1902 
the company continued to use the made beaver, by early 1904 it accounted for furs in terms 
of the dollar.21 This rapid change appears to be attributable primarily to Revillon Frères' use 
I~ On Revillon Frères early twentieth century operations, see Harris, "Revillon Frères Trading 
Company Limited," p. II-52, Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 92-3, and Marcel 
Sexé, Two Centuries ofFur-Trading, 1723-1923: Romance of the Revillon Family, Paris, Printed by 
Draeger Frères, 1923, p 57-73. 
19 Following "vague rumors that opposition is sending in," "the Trader party - long expected, come in 
from their camp about the breach." George McKenzie to [?], 7 July 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/56, file 2, f. 
156v, reellMl120 and Saturday, 16 August 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/189, f 41r, reellMlO12. Although 
several Revillon Frères subsidiaries held Canadian letters of patent permitting them to operate within 
the coUhtry's borders, none appear to have requested permission to establish posts at any specifie 
locale. Harris, "Revillon Frères Trading Company Limited," p. 53-4. 
20 On the sinking of Revillon Frères steamer, the El Dorado, 1 September 1903, see "Wreck of the 
Lady Head on the Gasket Shoal," n.d., HBCA, B.135/z/7, f. 10r, ree11M1666. For a global description 
of this expedition, see Harris, "Revillon Frères Trading Company Limited," p. 12-21. 
21 The Moose Factory post journal's last entry describing a transaction in terms of Made beaver was 
recorded 17 March 1902: "Cephas[?] came in today with 104 Made beaver of a hunl." Monday, 17 
March 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/I89, f 29r, ree11MI012. The next entry in which a monetary value is 
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of the currency, both in its material and abstract forms, rather than any equivalent of the made 
beaveL Indeed, the new company appears never to have employed the beaver as a monetary 
unit, thereby building its commercial relations with the Cree on the Canadian dollar, a 
currency with whicb many were already familiar from their trading trips to the railroad. 
The increased circulation of cash caused by Revillon Frères' failure to adequately 
supply its posts in James Bay, although perhaps not decisive, also appears to have been 
important in changing James Bay's basic monetary unit. The wreck of its supply ship forced 
the French company to rely on canoes as the unique means of conveying people and 
provisions to the region. As a result, from its an"ival at Moose FactolY in August 1902 
through the summer of 1904, Revillon Frères did not have enough goods to even support its 
own employees.22 In the bopes of forcing the French traders from the region, the HBC's 
district manager, George McKenzie, instructed the company's manager at Moose Factory to 
refuse cash payments from the competition. In 1902, he wrote: "If any of the opposing party 
should appear near or at your Post you will not give them any assistance whatever either by 
selling them provisions or selling to their men for cash. Provisions are not to be supplied at 
any figure.',23 The following year, McKenzie even went so far as to assert that the HBC could 
not be he Id responsible if Revillon Frères employees were to starve for want of food. 24 
mentioned was recorded nearly two years later: "John Narager in on Wednesday with a good hunt 
(355.00)." Friday, 5 Febmary 1904, Ibid, f. 87r. 
22 Beginning in the summer of 1902, Revillon Frères' employees were lInable to feed themselves from 
their own stores and hoped to purchase goods from the HBC. On the difficliities experienced by the 
company's employees in obtaining food, see, for example, Friday, 29 August 1902, HBCA, 
B.135/a/I89, f. 42r, reel IMIOl2 and Donald Gillies to ML Ware, 2 February 1903, HBCA, A.II/48, 
f. 202, reel 725. 
23 George McKenzie to the Officer in Charge, Hudson's Bay Company, Moose River Post, \0 
September 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 207v, reel IMII22. 
24 George McKenzie to the Revillon Freres far North Company Limiled, Moose River Post, 22 
September 1903, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 3331', reel IMl122. McKenzie probably wrote this in order to 
encourage Revillon Frères' shipwrecked crew and employees to leave Moose Factory and to continue 
down the Moose River to the railroad. 
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However, this official stance appears to have been anything but rigid in practice. In Outfit 
190 l, the HBC sold goods for a total of $807.47 in cash at Moose Factory, most probably in 
the sales shop it maintained for its Euro-Canadian clientele.25 During the next two years, 
precisely the period in which Revillon Frères proved unable to supply its post on the Moose 
River, thereby forcing it to conduct its trade through the use of hard currency alone, the 
HBCs Moose Factory cash sales shot up to $2,426.97 in Outfit 1902 and then to $3,241.03 
the following year. During Outfit 1904, the first year that Revillon Frères managed to supply 
its post's needs in provisions and trade goods, Moose Factory's cash sales retumed to their 
1901 \evel ($819.05).26 In other words, the HBC's increased cash sales appear to have been 
caused by its new competitor's inability to trade the Cree anything but currency for basic 
necessities and pelts alike. This in turn suggests that the English company was fully willing 
to accept cash when unable to control money-use in a monopolized environment. That cash 
sales decreased once more in 1904-5 further suggests that Revillon Frères, like the HBC, 
preferred to use book credits and debits when large supplies of trade goods made such a 
policy feasible. 
While the HBC discounted the newcomers' chances of capturing any part of the fur 
market due to their lack of merchandise, the Cree do not appear to have shunned the purely 
cash-based trade that Revillon Frères could offer. In December 1902, McKenzie wrote to the 
HBC manager at Rupert's House that, "The Opposition is still here [at Moose Factory] but do 
not seem to be doing much. l hear one of them is going out after Christmas, they are not 
likely to do much as they only have cash and we are not trading cash in our stores.,m Despite 
daims to the contrary sent by the HBC's district manager to his superiors in Winnipeg, this 
25 At the same time, the HBC only purchased $13.95 of furs in cash at Moose Factory (compared to 
$576.86 of furs "Bartered for Goods" and $3602.52 in furs credited to Cree accounts). Trading 
Account, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfit 190 l, HBCA, A.76/l5, f. 92, reel 973. 
26 Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1902-4, HBCA, A.76/l6, f. 92, 
A.76/l7, f. 86, A.76/18, f. 86, reel 974. 
27 George McKenzie to A. G[?]. Nicholson, 19 December 1902, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 223r-224r, reel 
IMII22. 
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state of affairs does not appear to have kept the Cree from exchanging their pelts for currency 
with Revillon Frères. 28 Moreover, the Cree even appear to have profited handsomely from the 
situation. According to Robelt Renison, an Anglican missionary based at Moose Factory 
during this period, the Cree took advantage of Revillon Frères' supply difficulties in order ta 
charge them "Parisian priees for fish and game.,,29 This suggests that, despite HBC claims to 
the contrary, the Cree perceived trading pelts and country provisions for money as 
advantageous. Tbus, like the company, Cree hunter-trappers understood cash's potential 
power and sought to acquire it in arder to transform their relationship with the region's 
dominant economic and political actor - the HBC.3ü 
Money in the James Bay Fur Trade after Treaty No. 9 
Fur trade competition, then, contributed to the rapid disappearance of the made 
beaver from James Bay. However, while competition did not force the HBC, still the most 
powerful Euro-Canadian economic and political presence in the region, to accept cash at its 
posts, it did render the debt system significantly more fragile than it had been under 
monopoly conditions, even if it remained at the core of the fur trade in the region into the 
1930s. Despite the continued re1evance of debt, the HBC abruptly began accepting large 
quantities of cash at its posts after the state's introduction of annual monetary payments in 
western James Bay during the summer of 1905. On 9 August, representatives of the Cree, the 
28 For an example of the HEC claiming that the Cree did not trade with Revillon Frères, see G. 
McKenzie to the Commissioner, 24 September 1903, RBCA, A.II/48, p. 210-3, reel 725. According 
to Moose Factory's post journal, "Most of the Indians have gone to work for the Traders." Tuesday, 26 
August 1902, HBCA, B.135/a/l89, f. 41v, reel IMI012. In January 1903, George McKenzie wrote to 
the HBC manager al Abitibi waming him that "1 understand that Mr. Loudin our opponent is going 
down your way on his way out you better pick up ail furs as soon as you can as he is paying ail sorts of 
outrageous priees and of course would get the furs if there are any to gel." George McKenzie to Robert 
Skene, 10 January 1903, HBCA, B.135/b/58, f. 2341', reel 1M1122. 
29 Robert John Renison, One Day al a Time, Margaret Blackstock (ed.), Toronto, Kingswood House, 
1957, p. 57. 
30 For a more detailed analysis of Amerindian perceptions ofmoney, see Chapter Seven. 
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Canadian and Ontario govemments, and the HBC signed Treaty No. 9 at Moose Factory.31 
The following day, the Treaty Commissioners began and "rapidly completed" the payment of 
a one-time $4 gratuity and a $4 annuity (for a total of $8) to each "Indian" who presented 
himse1f at the payment table. 32 Regardless of the money Revillon Frères and other, smaller 
fur-traders paid for furs, Treaty No. 9 payments represented the first substantial and regular 
influx of cash into western James Bay. Between 1906, the first year in which every band 
member received $4, and 1932, the Treaty Commissioner paid an annual average of 
$1,445.69 at Moose Factory.33 In comparison, during outfit 1900, the HBC gave $3,877.91 in 
credit to the Cree at Moose Factory.34 The state's annual treaty payments, then, equaled 
roughly 37% of the Cree's revenue arising from trade with the HBC a mere five years before. 
Even if the HBC had greatly increased the amount of goods sold on credit to Cree by 1905 
(an amount, furthermore, that would skyrocket over the following twenty years), treaty 
31 For the text of the treaty, see Canada, The James Bay Treaty, Treaty No. 9 (Made in 1905 and 1906) 
and Adhesions Made in 1929 and 1930, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, [1931] 1964. 
32 The commissioners generally made payment of the appropriate sum to the male head of each family. 
On the commissioners' decision to deny Moose Factory's Métis population Indian status, and thus 
access to treaty payments, see John S. Long, "Treaty No. 9 and Fur Trade Company Families: 
Northeastern Ontario's Halfbreeds, Indians, Petitioners and Métis," in Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer 
S.H. Brown (eds.), The New Peoples: Being and Becoming Métis in North America, Winnipeg, 
University of Manitoba Press, 1985, p. 137-62. 
33 This average is based on annuity and arrears payments made from 1906 through 1932, excepting 
1931 for which no data is available. LAC, RG 10, vol. 3034, file 235,225, part 4, reel C-9666. 
34 The HBC's accounting year stretched from 1 June of the "outfit" year through 31 May of the 
following year. This sum equals 7050 31.. made beaver. In 1901, the HBC valued 1 MB at $0.55. 
"Appendix 7: Statement of Indian Debts, Outfit 1900, (Amended Copy), Moose Post," in Alex Milne, 
"Inspection Report on Moose Factory," 4-11 Julyand 12-18 August 1901, HBCA, B.135/e/34, p. 24, 
reel lM 1257. The $3,877.91 that the HBC extended to the Cree in credit is significantly greater than 
$2,572.76 that the Cree paid the HBC during the outfit. 
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annuities significantly increased the amount of cash in circulation in a region which had for 
the most part previously only made use of abstract money?S 
Once the state began making annual cash payments to Moose Factory's Aboriginal 
population, the HBC could no longer refuse to accept money at its trading posts. From its 
1904 level of $819.05, Moose Factory's cash sales of goods rose to $1,973.69 in Outfit 1905. 
Through the end of the decade, this number fluctuated, from a low of $1,589.67 in 1906 to a 
high of $3,129.80 in 1910, but always remained well above its pre-treaty level. 36 This 
experience extended throughout western James Bay where Treaty No. 9 served to definitively 
open the region's fur trade to the use of cash. For example, on 3 August 1905, nearly a week 
before their arrivai at Moose Factory, the Commissioners signed Treaty No. 9 with the Cree 
of Fort Albany, a comparable HBC post located several hundred miles north of Moose 
Factory. That same day, the post at Fort Albany made cash sales totaling $1,072.37 For the 
whole of August 1905, the post sold $2,103.14 worth of goods in cash while making a total 
of $2,303.24 in cash sales for the entire outfit. 38 By comparison, in August 1903, the HBC 
post at Fort Albany had made cash sales for a total of only $1.50.39 Thus, in two years, cash 
sales at the post had increased by a factor of 2,000. Moreover, given that the Fort Albany 
Cree received a total of $776 in gratuities and annuities on 3 August 1905, more than 60% of 
3S In 1905, the HBC sold $16,001.09-worth ofgoods on credit at Moose Factory. By 1925, this amount 
had climbed to $58,943.66. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1905 
and 1925, HBCA, A.76/19, f. 88, reel1359 and A.76/42-8, f. 1351', reel 1367. 
36 Trading Accounts, MooseFactory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1905-10, HBCA, A.76/19, f. 88, 
A.76/20, f. 96, A.76/21, f. 96, A.76/22, f. 101, reel 1359, A.76/23, f. 102, A.76/24, f. 107, reel 1360. 
37 Thursday, 3 August 1905, HBCA, B.3/a/205, f. 84r-84v, reeJ IM995. 
38 "List of post transactions," 31 August 1905, HBCA, B.3/b/l03, p. 108, reellMI637 and Trading 
Accounts, Albany Post, James Bay District, Outfit 1905, HBCA, A.76/l9, f. 90, reel 1359. 
39 "List of transactions, Fort Albany," August 1903, HBCA B.31b1I01, p. 789, reel IMI032. 
Unfortunately, no data is available for August 1904. 
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the money made by the HBC that month came from elsewhere than treaty payments.40 
Furthermore, as at Moose Factory, Revillon Frères maintained a trading post at Fort Albany 
in 1905 - a post which was fully stocked following the uneventful arrivaI of their supply ship 
in 1904 and perhaps in 1905.41 Thus, the Cree most likely expended a certain quantity of 
treaty annuities elsewhere than at the HBC's store, making the amount of money in 
circulation at Fort Albany greater than the company's figures alone would indicate. As a 
result, it would appear that the annuities and gratuities provided by Treaty No. 9 forced both 
the HBC and Revillon Frères to accept money indiscriminately. This in tum suggests that the 
Cree had been saving cash from their trips to the "Iine" and that following the state's arrivaI, 
they used this money to purchase goods that they would not otherwise have been able to 
afford. 
A similar analysis is more complicated in the context of Moose Factory. This is due 
to the presence at the treaty signing of a substantial number of "Moose Factory" Cree living 
to the south at Chapleau and Missanabie. While these individuals appear to have received 
annuities in 1905 as members of the Moose Factory band, they received their gratuities the 
following year in payments distinguishing them from those Cree who traded at the mouth of 
the Moose River. Thus, the $3,696 distributed at Moose Factory in 1905 would appear to 
have formed gratuity and annuity payments for the roughly 325 members of the Moose band 
"proper" as weB as $4 each in annuities to the roughly 250 band members based at Chapleau 
or Missanabie.42 Furthermore, because of the substantial cash business already carried on in 
40 Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to AJ. Mathason, Ontario Provincial Treasurer, 9 
April 1906, LAC, RG 10, vol. 3034, file 235,225, part 4, reel C-9666. The Cree at Albany also had 
access to the railway by way of the Albany River. 
41 No information is available on Revillon Frères' ship's arrival in 1905. However, given that in the 
early years of the twentieth century, the HBC's ship generally arrived at Charlton Island from mid ta 
late August, Revillon Frères' supply ship may not have reached Fort Albany by 3 August 1905. 
HBCA, B.135/z/7, f. 8v-9r, reel IM1666. 
42 For the payment of $3,696, see Deputy Superintendent General of Indian Affairs to AJ. Mathason, 
Ontario Provincial Treasurer, 9 April 1906, LAC, RGIO, vol. 3034, file 235,225, part 4, reel C-9666. 
The approximate population numbers were calculated from payments made in 1906 and 1907. Frank 
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the Moose Factory sales shop, it would appear that approximately $1,150 of that spent on 
goods at the post in 1905 came from the Cree.43 This suggests behavior in contradiction to 
that of the Fort Albany Cree. Rather than spending their cash reserves, the Cree spent less 
than half of what they had been paid by the treaty commissioners at Moose Factory.44 
However, given the presence of Revillon Frères at Moose Factory as well as the relative 
45proximity of the HBC's Lake Abitibi post - a post which had used Canadian currency for 
weil over a decade by 1905 - it is entirely possible that the Moose Factory Cree simply spent 
their treaty money at a larger number of locations than did their neighbors to the north. 
Despite this difference, the annual treaty payments made by the state beginning in 
1905 clearly forced the western James Bay fur trade to accept the Canadian dollar as a form 
of payment. However, as in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, the HBC continued to use book credit 
wherever possible when purchasing furs from the Cree. In the twenty-one-year period 
stretching from Outfit 1901 through Outfit 1921, the HBC paid for the vast majority of furs 
with credit at Moose Factory, with cash payments only amounting to 1% of its total 
expenditure. Furthermore, cash payments never exceeded 6% of ail fur purchases in any 
given year and frequently equaled less than 1% of total purchases. Simultaneously, the HBC 
paid nearly 94% of its funds used in the purchase of furs from the Cree during the period in 
Pedley to AJ. Matheson, 16 January 1907, in Ibid and Frank Pedley to A.l. Matheson, 15 October 
1907, in Ibid. 
43 In 1904, the HBC made $819.05 in cash sales at Moose Factory. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory 
Post, James Bay District, Outfits 1904, HBCA, A. 76/18, f. 86, reel 974. A year later, it made $1973.69 
in cash sales. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfit 1905, HBCA, 
A.76/19, f. 88, reel 1359. The difference between the two amounts suggests that the Cree spent roughly 
$1,150 at the post. 
44 If those based at Chapleau and Missanabie are excluded, the Moose Factory Cree were paid 
approximately $2,600 in gratuities and annuities in 1905. 
45 In 1905, Abitibi sold $2,865.66 of merchandise for cash. Trading Accounts, Abitibi Post, Lake 
Huron District, Outfit 1905, HBCA, A.76/19, f. 81, ree11359. 
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the form of book credit. 46 Thus, although the HBC now accepted cash in exchange for goods 
at Moose Factory, it continued to pay for the vast majority of nus it purchased from the Cree 
with abstract accounting currency. 
Pre-War Controls: Money and the Fur Trade Status Quo 
The fur trade's altered environment in the context ofindustrialization and the state's 
and colonists' push into the subarctic led HBC management to question many of the 
company's longstanding practices in an attempt to stave off competition and revitalize its 
market share. By the late nineteenth century, the HBC employed a two-tiered purchasing 
tariffby which it paid less for furs in cash than it did in credit- or ba11er-based transactions. In 
1888, two company inspectors, Edward K. Beeston and Richard Hardisty, recommended both 
increasing the cash tariff and forming two categories from the single barter categolY then in 
existence, one for creditlbarter and the other for ready/barter. Beeston and Hardisty felt that 
the first change would staunch the f10w furs to rivais who paid cash while the second would 
discourage Amerindians from taking their "prompt trade" - that is, those furs not needed for 
the repayment of debt - to the opposition by increasing the tariff for readylbarter furs. 47 By 
the beginning of the twentieth century, a modified version of this tariff was in use by the 
HBC in its St. Maurice and Saguenay Districts. Under the new model, the company paid the 
lowest amount for pelts in cash and the highest for pelts exchanged by those having existing 
accounts with the company, while providing an intelmediate amount for furs given in straight 
barter or as a means of opening a new account. The maximum prices that the HBC perrnitted 
its employees to pay varied widely and for some furs, such as mink and ermine, the tariff 
46 During the period, the HBC made a total of $2,633.80 of cash paymenls for furs. In contrast, it 
expended $14,691.66 in "barter" - that is, where neither cash nor credit was provided - and 
$256,647.49 in credit to the Cree. Trading Accounts, Moose Factory Post, James Bay District, Outfits 
1901-21, HBCA, A.76/15-38, reels 973-4 and 1359-65. 
47 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 77. 
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allowed for twice the amount to be paid in credit on an existing account as ln cash.48 
Furthermore, as the chief factor of the Montreal Agency, P. McKenzie, instructed the HBC' s 
post employees, the amount paid for longstanding debt might be significantly greater than 
that stipulated by the tariff. "For old debts you can give prices according to circumstances ­
in fact almost any price to wipe off old balances.,,49 However by 1908, the HBC had ceased 
using this tariff at Mashteuiatsh, instead offering a single price-list regardless of the method 
so
of payment. Four years later, the company's St. Maurice and Saguenay District manager 
encouraged the HBC's post manager at Pointe Bleue to aggressively pursue the local cash 
trade, effectively ending the policy of favoring credit and barter over cash when selling 
merchandise. "The day is gone for this District to be entirely independent of the white man's 
trade, or the Indian's Cash so 1 trust you will join with the others in the District and BOaST 
every PART OF THE BUSINESS THAT WILL BRING IN REVENUE."sl Given that the HBC 
began accepting cash payments in western James Bay following the signature of Treaty No. 
9, it would appear that the company had already adopted a similar policy at Moose Factory. 
While HBC management formulated an explicit policy on the sale of merchandise 
for cash, prior to the beginning ofWorid War 1 it never appears to have barred the company's 
employees from purchasing furs with currency and even explicitly supported the practice on 
occasion. In 1909, the company's commissioner, c.c. Chipman, argued that, when post 
managers exercised extreme caution, limited cash purchases would provide an effective 
48 P. McKenzie to W.R. Hamilton, 13 May 1904, f. 326 and P. McKenzie, "Purchasing Tarifffor Furs, 
St. Maurice and Saguenay Districts," 3 April 1905, HBCA, B.329/c/2, f. 375, reel 1MB89. 
49 P. McKenzie, "Purchasing Tariff for Furs, St. Maurice and Saguenay Districts," 3 April 1905, 
HBCA, B.329/cl2, f. 375, reel 1MB89. 
50 [M.R. Grahame], "Fur Purchasing Tariff, 'Canada' Furs," 11 December 1908, HBCA, B.329/c/2, f. 
845, reel 1MB89. 
51 c.G. Wilson to W.R. Hamilton, 30 November 1912, HBCA, B.329/c/3, f. 518-9, reel IMB90. 
Emphasis in original. 
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means of remaining competitive.52 However, in keeping with the company's basic business 
model, senior executives universally preferred strengthening the HBC's standing through the 
maintenance of a large stock of quality merchandise, an area in which they had traditionally 
held an advantage over their competitors. In early twentieth-century James Bay, for example, 
the HB.C engaged Revillon Frères by reserving such trade goods for those Cree who remained 
"faithful" rather than through any major policy of cash purchasing.53 ln this way, senior 
executives hoped to force the Cree to do business with the company. However, by the end of 
the decade, the Cree had the option of purchasing supplies from the Revillon Frères post at 
Moosonee which by now was as well-stocked as the HBC store across the river. 54 
Furthermore, as a result of more intense competition elsewhere, the commercial situation 
proved at least as favorable, if not more so, for Amerindians throughout Canada. Thus, the 
company's merchandise-based credit policy proved unworkable in the context of competition 
and the HBC found itself forced to define most Amerindians as "reliable" and to sell them 
goods on credit or lose a significant portion of the trade. 
This pragmatic acceptance of credit did not, however, erase the widespread 
conviction among senior executives that "improvident" and "unfaithful" trappers would fail 
to reimburse their debt, thereby creating substantial losses for the company. However, up 
until the outbreak of the First World War the Winnipeg-based Fur Trade Department 
employed precisely this figure (the "improvident Indian") in attempting to overcome 
52 c.c. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31 st May, 1908," 24 February 1909, 
HBCA, A.74/17, p. 50, reel 1349. 
53 The HBC' s commissioner wrote in his 1905-6 annual report that: "The increase in Capital employed 
of approximately $13,000 it is believed is fully justified to meel the increasing requirements of the 
trade and to gradually build up the advance Outfit, upon which heavy encroachments have been 
made." c.c. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31 st May, 1906," 26 February 1907, 
HBCA, A.74/15, p. 30, reel 1349. The James Bay District manager increased his stock ofmerchandise 
to an even greater extent during the following outfit. c.c. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year 
ending3lstMay, 1907," 10 February 1908,HBCA, A.74/16,p. 32,reel 1349. 
54 c.c. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31 st May, 1909," 12 January 1910, HBCA, 
A.74/18, p. 36, ree11349. 
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London' s resistance to the provision of credit to Amerindian trappers. In 1908, for example, 
Chipman wrote that, "On account of the improvident disposition of the natives many of them 
take no thought for the provision of future requirements, and it is absolutely impossible for 
them to reach the hunting grounds without necessary supplies.,,55 Despite Chipman's rhetoric, 
the company's upper management (including Chipman himself) considered debt to be the 
primary impediment to success in the fur trade. In many ways, this belief was an artifact of 
the counterproductive system that the HBC employed to supply its posts. The company 
required both its depots in Montreal, Winnipeg, and Edmonton along with individual posts to 
register a profit. As a result, when supplying posts with their inventory, warehouses applied a 
surcharge to the goods delivered which the posts then had to overcome in order to generate 
positive net revenue. In this way, the HBC eliminated the advantage that bulk purchasing 
should have provided. Furthermore, this policy called for post managers to impose an average 
percentage price increase on ail goods, which had the effect of preventing the company from 
responding to local market conditions through competitive pricing of selected merchandise. 
Although HBC executives had been aware of this policy's unfavorable consequences for 
trade since at least 1870, they did not make any effort to address the issue prior to the late 
1930s when they eliminated the requirement that supply depots make a profit. 56 
Instead, during the first decade of the twentieth century the HBC used its trade 
goods in an effort to diminish the effects of bad debt through the application of substantial 
markups to the price charged for every item sold at its posts throughout Canada. Chipman 
relied on this practice to minimize the importance of the losses suffered by the company on 
unpaid debt during the 1906-7 season: "Though these amounts seem large, and particu larly so 
the unpaid advances for the Outfit under review, it will no doubt be understood that the 
advances are charged at trade prices, and the amounts written off as above are therefore 7S to 
S5 c.c. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May, 1907," 10 February 1908, 
HBCA, A.74/16, p. 55, ree1 1349. 
S6 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the indus/rial Age, p. 194-7. 
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100 per cent greater than the actual cost of the goods to the Company.,,57 Chipman reiterated 
this same argument two years later, although this time noting that the lower limit of the 
markup had actually increased from 75% to 83.3%.58 By the early 1910s, the HBC's fur trade 
commissioner reported that the margin between cost to the company and the price charged 
consumers had increased at most posts in James Bay, where "the profit exceeds 100%, so that 
the actual losses by Indian debts are less than half the face value." However, both the HBC 
and Revillon Frères continued to provide unprecedented amounts of credit to the region's 
Cree. 59 Thus, the large profit margin that the company eamed on its merchandise appears ta 
have been supported by its willingness to provide substantial advances to its Aboriginal 
customers. That Amerindians accepted these conditions in lieu of cash payments further 
suggests that they had a need for supplies and provisions at the beginning of the hunting and 
trapping season that monetary payments made upon receipt of their production could not 
meet. 
Thus, the HBC's policy with respect to cash sought to make money superfluous 
from an Aboriginal perspective while earning profit for the company through inflated prices 
charged on merchandise sold on credit. From management's perspective, monetary payments 
in exchange for furs promised to decrease the company's profitability by allowing 
Amerindians to spend their revenue, now provided in the form of a generalized medium of 
exchange rather than in kind or in credit, elsewhere than at the company's stores. This, in 
tmn, would cut into profits, provided in large part by the sale of goods and provisions. By the 
57 c.c. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May, 1907," 10 Febnlary 1908, 
HBCA, A.74/l6, p. 54, reel 1349. 
58 "It is hardly neeessary to mention here that the losses from 1ndian Debts as shown above are based 
on the trade priees of supplies at the several Posts, and that the aetual loss to the Company on the basis 
of Cost Landed priees represents but from 50 to 60 per eent of the amounts as set out in the 
eomparisons." c.c. Chipman, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31 st May, 1909," 12 January 
1910, HBCA, A.74/18, p. 61, ree11349. 
59 R.H. Hall, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May 1912," 15 February 1913, HBCA, 
A.74/2 l, p. land 24, ree1 1349. 
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early 1910s, the HBC's fur trade commissioner, R.H. Hall, noted that the company's profits 
primarily came from precisely this sector, whether it sold merchandise on credit or in 
exchange for furs or cash, and not from the sale of fins. The widespread competition that the 
HBC faced, along with technological changes that allowed the rapid dissemination of fur 
prices being paid in London, Leipzig, and New York, forced the company "to pay for furs 
very nearly their full market value.,,60 Thus, the spector of a purely cash-based fur trade 
promised to lessen the company's control over its trading partners and the profits such control 
generated while also appearing to pose a threat to the HBC's very existence, based, as it was 
in large part, on the revenue generated by its sale of merchandise. 
Furthermore, from management's perspective, the company's debt system appeared 
to place it in an even more precarious position with respect to cash than would have 
otherwise been the case. Although Amerindians' continued willingness to subscribe to this 
system provided the company with limited protection against the fur trade's full 
monetization, the absence of a highly developed legal system in the subarctic forced the HBC 
to rely on what its executives considered to be Amerindian trappers' inconstant "faithfulness" 
rather than judicial coercion in order to guarantee repayment of credit. Upper management 
does not appear to have called upon the legal system even in those regions where it was weil 
established, such as Saguenay-Lac St. Jean.61 Thus, the company's management feared that 
cash would place its Aboriginal trading partners in a secure economic position from which 
they could refuse to honor their debt. Although no such mass default on the part of cash-rich 
trappers ever materialized, the HBC's senior managers unceasingly demanded the reduction 
of sales on credit to Amerindian trappers, with a view to their ultimate abolition. Moreover, 
60 R.H. Hall, "Report on Fur Trade for the year ending 31st May 1912," 15 February 1913, HBCA, 
A.74/21, p. 2, ree11349. 
61 Furthermore, corporate management was weB aware that it might attempt to secure payment through 
the courts. W.R. Hamilton, the HBC's Pointe Bleue post manager, proposed a blueprint for corporate 
policy with regard to debt and the judicial system in his annual report for Outfit 1900. His superiors do 
not appear to have ever attempted to implement this plan. W.R. Hamilton, "Report upon District, 
Outfit 1900," n.d., HBCA, B.329/e/9, p. 2. 
301 
HBC executives were not alone in seeking the end of credit, being joined in the effort by 
Revillon Frères' management. In the diary he kept during his 1920 inspection trip of Revillon 
Frères posts in Hudson and James Bay, Thierry Mallet succinctly described the message he 
had relayed to his subordinates at Moosonee: "More fur - less general expenses, and more 
paid debts.,,62 However, Arthur J. Ray points out that, given the massive markups on 
merchandise and the HBC's practice of accounting for debt based on the price the customer 
paid for goods rather than their cost to the company, bad debt never posed as serious an issue 
as generations of senior HBC officiais believed. Rather, bad debt represented a relatively 
small operating cost, totaling less than 6% of the value of returns during the last decade of the 
nineteenth century .63 
Wartime Changes 
The First World War brought radical change to the Canadian fur trade. In reaction 
to the close of the English market, the HBC slashed the amount of furs that it authorized its 
employees to purchase while also making deep cuts in credit and eliminating the use of cash 
as a means of purchasing pelts. In August 1914, c.G. Wilson, the manager of the company's 
St. Lawrence District, wrote a rapid succession of letters to W.R. Hamilton, its post manager 
at Mashteuiatsh, providing a clear outline of the HBC's monetary policy in view of the 
outbreak of hostilities. After fi l'st instructing Hamilton to drastically cut back on fur 
purchases, Wilson quickly directed him to hait cash purchasing altogether and to decrease the 
total amount of credit made available to the Innu by 83%.64 Although management required 
62 Thierry Mallet, "Diary: James Bay and Hudson's Bay Trip, Summer 1920," LAC, MG28-III97, p. 3, 
reel F-1615. 
63 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 85-6. 
64 c.G. Wilson to the Manager, Pointe Bleue, 5 August 1914, HBCA, B.329/c/4, f. 128, reel IMB90, 
c.G. Wilson to the Manager, Pointe Bleue, Il August 1914, Ibid, f. 129, c.G. Wilson to the Manager, 
Pointe Bleue, 14 August 1914, Ibid, f. 130, and c.G. Wilson to the Manager, Hudson's Bay Company, 
Pointe Bleue, 23 November 1914, Ibid, f. 184. 
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the company's post managers to stop providing Amerindians with cash, it simultaneously 
sought to boost cash sales, thereby increasing the Dow of currency to the HBC's offices in 
Montreal and Winnipeg while also rnaintaining profits on merchandise.65 During the winter 
of 1914-5, the HBC, increasingly under pressure from independent traders, issued a new fur­
purchasing tariff to its post managers throughout Canada, setting priees at 83% below those 
eamed at the company' s March 1914 sale.66 
After having initially required the company's post managers to apply the same 83% 
reduction in credit to ail Amerindian trappers, N.B. Bacon, the HBC's fur trade 
commissioner, changed tack during the 1915-6 season, instituting a new debt policy based on 
trappers' records. 
The amount of advances to be given an Indian for Outfit 1915 was to be in 
proportion to his past record of hunting, conservatively based at the reduced tariff 
on the number of skins he is likely to produce, so that each will be able to pay up 
his account in the Spring of 1916 for Outfit 1915 advances. Any Indians not living 
up ta this arrangement are ta be refused further debt. 
By these instructions it is hoped to eliminate eventually ail those Indians who do 
not fulfill their obligations and rninimize the loss from Indian Debts in future. 67 
Although the start of the War and the closing of the English and German markets devastated 
the fur trade, the situation rapidly reversed course, with the majority of Canadian furs being 
routed away from European auctions and to sales in New York, St. Louis, and Montreal. This 
change came at the expense of the HBC, which awaited the reopening of the auction in 
London in order to sell its furs. Although the company's board permitted limited fur sales in 
the United States for a short period between June 1916 and the winter of 1917, it quickly 
6S c.G. Wilson to the Manager, Pointe Bleue, 110 October 1914, HBCA, B.329/c/4, f. 167, reel 
IMB90. 
66 N.H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annual Report, Olltfit 1914," 31 January 1916, HBCA, A.74/23b, p. 3, reel 
1350. 
67 N.B. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annual Report, Olltfit 1914," 31 Janllary 1916, HBCA, A.74/23b, p. 3, reel 
1350. 
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overtumed this decision to act more from patriotic fervor (the HBC's head office was located 
68in London) than capitalistic reason. In his annual report on Outfit 1914 (submitted in 
January 1916), Bacon claimed that, "at many of the Posts it is absolutely necessary in order ta 
hold our trade, to pay the Indians for their Furs partly in cash, which is subsequently tumed 
over to the store for goods. Many Indians like to handle actual cash and cannot be persuaded 
to do business on a straight barter basis.,,69 The HBC's London board responded shortly 
thereafter by authorizing limited cash fur purchasing in an effort to stem the tide of furs 
flowing to its competitors. However, this new policy only permitted cash to be employed 
under the strict supervision of district managers "at those centres in Canada which wouId not 
interfere with the Post trade.,,70 In other words, employees would only be allowed to 
exchange cash for furs at the company's "line" posts. Whereas this policy did not lift the ban 
on cash purchases at Moose Factory, it did have an immediate effect on purchasing at 
Mashteuiatsh, where cash purchases jumped from $3.60 during the 1915-6 season ta 
$1,689.63 the following year (Figure 5.1). Despite this dramatic increase, the overall sum 
spent in 1916-7 was low when compared to the volume of money spent in this way by the 
post during the pre-War period (for example, during the 1913-4 season, the HBC spent 
$9,687.65 in cash on furs). Moreover, total cash fur purchases at Mashteuiatsh would remain 
small through the cessation of hostilities. 
68 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 99-102. 
69 N.H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annua1 Report, Outfit 1914," 31 January 1916, HBCA, A.74/23b, p. 10, 
reel1350. 
70 N.H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annual Report: Outfit 1915," 1 March 1917, HBCA, A.74/24, p. 3-4, reel 
1350. 
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Figure 5.1: Furs Purchased for Cash by the Hudson's Bay Company at Moose Factory and 
Pointe Bleue, 1901-1924 (Source: HBCA, A.74/34 and 40, reels 1351 and 1353 and A.76/15­
42, reels 973-4 and 1360-7) 
These policies immediately altered prevailing market conditions in Lac St. Jean and 
western James Bay. At the same time that the HBC drastically curtailed its accumulation of 
furs and its extension of credit, small traders continued acquiring pelts for cash from the Innu 
of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean on account of the furriers of Quebec City. These traders paid much 
higher priees than the company and appear to have absorbed many of the furs that the Innu 
would have atherwise sold to the HBC. 71 In contrast, the significant reduction in credit 
provided at Maose Factory by the HBC and Revillon Frères following the outbreak of the 
war did not lead the Cree to increase their cash trade with independent buyers. Instead, the 
two companies' drastically lowered fur-purchasing tariffs meant that, "a large proportion of 
them took up their traps and quit hunting fur and devoted ail of their time to hunting country 
71 Although the HBC's correspondence mentions several "Quebec Dealers," it only refers to Vermette 
by name. C.G. Wilson to w.R. Hamilton, 28 November 1914, HBCA, B.329/c/4, f. 187, reel 1MB90 
and c.G. Wilson to W.R. Hamilton, 8 December 1914, Ibid, f. 191. 
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food." This reaction proved disastrous for the HBC because, as the James Bay District 
Manager writes, "although the amount of Indian Advances given out in July and August was 
very much smaller than in previous years, the amount of unpaid debts was increased by 
$9,024." In other words, since "news of the War and the slump in the Fur market" only 
reached Moose Factory after most of the Cree had already been outfttted for the season, the 
generally small catch among trappers meant that very few proved able to reimburse the 
HBC.72 
However, the fur trade commlSSlOner realized that the company could not 
realistically hope to erase ail losses due to unpaid debt without entirely ceasing to provide 
credit to the Cree, which, given the conditions of the James Bay trade, would have meant 
abandoning the region entirely. In spite of the changed credit policy that the company had 
adopted during Outftt 1915, by the beginning of the following outfit in June 1916 the 
situation had not improved materially from the HBC's perspective. Bacon, however, decided 
to continue providing credit along the lines established during the previous season regardless 
of the losses that would surely result. "Advances have been authorized for Outfit 1916 by the 
District Manager based on the average hunts of the past four years in value at current 
purchasing prices. In any case, however, advances to the extent of the total estimated hunt are 
too much and wherever there is opposition, must result in loss.,,73 Despite concurrent efforts 
to centralize the extension of credit in district headquarters through the submission by post 
managers of detailed accounts, providing the amount of credit they proposed to advance to 
each Amerindian trapper, the HBC continued to record large losses on unrecovered debt 
through the end of the War.74 Moreover, the company actually increased the value of goods 
72 F.D. Wilson, "Annual Report: James Bay District, Outfit 1914," 16 October 1915, HBCA, A.74/44, 
p. 100-1, reel 1354. 
73 N.H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annual Report: Outfit 1915," 1 March 1917, HBCA, A.74/24, p. 59-60, reel 
1350. . 
74- On the centralization of debt policy, see N.H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annual Report: Outfit 1916," 31 
January 1918, HBCA, A.74/25, p. 9, reel 1350 and 1. Thomson, "Annua1 Report: Outfit 1917," 28 
Febmary 1919, HBCA, A.74/26, p. 7, reel 1350. 
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sold on credit at Moose Factory (and at Mashteuiatsh, although to a much lesser extent) 
during the War (Figure 5.2). Despite ongoing fears that Amerindians would prove unable to 
reimburse their debt (fears that the unsure economic context of wartime only amplified), the 
HBC's senior managers effectively used credit to li mit the amount of currency in circulation 
wherever possible. Thus even at Mashteuiatsh, where "hne" conditions rendered cashless 
trade suicidaI from the company's perspective, HBC executives sought to control demand for 
money, and thus the custom of their Amerindian clients, through recourse to the other bête 
noire of the subarctic fur trade: unsecured credit. 
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Figure 5.2: Net Cost of Goods Sold by the Hudson's Bay Company on Credit at Moose 
Factory and Pointe Bleue, 1901-1925 (Source: HBCA, A.74/34 and 40, reels 1351 and 1353 
and A.76/15-42, reels 973-4 and 1360-7) 
Following the end of the War, the HBC continued working to combat cash's 
influence in the fur trade. However, at this point senior officiaIs realized that the HBCs 
bookkeeping system prevented them from determining whether goods had been sold to 
Amerindians on credit or in payment offurs previously "deposited" on their account at a post. 
James Thomson, the HBCs fur trade commissioner, described the confusion resulting from 
this system with reference to the St. Lawrence District (in which Mashteuiatsh was situated): 
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"While the accounts for this District would show the total advances to Indians for the Outfit 
to be $33,611.00, it should be understood that the natives frequently tum their furs over to the 
Post for the credit of their accounts, drawing against such credit, supplies as required from 
time to time, in this manner while the records would show such supplies to be 'credit' sales or 
'advances', the goods are often actually paid for in advance." Thomson continued to observe 
that this confusion permeated the whole of the HBC's fur trade operations except for those in 
British Columbia, "where furs, that are not in liquidation of advances made on credit, are paid 
for, either by 'trade tokens' (due bills) or cash, the supplies then furnished to the Indian are 
paid for by him in trade tokens or by cash and thus appear in the accounts as 'cash' sales.,,75 
The company had, in fact, been employing such private money in British Columbia since the 
early years of the War. In 1916, Bacon had described the system, which recalled the made 
beaver in both spirit and form: "at the Interior Posts the Indians are paid by orders on the 
stores, which can be exchanged at any time for goods. The transaction is then treated in the 
books as a cash sale. This system is of great advantage to the Company, as it practically gives 
the Indians cash without cash being paid out by the Company's PostS.,,76 By the 1910s, then, 
the HBC had renewed a practice that was common during the nineteenth century by 
employing tokens and store orders to provide its Amerindian trading partners with the "feel" 
of cash while restricting their use and the valuethey represented to the company's posts. 77 
In his account of the fur trade during the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
Philip Godsell wrote that the increased severity of the HBC's monetary policy was a direct 
result ofWinnipeg's unwillingness to heed the opinions of its field staff. Godsell felt that this 
tendency was best embodied by the decision of Norman H. Bacon, who had been appointed 
7S J. Thomson, "Annual Report: Outfit 1917," 28 February 1919, HBCA, A.74/26, p. 6-7, reeI1350. 
76 N.H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annuai Report, Outfit 1914," 31 January 1916, HBCA, A.74/23b, p. 10, 
reel 1350. 
77 On HBC tokens, both in the 1860s and during the 1910s-20s, see Hudson's Bay Company Archives, 
"HBCA Information Sheet: HBC Fur Trade Tokens," http://www.gov.mb.ca/chc/archives/hbca/ 
info_sheetslindex.htmi (18 January 2010). See a1so, Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial 
Age, p. 108. 
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fur trade commissioner in 1913 after having been employed by the HBC in London but never 
in Canada, to discontinue advances following the outbreak of World War l, in the process 
disregarding the recommendations ofN.W.M.J. MacKenzie, a veteran fur trader and Bacon's 
board-appointed advisor. 78 After having pointed to Winnipeg's arrogance at dismissing its 
employees' on-the-ground experience, Godse11 ridiculed Thomson' s decision to bar cash 
because it refused to accept the economic reality of the post-War fur trade, which he felt had 
been in part created by Bacon's abrogation of credit in 1914. "The traveling buyers had 
accustomed the Indians by this time to using cash and they liked to handle a little of it after 
having paid offtheir debts. They did foolish things with it undoubtedly. Ifa couple ofIndians 
wanted to spend their money traveling backwards and forwards on a passenger train, eating in 
the diner for the novelty of the thing, that was their affair!" In addition to Amerindians' 
opposition to this policy, he asserted that post managers bitterly resented this order and "ail of 
them put up a fight to obtain the cash from the Company... [as a] means for preventing a 
serious loss of trade." According to Godse11, the average HBC manager was aware of the 
danger that refusing ail cash purchasing posed the company. "Realizing that the Indians 
would sell to the opposition for cash he rightly considered that it would be much better to 
have the dealings take place in the store so that he couId obtain a share of the money across 
the counter rather than have the fur bought surreptitiously around the Indian camps.,,79 In 
spite of its employees' opposition to banning cash purchasing, the HBC adopted the pan­
Canadian policy of using tokens to increase "cash" sales while decreasing the amount of 
goods theoretica11y sold on credit. However, by the mid-I920s northem Ontario Amerindians, 
looking to purchase goods that the HBC either did not carry or priced too highly, had 
78 Philip H. GodseIl, Arctic Trader: The Account of Twenty Years with the Hudson 's Bay Company, 
New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1934, p. 148. 
79 Ibid, p. 163-4. 
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successfu11y forced the company to retire its private coins and begin once more paying for a 
portion of their catch in Canadian currency.80 
Cash and Credit in the Context of Fur Trade Boom and Bust, 1920s-1940s 
In 1925, the HBC's James Bay district manager, George R. Ray, described the debt 
system as "most inimical to the Company's Interests. The supremely difficult problem is to 
conduct an extensive business comprised almost solely of unsecured credit accounts with a 
modicum of loss." Ray asserted that the Amerindian trapper "may any day succumb to the 
blandishments of the free traders and leave a large unpaid balance in our books, yet we can 
do nothing to protect ourselves. We must take our chance."s, Thus, although debt fel! weil 
within the bounds of the Western legal regime theoretical!y in place in the totality of 
Canadian territory during the twentieth century, the fur trade of the relatively remote James 
Bay district fel! beyond its scope. In spite of the HBC's inability to force repayment of debt 
through legal means, Ray championed the continued use of credit. In 1926, he expanded on 
his earlier statements, providing a theoretical argument in favor of the continuation of the 
system, despite its clear drawbacks. 
The influence of credit is in stimulating enterprise. This applies to us as with 
outside firms. Every Indian who takes debt is real!y an agent of the Post in 
executing duties which the Manager would himselfbe unable to perform. The stock 
at the Post would be comparatively useless without a union of skil! and industlY: 
without the aid of credit the talent of the native is comparatively ineffectual: 
credit[,] by advancing supplies among the natives, promotes the most essential of 
a11 divisions of labor - that which uses and makes effective the ingenuity of the 
native in those pursuits for which he is adapted. And if credit is granted beyond the 
natural requirements of the native, improvidence and waste' are encouraged. The 
80 Although Ray refers to the demands for state-issued currency by Amerindians living in "northern 
Ontario," no reference has been found to the use of tokens at Moose Factory and Mashteuiatsh. Ray, 
The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 108. 
81 George R. Ray, "James Bay District Annual Report - Outfit 255," 30 September 1925, HBCA, 
A.74/38, p. 30, ree11352. 
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peculiar character and effects of the credit system upon an Indian is that deferred 
payments offer a strong temptation to purchase. They are always eager to possess 
and the cost of possessing appears small in remote prospective [sic]. 
Indian receipts are irregular, their consumption constant.82 
In spite of Ray's defense of credit a10ng capitalistic !ines, fur trade conunissioner Charles 
French ordered significant cuts to be made in advances to both Amerindian and Euro­
Canadian customers in June 1927. According to this policy, no trapper, regardless of 
ethnicity, was to receive credit for a sum exceeding 50% of the value of his average fall or 
spring hunt, a sum for which he would again become eligible only after having repaid the 
tota!ity of his debt. 83 
This decision marked the end of the credit boom of the 1920s, during which both 
the HBC and Revillon Frères advanced substantially increased amounts of provisions and 
trade goods to the James Bay Cree and Lac St. Jean Innu (Figure 5.2). Toby Morantz cites 
one oral account claiming that during the decade's boom years, a good hunter might receive 
up to $1,500 in credit.84 This willingness on the part of the two competing companies to 
provide significant advances to the Cree arose from the companies' recognition that although 
western James Bay remained beyond the reach of most small traders due to its remoteness, 
Amerindians felt no need to restrict their business to the region. Instead, they frequently 
traveled to more southerly HBC and Revillon Frères posts (e.g. Abitibi) or to towns such as 
Cochrane that had grown up along the railway. Morantz argues that this abundance of credit, 
when coupled with dramatically decreased shipping costs of relatively low-value provisions 
such as fiour, led the Cree to focus more of their energy than they had previously done on 
commercial trapping rather than subsistence hunting, in the process becoming dependent on 
82 George R. Ray, "James Bay District Annual Report for Outfit 256," 1 September 1926, HBCA, 
A.74/40, p. 151, reel 1352. 
83 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 213. 
84 Toby Morantz, '''So Evil a Practice': A Look at the Debt System in the James Bay Fur Trade," in 
Rosemary E. Ommer (ed.), Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective, 
Fredericton, Acadiensis Press, 1990, p. 215. 
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store-bought food. However, as the value of furs on the world market declined during the late 
1920s and inta the 1930s, the HBC and Revillon Frères slashed not only the prices they paid 
for furs but also the amount of goods they sold to Amerindians on credit, thus locking the 
Cree in a downward spiral of indebtedness. Furthermore, the period witnessed a significant 
drop in the numbers of animais upon which the Cree had previously relied for food making 
any attempt to leave the fur trade by "taking up their traps" and turning to subsistence hunting 
as they had dane at the beginning ofWorid War 1 impossible. Thus, the late 1920s and 1930s 
were years of considerable hardship for James Bay First Nations which caused their eaming 
power to dive and led to the death by starvation of many Cree.85 
During the 1930s, the fur trade, like the rest of the Canadian economy, struggled to 
overcome the effects of the Depression. As Ray has noted, deflation du ring the early 1930s 
practically returned the purchasing power of treaty annuities to their 1870s level. 86 However, 
fur prices on the world market, already in decline during the late 1920s, feU to historic lows 
during the first haIf of the 1930s, before briefly rebounding at the end of the decade and 
falling once moreduring the early years of the Second World War. 87 At the same time as fur 
prices sagged, Indian Affairs reduced relief payments, negatively affecting both Amerindians 
and the HBC whose profits depended to a certain extent on relief payments. 88 Moreover, Ray 
demonstrates that Amerindians did not benefit from the increasing value of the fur trade 
during the 1920s, instead seeing the value of their trapping income decline during the 
period. 89 This meant that Aborigina1 trappers across Canada entered the Depression in an 
already fragile economic condition, which was only worsened by reductions in relief 
85 ibid, p. 219. 
86 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the industrial Age, p. 200-1. 
87 ibid, p. 114. 
88 In late winter 1934, the Mashteuiatsh post journal reports thal, "the Department ofIndian Affairs has 
cul down the relief to Sick and Destitute Indians, which has occasioned a heavy reduction in our 
business." Saturday, JO March 1934, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 53, reellMA53. 
89 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the industrial Age, p. 202. 
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expenditure during the early 1930s. In addition to these factors, the loss of employment in 
southem cities and towns drove substantial numbers of Euro-Canadians into the forests of 
subarctic Quebec and Ontario in search of revenue from trapping. This phenomenon greatly 
affected both the Innu of Lac St. Jean and the James Bay Cree, in many cases simultaneously 
lowering their short-term income and decimating the long-term productivity of their trapping 
grounds.90 Although Indian Affairs, the govemment of Quebec, and the HBC had begun 
addressing this issue through the creation of beaver sanctuaries in eastern James Bay by the 
early 1930s, the Cree of Ontario and the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean would not gain access 
to sirnilar programs until the 1940s.91 
In this context, the large fur trade corporations continued to prefer purchasing furs 
with store credit, causing them to react negatively to trappers who dealt only in currency. 
Julius E. Lips reports that in order to secure cash during the 1930s some Lac St. Jean Innu 
traded their catch fur-by-fur, rather than as a single lot, which was the preferred method of 
the HBC. This meant that the company risked losing the funds paid for furs that, if provided 
as credit or payment in abstract accounting form, would otherwise necessarily retum to the 
company through the sale of merchandise. As a result, the HBC sought to discourage smal1 
fur sales. "This type of Indian does not enjoy the benefits of a winter supply which the more 
conservative Indian gets on credit from the Company. With him, only cash deals are closed. 
He receives no credit."n In the context of the fur trade, then, the pure cash economy mptured 
the ties that bound company and hunter together through ongoing credit relations, providing 
Amerindians with opportunities for profit during good economic times while depriving them 
90 Claude Gélinas, Les Autochtones dans le Québec post-confédéral, 1867-1960, Sillery, QC, 
Septentrion, 2007, p. 205. 
91 For more on beaver sanctuaries, see Chapter Six. 
92 Julies E. Lips, "Naskapi Law: (Lake St. John and Lake Mistassini Bands) Law and Order in a 
Hunting Society," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 37, part 4 (December 
1947),p.379-490,p.446. 
313 
of the safety net provided by credit that was central to survival during difficult periods. It also 
threatened the large trading companies' profit mode!. 
Following the end of the First World War, the HBC and Revillon Frères continued 
to split the lion's share of the fur trade in James Bay. Although a fierce rival, HBC 
management considered the French company to be "straight and honourable" because it 
pursued the fur trade in the traditional manner through the debt system and the annual cycle, 
while employing as little cash as practicable.93 From the HBC's perspective, this approach 
preserved the region from the independent cash buyers who were proving so destructive to 
the company's trade elsewhere in the country.94 Furthermore, the mutual respect in which the 
senior managers of the HBC and Revillon Frères held each other was encouraged by the 
resemblance of the two compaoies' quasi-imperial corporate structure, within which their far­
flung networks of posts necessarily adapted the policy formulated by central, Canadian-based 
management, itself subject to the supervision of boards of directors in London or Paris.95 
However, due to massive losses during the first half of the 1920s, Revillon Frères proved 
incapable of continuing to pursue the fur trade as it had since the turn of the century and sold 
a controlling stake in the company to the HBC in 1926. The HBC initially planned to keep 
the merger secret in order to give both the Canadian government and its Amerindian partners 
the impression that the two corporations continued to compete. Through the collusion of the 
two apparently antagonistic companies, the HBC hoped to limit debt, eliminate the trapping 
of "unprime furs" (those pelts of inferior quality taken in the late summer and early fall), 
control fur prices, reduce post operating costs, eliminate unnecessary outposts and "tripping" 
(the relatively expensive practice of sending goods to trappers' camps), provide the 
93 William C. Rackham, "Annual Report: James Bay District, Outfit 1918," 29 November 1919, 
HBCA, A.74/48, p. 105, reel 1355. 
94 See, for example, Ray's analysis of the Athabasca-McKenzie District. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade 
in the lndustrial Age, p. 142-9. 
95 On the HBC's corporate and administrative stntcture during the first half of the twentieth century, 
seelbid, p. 171-2. On Revillon Frères, see Sexé, Two Centuries o/Fur-Trading... , p. 117-20. 
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impression that competition was already fierce in order to discourage third parties from 
entering the trade, and reduce transportation costs. However, from the beginning fur trade 
publications reported the deal to their readers and rumors of the merger circulated widely 
among Amerindians. Moreover, many HBC and Revillon Frères employees refused to forget 
the nearly quarter-century of competition in which the two companies had engaged and 
ignored their superiors' demands for tacit cooperation, thereby preventing the realization of 
the HBC's plans (with the notable exception of decreased transportation costs). The mounting 
indebtedness of the French company brought on by the Depression aJong with continued 
tensions with its parent corporation led to its outright purchase by the HBC in 1936.96 
During the first half of the twentieth century, in addition to large companies such as 
Revillon Frères, the HBC competed against small itinerant traders and local storekeepers who 
generally only purchased pelts for cash. While the Temiskaming and Northem Ontario 
Railroad (T&NO) did not arrive at Moosonee until 1932, southwestem James Bay had 
already proved to be weIl within the reach of small, cash-paying traders. By the late 1920s, 
the HBC's James Bay District manager, V.W. West, noted the "growing tendency on the part 
of the Moose Factory and Albany Indians to trade at the' line'." West reported that trade 
goods continued to fumish one of the company's primary means of resisting this extra­
regiona1, cash-based competition. However, by this point, the HBC had also begun trying to 
"keep the Indians as satisfied as possible by the adjustment of selling priees of goods and 
purchasing priees of furs." At the same time, West felt that by the time the T&NO reached 
Clay Falls (on1y 100 miles upstream from Moose Factory and "an easy run both summer and 
winter") during the 1929-30 season, the post would be within easy striking distance for a 
"number of Jewish and Syrian traders" based in Cochrane.97 The following year, West 
reported that the Cree had increased their trips to the railway while also receiving the visit of 
"a Syrian trader from Cochrane, one Shamus, [who] came down with four canoe loads of 
96 Harris, "Revillon Frères Trading Company Limited," p. 65-82. 
97 V.W. West, "James Bay District, Annual Report: Outfit 258," n.d. [1928], HBCA, A.74/42-8, p. 14­
5 and 25, reeJ 1353. 
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fancy dry goods and fresh fruits. He established on an island opposite our Post on Moose 
Factory Island, and for a few days did quite a trade in Musquash and cash." The HBC's 
manager, however, noted that, "as we met his priees for furs, and had taken the lead by 
raising them before his arrivai, his trade slackened off once the Indians had gratified their 
curiosity by looking over his goods and buying what attracted them most." In order to combat 
these traders, the Fur Trade Department gave company employees permission to pay "!ine 
priees" at Moose Factory.98 Although little information is available, following the railroad's 
completion to Moosonee, at least one general store, owned and operated by a former HBC 
employee, purchased furs from the Cree by 1940 (W.R. Cargill & Son). Moreover, by the end 
of the 1940s, in the context of the state-run Kesagami beaver sanctuary, Indian Affairs also 
purchased furs for cash from the Cree. 
The HBC faced a different situation in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean. There, the company 
competed for furs against a much larger number of independent fur buyers who were 
generally better financed and thus better equipped to challenge the HBC's dominance than 
the relatively minor and distant opposition of southwestem James Bay. In 1933, for example, 
George Fow!ie, the HBC post manager at Mashteuiatsh, reported that in Saguenay-Lac St. 
Jean "There are seven buyers in opposition to us. In addition to the local buyers - Meridy 
Robertson, Brousseau the Revillons agent and Brassard of Roberval, there are Clement 
Dufour from Chicoutimi, René Yasin who buys for the Paris market, Harry Brahms of 
Montreal and ML Harvey from Kenogami.,,99 As independent fur buyers elsewhere ID 
Canada, those who operated in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean sought above ail to make a profit 
uniquely on furs and not, like Revillon Frères and the HBC, on merchandise. Thus, these 
traders dealt primarily in cash. However, sorne merchants, who also ran general stores in the 
region, fol1owed their larger rivais' example and provided advances to Amerindian trappers. 
Both Alfred Drolet and Clément Dufour, for example, sold goods on credit to Innu trappers 
98 V.W. West, "James Bay District, AW1UaJ Report: Outfit 259," n.d. [1929], HBCA, A.74/43-8, p. 16­
7, reel 1354. 
99 Tuesday, 1 June 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 1, reellMA53. 
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beginning in the 1920s and, in the case of Dufour, continued to do so through mid-century 
from their stores in St. Félicien and Chicoutimi. IDD Méridé Robertson, a band member who 
operated an on-reserve store at Mashteuiatsh, also provided several Innu with credit through 
IDIthe 1940s. 
Regardless of whether they combined credit with cash or not, all of these traders 
purchased furs in the hopes of selling them at a profit either to the HBC or Revillon Frères or 
to fur dealers in Quebec City and Montreal. Their strategy consisted of taking advantage of 
the centralized fur-purchasing tariffs of the HBC and Revillon Frères in order to buy at prices 
between those paid by the larger fur concerns. In this way, they set themselves up as 
middlemen, capable of both outbidding sorne of the competition and selling the purchased 
furs to the rest. They were able to do so because of the practice that most of the Innu had 
adopted by the mid-I920s of selling their furs at informai auction at which each of the traders 
present would tender a bid, the highest of which would secure the furs. Since no trader or 
company could be present at each sueh sale, the sma\! traders often proved capable of playing 
the HBC off against Revillon Frères. For example, in March 1932, George Fowlie, the HBC 
post manager at Mashteuiatsh, observed the workings of this commercial strategy: "Meridy 
Robertson can pay more than me and make a profit selling them to Revillon's."ID2 In addition 
to profiting from differences in priee between the French and English companies, small 
traders also eamed their living by purchasing directly for Montreal and Quebec City furriers. 
In such cases, they were generally authorized to pay higher priees than the HBC and Revillon 
Frères on select pelts. In November 1931, Fowlie reported that John Murdock, "a millionaire 
100 While Drolet appears to have been active primariJy during the 1920s, Dufour, who operated two 
stores (his initial store in Sainte Anne de Chicoutimi and in 1927 added thal of his deceased brother in 
St. Félicien), was an active fur-buyer through mid-century. Carl Beaulieu, Les entrepreneurs Martel, 
Chicoutimi, Les Éditions du Patrimoine, 2008, p. 248. Drolet's activities are recorded in the HBC 
Pointe Bleue post journal. For example, 'Two Indians arrived lhis P.M. but got their advances at 
Drolet St. Felicien." Wednesday, 7 May 1924, HBCA, B.329/a/8, p. 36, reel IMA53. 
101 For more on Robertson 's activities, see Chapter Seven. 
102 Friday, 4 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/aI14, p. 100, reellMA53. 
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contractor of Chicoutimi," finaneed Clément Dufour's fur operations. While in Chicoutimi, 
Fowlie observed that, "Dufour had a phone cali from the Bank saying that Murdock had 
deposed $500.00 to his credit.,,103 
As a result of the relatively high priees and the fierce competition in the Lac St. 
Jean fur trade during the 1920s, the Innu of Mashteuiatsh were able to innovate through the 
adoption of a powerful new tool through which to sell their furs to Euro-Canadian merchants. 
In 1925, an HBC employee noted that the system "works like an auction sale - the buyers 
writing down their priees; and the highest bid gets the FurS.,,104 This mechanism, which 
continued to function through at least the mid-1930s, aUowed Innu hunter-trappers, whether 
they "belonged" to one of the competing commercial interests in the region or not, to sell 
their catch on the open market, using the cash proceeds to reimburse whatever debt they may 
have had. 105 The Innu generaUy held these auctions either on the reserve or in the neighboring 
towns of Roberval and St. Felicien and invited aU interested parties to attend in order to place 
bids. The HBC's Pointe Bleue post journal describes a June 1935 auction: "Baptiste 
Philippe's fur was worth about $525.00. Brassard of Roberval bid $475.00 Clement Dufour 
bid $535.00 so [HBC employees] G. Fowlie & L.G. Tassé bid $550.00. Then the fun started 
and Dufour began bidding up the furs as he did on the Boivin deal. The Company's men were 
determined ta purchase, on account of the moral affect on the Indians, and kept raising their 
priees until they got the lot at $620.00.,,106 Thus, auctions served to secure cash for the Innu 
103 Monday, 23 November 1931, HBCA, B.329/a/l4, p. 72, reel 1MA53. 
104 Tuesday, 26 May 1925, HBCA, B.329/a/9, p. 46, reel lMA53. 
105 This use of the auction to make money from the highest bidder in spite of having been accorded 
credit by one of the competing fur interests is illustrated by the Clearys' 1925 sale. The HBC's post 
journal records the incident: "Two of our Hunters arrived today, Wm. & Chs. Clarey. They will sel[ 
tomorrow, by auction... We gol the lots of Wm. & Charles C1arey this moming, Dufour's bid being 
lower than our's. 75 Beavers in that lot." Sunday 7 and Monday 8 June 1925, HBCA, B.329/aIlO, p. l, 
reel IMA53. Of course, the Innu also continued to reimburse their debt in the "traditional" manner, 
through the use of furs not cash. "Eustache Robertson was in this morning with enough Furs to pay for 
his account." Wednesday, 5 January 1927, HBCA, B.329/a/ll, f. 21r, reellMA53. 
106 Friday, 14 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 5, reellMA53. 
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at rates well above those that they would have eamed from isolated buyers. 107 Even if 
generally unwilling to pay such inflated priees, company employees considered that ensuring 
this "moral affect" was absolutely central to their business because Innu trappers were 
attuned to the amount they could expect from each trader. If the HBC revealed itself to be 
unprepared to meet the competition often enough, Amerindians would begin taking their furs 
elsewhere without verifying different buyers' priees. 
However, not all Innu participated in the auctions, sorne preferring to sell their 
catch as they had traditionally done directly at the HBC post. 108 Such preference for the HBC 
was anything but a rule and, when it occurred was cause for comment. In June 1925, the 
Pointe Bleue post joumal records that, "Old Malek Begin, arrived during the aftemoon, and 
brought his hunt right to the door - a rarity round here, by the way.,,109 Others preferred to 
se11 their catch elsewhere, without necessarily auctioning it, and then reimbursing whatever 
credit they may have received from fur companies. In 1928, the HBC's manager at 
Mashteuiatsh wrote: "Francois Germain was in with two fine dark OUers as it was for paying 
his account. 1 offered him eighty dollars for both ten dollars more than allowed according to 
my Tariffbut he said that he could get $150.00 for these skins so 1 had to let him go. He said 
that he wouId bring me cash for his debt."IIO 
By the mid-1920s, in an effort to increase its Innu patronage and presumably to 
decrease the amount of fur sold at auction, the HBC had reopened its post on the 
107 Although the archives rarely exp1icit on the method of payment, occasional references make it clear 
that the HBC paid for furs purchased at auction in cash. For example, the Pointe Bleue post journal 
from 1933-4 notes: "Mr. Tassé and G. Fowlie made four or five trips ta see fur of Baptiste Philippe. 
Ali the other buyers made bids and we finally secured it for $780.00. [... ] Mr. Fowlie went ta Bank for 
cash ta pay for furs." Tuesday, 6 June 1933, HBCA, B.329/a116, p. l, reel IMA53. 
108 For example, in 1924 the post manager at Mashteuiatsh wrote: "We went ta St. Felicien ta see sorne 
Furs, but could not buy. There is sorne more lndian In & bought sorne Furs." Sunday, 25 May 1924, 
HBCA, B.329/a/8, p. 37, reel IMA53. 
109 Friday, 5 June 1925, HBCA, B.329/a110, p. l, reel IMA53. 
110 Thursday, 2 February 1928, HBCA, B.329/a/12, f. 19r, reel IMA53. 
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Ashuapmouchouan RiveL l11 Now known as "Moar's Post," after its manager, Tom Moar, the 
outpost, open exclusively in the win ter, conducted its business in the heart of Innu hunting 
and trapping grounds as a means of increasing its market share. Rather than the formaI 
environment of the company's stores, Moar's "post" was essentially a well-stocked winter 
camp, from which Moar and his family based their own hunting and trapping activities. The 
HBC's employment of Moar, a member of the Mashteuiatsh band (althougb originally from 
Mistassini) of mixed Aboriginal and European ancestry, reflected its interwar practice of 
hiring precisely such men to manage its outposts throughout Canada. 112 In this case, as 
elsewhere throughout the subarctic, the HBC outfitted such "independent" traders at 
advantageous price in the hope that they would be able to protect the company's credit 
through the collection of those furs caught in the vicinity of their outpost. 1I3 However, while 
Moar's Post was primarily dedicated to recovering furs in repayment of credit and, to a lesser 
extent, the provision of supplies, the company could not neglect the appeal of currency even 
at this relatively remote outpost. In the fall of 1925, for example, cash accounted for over 
30% of the.value of Tom Moar's trade stock. 114 Thus, the outpost trade, initially devised as a 
means of protecting the HBC's merchandisc-based profit margin, ultimately allowed the Innu 
to partially escape the company's control through the cash it provided. Although impossible 
to verify, the company's opposition to cash fur-buying whenever practical suggests that the 
III The first reference to the outpost in the Pointe Bleue journals dates to the fall of 1924. Thllrsday, 9 
October and Friday, 10 October 1924, HBCA, B.329/a/9, p. 16, reel lMA53. Between the early 1890s 
and 1903, the HBC had also operated this OlltpoSt, but it abandoned it and burnt the buildings when its 
manager, the llU1U Charles Robertson, resigned. S.K. Parson, "Report: Rupert's River District, 
Mistassinni Post," 9 September 1891, HBCA, B.133/e/17, p. 12-3, reel 1MI257 and P. McKenzie to 
W.R. Hamilton, 14 March 1903, HBCA, B.329/c/2, f. 208, reel IMB89. 
112 Ray writes: "by 1919 'native' (mixed-blood) men managed a high proportion of its outposts." 
Although these men worked hard, their employment proved problematic from the HBC's perspective. 
"Most native men were illiterate and they had been given no training in simple bookkeeping. Even 
more troublesome, they extended credit too liberally to their kinfolk, and often they paid too much for 
their furs." Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Indus trial Age, p. 110. 
113 Ibid, p. 76. 
114 The HBC's Pointe Bleue post journal records that, "ML Moor left this AM at 10, with about 700.00 
Dollars of merchandise and 325.00 in Cash."13 October 1925, HBCA, B.329/a/10, p. 15, reel IMA53. 
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Innu themselves most likely forced this conceSSIOn, presumably threatening to take their 
business elsewhere if Moar could not provide cash. 
Beyond purchasing furs with cash in the bush, Moar contributed to the region's 
rapidly changing fur trade by placing his personal interests above those of the HBC. 
Although outfitted by the company and provided with trade goods at preferential prices, Moar 
followed the example of other Amerindians and sold his personal catch to the highest bidder 
in order to repay the HBC in cash. In 1931, for example, the company's Masteuiatsh post 
journal records that, "Tom Moar. .. had about $250.00 in furs which he left on his account and 
$130.00 his personal hunt which 1 paid in cash. There were four buyers there to see hùn 
besides me Meridy Robertson, Mr. Brousseau, A. Drolet, and Eugene Simard. Meridy 
Robertson bought a smalliot from him.,,115 
Although the archives provide the greatest amount of infonnation on Tom Moar's 
operations, at least one other Innu conducted outpost trade on behalf of the company. From 
the late 1920s, Napoléon Bégin worked to secure furs on behalf of the HBC at his winter 
camp, most Iikely located near Chibougamau. 116 Like Moar, Bégin sold his personal fur catch 
for cash to the highest bidder after having purchased "his goods for cost" from the HBC. lI7 
According to J. Allan Burgesse, an employee of the HBC's Pointe Bleue post during the 
period, both Moar's and Bégin's posts declined during the 1930s and "disappeared quietly 
around 1937.,,118 Thus, like other Innu, Moar and Bégin preferred selling a portion of their 
115 Wednesday, 1 April 1931, HBCA, B.329/a/14, p. 24, reellMAS3. 
116 In 1926, the Pointe Bleue post journal notes that, "Napoleon Begin left today, leaving Tom Moar 
the only one of our men to go now." Wednesday, 28 July 1926, HBCA, B.329/a/1l, p. 5, reel IMAS3. 
Although he fails to mention the individual who ran the outpost, Burgesse, in his article on the history 
of the HEC's Ashuapmouchouan posts, refers to "a second establishment [that] was located at 
Chibougamau, a !ittle further north" during the 1930s. 1. Allan BUJgesse, "The Unwanted Post," 
Canadian Historieal Review, vol. 28, no. 4 (December 1947), p. 410. 
117 Saturday, 8 June 1931, B.329/a/14, p. 39, reel1MAS3. 
118 Burgesse, "The Unwanted Post," p. 410. 
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furs on the open market, thereby increasing their revenue and contributing to the process that 
would eventually end in the fur trade's full monetization. 
In this context, the HBC increased the harshness of its credit and cash policy even 
as its market share appears to have begun declining during the late 1920s. However, given the 
intense competition of the period's fur trade, the company's Mashteuiatsh post manager 
tempered this policy with practice aimed at retaining his customers whilc not antagonizing 
his superiors. In the spring of 1932, HBC management had apparently decided to eliminate 
nearly ail credit at Mashteuiatsh. George Fowlie opposed this policy, noting that it would 
certainly negatively affect the company's business because "The people have no money and 
the other merchants are giving supplies on credit as the guiding season is about ta 
commence." Fowlie felt that the company cut credit at its peril as the Innu, who contended 
"that they require small credits from time to time to tide over periods of unemployment," 
prefen"ed trading with merchants who proved willing to "accommodate them." As 
generations of post managers before him, Fowlie defended the sale of goods on credit 
because he believed that, "by giving smail credits to those who pay fairly weil that it would 
help our trade considerably.,,119 By the late summer of the same year, Fowlie had begun 
outfitting a large number of Innu trappers on credit. However, he provided significantly 
smaller advances than those of the preceding decade, confirming management's 
determination to reduce credit sales. 120 Moreover, the Innu were not alone in feeling the 
credit crunch; during the 1933-4 season, the HBC reduced advances to Euro-Canadians at the 
post "to practically nothing.,,121 Even in the depths of the Depression, however, the HBC 
119 Monday, 16 May 1932, HBCA, B.329/aIl5, p. 17, ree! lMA53. 
120 For examp1e, in December 1932, George Fowlie purchased $243.65 in furs from Charles and Will 
Cleary which was sufficient to reimburse their combined debt. Saturday, 24 December 1932, HBCA, 
B.329/aI15, p. 45, ree1 1MA53. 
121 Saturday, 10 March 1934, HBCA, B.329/aI16, p. 53, ree11MA53. 
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continued paying for a portion of the furs it purchased at Mashteuiatsh in cash. 122 Moreover, 
according to the company's post manager, the market remained competitive enough that the 
Innu could decide whether to sel! their catch to the company for store credit or cash. 123 By 
this point, many Innu who had been advanced by the HBC repaid their debt in cash eamed by 
selling their furs to the highest bidder. George Fowlie decried this practice, in the process 
calling into question yet again the utility of extending credit to trappers. "This is gratitude as 
understood and practised by the Indian. He prefers to sell his furs to an outsider rather than to 
the Company, which advances him. Boivin paid his debt in cash and this raises the question 
whether it is worthwhile advancing the Indians. We have to wait almost a year before being 
paid and have to take cash or pay far more than his fur is worth in order to collect the 
account.,,124 In other words, during the mid-1930s, the HBC's profits in Saguenay-Lac St. 
Jean remained dependent on the sale of merchandise. In this context, Innu use of cash when 
reimbursing their debt continued to pose serious problems for the company's bottom line. 
However, by this point, even the most recalcitrant of HBC employees had come to accept that 
cash had become a pennanent fixture of the fur trade. As a result, Fowlie, like his superiors, 
increasingly argued in favor the total elimination of credit. 
Arthur 1. Ray describes this moment, also characterized by the increasing 
importance in the subarctic of Euro-Canadian trappers along with religious and state 
organizations, as that at which "company paternalism" ceased ta suffice in justifying 
corporate policy.125 Beginning at the tum of the twentieth century, the state charged the HBC 
122 The Mashteuiatsh post journal contains the following entry: "Several Indians came down to-day so 
we had a very busy day. l bought furs ... [for] a total of$1244.80... l bought these furs partly for cash 
and partly on account ofdebt." Monday, 9 January 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 48, reellMA53. 
123 In January 1933, Fowlie wrote: "1 managed to buy from Joseph McNicol for $67.35 and Benoit 
Jourdain for $59.85. They took most of it in trade so we had a good day in the store." Friday, 20 
January 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 50, reellMA53. 
124 Saturday, 8 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/18, p. 3, reel IMA53. 
125 Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, p. 220-1. 
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and Revillon Frères with delivering relief to Amerindians in remote areas such as James 
Bay.126 Although the state rather than the fur trade companies funded the majority of such 
aid, its raie was kept secret due to fears among Indian Affairs officiais that knowledge of the 
state's involvement would instill a sense of entitlement in Amerindians that, according to the 
prevailing wisdom of the Canadian socioeconomic elite, would only serve to remove the 
motivation to work, thereby permanently pauperizing First Nations. Thus, the HBC and 
Revillon Frères provided relief to the Moose Factory Cree and their neighbors in terms that 
accorded with the traditions of the fur trade and in the hopes of gaining an advantage over the 
competition. The HBC's annual report for the 1916-7 season admitted as much: "The 
Govemment themselves are greatly to blame for the abuses which had arisen due to the fact 
that both the Hudson's Bay Company and Messrs. Revillon Freres were authorized to make 
advances. The natural consequence had been that this authority has been lIsed as a lever to 
obtain the goodwill of the Indians.,,127 This method of distribution required Amerindians to 
hunt and trap if they hoped to receive succor from one of the companies in lean years. 
However, once Indian Affairs, succumbing to popular opinion that increasingly cast 
assistance as a right rather than a privilege while advancing its own legitimacy through what 
Toby Morantz has termed "bureaucratie colonialism," began distributing aid in its own name 
during the 1940s, ail such obligation to trap disappeared. In this sense, the reorganization of 
relief led to the loss of a central element of the HBC' s control over Aboriginal peoples. 128 By 
the 1940s, then, the HBC had become, even in remote regions, simply one fur purchaser 
among many, with little claim to special status in the minds of Aboriginal trappers. At the 
same time, due to the overhunting of fur-bearing animais during the 1920s and 1930s, the 
126 On the HBC's l'ole in securing the right to distribute state-funded assistance to Amerindians, see 
Hugh Shewel1, "Enough to Keep Them Alive". 1ndian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press, 2004, p. 77-87. 
127 N .H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annual Report: Outfit 1916," 31 January 1918, HBCA, A.74/25, p. 63, reel 
1350. 
128 Arthur 1. Ray, "Periodic Shortages, Native Welfare, and the Hudson's Bay Company, 1670-1930," 
in Shepard Krech III (ed.), The Subarctic Fur Trade: Native Social and Economie Adaptations, 
Vancouver, UBC Press, 1984, p. 16. 
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state supplanted the company as the primary actor in Quebec and Ontario's subarctic fur 
trade. During the 1940s, then, the state's policies with respect to money influenced Cree and 
Innu economic fortunes more profoundly than those of private capital. 
Conclusion 
During the first half of the twentieth century, large corporations and small buyers 
each employed money in distinct ways white competing for control of the subarctic fur trade. 
Whilc indcpendent traders, who made their profit on the sale of furs and not on merchandise, 
preferred to employ cash in their transactions with Amerindians, both the HBC and Revillon 
Frères attempted to use their size and capital reserves to lock the Cree and Innu into long­
term commercial relationships bascd on thc provision of goods on credit in the late summer 
and the repayment of debt, including what effectively amounted to interest, nearly a year later 
in the form of furs. At the same time, these large capital concems attempted whenever 
possible to prevent the circulation of cash within fur trade networks as money, espccially 
when used to purehase furs, afforded Amerindians a degree of independence from the 
companies that threatened their business model and, in the minds of top executives, even their 
continued existence. Despite their massive investment in the project, neither Revillon Frères 
nor the HBC proved capable of resisting the monetization of the fur trade that had largely 
come to pass by the 1940s. This failure was in many ways foreshadowed by the HBC's 
inability to force commercial relations to assume a purely barter-based form in western James 
Bay and elsewhere following the end that the French company put to the HBC's monopoly at 
the beginning of the century. In fact, the arguments that eventually paved the way for the 
cash-based trade were strikingly similar to those that post managers employed when arguing 
in favor of credit: if the HBC failed to provide Amerindians credit or cash, they would 
inevitably take their business elsewhere. However, this change was never purely economic. 
The increased circulation of cash in the fur trade resulted as much from political intervention 
as from market activity. Indeed, after the western James Bay market reverted to an essentially 
cashless state following the provision of Revillon Frères' posts with merchandise in 1904, 
Treaty No. 9 forced it to permanently accept Canadian dollars the very next year. During the 
First World War, the HBC, acting from patriotic fervor, halted fur exports (despite substantial 
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growth in demand for furs in the United States), thereby ceding a large portion of its market 
share to cash buyers. The final step towards full monetization, moreover, arose not from any 
decision on the part of the company, but from Indian Affairs' decision to occupy the field of 
social assistance in the north to an unprecedented extent in the 1940s, in the process even 
going so far as to involve itself in the purchase of pelts from Amerindians. Thus, money's 
integration into the subarctic fur trade arose from a combination of economic and political 
factors that included the rise of "bureaucratic colonialism" and the decline of "company 
paternalism." 
In more explicitly political terms, the dollar's replacement of beaver currency in 
western James Bay effectively marked the region as belonging to the Canadian nation-state, 
thereby continuing the process ofstate formation that had begun in mid-nineteenth-century 
Saguenay Lac St. Jean. As a resu1t of its active use by First Nations throughout the north and 
its introduction through treaty by the federal and provincial states, this symbol of national 
sovereignty definitively escaped the strict controls that the HBC had previously placed on its 
use. Thus, Amerindians, who had embraced the Canadian dollar above ail as a means of 
restructuring the commercial relations they maintained with large fur trade corporations, 
inadvertently provided southern authorities with a particularly effective means of 
symbolically integrating the region into national political space. This development ultimately 
led the Cree and other subarctic First Nations from one relationship of dependence on 
external institutional actors to another, as the state theoretically assumed the HBC's 
predominant economic and political role throughout the region. The following chapter 
analyzes the state's nationwide policy and its local practice in Moose Factory, Mashteuiatsh, 
and Wendake with respect to money-use during the first half of the twentieth centulY, 
demonstrating that despite its theoretically straightforward role, the state's discourse and 
material actions proved once more to be anything but identical. 
Chapter 6 
Discourse and Practice from Above: The State and Money, 1900-1951 
During the first half of the twentieth century, the distance separating the state's 
discourse from its practice with respect to Aboriginal money-use remained great. While high­
level bureaucrats and elected officiais proclaimed through legislation and public statements a 
policy aimed at assimilating Amerindians into the Canadian body politic, a discourse which 
turned on the rhetorical figure of the "improvident Indian" who, it was asserted, could not 
competently paliicipate in market society without state supervision, the state's concrete 
engagement of First Nations money-use proved far less clear-cut. Indeed, officiais often 
proved less interested in the concrete implementation of policy than they were in defending 
its theoretical bases. This chapter analyzes state discourse and action with respect to money 
from the top-down. It pays particular attention to Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and 
Wendake while also considering the pan-Canadian context in order to demonstrate that the 
state, like capital, continued to employ money as means of discursively portraying Aboriginal 
peoples as requiring close supervision throughout the period. However, unlike the HBC and 
Revillon Frères, the state rarely made use of money as a material means of exerting force 
over Amerindians, either individually or collectively. Instead, this chapter argues that Indian 
Affairs primarily employed money during the period in order to protect its administrative 
prerogatives vis-à-vis other state agencies, at both the federal and provincial levels, that had 
in several cases begun providing services to Amerindians without regard for their particular 
legal status. 
Between the turn of the century and the post-World War II cra, the state underwent 
important changes, altering its relationship to Canadian and First Nations societies. These 
changes had the effect of introducing new institutional actors in Amerindian communities, 
bom of participation in society-wide organizations and programs such as the military and 
family allowances. Although the Canadian legal regime theoretically allowed Amerindians to 
act in these spaces on equal terms to those enjoyed by ail participants, Indian Affairs 
considered the multiplication of institutional actors in Aboriginal communities to be a direct 
threat to the existence of the clientele model under which it had functioned since the 1860s. 
327 
This competitive context accounts for much of the Department's discourse and action with 
respect to money-use through the mid-twentieth century. Although the state's involvement in 
real-world money-use did affect aspects of day-to-day life among the Cree, Huron, and Innu, 
the Department's discursive intervention into monetary affairs ultimately proved to be of 
greater consequence, favoring the continued existence of colonialism's infantilizing vision of 
Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, this chapter argues that Indian Affairs' use of the "improvident 
Indian" in establishing its institutional raison d'être ultimately had the effect of perpetuating 
widespread stereotypes with respect to Aboriginal peoples and reinforcing the notion that 
they were not yet ready to fully participate in Canadian civil society despite the very real 
socioeconomic success that many Amerindians had achieved. 
The State's Limited Monetary Control, 1900-1929 
During the first three decades of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs only engaged 
money-use in practice on rare occasions, primarily in the context of treaty payments. 
However, even during this period of limited monetary control, official discourse continued to 
portray Amerindians through the accepted stereotype of inherent improvidence. Frank 
Pedley, the deputy superintendent gcncral during much of the first decade of the twentieth 
century, claimed that the legislative framework within which the state had placed 
Amerindians was partly to blame for their poverty. Pedley asserted that this "peculiar 
constitutional tendency of the Indian [leads him) to prefer employment which gives quick 
retums and allows of intennittent application relieved by periodical indulgence in recreation 
to the comparatively plodding and monotonous occupation of farming."l Pedley argued that 
the state had failed in "helping the Indians to help themselves," because "The Indians have 
never manifested any slowness in grasping the fact that irrespective of their own exertions, 
they would not be left to starve, nor could the withholding of rations as a disciplinary 
1 Indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1907, p. xxiii. 
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measure be freely employed in the early days, consistently with the safety of settlers and their 
property. The result was that the industrious found themselves little, if at ail, better off than 
their brethren who opposed vis inertiae to efforts to arouse them.,,2 Thus, the Department's 
chief bureaucrat echoed the conclusion to which the Committee of Lower Canada's 
Executive Council had come seventy years before by claiming that the protective structure 
within which Canada had placed its wards was at least partially responsible for their 
pauperization. While this discourse of inherent improvidence continued through mid-century, 
it initially receded somewhat until thrust into the spotlight once more by the economic 
hardships and increased relief expenditure of the Great Depression. As a result, prior to the 
1930s, the Department's provision of limited amounts of cash to Amerindians proved less 
problematic than it would later become. 
Treaty No. 9 Payments as the "Eyes ofPolitics" in Western James Bay 
Whereas state-backed money imposed itself in Saguenay-Lac St. Jean through its 
use by colonists, it arrived in western James Bayas a result of direct action on the palt of 
authorities. This difference in origin is critical in understanding the divergent manner in 
which the state exerted monetary force in the two regions. Although the state did play a role 
in Innu money-use following the transition to the Canadian dollar, it influenced money-use 
among the Moose Factory Cree in far more direct ways, Iiterally placing cash in their hands. 
Toby Morantz argues that the advance of southern political, economic, and religious 
institutions inta eastem James Bay during the late nineteenth and twentietb centuries is best 
understood in terms of what she caIls "bureaucratic colonialism" because of both "the 
contradictions caused by the various agencies of government's approach to social 
engineering" and the general neglect with which bureaucrats and elected officiais treated the 
2 Indian AjJairs Annual Report, 1906, p. xxiv. 
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relatively remote region. 3 While both of these observations also hold in western James Bay, 
the present section is most concerned with the ways in which the state, although asserting 
official claims to sovereignty, long refrained from governmg the region in any way 
whatsoever. Indeed, even after 1905, Indian Affairs and other state institutions proved 
reticent to occupy any but the most minor of roles in western James Bay, with annual treaty 
payments constituting practically the only interaction between the Cree and the state prior ta 
the late 1920s. 
While the Cree had only limited contact with the federal and provincial state du ring 
the first-half of the twentieth century, previously they had had practically none. Beginning in 
its 1872 Annual Report, the Department of Indian Affairs claimed each year that 420 Cree 
traded at Moose Factory. By 1883, however, this number, whose origin is unclear and which 
had not changed in a decade, disappeared from the Department's official lists.4 In 1902, as 
part of the preparations for Treaty No. 9, the Indian Agent at Fort William polled an HBC 
employee and an Anglican missionary who had bath been active in the area and reported to 
Ottawa that 500 Amerindians were based at Moose Factory.5 Although the HBC had ceded 
its claims to the region to Canada in 1870 through the sale of Rupert's Land, it remained the 
primary Euro-Canadian entity in western James Bay weil into the twentieth centUly. Thus, 
when federal and provincial officiais decided to "negotiate,,6 à treaty with the region's 
3 Toby Morantz, The White Man's Gonna Getcha: The Colonial Challenge ta the Crees in Quebec, 
Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002, p. 7-9. 
4 Indian Affairs reported this number annually from 1872 through 1882.lndian AJJairs Annual Report, 
1872, p. 62 and lndian AJJairs Annual Report, 1882, p. 257. 
5 This estimate, provided by the Indian Agent at Fort William, was based on information obtained from 
"Mr Alex Matheson of Hudson's Bay Co, and Archdeacon Thomas Vincent late of Moose Factory." 
J.F. Hodder, to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 6 December 1902, LAC, RG la, vol. 3033, 
File 235,225, Part 1, reel C-11314. 
6 As John S. Long demonstrates, state officiais did not so much negotiate Treaty No. 9 with First 
Nations as they imposed its terms on them. Long, "How the Commissioners Explained." 
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Aboriginal peoples, they turned to the company? The HBC facilitated the state's assertion of 
sovereignty over far northern Ontario through treaty by furnishing both information in the 
years immediately preceding 1905 and material support to the commissioners who set out in 
that year. 
However, the HBC's role extended beyond the provision of assistance to public 
officiais as its trading posts hosted the treaty "negotiations" and subsequent annuity payments 
to the Cree and Ojibway. Thus, Moose Factory and other posts in the region became the loci 
at which the state interacted with First Nations. Although many Cree continued to lead a 
semi-nomadic lifestyle through mid-century, the arulUal treaty payments helped reinforce 
Moose Factory's role as the center of gravity around which the Cree's annual cycle tumed. 
Prior to the state's assertion of sovereignty over northern Ontario through Treaty No. 9, 
Aboriginal peoples living there possessed greater control over their movements in that if their 
economic well-being favored it, they could change the post at which they conducted their 
business or they might remain in the bush for several years without returning to the post. 
Annuity payments, however, changed this. As John S. Long points out, "[a]long with the 
cash, each male household head received a card or 'ticket numbered for future use and 
identification. ",8 In order to receive payment, then, every beneficiary needed to retuI'n to the 
same post each year. In this way, the money provided by the treaLy commissioners tightened 
the relationship between the Cree and the trading post, making it the point at which the state 
and Amerindians interacted and providing the HBC with a critical means of ensuring its 
continued profitability in the region. 
Treaty payments also had the effect of "creating" far northern Ontario's Aboriginal 
population. They did so through the compilation and maintenance of series of statistical data 
7 David Ca1verley, "The Impact of the Hudson's Bay Company on the Creation of Treaty Number 
Nine," Ontario History, vol. 98, no. 1 (Spring 2006), p. 30-51, esp. p. 38-9. 
8 Long, "How the Commissioners Explained," p. 22-3. The quotation is from the diary of Ontario's 
representative on the Treaty Commission, Daniel George MacMartin. 
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that allowed the state to systematically assess the situation "on the ground" within its national 
bouildaries in order to more effectively govern its territory.9 Indeed, tiu'ough the middle of the 
twentieth century, the Department of Indian Affairs considered that treaty payments provided 
an excellent means of keeping First Nations under close surveillance. 10 Despite the seemingly 
objective nature of official population statistics, the treaty commissioners. determined the 
most fundamental parameter (which individuais belonged to each band) in seemingly 
arbitrary ways. Prior to the signature of Treaty No. 9, the Cree and the other inhabitants of 
western James Bay (primarily Scottish traders and their mixed-blood descendents) did not 
necessarily think in Euro-Canadian sociological terms. Although labor and ethnie divisions, 
one often serving as shorthand for the other, existed and were recognized within trading post 
communities in the region, only in 1905 and 1906 did they become fixed in the federal 
government's insistence that ail local residents be classified as "Indians," thereby benefiting 
from the new treaty, or not. The payment of annuities visibly reinforced this differentiation, 
remaking the society of far northern Ontario in terrns of the pan-Canadian distinction 
between the federal state's Amerindian wards ("status Indians") and ail other Canadians. 
However, the decision to include or eXclude certain individuals from annuity payments was 
in no way "scientific." Although the commissioners admitted large numbers of "halfbreeds" 
to treaty in certain communities, such as Fort Albany, elsewhere (e.g. Moose Fact6ry) only 
9 In his work on the mid-nineteenth-century development of census making in Canada, Bruce Curtis 
terms this knowledge-based apparatus the "eyes of poli tics." Bruce Curtis, The Politics ofPopulation: 
State Formation, Statistics, and the Census of Canada, 1840-1875, Toronto, University of Toronto 
Press, 2002. See also Bruce Curtis, "Révolution gouvemementale et savoir politique au Canada-Uni," 
Sociologie et sociétés, vol. 24, no. 1 (Spring 1992), p. 169-79. On "population" and "governmentality" 
more generally, see Michel Foucault, Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au collège de France, 
1977-1978, Paris, Gallimard/Seuil, 2004, p. 69-77. 
JO See, for example, the testimony that Indian Affairs' secretary, T.R.L. MacInnes, gave to the special 
joint committee of the Senate and House of Commons considering changes to the Indian Act. "Minutes 
of Evidence, No. 3, Brooke Claxton, K.C., Minister of National Health and Welfare, and T.R.L. 
MacInnes, Secretary, Indian Affairs Branch," 6 June 1946, in Canada, Special Joint Commi//ee of the 
Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 80-1. 
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those recognized by local community members as "Indians" signed the agreement.'1 Thus, 
through the monetization of Moose Factory's Cree "population," Indian Affairs was able to 
clearly delineate the object upon which it exerted its force and to simultaneously fix that 
object to a well-defined geographical location. Through this double maneuver, the Canadian 
state integrated the Cree of Moose Factory into its administrative framework and handed 
responsibility for this "new" population to the Department ofIndian Affairs. The significance 
oftreaty payments, then, was anything but purely economic. 
It is important to note that the state always paid the Treaty No. 9 annuities in cash. 
One of the 1905 Treaty Corrunissioners, Duncan Campbell Scott, wrote that the treaty party 
transported by canoe "the treasure-chest which was heavy with thirty thousand dollars in 
small notes.,,12 This policy of paying cash even resisted one of the period's, and Indian 
Affairs', strongest prejudices: the belief that Amerindians, like the pOOl', were naturally 
improvident, and thus could not be trusted with money. In 1928, when G.A. Brown, the 
Provincial Auditor of Ontario, inquired whether Indian Affairs, whieh had itself previously 
voiced concem about the wisdom of paying arrears worth $212 in cash to James Luke of the 
Moose Factory Band, lD. McLean, the Secretary of Indian Affairs, responded dryly that, 
"This man was paid $212.00 arrears by the Department pel' cheque No. 8238.,,13 The 
Department, then, viewed the payment of monetary treaty annuities as an inalienable right. 
This position placed such money beyond its power to alter or control, meaning that it was 
eonceptually distinct from other fOlms of money that the state might eonceivably provide in 
1\ Jolm S. Long, 'Treaty No. 9 and Fur Trade Company Families: Northeastern Ontario's Halfbreeds, 
Indians, Petitioners and Métis," in Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer S.H. Brown, The New Peoples: 
Being and Becoming Métis in North America, Wirmipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 1985, p. 137­
62. 
12 Duncan Campbell Scott, "The Last of the Indian Treaties," Scribner's Magazine, vol. 40, no. 5 
(November 1906), p. 574 quoted in Long, "How the Commissioners Explained ... ," p. 7. 
13 G.A. Brown to Duncan Campbell Scott, 20 December 1928, LAC, RG 10, vol. 3034, file 235,225, 
part 4, reel C-9666 and J.D. McLean to G.A. Brown, 24 December 1928, Ibid. 
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the execution of its duties. This explains depar1mental employees' divergent discourse and 
practice with respect to treaty payments and, among other things, monetary social assistance. 
Although the Department officially began its relationship with the Cree on the 
signature of Treaty No. 9 in 1905, it did not station its first agent, Dr. B.H. Hamilton, in the 
region until August 1929. 14 Hamilton, whose office was located at Moose Factory, was 
responsible for ail of the Amerindian communities on both the Quebec and Ontario sides of 
James and Hudson Bay. In addition to the administrative tasks that Indian Affairs required of 
a\l its agents, Hamilton was also charged with providing medical services to the region' s First 
Nations, each of which he visited by boat or airplane at least once a year. However, given his 
residence at Moose Factory, Hamilton maintained a relatively high profile among the Cree of 
southwestern James Bay. Prior to his appointment, the Department had contact with the First 
Nations of the Ontario portion of the region only once a year at treaty time. In 1931, Dr. W.L. 
Tyrer succeeded Hamilton and held the post until his death in December 1940, at which point 
Dr. T.J. Orford was named agent. In September 1947, Indian Affairs named J.S. Allan agent 
in James Bay while retaining orford 's services as the region' s medical officer. 
During the summers of 1929 and 1930, the same time that Hamilton took up 
residence at Moose Factory, the federal and provincial states extended Treaty No. 9 ta 
include those First Nations north of Fort Albany, including Winisk, Fort Severn, and 
Attawapiskat. In 1936, Indian Affairs reported that, "On the Treaty Nine trip $17,000 in crisp 
new bills is provided by the Government. New bills are taken because they pack easier and 
also because they will constitute a large proportion of the money in circulation in the territory 
for the next year.,,15 Given that the federal government had assumed sole responsibility for 
issuing paper cunency for the first time in 1935, this observation points to the importance of 
treaty payments in modifying the image that Canada sought to project of itself throughout the 
14 Hamilton began drawing a salary on 2S August 1929.lndian AJJairs Annual Report, 1930, part l, p. 
9. 
15 lndian AJJairs Annual Report, 1936, p. 12. 
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whole of its territory. Indeed, prior to 1935, banks had the right to print a portion of the 
Canadian dollars in circulation, although the federal government had exercised a monopoly 
on the issue of $0.25, $1, and $2 notes since Confederation, thereby making it highly unlikely 
that Amerindian treaty signatories ever received private notes in payment. While the 
iconography of private notes referred to their bank of origin as the authority in which their 
value originated, publicly-printed notes also served a different master in the pre-1935 period 
when they bore the words "Dominion of Canada" rather than "Bank of Canada," as they 
would after the founding of that institution. 16 The unification of national space under a single 
currency, printed solely by the newly created Bank of Canada, then, clearly struck the author 
of the Annual Report as a process that was in perfect harmony with the state's payment of 
treaty annuities in "New Ontario." Thus, treaty officiais sought to fulfill their role not only by 
supplying the Cree and Ojibwa of rlOrthern Ontario with the $4 in annuities that the federal 
and provincial treasuries owed them but also by injecting newly printed currency into the 
region, thereby marking it more effectively, in the eyes of both inhabitants and visitors, as 
part of the nation of Canada. 
Since the signature of the original seven numbered treaties during the 1870s, a 
debate of relatively low intensity had been ongoing among politicians, bureaucrats, 
Amerindians, and the public concerning the nature and purpose of treaty payments. While 
First Nations generally held that annuities and other treaty benefits had been designed to 
provide material security in the face of changing economic conditions,J7 representatives of 
the crown tended to argue in favor of the symbolic nature of benefits. During the 1940s, 
16 On the visual imagery of Canadian notes, both private and public, see Emily Gilbert, "'Ornamenting 
the Facade ofHell': Iconography of 19th-Century Canadian Paper Money," Environment and Planning 
D: Society and Space, vol. 16, no. 1 (1998), p. 57-80 and James Powell, A History of the Canadian 
Dollar, Ottawa, Bank of Canada, 1999. 
17 Ray, Miller, and Tough write that, in the case of Treaty No. 6, "the Cree and their allies sought a 
partnership with Canada... thal provided for their basic socioeconomic securi ty lmder the new 
economic realities of the dawning industrial age." Arthur 1. Ray, Jim Miller, and Frank Tough, Bounty 
and Benevolence: A History of Saskatchewan Treaties, Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's 
University Press, 2000, p. 147. 
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Indian Affairs' senior officiais continued to make this c1aim, f1atly rejecting the "mistaken 
idea abroad, that the treaty In,dians were supposed to have a kind of subsistence allowance," 
and instead confidently asserting that, "treaty money is only a token of good faith." However, 
while economically inconsequential, treaty payments continued to furnish the state with a 
wealth of information on their beneficiaries - a fact of which Indian Affairs was acutely 
aware. In 1946, the Branch's secretary, T.R.L. MacInnes, exp!icitly called attention to 
annuities' use in surveillance: 
we know where they are, we know where our treaty Indians are, because they have 
treaty tickets. They have to have that ticket in order to get their payments, so they 
always keep it and never lose it. AIso, the head of a family in a treaty has to report 
in to get his payments, for each member of his family, the deaths and births that 
have occurred in that family; so we know ail about our treaty Indians, and we have 
a very accurate census and individual information about them, because people will 
give information for a consideration which they will not give otherwise; so, if for 
no other reason, 1 be!ieve it to be worth while having that annual treaty payment to 
enable us to keep such good track of our Indians. 
Of course, the secretary went on, officiais were aware "that the actual money, in large part, 
may be frittered away because offolly, for ifan Indian be given $5, he will probably spend it 
for a few !ittle knick knacks or odds and ends, the same day that he gets it; and that is what 
has given rise to the criticism that we were wasting money by that payment. Nevertheless, it 
is an obligation which must be fulfilled unless it be extinguished by commutation of sorne 
kind to pay it off and discontinue the practice.,,18 Branch employees, then, dismissed treaty 
money's economic importance, calling it a symbol and claiming that its distribution depended 
solely on legal obligation. Thus, by mid-century, annuities had become, at least according to 
Maclnnes, a tool useful only for the collection of information concerning its wards and for 
the supervision oftheir movements. 
18 "Minutes of Evidence, No. 3, Brooke Claxton, K.C., Minister of National HeaJth and Welfare, and 
T.R.L. Madnnes, Secretary, Indian Affairs Branch," 6 June 1946, in Canada, Special Joint Committee 
of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed ta Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes 
ofProceedings and Evidence, vol. l, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 79-81. 
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The Depression and State Control of Money 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs continued to deny any 
role to money in relief provision. As had been the case since the commutation debates of the 
1820s and 1830s, state officiais asserted that money offered their naturally improvident wards 
too much freedom. As a result, they preferred to exercise strict supervision of the ways in 
which Amerindians benefited from state-funded social assistance .. At the same time, 
authorities in Ottawa continued seeking to minimize departmental expenditure. These two 
goals combined with the institution's need to justify its existence in order to shape Indian 
Affairs' discourse and practice during the Great Depression. 
Vouchers and the Control ofConsumption 
The Depression led to a substantial increase in departmental relief. An analysis of 
the assistance provided by Indian Affairs in eight of the nineteen agencies in Quebec, 
representing both southem, "settled" First Nations and northern, "hunting and trapping 
Indians," reveals that total relief expenditure in 1933 was 8.5 times greater than it had been in 
1929. Although relief outlay declined somewhat thereafter, it remained well above its pre­
Depression level at least through 1938. 19 Of these eight First Nations, Odanak, Listuguj, 
Kahnesatake, and Wendake, each located in proximity to the Euro-Canadian population, 
received amounts of per capita aid during the period that dwarfed those provided to more 
remote agencies such as Pessamit, Mashteuiatsh, and Temiskaming. 2o In 1931, the 
19 In 1938, relief expenditure was roughly seven times as great as in 1929. The sample used includes: 
Bersimis (Pessamit), Caughnawaga (Kahnawake), Lorette (Wendake), Oka (Kahnesatake), Pierreville 
(Odanak), Pointe-Bleue (Mashteuiatsh), Restigouche (Listuguj) and Temiskaming. The data analyzed 
is from the Indian AfJairs Annual Reports for 1929 ta 1938 (excluding 1937 when the Report included 
no relief statistics). 
20 For example, in 1935, the year in which the Department provided them the greatest amount of relief, 
the Abenaki of Odanak received $56.16 per capita. In contrast, in 1938 Indian Affairs provided the 
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Department reported that, "In the long settled parts of the country, such as the Maritime 
Provinces and older Ontario and Quebec, the Indians on the reserves are in close contact with 
the conununity at large, many of them earning their living as mechanics, labourel's, industrial 
employees, and so on. Lack of employment has affected this class of Indian severely, and the 
department is obliged to provide for many of them by direct relief."zl Of course, as John Lutz 
has demonstrated in the context of British Columbia, such marked disparity in the provision 
of assistance was also due to Indian Affairs ' assumption that subsistence hunting, fishing, and 
gathering would meet the majority of remote Amerindians' nutritional needs, thereby 
sanctioning the distribution of meager relief rations in these conununities. 22 The Department 
also applied this system to central and eastern Canada where it provided relief to "the hunting 
and fishing Indians dwelling in more remote districts, particularly in northern Ontario and 
northem Quebec ... This ration is given to the Indians with the understanding that they must 
go back into the bush and hunt and not loiter about the posts and railway lines looking for 
charity.,,23 Whatever the real needs of these different First Nations, the Department's solution 
to their difficulties consisted of a mixture of straight relief and work-for-welfare programs by 
which residents carried out "road repairs, ditch digging, building operations and other 
necessary activities on reserves."Z4 
The state did not provide such assistance to Amerindians in cash, but in the form of 
non-transferable vouchers good only at the store for which the Indian agent had issued them. 
In exchange for these vouchers and the funds they guaranteed, stores provided Indian Affairs 
with detailed accounts of the goods Amerindians had purchased. Developed during World 
Innu of Pessamit with $5.99 in pel' capita relief - the most assistance that they received during the 
1930s. 
21 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 7. 
22 On relief policy and subsistence gathering see, John Suttan Lutz, Makûk: A New History of 
Aboriginal-White Relations, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008, p. 261-2. 
23 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 8. 
24 1bid, p. 7. 
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War l by the Department's top officiaIs, this system allowed Indian Affairs' headquarters 
staff to supervise the whole process from application for relief through the issue of supplies 
to the repayment of merchants, in the process individualizing each recipient as a separate case 
that required specifie attention?5 In this sense, relief vouchers bore more than a passing 
resemblance to the abstract form of the fur trade's private currency - instead of being 
generally acceptable while representing value independent of their holder's identity, vouchers 
were personalized and only good at a single location. However, in contrast to beaver 
currency, vouchers only allowed their holders access to an extremely limited range of goods. 
According to Mashteuiatsh resident Harry Kurtness, "Nos vieux n'avaient que six ou sept 
piasses par mois. Ils appelaient ça le prêt. À un moment donné, ils appelaient ça les pitons. 
Mais c'était accordé seulement aux vieillards. Avec les pitons, ils n'avaient pas le droit 
d'acheter n'importe quoi. C'était du lard, de la farine, du thé. Ils n'avaient pas le droit au 
luxe, pas de tabac, pas d'autres choses.,,26 In order to change the store for which the 
Department had issued a voucher, its recipient needed to convince the Indian agent that such 
a change was warranted. Certain agents, such as Antoine O. Bastien in Wendake, appear to 
have considered it their duty to decide whether such requests were warranted. Thus, in 1917, 
he refused to transfer Mrs. Georges Gros-Louis's $6 monthly voucher from Albert Rochette's 
store to that of Pierre Pageau.27 Other agents, such as Maurice E. Bastien also of Wendake, 
claimed to have left the decision entirely to relief recipients, even if in Bastien 's case the 
25 Duncan Campbell Scott, the deputy superintendenl general of Indian Affairs, and J.D. McLeam, the 
agency's secretary, both played central roles in the system's development. Hugh Shewell, "Enough to 
Keep Them Alive": Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
2004, p. 99-104. 
26 Althaugh Kurtness's life history, from which this quote is taken, does nat permit the precise dating 
of the system he describes, given that he began working off-reserve in 1936 at the age of 13 and that he 
continued ta earn his living off-reserve thraugh mid-century, il would appear that he is referring 10 lhe 
1930s. Harry Kurtness et Camil Girard, La prise en charge: Témoignage d'un Montagnais, 
Chicoutimi, Les éditions JCL, 1997, p. 19 and 36-7. 
27 21 May 1917, Pierre-Albert Picard, Journal personnel, 1916-1920, p. 44, ACNHW, F-1-79. The 
Huron grand Chief, Pierre Albert Picard Tsichiek8an, claims that Agent Antoine O. Bastien refused 
Gros-Louis's request because he felt that she would receive better value for her voucher l'rom 
Rochette. 17 June 1917, in Ibid, p. 50. 
339 
assertion seems somewhat oversimplified.28 Regardless of how Indian agents accorded 
vouchers, Ottawa sought to bold their value to a strict minimum while also decreeing that, 
"only the aged and destitute or those utterly unable to provide for themselves should receive 
assistance.,,29 ln this way, the Department limited the relief it distributed to a level far below 
that which non-Aboriginal Canadians received during most of the Depression.3o 
While vouchers kept currency out of beneficiaries' hands, they did provide 
significant amounts of money to the merchants who accepted them in exchange for the 
goods. 3 ! Despite Indian Affairs' parsimonious approach to relief provision, two Huron 
merchants, Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui, asserted in 1933 that at Wendake 
departmental vouchers constituted "la presque totalité du pouvoir d'achat d'épicerie de la 
réserve entière." The control of these vouchers and the money they guaranteed the stores that 
received them in payment constituted a major political issue among the Huron, setting the 
less well-heeled members of the band against its political and economic elite. In an open 
letter publisbed in the Quebec City daily, Le Soleil, Gros-Louis and Sioui accused Ludger and 
Maurice E. Bastien, the owners of the third on-reserve store ("Au Bon Marché"), of using 
their political influence to conspire with the conservative MP of Quebec-Montmorency, 
Charles-Napoléon Dorion, to gain control of the vast majority of vouchers. Sioui and Gros­
Louis claimed that together they only received $108 per month in relief vouchers, or roughly 
28 Bastien made this daim in M. E. Bastien, Agent des Hurons de Lorette, to M. le Rédacteur, 6 
February 1933, in "Lettres que nous recevons," Le Soleil, 10 February J933, p. 4. See below for more 
on Maurice E. Bastien's involvement with vouchers. 
29 The Department's secretary sent these instructions to the agent at Wendake near the beginning of the 
Depression in response to increasing requests for relief. T.R.L. MacInnes to P.A. Picard, 5 November 
1930, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 8. 
30 In 1931, Indian Affairs provided more per capita relief than that received by non-Aboriginal 
Canadians. However, in 1932, Amerindians began receiving less expenditure per capita than other 
Canadians. Shewell, "Enough ta Keep ThemAlive ... p.115. 
31 For a more detailed analysis of the issues raised in this paragraph, see Brian Gettler, "La 
consommation sous réserve: les agents indiens, la politique locale et les épiceries à Wendake aux XIX· 
et XX· siècles," in Bulletin d'histoire politique (forthcoming). 
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11.5% of the total, with the remainder being spent at the Bastiens' store. 32 Although 
impossible to veri.fy, their accusations are at least plausible in that, in addition to having been 
the conservative member of the Legislative Assembly from Quebec County between 1924 
and 1927, Ludger Bastien was the grand chief of the Huron from 1929 to 1935. His brother, 
Maurice E. Bastien, was the Indian agent at Wendake from 1931 through the late 1940s, 
thereby wielding significant political influence within the reserve as weil. Moreover, the 
brothers had inherited their father's and grandfather's industrial fortune, created through the 
manufacture of snowshoes and moccasins, and continued to operate several businesses in 
Wendake that employed numerous Huron. Although the accusation generated two responses 
from Maurice E. Bastien along with a second letter from Sioui and Gros-Louis, ail of which 
were published in the widely read Le Soleil, the Department appal'ently nevel' entered the 
struggle. 33 As a result, the situation did not change and "Au Bon Marché" continued to 
dominate the provision ofreliefthrough at least the late 1930s.34 
Although this episode did not lead to the change for which Gros-Louis and Sioui 
hoped, it does underline the centrality of this highly controlled purchasing instrument to both 
Indian Affairs' welfare policy and the economic fortunes of local merchants. Indeed, as they 
provided at least sorne Amerindians with one of their primary sources of revenue during the 
Depression, vouchers contributed both to the survival of the pOOl' through in-kind relief and 
the economic well-being of relatively privileged members of local society through cash 
32 Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui to J.F. Pouliot, M.P., 2 January 1933, in "Lettres que nous 
recevons," Le Soleil, 2 février 1933, p. 4. In the same year, the Department provided a total of 
$11,285.59 in relief to the Huron, or roughly $940 pel' month. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1933, part 
l, p. 6. 
33 The other three letters that Le Soleil published are: M. E. Bastien, Agent des Hurons de Lorette, to 
M. le Rédacteur, 6 February 1933, in "Lettres que nous recevons," Le Soleil, 10 February 1933, p. 4, 
Paul Sioui and Gustave Gros Louis to the Rédacteur, 13 March 1933, in "Lettres que nous recevons," 
Le Soleil, 17 March 1933, p. 4, and M. E. Bastien to the Rédacteur, n.d., in "Les lettres que nous 
recevons," Le Soleil, 21 March 1933, p. 4. 
34 In 1937, two Huron swore before a justice of the peace: "Que l'Agent Bastien détient le magasin 
'Au Bon Marché' par Bastien & Frères, contrôlant les Fonds de Secours des Indiens." Elzéard Sioui 
and Charles Sioui, Sworn Affidavit, II June 1937, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05. 
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payments. While it seems inappropriate to imagine that this system benefitted the Bastiens 
and other Huron to the same extent, departmental assistance did, at least in this specifie 
instance, provide both succor to the economically disadvantaged and currency to the weil-off. 
Vouchers' ability to supply Indian Affairs with a significant amount of information 
concerning relief recipients' consumption habits, while shaping those habits through Indian 
agents' supervision of the goods for which vouchers were exchanged, was also central to 
their development and continued use. 35 
Indian AjJairs and the Conversion ofCash Pensions to ln-Kind Relief 
During the Depression, then, Indian Affairs continued to subscribe to and promote 
the stereotype of Amerindians as inherently improvident. Although rhetorical in nature, this 
figure served to justify the state's practice of witWlOlding cash payments despite growing 
acceptance among Canadians that relief recipients deserved monetary benefits. At the height 
of the Depression, Indian Affairs employees collaborated with their counterparts in the 
Department of Pensions and National Health in order to first extend the coverage to 
Amerindians of a program from which they had previously been excluded - the 
supplementary payments made by the latter to veterans it characterized as "Iow pensioners" ­
before ultimately converting the program's benefits to in-kind relief. This nationwide policy 
change was prefigured by more tentative efforts on the part of the Indian Affairs Branch to 
replace monetalY pensions with in-kind payments to at least a portion of veterans' dependents 
who received monthly payments from the Board of Pension Conunissioners for Canada 
(BPC) and its institutional successor, the Canadian Pension Commission (CPC). Indian 
Affairs officiais' stated goal in pursuing these changes was to ensure that its wards remained 
under the benevolent guidance of the Branch while guaranteeing that they did not succumb to 
the temptation inherent in more cash than was necessary for survival, in the process 
35 Shewell, "Enaugh ta Keep Them Alive", p. 99-\04. See Chapter Seven for more on vouchers in 
Wendake. 
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transforming payments that were universally considered a right glven their recipients' 
wartime service into a privilege akin to charity. However, this substitution also served to 
continue both the Branch's predilection for reducing its expenditure (wherever possible il 
used pension payments as a means of replacing its own relief provision) and its unstated and 
necessary policy of founding "its rightness in reason and in nature."J6 Indeed, since the early 
1860s, Indian Affairs had exercised a virtual monopoly among state actors over its clientele. 
During the interwar period, however, a series of novel programs and state agencies that 
offered services to the entire population, Amerindians included, appeared to threaten the 
Branch's role as the federal state's sole representative among Canada's First Nations. In this 
way, Indian Affairs' efforts to lay claim to the new administrative ground created by 
veterans' and dependents' pensions allowed it to reaffirm its raison d'être at the expense of 
both its stated objective of Amerindian assimilation and the relative autonomy afforded 
Aboriginal veterans and their dependents by monthly pension checks. 
Following the Pension Act of 1919, the BPC awarded benefits to those members of 
the Canadian Expeditionary Force (CEF) whose disabilities arose from or were aggravated by 
military service. Because this act created the BPC as "an independent, quasi-judicial 
tribunal," Indian Affairs held no direct authority over the application of its programs to 
Aboriginal veterans and their dependents.J7 However, for mllch of the interwar period, the 
process by which individuals appl ied for and ultimately received veterans' benefits was 
dallnting in its complexity. Moreover, the BPC frequently proved reticent to award 
meaningful benefits, when it chose to award any at all. 38 In the case of northern Aboriginal 
36 Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1986, p. 45. 
37 Margaret E. McCallum, "Assistance to Veterans and their Dependents: Steps on the way to the 
Administrative State, 1914-1929," in Canadian Perspectives on Law and Society: Issues in Legal 
History, ed. W. Wesley Pue and Barry Wright, Ottawa, Carleton University Press, 1988, p. 162. See 
also, Desmond Morton, "Resisting the Pension Evil: Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Canada's Board of 
Pension Commissioners, 1916-33," Canadian Historical Review vol. 68, no. 2 (1987), p. 204. 
38 On the BPC's complicated administrative apparatus and its frequent unwillingness to award 
pensions, see Desmond Morton and Glenn Wright, Winning the Second Baule: Canadian Veterans and 
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peoples unaccustomed to the logic and workings of a centralized bureaucracy, these 
challenges may very weil have seemed insurmountable. However, given their "privileged" 
relationship with the federal state, First Nations veterans and their dependents were often able 
to draw on the bureaucratic expertise of Indian Affairs and its agents in obtaining and 
defending their military pensions.39 In the case of Moose Factory, this expertise permitted 
Indian Affairs to "recover" its wards from a rival institution. 
Indian Affairs pursued disability pensions for the dependents of at least three Cree 
veterans residing at Moose Factory, ultimately secUling them in two cases. The first of these, 
that of James Quachegan's40 dependents, arose following the veteran's death on 24 October 
1927. The next day, the manager of the HBC post at Moose Factory wrote to the Department 
on behalf of Rachel Quachegan41 to determine whether she and her children, given their 
status as James Quachegan 's dependents, might continue to receive a pension from the 
BPC 42 Although the process required nearly a year to complete, the Department's 
intervention on her behalf led to the BPC awarding Quachegan and her three children a 
pension of $97 per month. 43 Dinah Tapes, the daughter of Cree veteran Obeiah Tapes, also 
the Return to Civilian Life, 1915-1930, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1987, esp. p. 202-25. See 
also Morton, "Resisting the Pension Evil." 
39 Brownlie briefly mentions a similar case in which the Indian agent in charge of the Parry Sound 
Agency from 1922 to 1939, John Daly, assisted Francis Pegahmagabow, one ofhis wards, in receiving 
a pension for his service during the First World War. Robin Jarvis Brownlie, A Fatherly Eye: lndian 
Agents, Government Power, and Aboriginal Resistance in Ontario, 1918-1939, Don Mills, ON, Oxford 
University Press, 2003, p. 69. 
40 The spelling used throughout this dissertation accords with the variant used in present-day Moose 
Factory. Many alternative or~hographies appear in Indian Affairs' files. 
41 Although Rachel Quachegan remarried in 1933, for the purpose of clarity 1 use her original married 
name (Quachegan) in place of her maiden name (Chum) and the name of her second husband 
(Cheena). 
42 James Neil to MI. Awrey, 25 October 1927, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part l, reel C­
8525. 
43 R[?]. Simpson to the Secretary, Deparlment of Indian Affairs, 27 July 1928, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6789, 
File 452-482, Part l, reel C-8525. 
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received a pension through Indian Affairs' efforts.44 Unlike the case of Rachel Quachegan, 
Indian Affairs initially failed to act in order to secure benefits for Obeiah Tapes' widow 
Emily and daughter Dinah following his death on 10 June 1929. The CPC claims that BPC 
officers had attempted to contact both the James Bay Indian agent and the HBC's manager at 
Moose Factory in 1929 and 1930 without ever having received a reply.45 On 24 September 
1936, Tapes's widow, who had since married Andrew Cheena, revived the case by visiting 
the Indian agent at Moose Factory in order to determine whether her fourteen year-old 
daughter, Dinah, was eligible for pension benefits.46 Following Mrs. Cheena's visit, Indian 
Affairs worked rapidly, making a written application for pension to the CPC on 3 October. 
By February 1937, the Commission had ruled in favor of granting a pension to Dinah Tapes 
"at ordinary rates [$15 per month], with effect from the date of application, namely October 
3rd, 1936.'>47 Although Indian Affairs attempted to secure pension benefits for the dependents 
of a third Moose Factory Cree, Oliver Mark, it ultimately failed in doing so because the BPC 
and later the pension tribunal held that Mark had contracted the disease that ended his life 
(tuberculosis) prior to his enlistment.48 
44 As in the case of James Quachegan, Indian Affairs' files contain a plethora of different 
orthographies for bath Tapes (frequently "Tapas") and Obeiah (Obediah/Obadiah/Obiab). "Dinah" is 
aisa occasionally rendered as "Diane" or "Dianah." 1 have again priviJeged the spelling found in 
military documents. 
45 H.W. NichaI ta A.F. MacKenzie, 8 October 1936, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reeJ C-8527. 
46 W.L. Tyrer ta the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 24 September 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 
6796, file 452-584, reel C-8527. 
47 C.H. Cawley[?] ta T.R.L. Madnnes, 12 February 1937, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C­
8527. 
48 For the BPC's initial rejection letter, see N.M. Halkett ta A.F. MacKenzie, 16 October 1930, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 6789, File 452-493, reel C-8525. The Indian Agent later reported that he had "appealed [his 
case twice with the same result, it seems uneless [sic] for me ta do sa again." W.L. Tyrer ta the 
Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 7 October 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6789, File 452-493, reel C­
8525. 
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In aiding its wards with the pension application process, Indian Affairs sought to 
secure control over the resulting funds. A.F. MacKenzie, Secretai)' ofIndian Affairs, wrote in 
the letter that accompanied Rachel Quachegan' s application to the BPC that she "appears to 
be an Indian woman above the average type, and yet, notwithstanding this, l would ask that, 
if any pension be granted to her, and l trust it will, the same be forwarded to this Department 
to be placed to her credit in a Savings Account. The Department will then authorize the 
Hudson's Bay Company at Moose Factory to supply her with provisions and clothing to a 
reasonable amount each month.,,49 In Dinah Tapes' case, the CPC did not wait until Indian 
Affairs had made a similar request, preferring to suggest that the Branch administer the funds 
itself. In a letter addressed to Indian Affairs' secretary, a CPC employee wrote: "When 
retuming the application form will you kindly forward a recommendation as to what disposai 
should be made of payments if an award is authorized. Presumably your Department would 
desire to act as administrator.,,50 The Indian Affairs Branch agreed and it began receiving 
monthly payments following the CPC's decision to award the pensionsi In thes.e two cases, 
then, Indian Affairs proved able to retum its relationship with Amerindians to the clientele 
basis on which the institution had been based since the l860s. 
However, this renewed control over the lives of Indian Affairs' wards and the 
justification that it provided formed only one aspect of pensions' utility from the institution's 
point ofview. These payments also permitted Indian Affairs to reduce the cost of the reliefit 
supplied. In sorne cases this method of reducing departmental outlay seems to have motivated 
Indian Affairs' initial decision to pursue dependents' pensions. In 1930, when first writing to 
the Depaliment on behalf of Kathleen Mark, Indian agent B.B. Hamilton revealed his vision 
49 A.F. MacKenzie to the Secretary, Board of Pension Commissioners for Canada, 18 July 1928, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part l, reel C-8525. 
50 B.W. Nichol to A.F. MacKenzie, 8 October 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C-8527. 
51 T.R.L. Maclnnes to the Secretary, Canadian Pension Commission, 2 February 1937, LAC, RGI0, 
vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C-8527 and c.H. Cawley[?] to T.R.L. MacInnes, 12 February 1937, LAC, 
RGIO, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C-8527. 
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of the use of veterans' benefits at Moose Factory - that is, as a means of assisting destitute 
Amerindians while simultaneously shifting the financial burden of their relief from Indian 
Affairs to the Department of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment. "This woman at the present 
time has absolutely nothing, in fact she has been requisitioned by the Department for years. 
Ali things considered l feel that she has possibly sorne daims to a pension. In writing for her, 
l feel that the responsibility for her maintenance should be placed where it properly 
belongs.,,52 A year later, while renewing his push for a pension on behalf of Mark, Hamilton 
again noted his ward's destitution while subtly suggesting that a successful application would 
eliminate at least a portion ofIndian Affairs' financial responsibilities towards this ward and 
her family.53 
Thus, potential reduction of relief expenditure in part motivated Indian Affairs' 
attempts to secure pensions. Once BPC/CPC funds hadbeen secured, Indian Affairs issued 
vouchers for a value below that provided by the pension payments and invested the remaining 
funds in order to increase their lifetime. Beginning in July 1928, for example, the BPC paid 
$97 per month to the Department on behalf of Rachel Quachegan and her children. 54 Indian 
Affairs issued Quachegan credit at the HBC's post at Moose Factory for the purchase of 
"provisions and clothing to the approximate amount of $60.00 per month." In other words, 
through its policy of depositing a portion of the beneficiary's funds in a bank accounl under 
its supervision, Indian Affairs deprived the widow of nearly 40% of her monthly revenue 
from this source.55 Simi1ar1y, in February 1937, Indian Affairs' Ottawa office requested that 
52 B.H. Hamilton to [?], 25 February 1930, LAC, RO 10, vol. 6789, File 452-493, reel C-8525. 
53 "The Case of Mrs. Oliver Mark, has been in slings for some time. The facts have been before the 
Board on several occasions. This woman is destilute, and has been on the rations list of the Department 
of lndian Affairs, off and on for several years." B.H. Hamilton to the Secretary, Department of Indian 
Affairs, 16 March 1931, LAC, RO la, vol. 6789, File 452-493, reel C-8525. 
54 B. Simpson to the Secretary, Departmenl ofIndian Affairs, 27 July 1928, LAC, ROIO, vol. 6789, 
File 452-482, Part l, reel C-8525. 
55 A.F. MacKenzie to James Adams, 30 July 1928, LAC, RO 10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 1, reel 
C-8525. When Quachegan's pension was later reduced to $87 pel' month, Indian Affairs' central office 
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its agent at Moose Factory, W.L. Tyrer, propose a scheme for managing Dinah Tapes's 
pension payments in the absence of any information regarding the amount that she was to 
receive from the CPC.56 Tyrer responded: "1 think ifwe allowed her to get $5.00 per month in 
supplies at the H.B.C. here and $10. both in spring and fall for c1othing, the rest cou Id be put 
to her credit at the Department and only be used in case of need.,,57 Indian Affairs' central 
office accepted this plan, effectively removing from Tapes's control over 55% of her annual 
58pension income.
Furthermore, once the BPC/CPC had awarded a pension, Indian Affairs and its 
employees c1ear1y looked upon the resulting funds as falling within the realm of relief. When 
writing in January 1940 to inform his superiors in Ottawa that according to his records the 
account held in trust by Indian Affairs for Allan Quachegan had been depleted, the Indian 
agent for James Bay, W.L. Tyrer, c1ear1y enunciates his understanding of the purpose of 
pension accounts: "If there is still a small balance please inform me and l will issue reliefto 
suggested to the HBC manager at Moose Factory, who was then responsible for supervising 
Quachegan's pension expenditure, that "[i]l will, therefore, be in order for you to issue relief. to this 
widow as usual but it is thought that she should not require provisions and c10thing each month to this 
full amount, but that a small portion of it should be left to her credit here to be used in case of 
emergency." A.F. MacKenzie to V.W. West, 7 March 1929, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 
l, reel C-8525. This practice led to widely varying monthly expenditure. Once Indian Affairs had a 
permanent agent residing at Moose Factory, Quachegan's monthly expenditure immediately stabilized 
at $50. Hudson's Bay Company, Receipt for goods issued to Widow Quatchiquan, 3 September 1930, 
LAC, RG 10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part l, reel C-8525. 
56 T.R.L. MacInnes to W.L. Tyrer, 16 February 1937, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C­
8527. 
57 W.L. Tyrer to the Secretary, Indian Affairs, 26 February [1937], LAC, RG10, vol. 6796, file 452­
584, reel C-8527. 
58 $5 per month plus $10 every six months provided Dinah Tapes with $80 of goods annually from the 
HBC. By comparison, Tapes received $15 monthly from the CPC, amounting to an annual total of 
$180. For the details of Tapes's pension, see Canadian Pension Commission, Award Declaration for 
Dinah Tapas, 17 March 1937, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6796, file 452-584, reel C-8527 
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that amount so that the account may be closed."S9 Indian Affairs applied this vision in which 
pension funds provided a means of cutting welfare expenditure in more extraordinary 
circumstances as weil. For instance, when James and Rachel Quachegan's son Peter fel! il! 
while in the bush in March 1936, the Department charged the expenses incurred In 
transporting him to Moose Factory for medical attention to his pension account.60 
However, Cree veterans' dependents did not experience this re-establishment of 
Indian Affairs' control over their lives in entirely negative terms. For instance, the simple fact 
that the Department maintained a permanent address greatly facilitated nomadic families' 
access to pension funds. 6\ Moreover, although Indian Affairs did impose a limit on the credit 
that beneficiaries could receive at the HBC each month that was inferior to the monthly 
pension that the BPC/CPC had awarded them, Indian Affairs placed this money in an 
interest-bearing account, thus allowing the pension funds to grow and, in the case of the 
Quachegans, to ultimately reach tbree generations of the family.62 Prior to the arrivai of the 
Temiskaming and Northem Ontario Railway (T&NO) at Moosonee in 1932, neither Moose 
Factory nor Moosonee (nor any other town within the immediate vicinity) could boast the 
presence of a bank. Thus, Rachel Quachegan, like every other Cree inhabitant of the region, 
would have been unable on her own to open and main tain such an account. In other words, 
59 W.L. Tyrer to Mr. Patrick, 12 January 1940, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 2, reel C­
8525. Emphasis added. From Indian Affairs' records, it is impossible ta determine Allan Quachegan's 
relationship ta James and Rachel. 1would surmise that he was their nephew. 
60 W.L. Tyrer ta Doctor Stone, 6 April 1936 and W.L. Tyrer ta the Secretary, Department of Indian 
Affairs, 12 April 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part l, reel C-8525. 
61 Claude Gélinas astutely makes this point in reference ta welfare benefits paid ta Amerindian 
families in northem Quebec. Gélinas, Les Autochtones dans le Québec post-confédéral, 1867-1960, 
Sillery, QC, Septentrion, 2007, p. 211. 
62 For instance, following the successive deaths of Peter Quachegan on 27 November 1937 and his 
widaw on 8 March 1938, the pension funds remaining in trust at Indian Affairs passed back ta Rachel 
Quachegan to be spent in favor of Peter's three year-old chi Id. W.L. Tyrer to c.c. Parker, 24 
December 1937, W.L. Tyrer ta The Secretary, Indian Affairs, 14 March 1938, and G.A. Conley, Chief, 
Trusts & Annuities, ta W.L. Tyrer, 23 March 1938, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6789, File 452-482, Part 2, reel 
C-8525. 
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through its penny-pinching policy of substituting veterans' benefits for relief, Indian Affairs' 
institutional interests led it to effectively increase the lifespan of its wards' pension payments. 
Of course, this analysis only pertains to a pOl1ion of Aboriginal beneficiaries of 
military pensions. As a result of the pension system's structure, Indian Affairs could only 
intercede on behalf of those Amerindians who changed status. Thus, just as James Quachegan 
drew a pension from his discharge until his death, those veterans who had been awarded 
benefits by military authorities at the end of their service remained beyond the reach of 
Indian Affairs. Furthennore, certain First Nations veterans and their dependents proved 
capable of negotiating the application or modification process without Ottawa's help. In the 
three communities under consideration, several veterans and dependents managed to draw 
pensions in this way. For example, Albert and Caroline Gustin began receiving pension 
payments as a resu1t of their son Joseph 's wartime service in 1937. In contrast to other Moose 
Factory Cree, Indian Affairs appears to have only become involved the following year when 
pension authorities sought its aid in having the coup1e's endorsement of their benefit checks 
witnessed as neither could write. 63 The Indian agent for James Bay arranged for the HBC's 
post manager to witness the Gustins' signatures, thereby ending Indian Affairs' involvement 
64in the case. William Frenchman, a Cree veteran from Moose Factory, also drew a military 
pension without Indian Affairs interference. By 1922, if not before, Frenchman received 
65
monthly checks for $7.50. Two years later, a BPC employee informed Indian Affairs that, 
"Mr. Frenchman requested pension to be paid semi-annually on March 31 st and 30th 
September of each year.,,66 Frenchman continued to manage bis pension without state 
631. Franklin ta W.L. Tyrer, 28 October 1938, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6796, file 452-599, reel C-8527. 
64 W.L. Tyrer ta Mr. Patrick, 3 February [1939], LAC, RGIO, vol. 6796, file 452-599, reel C-8527. 
65 Indian Affairs' archives contain no reference ta the initial pension - neither in terms of the amount, 
nor in terms of the date at which the BPC awarded il. 1.L. Biggar to the Secretary, Department of 
Indian Aftàirs, 7 January 1922, LAC, RGI0, vol. 6786, File 452-432, reel C-8524. 
66 J.T. Gibaut ta A.F. MacKenzie, 10 September 1924, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6786, File 452-432, reel C­
8524. 
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supervision through the mid-1940s. By this point, Reverend Gilbel1 Thompson of Moose 
Factory administered Frenchman's pension benefits on his behalf. When Thompson informed 
the CPC that he was leaving the area, Indian Affairs attempted to gain control of the pension 
as its James Bay agent considered Frenchman "quite incapable of handling his own affairs.,,67 
However, it is unclear from the documentary record if it succeeded in doing so. 
Of course, the Cree were not the only Arnerindians to receive pensions as a result of 
their wal1ime service, even if numerically their military participation dwarfed that of the 
Huron and Innu. In contrast to the Moose Factory Cree, every resident of Wendake or 
Mashteuiatsh who drew a pension appears to have done so without Indian Affairs 
interference. The Huron Captain Louis Philippe Ormond Picard, for example, received a 
small pension of $5.42 per month, paid by check by the BPC, until his death in 1930.68 
Perhaps as a result ofPicard's high rank, Indian Affairs never appears to have taken a hand in 
the administration or payment of his pension. Joseph Kurtness, an Innu from Mashteuiatsh, 
also received a small monthly payment ($7.25) from the BPC follo'wing his discharge. 69 
Indian Affairs only became involved in the case when, after a relatively long exchange of 
letters, pension authorities realized that Kurtness was an Amerindian. They then turned to the 
Department, requesting that it act in its official role as intermediary between Kurtness and the 
BPC.70 However, since the BPC did not grant Kurtness's requcsts for increased benefits, 
Indian Affairs had no means of receiving payment on behalf of the veteran. All of these 
cases, those involving Cree veterans and dependents as well as their Innu and Huron 
67 A.G. Leslie to Doctor Tl Orford, 7 July 1945 and Dr. TJ. Orford to Indian Affairs Branch, 21 
September 1945, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6786, File 452-432, reel C-8524. 
68 H.J. Baueron[?] to Louis P.O. Picard, 7 April 1930, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, File 7. Picard died on 28 
June 1930. n.d., Pierre-Albert Picard, Journal personnel, 1916-1920, n.p., ACNHW, f-I-79. 
69 This is the sum of Kurtness's personal pension ($6.50) and the amount accorded for the support of 
his elderly mother ($0.75). Joseph Kurtness to TG. Murphy, 27 May 1931, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6790, 
fi le 452-511, reel C-8525. 
70 [?], Private Secretary, Memorandum to Dr. Scott, 12 June 1931, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6790, file 452­
511, reel C-8525. 
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counterparts, demonstrate that Indian Affairs depended upon pension authorities at the time 
of changes in pension status when working to claim control over such funds. In the absence 
of such changes and the toehold that they offered, Indian Affairs did not possess a means for 
iuterposing itself between the BPC/CPC and disabled Aboriginal veterans or their 
dependents. Moreover, this means of gaining access to funds proved extremely burdensome, 
as authorities had to intercede on behalf of Amerindians one case at a time. By the height of 
the Depression, however, Indian Affairs had discovered a far more administratively effective 
meaus ofusing veterans' benefits to reduce its own relief expenditure. 
In 1936, the Department of Pensions and National Health decided to extend 
veterans' benefits to "Iow pensioners" residing on-reserve - that is "to Indian Returned 
Soldiers who are receiving a military pension ... too small to enable them to provide for 
themselves and families.,,71 Although Pensions and National Health provided such assistance 
to Amerindians living off-reserve, it had refrained from applying the program to the whole of 
the Aboriginal population because its employees were convinced that Indian Affairs "wouId 
not wish to have on the Reserves any inequality of treatment." However, correspondence 
with Branch officiais in April of that year convinced pension authorities that Indian Affairs 
had "no objection to this inequality" and they therefore proposed that the two agencies 
"decide upon how much additional unemployment assistance will be required to be granted to 
the Indians on your Reserves over and above that afforded by your Department, in order to 
bring the total monthly amount of assistance up to that granted to Indians living just outside 
of the same Reserves."n Although the method of payment that the two agencies decided to 
adopt did not initially provide Indian Affairs with absolute control of the funds (as in the case 
of sorne dependents' pensions), it did allow the Indian agent to exercise a significant degree 
of supervision. In late spring 1936, the Department of Pensions and National Health and 
Indian Affairs held a conference to work out the details of the plan and decided that, 
71 A.F. MacKenzie to E.E. Binet, 3 September 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515. 
72 R.E. Wodehouse to Harold W. McGill, 4 April 1936, LAC, RG10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, ree1 C­
8515. 
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"cheques would be issued by yom DepaItment and sent to the Indians through the office of 
the Indian Agent in order that he may see that the money is properly used.,,73 
However, by December of the same year, the director of Indian Affairs, Harold W. 
McGill, wrote to the deputy minister of Pensions and National Health in an attempt to change 
this system. Branch officiais now believed that, "there might be difficulty if cheques were 
issued to the Indians direct by yom Committee as the Indians might object to the allowance 
being small compared with white pensioners in the neighbourhood. Complaints wou Id, in ail 
probability, be made to yom Committee who wou Id not be in a position to deal satisfactorily 
with the objections raised." McGiIl proposed that a "better plan of handling the allowances 
would be for Indian Affairs Branch to advise the various Iodian Agents of the monthly relief 
grant to each low pensioner in his Agency. Payment would be made by this Branch and each 
month an itemized statement would be forwarded to you and you could reimburse us for the 
month's outlay on behalf ofIndian low pensioners.,,74 The deputy minister promptly accepted 
McGill's proposal. 75 When forwarding the details of the new system to Indian agents across 
Canada, McGill pointed out that the relief was not to be issued, as per the initial plan, by 
check but in kind, instructing the agents "to furnish supplies to the amount of the monthly 
grant.,,76 Thus, Branch officiais gained access to relieffunds and the ability to forcefully align 
their expenditme with Iodian Affairs' general relief policy. Yet again, the agency removed 
cash from the hands of a portion of its Amerindian wards who, according to established 
military pension practice, were entitled to it. In order to forego the possibility of injudicious 
expcnditure ofunrestricted funds, the agent was to supervise pension monies in the same way 
73 A.F. MacKenzie to J.W. McKee, 12 June 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515. 
74 Harold W. McGili to R.E. Wodehouse, 7 December 1936, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel 
C-8515. 
75 R.E. Wodehouse to Harold W. McGill, 9 December 1936, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel 
C-8515. 
76 Harold W. McGill, Circular Letter to Indian Agents, 21 December 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6772, file 
452-40, reel C-8515. 
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that he oversaw the use of relief vouchers, permitting Amerindian veterans and their 
dependents to purchase approved cornmodities alone. Moreover, Indian Affairs used these 
additional funds not to improve the living conditions of veterans and their dependents but to 
reduce its own expenditure. A.F. MacKenzie, the Branch secretary, clearly demonstrated this 
when describing to his counterpart in the Department of Pensions and National Health the 
rate of payment that he felt on-reserve low pensioners should receive. "In arriving at what is 
considered a reasonable allowance, an endeavour is made to put the total monthly receipts of 
a pensioner on a par or it may be slightly higher than that enjoyed by the other members of 
the Indian tribe.,,77 In other words, Indian Affairs would substitute low pensioner payments 
for those who qualified for the Branch's existing outlay on social assistance. Pension officiais 
failed to register any objection to MacKenzie's proposai, thereby effectively condoning il. 
This scheme affected, although only to a limited degree, Indian Affairs' relief 
policy in the three communities under consideration. A. de la Boissière, the Indian Agent at 
Mashteuiatsh, informed his superiors in Ottawa that Joseph Kurtness, an Innu veteran living 
on-reserve, received a monthly pension of $40 for his wartime service in addition to $40 per 
month in Branch-supplied relief. This money, furthermore, provided Kurtness, his wife, and 
their fourteen year-old son with their sole income.78 Similarly, Euséric Picard, a resident of 
Wendake, subsisted solely on the $40 monthly pension that she received for the service of her 
son Joseph who had been killed in action. Picard was not in receipt of any Indian Affairs­
provided relief and the Indian agent did not recommend providing her with any additional 
funds. 79 Thus, Picard did not benefit from any additional outlay for low pensioners because 
the agent at Wendake felt that $40 provided sufficient income to guarantee her survival. 
Likewise, although the burden of providing relief to Kurtness appears to have passed from 
77 A.F. MacKenzie to E.H. Scammell, 24 July 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515. 
78 A. de la Boissière to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 27 May 1936, LAC, RGIO, vol. 
6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515. 
79 M.E. Bastien to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 19 May 1936, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6772, 
file 452-40, reel C-8515. 
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lndian Affairs to Pensions and National Health, his income did not increase. In fact, of ail the 
members of the three First Nations under consideration, only Thomas Nicoshee of Moose 
Factory received assistance in addition to that provided by the combination of his original 
pension and Indian Affairs' relief. 80 From January through May i937 (at which point he 
disappears from the relief rolls), Nicoshee received, in addition to the monthly check for 
$3.75 he drew from the CPC, $10 in monthly supplies from lndian Affairs, an apparent 
increase over the "very little" the James Bay Indian agent reported having previously 
supplied him. 81 
More often than not, the Department repaid the wartime effort of First Nations 
veterans and their dependents not by recognizing their sacrifices, but by seeking control over 
their pension accounts in a bid to decrease relief expenditure and to assert its institutional 
raison d'être in the face of "competing" state agencies. In contrast to the sense of entitlement 
that fuelled Euro-Canadian Great War veterans' political action, which ultimately contributed 
to the expansion of the Canadian welfare state and to changing perspectives on relief among 
the population in general, Indian Affairs officiaIs do not appear to have viewed First Nations 
military pensions as imbuing veterans or their dependents with any particular rights. 82 Rather, 
throughout the period, the Branch only deigned to admit Amerindian veterans' contribution 
80 For the Indian agent's recommendation that Nicoshee be granted additional funds. see W.L. Tyrer to 
the Secretary. Department of Indian Affairs, 28 May [1936], LAC, RG 10, vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel 
C-8515. 
81 See the monthly accounts of relief allowances paid to Indian disability pensioners in LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 6772, file 452-40, reel C-8515. Although these accounts do not mention Nicoshee by name, he 
was the only member of the Moose Factory band whom the Indian agent had reported as being eligible 
for such relief. 
82 See Lara Campbell, "'We Who Have Wallowed in the Mud of Flanders': First World War Veterans, 
Unemployment and the Development of Social Welfare in Canada, 1929-1939," Journal of the 
Canadian Historieal Association/Revue de la société historique du Canada, New Series, vol. II 
(2000), p. 125-49. 
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to the war effort when the agency perceived this recognition as advantageous (either in fiscal 
terrns or as a means of justifying its own existence).83 
Via the control of pensions, the Department sought to reinforce its position as the 
"guardian" of Canada's Aboriginal peoples. This policy had the side effect of promoting 
Indian Affairs' continued institutional existence. Within the particular context of disability 
pensions, the Department actively negated its loudly proclaimed goal of assimilating 
Canada's Indigenous population. If Indian Affairs had first and foremost truly aimed at the 
assimilation of its wards, ail Amerindian beneficiaries would have collected their pensions 
directly from the BPC/CPC as veterans or dependents, rather than as Indians. 84 However, 
pension ftmds presented Indian Affairs with more than a means of reaffirming its institutional 
legitimacy. These monies simultaneously permitted the agency to fund the provision of relief 
to a certain segment of the Amerindian population. without incurring any expenditure 
whatsoever. Moreover, when pension beneficiaries and relief recipients overlapped, the 
administration of pension funds allowed Indian Affairs to reduce its outlay on welfare. Thus, 
the control of disability pensions arising from military service permitted Indian Affairs to 
consolidate its institutional standing while simultaneously curtailing its expenditure, thereby 
combining several of its institutional goals into a single, neatly packaged maneuver. 
83 In addition to the disability pensions forming the basis of the present study, lndian Affairs adopted a 
similar position with respect to the Last Post Fund, an organization dedicated to offering decent buriaIs 
to indigent veterans. In early 1928, following initial correspondence concerning Indian Affairs' on­
reserve burial practices for indigent Amerindians, Indian Affairs' secretary explained that his agency 
made no provision for the purchase of headstones. He continued: "If you are willing to make a grant 
from the Last Post Fund of $25.00 to suitably mark the graves of Indian soldiers this Department will 
be very pleased to accept the grant." A.F. MacKenzie to Arthur H.D. Hair, 21 January 1928, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 6771, file 452-37, reel C-8515. 
84 This observation is also applicable to later programs that included Amerindians even though they 
were l'un by state agencies other than Indian Affairs. For example, following World War II, Aboriginal 
and non-Aboriginal Canadians alike qualified for the benefits provided by the Veterans Land Act, 
although Amerindians were to receive reserve rather than unoccupied Crown lands. As a joumalist 
pointed out in 1946, "Indian veterans are covered under this plan too and so far 260 out of a total 
enlistment of 2,500 have taken grants on the Indian Reserves. The $2,320 in each case is handed over 
to the lndian Agent who supervises the development." Monty Berger, "Veteran Pioneers are Said to 
Get Opportunities in Quebec Province," Montreal Gazette, 14 August 1946, p. 6. 
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The State and Amerindian Money-Use during the 1940s 
Although First Nations began the 1940s in the marginal position they had long 
occupied in respect to the Canadian body politic, by the end of the decade many of their 
concems and their relationship to the Canadian state and society as a whole had come under 
national scnItiny. At the same time, Amerindians found themselves increasingly able to 
benefit from state programs run, at least in part, by agencies other than Indian Affairs. 
Although the state applied many of these programs to First Nations in ways that diverged 
from those used in the case of non-Aboriginal Canadians, the mere involvement of new 
agencies promised to provide Amerindians with novel ways of escaping Indian Affairs' 
bureaucratie control. However, more often than not, such promise remained illusory as the 
Indian Affairs Branch continued its practice of gaining total administrative authority over 
programs that theoreticaUy feU at least partiaUy beyond its purview. In this context, monetary 
payments (or, more frequently, their absence) provided the Branch with an effective means of 
both justifying its existence and applying force in order to ensure its continued control of 
First Nations. This section explores three state programs in effect during the 1940s, each of 
which had an important monetary component, before turning to the general parliamentary 
review that Indian Affairs underwent between 1946 and 1948 and the revised Indian Act that 
would result in 1951. While the political atmosphere of the decade, especiaUy following the 
end of the Second World War, favored greater inclusion of Amerindians in civil society, the 
Indian Affairs Branch discursively employed money in order to reinforce its own standing, 
sometimes to the distinct disadvantage of First Nations. 
Band Laans and Savings Accaunts: Finance Accarding ta Indian AfJairs 
At the very end of the 1930s, the Indian Affairs Branch. launched an ambitious 
program through which it hoped to supply individual Amerindians with developmentalloans 
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from band funds. Despite earlier, informai loan programs, this system had its roots in 
legislation passed in the 1920s.85 In 1924, Parliament accorded Indian Affairs the power to 
provide loans to band members backed by the value of the reserve lands heId by the loan's 
recipient. In that year, Parliament amended the Indian Act to stipulate that, "The Gavernor in 
Council may, with the consent of a band, authorize and direct the expenditure of any capital 
moneys standing at the credit of such band... in the making of loans to members of the band 
to promote pragress, no such loan, hawever, to exceed in amount one-half of the appraised 
value of the interest of the borrower in the lands held by him.,,86 A 1938 amendment to the 
Indian Act extended this power further by permitting the superintendent general of Indian 
Affairs to provide 10ans to "Indian Bands, group or groups of Indians, or individual Indians" 
from Canada's consolidated revenue fund in addition to band funds. Lawmakers intended 
such loans, the outstanding portion of which was never to exceed $350,000, to be extended 
"for the purchase of farm implements, machinery, live stock, fishing and other equipment, 
seed grain and materials to be used in native handicrafts."s7 Thus, although the Indian Act 
permitted the provision of loans to First Nations and their members, it placed tight 
restrictions on the purpose to which such funds might be applied. 
Beginning in August 1939, Indian Affairs' "Band Loans" program provided money 
primarily to individual Amerindians from the funds of the band to which they belonged. The 
Branch launched this initiative "to encourage the Indians to make greater use of their capital 
funds to promote the welfare and progress of band members and to enable individuals ta 
improve their locations by the erection and repair of buildings and fences, the sinking of 
wells, and the purchase of live stock and farming equipment, and ta enable them to enjoy 
85 For example, the Six Nations Iroquois had provided interest-bearing advances on the distribution of 
band funds ta individual members between the 1890s and 1910s. LAC, ROtO, vol. 2796, file 158,908­
2, reel C-I2793 and vol. 2828, file 169,189-1, ree1 C-9660. 
86 Canada, Statutes, "An Act ta Amend the Indian Act," 1924, c. 47, s. 5. 
87 Canada, Statutes, "An Act ta Amend the Indian Act," 1938, c. 3 J, s. 2. 
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more fully the productive value of their lands.,,88 Although the interest charges and 
application process imposed by the system are unclear from the documents consulted, their 
form probably approximated that of Indian Affairs' revolving fund, a similar program (that 
accorded significantly fewer loans) begun at the same time by which the Branch employed its 
own funds to provide funds to both bands and individual Amerindians. "Loans were 
repayable over a five year period and were to bear interest at 5 per cent pel' annum until 
repaid. Applications for loans were to be recommended by the Indian agent, approved by the 
inspector, the branch and the minister before being granted.,,89 Unlike conunercial loans, 
which because of the Indian Act's provisions could not be backed by on-reserve collateral, 
Indian Affairs made use of its role as First Nations' state-appointed guardian to ensure that 
these loans were "adequately secured by real property and chattel mortgages and by 
assignment of interest distributions.,,90 According to Indian Affairs, the loans' beneficiaries 
were afforded every opportunity to repay what they had bOlTowed, even if they proved unable 
to abide by the terms of the original agreement. "There is a procedure established and he gets 
a notice that he must either pay the money or make sorne re-arrangement. If he indicates that 
he proposes to do something in repayment that is accepted and no action is taken; but if he is 
perfectly indifferent as to repayment, then a notice of foreclosure is sent to him by registered 
mail and, upon the expiration of thirty days, foreclosure proceedings are instituted and the 
property is taken possession ofby the band.,,91 
88 Indian A./Jairs Annual Report, j 940, p. 193-4. 
89 "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 8, H.M. Jones, Supervisor, Family Allowance, Indian 
Affairs Branch, and B.F. Neary, M.B.E., B.A., Superintendent, Welfare and Training Division, Indian 
Affairs Branch," 27 March 1947, in Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of 
Commons Appointed ta Continue and Complete the Examination and Consideration ofthe Indian Act, 
Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1947, p. 372. 
90 Indian A./Jairs Annual Report, j 940, p. 193-4. However, prior to the beginning of the loan program, 
several bands had provided "a large volume of unsecured debl.., [toJ individuals." Indian A./Jairs 
Annual Report, 1945, p. 177. 
91 "Minutes of Evidence, No. II, A.G. Leslie, of Reserves and Trusts Service, Indian Affairs Branch, 
Department of Mines and Resources," 9 July 1946, in Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate 
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This liberality, however, did not extend to the control of the loaned funds 
themselves. Contrary to loans sought by contemporary Euro-Canadians, those provided 
through Indian Affairs did not place cash directly in the hands of the beneficiaries, giving the 
money instead to the Indian agent to be spent along the lines spelled out in the loan 
application. In the words of William Scottie Bryce, MP for Selkirk, Manitoba, "if he [the 
Indian] is borrowing money, then he never touches the money himself.,,92 However, because 
the program drew on band funds, only members of those bands that had accepted that their 
capital accounts be used for this purpose had access to loans. Furthermore, because the bands 
set limits on the funds made available to its members, not ail those who applied for loans 
could expect to receive equal treatment. In 1946, for example, only forty-three bands in 
Canada had decided to participate in the program, each making available between $1,000 and 
$15,000 for loans to band members. 93 By 1950, seventy-seven bands patticipated in the 
program, offering from $500 to $25,000 from their capital funds for loans. 94 However, by 
mid-century, none of the three First Nations under consideration appear to have made their 
funds availab1e for the provision of loans to band members. 
In addition to loans from band funds, Indian Affairs supervised another large-scale 
financial program. During World War l, Indian Affairs began holding funds in tmst for its 
wards who reccived payments due to military service. "Early in the war the department 
undertook to administer the estates of Indians who enlisted for active service overseas and ta 
take charge of pensions, assigned pay and separation allowance, when called upon to do so. 
At one time the department had over 400 active accounts, but this number has gradually 
decreased as the soldiers returned from overseas and took up their civil occupations." By 
and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 499. 
92 Ibid, p. 500. 
93 Indian AjJairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 218. Unfortunately, the records consulted do not contain any 
information as to which bands participated in the program. 
94 Indian AjJairs Annual Report, 1950, p. 67. 
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1921, $43,209, or slightly less than half of the total amount of such funds held by the 
Department, was destined for minors who "received pensions, owing to the death of the 
bread-winner." Indian Affairs planned to make use of this money "to start the children in life 
when their education has been completed.,,95 
By 1940, the Branch had expanded this program, apparently in an effort to provide 
banking services to Amerindians who lacked access to financial institutions. In that year, the 
state administered "1,063 individual savings accounts, representing a total of $240,517.46.,,96 
During World War II, the number of accounts and their total value grew substantially (to 
"l,610 individual savings accounts representing a total of $285,626.15") "due to Indians 
increasing their incomes by taking advantage of the demand for labour at good wages, and 
also to the fact that many dependents of enlisted men, saving part of their allowances, have 
used the facilities offered by Indian Savings Accounts as a means of accumulating a fund to 
assist in the rehabilitation of enlisted Indians." Indian Affairs determined that it was 
necessary to give "assistance and advice" to the "dependents whose allowances are 
administered by this Division... because the individuals, having no experience in handling 
money surplus to their essential needs, require supervision in the situations of increased 
income in which they now find themselves.,,97 By the end of the war, individual savings had 
again risen, this time to a total of $383,893.88 divided between 2,300 accounts.98 Although 
impossible to determine prior to this point, in the immediate postwar period these accounts 
bore 5% annual interest,99 By mid-century, this movement had grown further with Indian 
95 1ndian AJJairs Annual Report, 1921, p. 17. 
96 1ndian AJJairs Annual Report, 1940, p. 194. 
97 1ndian AJJairs Annual Report, 1943, p. 157. 
98 Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 217. 
99 The interest rate was calculated using the $19,194.69 the federal govemment paid in interest on the 
total balance of $383,803.88 held on 1 April 1946. 1ndian Affairs Annual Report, 1947, p. 222. 
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Affairs holding 2,679 individual savings accounts for a total value of$636,433.14 in 1951. 100 
While several Cree and Huron appear to have possessed such accounts, no specifie 
information is available on their extent and nature. 101 
In her study of state policy with regard to World War II dependents' allowances and 
Aboriginal families, Emily Arrowsmith convincingly demonstrates the centrality of control to 
Indian Affairs' management of these accounts. She notes that, "Indian Agents had the 
authority to supervise any expenditures" from accounts held by the Branch in the name of the 
wives of Amerindian soldiers, "advising the recipient against the withdrawal from the savings 
account, if he believed it 'unwise. '" Furthermore, Arrowsmith notes that Indian Affairs 
promoted its savings accounts as being preferable to the purchase of War Savings Certificates 
by individual Amerindians because the latter investment option placed its wards' money 
beyond the Branch's control. I02 Of course, as in the case of dependents' benefits stemming 
from the First World War, Indian Affairs' promotion of its in-house savings accounts over a 
rival program that escaped its control had at least one positive outcome: money held in the 
Indian Trust Fund bore a higher rate of interest than that placed in War Savings 
Certificates.'03 Arrowsmith notes, however, that ultimately only 268 of the 754 Aboriginal 
wives who drew dependents' allowances saved money through either of these two programs 
(with the vast majority of these - 220 of 268 - prefelTing War Savings Certificates). In other 
words, nearly 65% of the women who benefitted from these payments preferred to manage 
100 Indian Affairs AnnualReport, 1951, p.16. 
101 Unfortunately, the archivaI files are inaccessible due to restrictions placed upon them by Library 
and Archives Canada. "Lorette Agency - Savings Accounts for Indians, 1921-1961," LAC, RGIO, vol. 
8131, file 374/28-5, part 1 and "Savings Accounts for Indians in the James Bay District, 1901-1961," 
LAC, RG 10, vol. 8316, file 486/28-5, part 1. 
102 Emily Arrowsmith, "Fair Enough? How Notions of Race, Gender, and Soldiers' Rights Affected 
Dependents' Allowance Policies towards Canadian Aboriginal Families during World War Il,'' Ph.D. 
Dissertation (History), Carleton University, 2006, p. 315-6. 
103 Ibid, p. 318. 
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their money without any state involvement. 104 This indicates that the Branch's offer of 
banking services inspired little interest among Amerindians who were visibly more 
comfortable controlling their money themselves than providing Indian Affairs with an 
additional means of exerting force over them. 
Fur Preservation: The Example of the Kesagami Beaver Sanctuary 
According to Peter George and Richard Preston, in western James Bay 'The 1920s 
and 1930s were a time of destitution for the Indians, since the fur market had crashed and 
most of the fur and food animais had been hunted OUt."I05 By 1930, Indian Affairs hoped that 
the imminent arrivai of the T&NO Railway at Moosonee would "provide 0ppOltunities, to 
such of the Indiaris as are willing and industrious, of earning their livelihood and of gaining 
an independence." The Department's 1930 aru1Ual report continued to confidently predict 
that, "By becoming virtually an inland seaport Moose Factory, with its prospective tourist 
and summer trade and the contemplated extensive construction work covered by the 
expanding program of the Ontario Government, will afford openings for the dexterous canoe 
man, the ready guide and the tourist's handy man."I06 However, by the following year things 
had not improved and even the 1932 completion of the railway to Moosonee failed to revive 
the Cree economy as the Department had hoped. The general comments on northem Quebec 
and Ontario contained in Indian Affairs' 1931 annual report effectively illustrate the situation 
faced by the Moose Factory Cree during the entire decade: "The problem of the hunting and 
fishing Indians dwelling in more remote districts, particularly in northern Ontario and 
northern Quebec, is one of the most serious which confronts the department. Lack of 
104 Ibid, p. 321. 
105 Peter J. George and Richard 1. Preston, '''Going in Between': The Impact of European Technology 
on the Work Patterns of the West Main Cree of Northem Ontario," The Journal of Economie His/ory, 
vol. 47, no. 2 (June 1987), p. 451. 
106 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1930, p. 40. 
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employment in other fields has driven the white man in increasing numbers into Indian 
territory... Add to this that fur is scarce and priees are low, and that there is less employment 
guiding sportsmen than in former seasons, and it will be seen that the position of these 
Indians is precarious.,,107 By 1940, R.A. Hoey, Indian Affairs' superintendent of welfare and 
training, reported that the James Bay and Sioux Lookout agencies received "approximately 
fifty pel' cent of the total relief expenditures in the province of Ontario. The Indian popu lation 
of the two agencies is approximately 8,000, compared with a total Indian population in the 
province ofOntario of 31,000." In this context, Hoey felt that, "about the only way to reduce 
relief costs and establish the Indian population on a self-supporting basis would be to 
replenish the region with meat-producing and fur-producing animals.,,108 
During the twentieth century, the provincial states of Quebec and Ontario involved 
themselves in the regulation of Aboriginal peoples' resource harvesting to a much greater 
extent than they had previously done. 109 This generally involved a system by which 
provincial game wardens stamped legally taken furs and seized those that had been trapped 
illegally, sometimes bringing charges against those who had taken them. Initially, such 
regulation disadvantaged Amerindians, who, in accordance with established Aboriginal 
practice, generally preferred to steward the fauna on lands that they intended to continue 
occupying so that they might ensure themselves of a long-term source of food and revenue. 
By the end of the 1930s, however, increasing pressure from Euro-Canadians who sought to 
"trap out" a territory before moving on to the next (thereby eaming revenue while depleting 
107 Indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 8. 
108 R.A. Hoey to Ralph Parsons, 16 January 1940, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6748, file 420-8-2, part 2, reel C­
8105. 
109 On the deve10ping regulatory regime in Ontario, see David Calverley, "Who ContraIs the Hunt? 
Ontario's Game Act, the Canadian Governmenl and the Ojibwa, 1800-1940," Ph.D. Dissertation 
(History), Ottawa, University of Ottawa, 1999. For Quebec, see Toby Morantz, "Provincial Game 
Laws at the Turn of the Century: Protective or Punitive Measures for the Native Peoples of Quebee?" 
in David H. Pentland (ed.), Papers of the Twenty-Sixth Algonquian Conference, Winnipeg, University 
of Manitoba, 1995, p. 275-90. 
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whole areas of fur-bearing animais) inspired Indian Affairs employees to look to techniques 
of wildlife conservation developed in eastem James Bay that sought self-sustainability 
through an appeal to longstanding Cree interest in the fur trade. IIO In 1941, Indian Affairs, the 
Ontario provincial govemment, and the Cree launched the Kesagami beaver sanctuary in the 
hopes of accomplishing such economic revitalization. The preserve, which covered 7,000 
square miles between Moose Factory and the Quebec border, contained roughly twenty-seven 
sections, each providing trapping grounds to up to eleven hcads of household (although this 
number was generally between one and three), which the Cree and state authorities restocked 
with live beaver. 111 From 1946, the point at which the sanctuary was put into "production," 
through mid-century, Kesagami revived Cree fortunes in the fur trade, in the process 
fumishing them with a critical source of revenue. However, this money did not arrive without 
strings attached. As a result of a slumping fur market, the inexorable state drive for reduced 
expenditure, and Indian Affairs' marked tendency towards controlling its wards' lives, by 
1950 the Cree who trapped on the Kesagami found the project to be less productive than it 
had initially seemed. 
In order to ensure that the sanctuary operated according to plan, Indian Affairs, the 
state agency that ran day-to-day operations in the preserve, charged employees based in both 
Ottawa and Moose Factory with managing finances and distributing live-trapped beavers 
throughout the sanctuary. Several Cree actually accomplished this second duty, traveling into 
the bush in order to place beavers in pre-selected locations, in addition to tracking population 
changes within the preserve. In 1942, the year that Indian Affairs first appointed Moose 
Factory Cree to supervise the placement of beaver and to track population changes in 
110 On the population pressure created by "trapping out" and its contribution to the beaver preserve 
movement, see Hans M. Carlson, Home is the Hunter: The James Bay Cree and their Land, 
Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008, p. 172-3. On the establishment of the first beaver preserve in eastem 
James Bay (at Rupert House), see Morantz, The White Man 's Gonna Getcha, p. 159-61. 
III lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1943, p. 146 and [H.R. Conn?], "Beaver Quotas - Kesagami 
Preserve, 1947-48," n.d. [August-September 1947?], LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-I, part 2, 
ree1 C-8105. 
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Kesagarni, the Branch hired twenty-nine such tallymen. 112 Indian Affairs pa id the preserve's 
thirty-five Cree tallymen $50 each and by 1946 it employed thirty-nine Cree at the same 
annual salary."3 The Branch viewed these wages as a "small annual stipend," designed "to 
help them conserve their beaver by the purchase of supplies and to compensate them in part 
for the decrease in revenue due to the closing of the season.,,114 As a supplement to their cash 
wages, Cree tallymen received rations when traveling inland from Moose Factory to place 
beaver couples within the sanctuary."5 In addition to their work in the preserve, in 1943 
several Moose Factory Cree began making annual trips to Algonquin Park under the 
supervision of an Indian Affairs emp10yee experienced in live trapping in order to capture 
and transplant beaver to Kesagami. Each Cree employed in this way eamed $88 in wages 
while also being provided with food and provisions during the trip.116 Indian Affairs reduced 
their wages to $68.75 pel' trapper the following year. 1I7 Although in no way a formaI rule, 
these jobs generally went to members of the band council, with Chief John Fletcher 
occupying one of the positions in every year that the Cree visited the park. 
112 T.A. Crerar ta Herman O. Ripe], Ontario Minister of Game and Fisheries, 16 December 1942, LAC, 
RG la, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4IŒ-I, parti, reel C-8105. 
113 T.l. Orford, Memorandum for Hugh R. Conn, Fur SupervisaI', Kesagami Beaver and Fur Preserve, 
2 November 1943, LAC, ROI0, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4IŒ-I, parti, reel C-8105 and [Hugh R. Conn?], 
Report on Kesagami Beaver and Fur Preserve, n.d. [July 1946?], LAC, RG la, vol. 6749, file 420-8­
4IŒ-I, part 2, reel C-8105. 
114 [Hugh R. Conn?], Report on Kesagami Beaver and Fur Preserve, n.d. [July 1946?], LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 6749, file 420-8-4IŒ-I, part 2, reel C-81 05. 
115 Saturday, 29 June 1942, [Hugh R. Conn?] "Kesagami Fur Preserve: Supervisor's Journal," 15 June 
1942 ta 4 July 1942, LAC, RG la, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4IŒ-I, parti, reel C-81 05. 
116 D.J. Allan ta D.E. Denmark, 20 May 1943 and Hugh R. Corm, "Report on Transplanting Beaver 
Algonquin Park ta Kesagami Preserve," n.d. [April 1944?], LAC, RG la, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-I, 
parti, reel C-81 05. 
117 Hugh R. Corm, "Transplanling Beaver: Algonquin Park ta Kesagami Preserve," n.d. [April 1945?], 
LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4IŒ-I, partI, ree] C-8105. These wages remained in effect in 1945 
as weil. [Hugh R. Conn?], Report on Kesagami Beaver and Fur Preserve, n.d. [July 1946?], LAC, 
RGIO, vol. 6749, flle 420-8-4IŒ-I, part 2, reel C-8105. 
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Once brought into production during the 1946-7 season, the Kesagami beaver 
preserve, following established practice in other sanctuaries in Quebec and Ontario, 
functioned through strict limits placed on the harvest of pelts. Authorities permitted each 
head of household to trap an annual number of beaver. The size of this quota generally 
depended on the size of the Cree family engaged in trapping activities, with larger families 
receiving larger quotas. During the first two years of production, 1946-8, Indian Affairs and 
the Ontario Department of Game and Fisheries kept quotas relatively small, with most Cree 
being permitted to trap between ten and twenty beaver. 118 By the 1948-9 season, many Cree 
had been assigned larger quotas, tending to be between fifteen and thirty pelts pel' family, 
although Caleb Cheena, Joseph Dick, David Loon, and John Oustan were ail allowed to trap a 
maximum of thirty-five beaver. 119 
When Indian Affairs and the Ontario Fish and Wildlife Division first opened the 
Kesagami preserve to partial trapping operations during the winter of 1946-7, the law had yet 
to be changed to legally put it into production under to Ontario regulations. As a result, ail 
trapping of beaver during the 1946-7 season would be technically illegal, and therefore the 
two agencies "arranged that either the Police Constable, or lndian Agent acting in his 
capacity as Deputy Game Overseer, would accept the voluntary surrender of furs which 
would be sold in Toronto along with other furs illegally taken and seized by the provincial 
authorities.,,120 However, the HBC protested this decision because it feH that it deprived it of 
deserved revenue following its active encouragement of the preserve and, as a result, lndian 
Affairs and the Fish and Wildlife Division of Ontario's Department of Lands and Forests 
118 [T.J. Orford?J, "Kesagami Beaver and Fur Preserve: 1946-47, House count & beaver trapping 
quotas," n.d. [October 1946?J, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-l, parl2, reel C-8105 and T.J. 
Orford, "Recapitulation of Kesagami Beaver Funds," 1 September 1947, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 
420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105. 
119 [J.S. Allan?J, Recapitulation of Kesagami Funds, 31 March 1949, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420­
8-4IŒ-4, reel C-8105. 
120 RA Hoey ta R.H. Chesshire, 4 October 1946, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-I, part 2, 
reel C-8105. 
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121
agreed to hold auctions at Moose Factory instead. Indian Affairs provided its agent in 
James Bay with funds from which to make a $10 advance on each beaver skin, regardless of 
size, type, or quality, surrendered to him prior to the auction. Branch officiais decided on this 
course because the Fish and Wildlife Division did "not wish to make the marketing through 
our auspices obligatory on the Indians." In order to encourage high prices, the agent was to 
hold sales every Thursday during the winter "so that if any buyers from Cochrane are 
desirous of bidding on the pelts they may do so without a long lay-over at Moose Factory." 
The furs themselves were to be sold to the highest bidder (each offering a price by sealed 
tender) as lots corresponding to the catch of each individual trapper. In essence, then, Indian 
Affairs assigned its agent the role of fur buyer, a role generally perfonned elsewhere by small 
merchants or the HBC. 122 Once the agent had accepted a bid for a given lot, he wou Id credit 
123the trapper's account minus the sum of advances paid him upon surrender of the furs. 
Although this system was not entirely to the HBC's liking, Indian Affairs 
guaranteed that proceeds from fur sales would be funneled to the company in repayment of 
Cree debt. In January 1947, just after federal and provincial authorities had opened the 
Kesagami sanctuary to production, Conn responded to the HBC's concerns by informing T.l 
Orford, the James Bay Indian agent, by telegram that he had the authority to "accept orders 
from Indians for payment from beaver proceeds.,,124 At the same time, Conn informed the 
HBC's manager, Ronald Duncan, that the Branch would "accept assignment from Indians for 
121 For the HBC's continued protes t, see R.H. Chesshire ta C.W. Jackson, Secretary and Executive 
Assistant, Department of Mines and Resources, 15 November 1946 and R.H. Chesshire ta C. W. 
Jackson, 2 January 1947, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-810S. 
122 It had, however, hired Hugo Watt, the son of James Watt, ta help the agent in performing his new 
raie. H.R. Conn ta T.l Orford, 16 December 1946, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-l, part 2, 
reel C-81 05. 
123 H.R. Conn ta P.H. Watt, 16 December 1946, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-l, part 2, reel 
C-810S. 
124 Telegram fram [R.M.] Duncan to Hugh R. Conn, Il January 1947 and Telegram from H.R. Conn to 
T.lOrford, 13 January 1947, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-810S. 
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current advances against beaver peltS.,,125 Thus, Indian Affairs once again took a band ln 
managing Cree monies by guaranteeing the repayment of credit provided by the HBC. 
At the same time, Indian Affairs employees set about controlling Cree money 
through the payment of proceeds from the sale of beaver pelts by installment, implementing 
the plan that Indian Affairs' had first framed at the outset of the Kesagami project. 126 Under 
this system, the Cree head of household wou Id receive the proceeds of his furs "in three 
instalments, the first of which would be paid in a lump sum to enable the Indian to pay off his 
indebtedness with the merchants, the second palt to be divided into three equal instalments in 
June, July and August, and the balance paid in a lump sum in September to outfit him for the 
faU." Hugh Conn asserted that this plan had been adopted primarily in the interest of 
preventing trappers from receiving too large a sum of money at any one time, which would 
only serve to encourage them to go on "a little spree in Cochrane.,,127 In addition to the $10 
advance, Indian Affairs planned to subtract $4 (termed an "impost") to fund the taUymen's 
wages. 128 Therefore, each skin sold in the first lot of furs taken from the sanctuary was on 
average only wOlth $10 in new money, although in one instance, this sum dropped as low as 
$3.60. 129 As a result of low fur priees, by the summer of 1947, the Branch had reduced the 
125 Telegram from B.R. Conn to Manager, BBC, Moose FactOlY, 13 lanu31Y 1947, LAC, RG 10, vol. 
6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-S105. 
126 For the original plan, see D.l. Allan to Tl. Orford, 15 December 1941, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 
420-S-4KE-I, parti, reel C-SI05. 
127 B.R. COM to R.M. Duncan, 13 lanuary 1947, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel 
C-SI05. 
128 DJ. Allan to Tl. Orford, 2S lanu31Y 1947 and H.R. Conn to Tl. Orford, 12 FebrualY 1947, LAC, 
RG 10, vol. 6749, flle 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-SI05. 
129 For more on the first sale, see below. The average skin sold for $24, $10 ofwhich had already been 
paid to the trapper at the time of surrender. Orford mentions a Cree whose ten fuIS sold for a total of 
$176. Considering that he had been advanced $100 on sunender of the furs and was subject to a $40 
impost, lndian Affairs only owed him $36. Tl. Orford to H.R. Conn, 25 Febru31Y 1947, LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-S105. 
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impost from $4 to $1, raising to $2 during the 1947-8 trapping season, the last during which 
the preserve functioned as a stand-alone project. 130 
Unfortunately for both the Cree and Indian Affairs, "the local fine fur catch" during 
the Kesagmi's inaugural 1946-7 season was, in the Indian agent's words, "a total failure." 
Orford informed Conn that, "This condition is general throughout the Bay area and living is 
pretty grim for those bands not depending upon Sanctuary or Township beaver."J31 Orford 
held the first auction at Moose Factory on 9 January 1947. The HBC failed to pUl'chase the 
lot, making a bid of more than $1,000 less than that tendered by W.R. Cargill and Son of 
Moosonce ($5,584), the only other bidder. As a result, the 231 pelts sold for the relatively 
low average priee of $24.17 per skin. l32 The second auction, at which C. Paulson of Moose 
River Crossing purchased 239 pelts for $6,354, only slightly raised the average value of furs 
from the preserve to $26.58. 133 Furthermore, the HBC's Winnipeg headquarters instructed its 
post manager not to bid on the furs offered in this second auction. As a result of these 
disappointing results, Indian Affairs purchased a store license for $25 from the Ontario 
government and altered its fur marketing strategy in the hopes of receiving better prices for 
the furs. '34 While Hugo Watt, the Branch's fur supervisor based at Moose Factory, continued 
130 Tl Orford to H.R. Conn, 25 February 1947 and H.R. Conn to Tl Orfard, 3 March 1947, LAC, 
RG la, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-SI05 and T.J. Orford to H.R. Conn, 14 June 1947, 
H.R. Conn to Tl Orfard, 20 June 1947, and H.R. Conn to lS. Allan, 9 March 1945, LAC, RG 10, vol. 
6749, file 420-S-4KE-4, reel C-SI 05. 
131 T.J. Orford to H.R. Conn, 17 January 1947, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel 
C-SI05. 
132 Thomas J. Orfard to H.R. Conn, 9 January 1947, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, 
reel C-SI 05. 
133 P.H. Watt to H.R. Conn, 15 March 1947, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel C­
S105. 
134 Conn asserted that, "Our Abitibi (Quebec) furs realized an average of $35.93 on the first sale and 
$42.94 on the second sale... Since writing the above we have disposed of another lot of 173 pelts from 
the Abitibi Preserve in Quebec at an average price of $49.10." H.R. Conn to W.J.K. Harkness, IS April 
1947, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-SI 05. 
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to hold local auctions, the sales were contingent on bids being "twenty to twenty-five percent 
below going market levels in Montreal." If local fur buyers did not meet such minimal 
conditions, Indian Affairs would ship the furs directly to the Canadian Fur Auction Sales 
Company in Montreal for sale. 135 
During the 1948-9 season, the Kesagami beaver sanctuary officially ceased to exist 
as a separate entity, having been merged with Ontario's registered trapline program, although 
the preserve's changed status did not make itself felt on the ground prior to the sununer of 
1949. 136 Ontario's Department of Lands and Forests signaled its decision to change 
Kesagami's status when, in the fall of 1948, it began requiring those Cree trapping in the area 
to purchase standard Provincial Township trapping Iicenses, for which Indian Affairs paid 
during the first year that they were required. 137 This move altered the dynamic of trapping in 
the region yet again, in that, with the exception of those who had received advances from the 
Branch, the Cree were no longer required to sell their catch to the Indian agent. However, in 
the short term this did not prevent Indian Affairs from continuing to control a large portion of 
the furs from the Kesagami. From the Cree perspective, the other major consequence of the 
sanctuaty's transfer to the registered trapline program was the elimination of the tallymen 
positions and the $SO-salary this work brought. '38 
By the time the Kesagami sanctuary ceased to exist as an independent entity, 
seventy-three trappers worked the area, from which, du ring the 1947-8 season, they harvested 
1,336 beaver worth $43,968 ($32.91 per pelt). This represented a one-third price increase 
when compared to the preceding season, during which the Kesagami trappers sold 772 beaver 
135 H.R. Conn ta W.J.K. Barkness, 25 April 1947, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-I, part 2, 
reel C-8105. 
136 H.R. Conn ta J.S. Allan, 8 August 1949, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-81 05. 
137 lS. Allan ta B.R. Conn, 29 November 1945, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, [de 420-8-4KE-1, part 2, ree1 
C-8105. 
138 B.R. Conn ta J.S. Allan, 23 March 1949, LAC, RGI0, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-4, reel C-8105. 
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for $18,625 ($24.13 per pelt).139 This change seems to be primarily attributable to Indian 
Affairs' threat to send furs to Montreal as the agent managed to sel1 al1 of the season's catch 
at Moose Factory, where auction bids corresponded to the Branch' s new price requirements. 
During the 1948-9 season, Indian Affairs decided to fOl'ego local sales altogether, instead 
shipping ail Kesagami furs to the Canadian Fur Auction. 140 However, the Branch failed to 
secure prices in Montreal that equaled those of the previous season's sales at Moose Factory. 
Of the $30,138.28 eamed by Kesagami pelts during the fiscal year 1948-9, the Canadian Fur 
Auction only sold $13,121.28 worth offin as the rest had been auctioned at Moose Factory 
during the summer. However, the 610 furs that Indian Affairs shipped to Montreal earned an 
average per pelt price of only $21.51, a sum that was significantly lower than that of the 
preceding year. Moreover, this average price was also far below that earned by auction at 
Moose Factory in June 1949 ($35.39 per pelt).141 This decline continued into the next fiscal 
year when the three sales for which figures are available for both proceeds and skins sold 
generated an average per pelt revenue of only $17.56. 142 Thus, it would appear from the 
available data that at the same time as Indian Affairs decided to sell ail Kesagami pelts that it 
had purchased in Montreal the bottom fell out of the fur market. Those Cree who traded with 
the Branch noticed this correlation and, as a result, sorne of them sought to take their business 
elsewhere. 
1]9 [H.R. Conn?], Return, Kesagami Beaver Preserve, 1942-1948, n.d. [December 1948?], LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 6749, file 420-8-4K.E-I, part 2, reel C-81 05. 
140 H.R. Conn to lS. Allan, 13 October 1948, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4K.E-4, reel C-SI 05. 
141 For the amounts made by auctions in Montreal dming the year, see [J.S. Allan], James Bay Agency, 
Beaver Funds, 8 October 1949, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-4, reel C-8105. For the number 
of pelts sold, see J.S. Allan ta Canadian Fur Auction Sales Co., 5 March 1949 and J.S. Allan to 
Canadian Fur Auction Sales Co., 14 April 1949 in Ibid. 
142 These sales took place in July and September 1949 and February. The Branch also sold furs in 
Montreal in April and May 1949. J.S. Allan ta Canadian Fur Auction Sales Co., 30 May 1949, H.R. 
Conn ta J.S. Allan, 19 September 1949, and [J.S. Allan], James Bay Agency, Beaver Funds, 80ctober 
1949, J.S. Allan to Indian Affairs Branch, 16 January 1950, and H.R. Conn ta lS. Allan, 17 February 
1950, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4K.E-4, reel C-8105. 
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By the 1948-9 season, Indian Affairs had also begun outfitting Cree trapping in the 
sanctuary on credit in addition to paying the usual $10 fee on the surrender of each beaver 
pelt taken from Kesagami. 143 Dnder this system, the Indian agent guaranteed repayment by a 
Cree head of household of credit extended to him by the HBC or other traders, generally 
because local merchants had already refused to outfit him on unsecured credit. 144 However, 
this innovation contradicted Ottawa's intentions - namely, to provide a maximum of $10 per 
pelt in every trapper's quota, distributed either as an advance or on surrender, at the agent's 
discretion - and, as such, was abandoned when it came to headquarters' attention in March 
1949. 145 Indian Affairs considered the credit that it provided Kesagmi Cree entitled it to 
receive a11 of the furs that they trapped. In order to guarantee that the trappers surrendered 
their pelts to the Branch, the Indian agent required them to sign a statement to this effect 
when providing them with credit. Such contractual obligations had their origins in the 
Kesagami sanctuary's initial phase of production when federal and provincial officiais agreed 
that furs would be marketed exclusively through Indian Affairs. As a result of this practice, 
the HBC and other fur trade interests in the region ceased giving credit to the Cree trapping 
within the limits of the sanctuary, or reduced the credit they did extend to avoid underwriting 
the time spent trapping there, thereby leading to the state's assumption of this necessary 
charge. 146 However, once Ontario had integrated the Kesagami into its registered trapline 
program in the 1948-9 season, the requirement that the Cree trade exclusively with the Indian 
agent disappeared. In spite of this changed legal environment, several Cree remained unable 
143 J.S. Allan ta H.R. Conn, 28 February 1949, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105. 
144 J.S. Allan ta [H.R. Conn], 8 December 1949, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C­
8105. 
145 H.R. Conn ta J.S. Allan, 7 March 1949, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-81 05. 
146 ln December 1949, for example, Allan informed Ottawa that, "Up ta the moment 1 have assisted 
lndians ta the amaunt of about $2500.00 as mast of [hem have been refused any assistance whatever 
fram either Company or traders lacally." J.S. Allan ta [H.R. Conn], 8 December 1949, LAC, RGIO, 
vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-8105. Althaugh he cauched his report in terms of relief, the 
"assistance" he pravided was credit and he and his superiars expected it ta be repaid. 
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to secure advances from the HBC. As a result, Indian Affairs retained a provincial fur buyer's 
license and, to insure itself against unpaid debts, began requiring the signature of marketing 
agreements with each Cree head of household to whom it provided credit. 147 
As fur priees plummeted, the Branch's insistence that those who owed it money 
surrender their catch to the Indian agent created tension at Moose Factory. By late winter 
1949, J.S. Allan reported that he had been informed by the HBC that several Kesagami 
trappers had attempted to sell their catch to the company. Allan, reacting simultaneously as a 
fur trader and cost-obsessed bureaucrat, informed Ottawa that, "The Kesagami Indians have 
had considerable amounts advanced to them for the purpose of trapping this beaver and if the 
selling of their catches should be thrown open you may be prepared to accept a considerable 
IOSS.,,148 Price appears to have been the main factor motivating Cree trappers who sought to 
sell their furs elscwhere. The sale of furs at auction in Montreal imposed new financial 
burdens on trappers; in addition to slumping fur priees, Indian Affairs now had to paya 5% 
auction fee on ail pelts sold while also levying 10% in impost and the $2 per pelt Ontario 
royalty. Thus, a fur that sold for $36 in Montreal would only be worth $28.78 to the Cree 
who had trapped it. 149 Moreover, because the Canadian Fur Auction only held sales regularly 
during the winter and spring, Indian Affairs' practice of sending furs to Montreal, in 
conjunction with its insistcnce on selling the pelts prior to distributing the proceeds, increased 
the time that the Cree were forced to wait before receiving payment for their catch. 150 
147 Furthermore, McKay states that a similar policy of advancing Amerindians had been adopted in 
British Columbia's Stikine agency in the late 1940s. [D.M. MacKay] to R.H. Chesshire, 25 May 1950, 
LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4K.E-4, reel C-81 05. 
148 lS. Allan to H.R. Conn, 16 March 1949, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-4, reel C-81 05. 
149 H.R. Conn to J.S. Allan, 23 March 1949, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-S-4KE-4, reel C-8105. 
150 In July 1949, Hugh Conn wrote 10 a representative of the Canadian Fur Auction Company: "Since 
your next regular sale does not take place until September 6th and since we are anxious to return the 
proceeds of tbese pelts to the natives concerned at the first opportunity, l am writing to enquire 
whether the prospects of a private treaty sale are favourable at the present time and if in your opinion 
substantially the same priees would be reeeived now instead of waiting until the September sale." H.R. 
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Ontario's game warden at Moosonee, Thomas Tyrer, greatly assisted the Branch in 
its attempts to recover debt by forcing the sale of Kesagami pelts to the Indian agent. 151 Sorne 
Cree, however, challenged the authority of the game warden and Indian Affairs to deny them 
the right to trade with other merchants. In the late winter of 1950, Tyrer refused to stamp the 
beaver furs of Erland Vincent and his son, Bobby, both of whom trapped on the Kesagami 
preserve and both of whom felt that they would receive more money for their furs elsewhere. 
The Vincents filed a complaint with the local RCMP detachment, apparently believing that 
they had the right ta reimburse the Branch in cash from the proceeds of their sale. The RCMP 
officer in charge found the Vincents' complaint unfounded, because both father and son had 
signed an agreement ta market ail of their furs through the Indian agent when receiving their 
fall advance. 152 However, this appears ta have been an isolated case, perhaps owing ta Indian 
Affairs' surrender of the Moose Factory fur trade ta the HBC and other commercial interests 
when the agency closed its files on the Kesagami sanctuary after the 1949-50 season. 
Although Indian Affairs and the Ontario Department of Lands and Forests 
successfully revived the nearly extinct beaver population of southwestern James Bay through 
the Kesagami sanctuary, they did sa through a novel form of state surveillance and control, 
what Toby Morantz terms "bureaucratie colonialism," which was in the process of recasting 
Native-state relations. 153 As Hans M. Carlson has written of the Cree of eastern James Bay, 
Beaver reserves had changed the environment, and this had aided Cree hunters in 
their attempt ta live on the lands; at the same time, however, Cree culture had 
Conn to Mf. Prentice, 13 July 1949, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-810S. The 
Canadian Fur Auction recommended against a private sale, thereby delaying payment until September. 
W.P. Ewen to H.R. Conn, IS July 1949, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C-810S. 
151 Allan reports that Tyrer had changed his opinion within a month ofhis original letter to Conn on the 
subject. J.S. Allan to H.R. Conn, II April 1949, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-4, reel C­
810S. 
152 J.L. Van Blarcom, "Handling of Beaver - Kesagami Preserve, Complaint of Moose Factory 
Indians," 24 April 19S0, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4KE-I, part 2, reel C-81 OS. 
153 Morantz, The White Man's Gonna Ge/cha. 
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adapted to the new system of regulation. Because whites had to rely on the Cree for 
the success of these programs, the Cree were able to influence the character of 
bureaucratie action for their own cultural ends and to continue the history of 
negotiated change with the outside world. They had also developed the ability - an 
ability that they would continue to need - to work with white bureaucrats within a 
Western legal structure. 154 
However, such exchange was far from purely positive. Indian Affairs' monetary 
controls, whether in the form of installment payments from the proceeds of its statutory 
monopoly or the contractual and coercive relations it created with its indebted trading 
partners, restricted the ability of the Moose Factory Cree to manage their production and 
revenue as they saw fit. Of course, the Amerindian trading partners of the HBC and other 
commercial fur concerns were never free in any sense of the word. But the state's attempts to 
enforce compliance through contract and monopoly went far beyond the practice of the 
period's fur trade companies. For example, although many companies would cease to extend 
credit to Amerindians who had proven incapable of repaying their debt over a series of years, 
by the middle of the twentieth century they had universally come to accept payment of debt 
in cash earned from the sale of pelts to other traders who offered better priees. Indian Affairs 
refused to accept such conditions, in the process creating resentment among the Cree who 
found their purchasing power diminished because an otherwise legal form of exchange had 
been declared illicit. Furthermore, as the market deteriorated, Indian Affairs' insistence that 
the Cree bear the financial load required for the sale of their furs led to diminishing returns 
for both the trappers and the Branch (by the end of the 1940s, its fur trading budget was 
provided by the 10% fees it imposed on fur sales). This counterproductive behavior suggests 
the point to which the "improvident Indian" had become ingrained in Indian Affairs 
institutional imagination. That by 1950 sorne Cree had come to view the HBC as a preferable 
trading partner to Indian Affairs, in spite of their refusai to outfit these same individuals, 
demonstrates the extent to which the state agency had antagonized its wards. 
154 Carlson, Home is the Hunter, p. 200-J. 
376 
Farnily Allowances 
Family allowances, like fur preserves and veterans pensions, allowed Indian Affairs 
to bolster its institutional raison d'être through the administration of benefits. While most 
Amerindian mothers received payment of family allowances in identical form to that of their 
non-Aboriginal neighbors, the Indian Affairs Branch administered in one way or another the 
benefits of a significant minority.155 However, the Branch retained considerable authority 
over even those mothers who received checks directly from family allowance officiais as 
Indian agents and their superiors in Ottawa held the power to declare individuais unfit for 
cash benefits. Furthermore, Indian agents also often applied for family allowances on behalf 
of the Branch 's wards. In this way, even in those cases when it did not insist on the 
distribution of in-kind benefits, Indian Affairs co-opted monetary payments that might 
otherwise have undercut its legitimacy. The Branch, then, made the case for its necessary 
involvement in the supervision of the payments provided by tbis program tbat was 
specifically designed to avoid much of the paternalistic control and social stigma tbat had 
traditionally been associated with charity and relief 156 
The Family Allowances Act of 1944 permitted the payment of benefits (wbich, by 
May 1946, averaged $14.18 per family and $5.94 per child) to "Indians and Eskimos ... to a 
person autborized by tbe Governor in Council to receive and apply the same.,,157 In early 
155 In 1945, the Branch administered 6,11°of the 16,215 family allowances accorded to Amerindians 
across Canada (37.68%). By 1950, the Branch continued to administer 25.38% of these allowances 
(5,080 of 20,0 14). These pan-Canadian numbers reflect the experience of Ontario First Nations, where 
the number of administered al10wances fell from 42.30% (1,572 of 3,716) in 1945 to 26.30% (1,183 of 
4,498) in 1950. In Quebec, bowever, the percentage of administered allowances was significantly 
higher, falling from 58.48% (769 of 1,315) in 1945 to 50.82% (959 of 1,887) in 1950. 1ndian AfJairs 
Annual Report, 1946, p. 211 and 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1951, p. 21. 
156 On the history of family allowances and their relation to traditional forrns of assistance, see 
Dominique Marshall, Aux origines sociales de l'État-providence. Familles québécoises, obligation 
scolaire et allocations familiales, 1940-1955, Montreal, Les Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1998. 
157 Quoted in Indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 210. Family allowance payments were made on a 
graduated sca1e according to the age of the child for which they were made. Children below the age of 
5 received $5 per month, 6 to 9 year-olds $6, 10 to 12-year-olds $7, and 13 to 15 year-olds $8. 
However, families received $1 less for a fifth child, $2 less for the sixth and seventh, and $3 less per 
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1945, the Department of Mines and Resources and the Department of National Health and 
Welfare reached an agreement by which Indian Affairs would administer family allowance 
payments in cases it deemed necessary.158 In contrast to standard procedure among women of 
non-Aboriginal descent, the Indian agent generally applied for family allowances on behalf of 
his wards. Although the system theoretically required the agent to consult the families in his 
agency, in practice it allowed him to apply for benefits without their knowledge, even going 
so far as to sign the application form on their behalf. In addition, the Indian agent possessed 
significant discretionary powers with respect to the manner in which the Department of 
National Health and Welfare would provide Amerindian women their benefits. According to 
H.M. Jones, an employee of Indian Affairs' family allowances division, "In forwarding the 
registration to the regional director of family allowances the agent specifies the method of 
payment based on his knowledge of the Indian, local conditions, geographic location, etc." 
Jones claimed that, "Indian affairs branch policy as regards method of payment is to have the 
Indians receive their allowances by cheque wherever possible. Where the Indian lives close to 
civilization and can use the shopping facilities of nearby towns and cities, there is no problem 
as far as family allowances payments are concemed. Payment is made to the Indian mother 
by cheque direct, just as with the whites. The Indian mother then cashes her cheque and 
spends the money as she deems best in the interest of her children.,,159 Jones claimed that 
isolation from market infrastructure was the real reason for which the Branch insisted on 
providing benefits to northern Aboriginal mothers in kind because checks would presumably 
be useless in such an environment. Indian Affairs 
child thereafter. Dennis Guest, The Emergence ofSocial Security in Canada, 3rd ed., Vancouver, UBC 
Press, 1997, p. 125 and Marshall, Aux origines sociales de l'État-providence, p. 56-8 and 79, note 110. 
158 Indian AfJairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 210-1. 
159 "Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, No. 6, Max Campbell, M.P., (Battleford, Saskatchewan), G. 
Patrick, Indian Affairs Branch, and H.M. Jones, Indian Affairs Branch," 21 March 1947, in Canada, 
Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Continue and 
Complete the Examination and Consideration of the Indian Act, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1947, p. 
268-9. 
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felt that special arrangements wou Id have to be made to take care of the Indian who 
traps and is away from civilization for months at a time. 
These Indians get exactly the same rate of allowances as anyone else but they 
receive a monthly credit and the money representing this credit is paid to the Indian 
Affairs Branch. 
We buy specially selected foods and c10thing for the Indian children and pay for 
same out of credits mentioned above... Credits, similar to bank accounts, are set up 
for each individual family and are maintained separately. These purchases are made 
through 144 independent trading posts and 105 Hudson's Bay Company trading 
postS. 160 
This agreement, which allowed Indian Affairs to issue credit and sometimes 
specifie goods at local stores in place of the monetary payments made to non-Aboriginal 
mothers, implicitly cast family allowances as relief, something which the framers of the law 
had explicitly sought to avoid by providing checks to every Canadian mother regardless of 
socioeconomic status. In its annual report for 1946, Indian Affairs underlined its skepticism 
as to the advisability of providing such benefits to its Amerindian wards by highlighting "two 
phases of the Family Allowances Act which are not possible to assess in their true light at the 
present time. (a) Whether Family Allowances will tend to make the Indian lean too much on 
the monthly payment and not pursue his regular occupation to the fullest extent... [and] (b) 
Whether it is a good practice to attempt to spend a year's accumulated credits in the three or 
four summer months without causing waste and being of questionable benefit to the Indian 
families." In this way, Indian Affairs underlined its continued reliance on the discursive 
"Improvident Indian," which permitted it to justify its existence and its interference in 
Aboriginal Canada. Its 1946 Annual Report declared that, "The Branch is endeavouring to 
cany out the spirit and letter of the Family Allowances Act to improve the economic status of 
the Indians, but at the same time trying to keep undisturbed the Indian means of 
Iivelihood.,,161 As a result, although the majority of Amerindian families who benefited from 
allowances in 1945 (10,105) received direct payment by check, the remaining households 
160 Ibid, p. 269-70. 
161 Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1946, p. 212-3. 
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(6,110) were ail subject to some form of departmental surveillance. Thus, 1,959 mothers 
received payment by checks that first passed through the hands of the Indian agent, Indian 
Affairs administered the benefits of 602 families through trust funds, and 3,549 mothers 
received their benefits in kind at local stores. 162 
White the form in which the state paid family allowances at Mashteuiatsh and 
Wendake is unclear, it appears almost certain that Cree mothers received their benefits in 
kind at local stores. Although no information directly concerning payment at Moose Factory 
has been found, John J. Honigmann notes that the federal government did not provide family 
allowances by check directly to the Cree of Attawapiskat in northwestem James Bay until 
1955. 163 Toby Morantz, in her study of bureaucratie colonialism in eastern James Bay, 
demonstrates the deep flaws in this centrally-controlled system through which field and 
headquarters staff replaced cunency with credit. Morantz notes that the HBC wielded far 
more power in northern Quebec than Indian Affairs acknowledged in its public discourse. For 
example, post managers often required that the Cree spend ail of the credit accumulated 
during the win ter from family allowances when they returned to the post in the spring. This 
practice, which primarily served the company's bottom-line, forced Cree beneficiaries to 
purchase provisions from the posts' dwindling stock, providing mothers with a severely 
limited selection and often leaving them with items of little value to themselves and· their 
family.164 In the cases considered by the present dissertation, however, it appears unlikely 
that the HBC was able to employ family allowances with such disregard for their clients' 
162 Ibid, p. 211. Robert Hoey, director of the Indian Affairs Branch, repeated this information verbatim 
in the testimony he provided to the joint committee of the Senate and the House Commons charged 
with considering modifications to the Indian Act. "Minutes of Evidence, No. 1, Robert A. Hoey, 
Director ofIndian Affairs," 28-30 May 1946, in Canada, Special Joint Commillee ofthe Senate and the 
Hause af Commans Appointed ta Examine and Consider the Indian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 21-2. 
163 John J. Honigmann, "Attawapiskal- BJend of Traditions," Anthropologica, no. 6 (1958), p. 67 [57­
67]. 
164 Morantz, The White Man 's Ganna Getcha, p. 208-9. 
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wellbeing as even at Moose Factory, the least commercially developed of the three 
cornmunities analyzed, the Indian agent dealt with at least one local store in addition to the 
company's post (W.R. Cargill & Son in Moosonee).165 Regardless, family allowances 
affected Moose Factory and Mashteuiatsh profoundly as the state made their payment 
dependent upon the attendance of school by ail children (Euro-Canadian and Aboriginal 
alike). In ether words, these transfer payments required impol1ant changes on the part of 
hunting and trapping families who, if they chose to accept the substantial additional revenue 
that family allowances provided, could no longer benefit from the presence and assistance of 
children in the bush. 
Yet again the provision of cash by the state to First Nations proved to be anything 
but straightforward. Indian Affairs made use of family allowances to public1y promote its l'Ole 
as guardian of Amerindians, portrayed by both the law and the Branch as irresponsible 
minors. Even in those cases where its field and headquarters staff saw fit to provide checks 
directly to mothers, Indian Affairs maintained the ability to alter these arrangements in the 
absence of any external review. Thus, public and Branch mistrust of the ability to handle cash 
of a sector the population that had traditionally been perceived as inherently improvident 
along with the somewhat specious argument that relatively remote First Nations could only 
spend their family allowances at a single store provided Indian Affairs with ample 
justification for interjecting itself between the family allowance authorities and Aboriginal 
mothers. The HBC fully cooperated in the scheme, in the process securing access to increased 
sales and, in some instances at least, gaining a means of eliminating its stock of unsold 
merchandise. Although restrictions on the archivai record do not permit an in-depth analysis 
of how mothers employed family allowances in Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake, 
it seems reasonable to assume that they appreciated this novel source of revenue and used it 
165 Although primarily involved in bidding on lots of furs produced by the Kesagami fur preserve, 
W.R. Cargill & Son also occasionally outfitted tallymen working on the preserve. See, for example, 
Indian Affairs Branch, "Merchandise Order Slip for W.R. Cargill & Son, Moosonee," 30 September 
1943, LAC, RGlO, vol. 6749, file 420-8-4IŒ-l, parti, reel C-810S. 
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in much the same way as women across Canada. Ultimately, however, instead of serving first 
and foremost to encourage the financial independence and economic well-being of 
Arnerindian families, the implementation of this federal program in First Nations 
communities functioned primarily to generate profit for fur trade companies and to justify the 
Department's institutional existence. In this sense, family allowances seem to have reinforced 
the inequality of Canadian society as similarly universal social assistance programs did 
elsewhere. 166 
The Limited EfJect of Parliamentary Scrutiny on Indian AjJairs' Monetary Powers: The. 
Indian Act of1951 
In 1946, Parliament created a special joint committee of the Senate and House of 
Commons to scrutinize First Nations-state relations and to make recommendations for 
modifying the Indian Act. Specifically, the committee was charged with investing: 
1. Treaty rights and obligations. 
2. Band membership. 
3. Liability ofIndians to pay taxes. 
4. Enfranchisement ofIndians both voluntary and involuntary. 
5. Eligibility ofIndians to vote at dominion elections. 
6. The encroachment ofwhite persons on Indian Reserves. 
7. The operation ofIndian Day and Residential Schools. 
8. And any other matter or thing pertaining to the social and economic status of 
Indians and their advancement, which, in the opinion of such a committee, should 
be incorporated into the revised Act. 167 
166 For a study that points to Social Security's structural bias against single women and non-Whites in 
the United States, see Linda Gordon, Pitied but not Entitled: Single Mothers and the History of 
Welfare, 1890-1935, Toronto, The Free Press, 1994. 
167 Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine 
and Consider the lndian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, 
p. iii. 
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However, as lan V.B. Johnson points out, "many important issues were not addressed, 
particularly political questions such as the power and authority of chiefs and councils on 
reserves, funding mechanisms and trust accounts, jurisdictional disputes with the provinces 
and Indian self-government.,,168 
During the committee's hearings, officiais in the Indian Affairs Branch, in concert 
with Iawmakers, continued to perpetuate the image of Amerindians as being improvident by 
nature. The following exchange between committee members c.T. Richard, Liberal MP for 
Gloucester, New Brunswick, W.S. Bryce, CCf MP for Selkirk, Manitoba, and W.S. Arneil, 
the Department's inspector ofIndian agencies in Ontario, strikingly illustrates this tendency: 
Mr. Richard: We were taIking about the Indian and his easy way with money, 1 
wanted to ask if that was a trait peculiar to the Indian, and if that could be 
considered as being due to his lack of education. 
Mr. Bryce: You get a lot of white men who do that, who have nothing left two days 
after they are paid. 
The Witness: It is a combination ofboth. 
Mr. Richard: So that while he might be more inclined to spend than a white man, he 
cou Id be taught to save more? 
The Witness: Yes, very definitely.169 
During the same hearings, another departmental official, the principal clerk in charge of the 
administrative work of the Indian Branch's Trusts Division, reiterated the conviction of the 
agency's headquarters staff that individual Amerindians were, as a rule, incapable of wisely 
empIoying cash when he described the uses to which band funds should and should not be 
put. "[T]he poorest use to which they could be put is to let the fund lie there accumulating 
interest, and not to use it at ail. The next poorest use of band funds is to distribute them in 
168 Jan V.B. Johnson, "Helping Indians to Help Themselves - A Commillee to Investigate Ilse1f: The 
1951 lndian Act Consultation Process," Ottawa, Treaties and Historical Research Centre, Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada, 1984, p. 16. 
169 "Minutes of Evidence, No. 8, R.A. Hoey, Director of Indian Affairs, and W.S. Arneil, Inspector of 
Indian Agencies for Ontario," 24 June 1946, in Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the 
House of Commons Appainted ta Examine and Cansider the lndian Act, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 380. 
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cash. The aim of the depaliment has been to persuade the Indians to use their band funds to 
promote the welfare and progress of the band generally, as weil as to promote the welfare and 
progress of the individual.,,170 In other words, Indian Affairs' publicly-stated goal was to 
ensme the "welfare and progress" of First Nations through strict controls on the use of the 
funds that it held in trust for them, contraIs that precluded their distribution in cash. 
The Indian Act of 1951, although often considered a departure from earlier 
legislation, contains many of the monetary clauses of the law as originally passed in 1876. 
Thus, while the parliamentary hearings of the late 1940s conceming Indian Affairs and the 
Indian Act's revision appeared to promise significant changes to the state's approach to the 
"Indian problem," the resulting legislation proved to be a continuation of, rather than a break 
with, earlier policy. The revised act continued to define "band" in terms of lands and funds 
held in trust by the govemment, although adding a clause stating that the Governor in Council 
held the power ta declare any "body of Indians" a band. '7 ! The act stipulate? that those 
Amerindians who gained access to the franchise, and thus ceased being "Indians" according 
to the legal definition, werc entitled to "one per capita share of the capital and revenue 
moneys heId by His Majesty on behalf of the band" in addition to "an amount equal to the 
amount that in the opinion of the Minister [of Citizenship and Immigration] he would have 
received during the next succecding twenty years under any treaty then in existence between 
the band and His Majesty if he had continued to be a member of the band."I72 Indian Affairs 
maintained the right under the 1951 revised act to compel bands to maintain "the roads, 
bridges, ditches and fences within the reserve occupied by that band," with refusai allowing 
the Branch to carry out the work itself from monies payable to the band or its members held 
170 "Minutes of Evidence, No. 10, A.G. Leslie, of Reserves and Trusts Service, Indian Affairs Branch, 
Department of Mines and Resources," 4 July 1946, in Canada, Special Joint Committee of the Senate 
and the House of Commons Appointed to Examine and Consider the indian Act, Minutes of 
Proceedings and Evidence, Ottawa, Edmond Cloutier, 1946, p. 478. 
171 Canada, Statutes, "An Act Respecting Indians," 1951, 15 George VI, c. 29, s. 2, ss. 1. 
172 ibid, s. 15. 
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in trust by the state. 173 The Indian Advancement Act (1884) continued to exert its influence 
over the revised Indian Act in that the councils of bands declared by the Govemor in Council 
to have "reached an advanced state of development" were accorded the power, "subject to the 
approval of the Minister," of raising funds through "the assessment and taxation of interests 
in land in the reserve or persons lawfully in possession thereof' and "the licencing of 
businesses, callings, trades and occupations." Under the 1951 Indian Act, such band councils 
could also decree "a penalty for non-payment of taxes imposed ... recoverable on summary 
conviction.,,174 The 1951 act also continued some of the innovations of the preceding half­
century , such as the loan program initially created in 1924 and given greater scope in 1938, 
although it expanded the legitimate expenditure of such loans to coyer "gasoline and 
petroleum products," "the making of repairs," and "the payment of wages.,,175 Under the 
revised act, band councils continued to have the power to regulate "the conduct and 
activities" of visitors to the reserve who "buy, sell or otherwise deal 111 wares or 
merchandise.,,'76 
The 1951 act, however, did not maintain one of the more infamous amendments 
that Parliament had made to the Indian Act during the twentieth century. In 1927, it added a 
clause (Section 141) barring the contribution of Amerindian funds, whether held individually 
or in common, for the prosecution of legal claims. According to the amendment, 
Every person who, without the consent of the Superintendent General expressed in 
writing, receives, obtains, solicits or requests from any Indian any payment or 
contribution or promise of any payment or contribution for the pUl'pose of raising a 
fund or providing money for the prosecution of any claim which the tribe or band of 
Indians to which such Indians belong, or of which he is a member, has or is 
173 Ibid, s. 34. 
174 Ibid, s. 82, ss. 1. 
175 Ibid, s. 69, ss. 1. The following year, an amendment added "the clearing and breaking of land within 
reserves." Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the Indian Act," 1952-3, c. 41, s. 1, ss. l. 
176 Canada, "An Act Respecting Indians," s. 80, ss. n. 
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represented to have for the recovery of any daim or money for the benefit of the 
said tribe or band, shaH be guilty of an offence and liable upon summary conviction 
for each such offence to a penalty not exceeding two hundred dollars and not less 
than fifty dollars or to imprisonment for any term not exceeding two months. 177 
D.C. Scott, the deputy superintendent general, had initially drafted this amendment in 1924 to 
prevent daims being brought against the govemment without Indian Affairs' approval. When 
presenting the proposed legislation before the House of Commons in 1927, Charles Stewart, 
the Minister of the Interior and superintendent general of Indian Affairs, claimed that, "We 
think it is to the advantage of the Indians that these contracts should be scrutinized by the 
depaltment in order to protect them from exploitation.,,178 Although the discourse of 
protection allowed Indian Affairs to justify the amendment, its true objective appears to have 
been the disruption of the increasing number of political and territorial daims pressed by 
First Nations activists across Canada, daims that officiais viewed as disturbing the otherwise 
179
smooth administration of Indian affairs. However, it should be noted that the mere 
existence of this section did not guarantee its enforcement, as demonstrated by the fact that 
residents of Wendake hired lawyers on several occasions between 1927 and 1951 to pursue 
daims on their behalf l80 
177 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the lndian Act," J926-7, c. 32, s. 6. 
178 Quoted in E. Brian Titley, A Narrow Vision: Duncan Campbell Scott and the Administration of 
Indian AfJairs in Canada, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1986, p. 59. 
179 See Ibid, p. 59 and Paul Tennant, Aboriginal Peoples and Politics: The Indian Land Question in 
British Columbia, 1849-1989, Vancouver, UBC Press, 1990, p. 111-2. 
180 The most notable case is that in which J. Arthur Vincent and several other Huron used their own 
funds to hire Paul Lesage, a lawyer based in Quebec City, to press the band's claims on the O'Sullivan 
property in the parish of Saint Ambroise de la Jeune Lorette which bordered Wendake. See Paul 
Lesage to 1. Arthur Vincent, 31 March 1936, J. Arthur Vincent to Paul Lesage, 2 April 1936, and Paul 
Lesage to J.A. Vincent, 15 October 1936, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05. This same 
lawyer also intervened on behalf of Daniel Gros-Louis in order to press his claim for old age assistance 
with Indian Affairs once again failing to invoke Section J41. [Lessage and Lessage] to the Department 
of lndian Affairs, 8 March 1938 and R.A. Hoey to Messrs. Lesage and Lesage, 18 March 1938, 
ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05 
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Thus, the legal powers conferred upon the Indian Affairs Branch by Parliament at 
mid-century were strikingly similar to those originally afforded it in 1876. Although having 
come under intense public scrutiny during the 1940s, the Indian Act, at least in terms of its 
monetary content, emerged relatively unscathed. When combined with the overt and also 
highly publicized chal1enges posed to lndian Affairs' modus operandi by Aboriginal activists 
earlier in the decade, this constancy is al1 the more impressive. 181 When cal1ed to testify 
before the special joint conunittee, Branch officiaIs adopted the same patemalistic tone 
employed by their predecessors. ln the absence of any meaningful, public Amerindian 
participation in the hearings, this discourse inspired Parliament to adopt language in keeping 
with the progressive tenor of the inunediate post-war years while not altering the spirit or 
intent of the law beyond the removal of the most invasive powers accorded lndian Affairs 
during the twentieth century.182 The redefinition, then, of "the lndian 'problem' as one of 
citizenship and inclusion" du ring the first half of the twentieth century, brought about 
according to Hugh Shewell by pressure from "respectable groups like the Canadian Welfare 
Council" and Amerindian activist organizations, appears to have been above ail cosmetic, 
being a discursive rather than a practical or legal change. 183 Thus, in 1951 as in 1876, the 
Indian Act defined "Indians" in reference to monies and lands that the state held in trust for 
them while conferring authority upon Indian Affairs to intervene in its clientele's life far 
surpassing that wielded by other institutions. 184 In this sense, then, monctary control 
181 For an example of highly publicized Amerindian contestation of Indian Affairs during the decade, 
see Hugh Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-1944," Journal of 
Canadian Studies, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 211-42. 
182 Olive Patricia Dickinson, Canada 's Firsl Nations: A History ofFounding Peoples from the Earliest 
Times, 3rd ed., Don Mills, ON, Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 310-1. 
183 Shewell, "Enough to Keep Them Alive", p. 169-70. Dickinson also describes the change in state 
discourse as largely cosmetic: "the goal continued to be assimilation, or as it was worded, 
transformation from the status of wards to that of full citizenship." Dickinson, Canada 's Firsl Nations, 
p.310. 
184 It should be noted that this definition did not remain purely theoretical. ln 1922, Indian Affairs 
used, among others, the criteria that certain Innu had "participated in the distribution of money 
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continued to provide a central means of justifying the Branch's existence while theoretically 
providing it with sweeping powers in its everyday supervision of the "improvident Indian." 
Conclusion 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Indian Affairs continued to exercise 
tight controls on Amerindian money-use. In western James Bay, the Department pursued a 
policy of treaty-making patterned on that of the immediate post-Confederation era. This 
policy allowed the state to officially gain title to ail of the unceded lands in northern Ontario 
while simultaneously "creating" the region's Amerindian population. Indian Affairs explicitly 
claimed that monetary annuities served to provide authorities with information that would not 
have otherwise been available, thereby perrn.itting the Department to manage the Cree and 
their resources in keeping with established practice elsewhere in Canada. 
Although such payments provided valuable cash to Amerindians while 
simultaneously generating detailed population statistics for bureaucrats in Ottawa, the heart 
of Indian Affairs' monetary policy lay neither here nor in the relatively minor expansion of 
its legal prerogatives. Rather, Indian Affairs' complicated approach to money is most clearly 
observed in its agreements with "competing" institutions concerning the control and 
supervision of Aboriginal participation in ail state programs. Since the 1860s, Indian Affairs 
had operated as a clientele agency, theoretically serving ail of the needs of First Nations. 
However, during the first half of the twentieth century, a succession of both federal and 
provincial agencies instituted programs from which aIl Canadians, Indigenous and non­
Indigenous alike, could benefit. In several instances, these programs promised to place cash 
directly in Amerindian hands. In the cases examined above, Indian Affairs managed to secure 
supervision of these programs when applied to its "clients." In addition to clearly staking out 
pertaining to the Band" to affirm these individuals' lndian status. J.D. McLean to A. Tessier, 12 
October 1922, LAC, ROIO, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part l, reel C-9680. 
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its administrative terrain, this practice frequently allowed the Department to cut its relief 
expenditure while increasing its influence in the everyday lives of its wards. However, not aU 
of the state programs over which Indian Affairs gained control correspond to this model. 
Thus, the Branch and not Ontario fish and wildlife authorities took the lead in creating the 
Kesagami beaver sanctuary. However, this program had been explicitly designed to reduce 
Indian Affairs' relief expenditure and ultimately served to replace the HBC in many ways 
with the Branch, a public institution that sought to control monetary circulation in the fur 
trade through even more coercive means than those employed by its private predecessors. 
Thus, the control of money, whether actually implemented or not, coincided neatly with 
Indian Affairs' need to found its existence in nature while simultaneously defending itself 
from institutions that appeared intent upon "stealing" its cliente le. 
Indian Affairs' discourse and action, then, cast money in several distinct lights. It 
was, accordingly, indispensible in the constitution of the "eyes of politics," a serious danger 
to the "improvident Indian" (who could not be trusted with such a high level of freedom to 
consume), an exceedingly useful tool in justifying the institution's existence, a means of 
reclaiming lost administrative ground, and an effective method, once converted into 
provisions, of reducing relief expenditure. Although failing to form either a coherent policy 
or practice, these diverse conceptions were not contradictory either. Thus, Indian Affairs' 
discourse and practice with respect to money is perhaps best described as an approach that 
placed the needs of the institution above those of its clientele. Indeed, the single trait that 
characterizes the state's relation to Aboriginal money-use during the period is the unerring 
conviction that authorities in Ottawa and their agents on reserves were the only ones fit to 
decide whether money was beneficial or detrimental. In this sense, the "freedom" that cash 
appeared to promise, held both positive and negative connotations, forcing First Nations' 
legal guardian to judge on a case-by-case basis because, in the eyes of bureaucrats and 
lawmakers, such a critical issue couId not be left solely in the hands of"minors." 
Chapter 7 
Money from Below: Cash, Credit, and Community, 1900-1950 
Il Y a actuellement certains individus de la tribu, qui sont des 
fouteurs de discordes, qui poussent les membres à toutes sortes 
d'actes déraisonnables; ces individus, ignorants dans la force du 
mot, quoi qu'ils se croient d'un savoir extraordinaire et d'une 
intelligence supérieure, possèdent pour toute "qualité" qu'un cœur 
rempli de fiel de la jalousie et de l'envie: pour eux l'argent est tout; 
ils peuvent faire quoi que ce soit et toutes les choses les plus basses 
et les plus viles quand il s'agit de recueillir un peu d'argent: ils 
saluent jusqu'à terre le "signe de piastre" et rampent comme des 
serpents à travers honnêtes gens: "rongeurs de balustrades" l'on 
croirait avoir affaires à des saints; mais le vol et les injustices leur 
sont familiers. Leur fourberie est sans borne, car ils frappent de leur 
langue sale lorsqu'ils viennent de vous faire leurs compliments. Ces 
individus iront chez le diable à la fin de leur jour, car le tort 
commis par eux est incommensurable et ne peut être réparé à 
temps. Quelle triste mentalité! 1 
Pierre Albert Picard Tsichiek8an, the grand chief of the Huron between 1916 and 
1920, recorded this impassioned tirade against money's corrosive nature and the individuals 
who succumbed to it in his diary in 1917. Picard 's description of the destructive misuse of 
money by certain unnamed band members and the threat that he felt such use posed to the 
bonds of community that held Wendake together indicates an awareness among Amerindians 
of the force that could be brought to bear through currency at the local level. This chapter 
applies this insight in order to demonstrate that the state and capital did not enjoy a monopoly 
of monetary power among First Nations during the first half of the twentieth century. In 
Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake, residents used money to eam revenue, to access 
and to provide small amounts of credit, and to purchase consumer goods as they saw fit. At 
1 Emphasis in original. Pierre Albert Picard, Journal personnel, 1916-1920,29 June 1917, p. 53-4, 
ACNHW, f-I-79. 
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the same time, currency allowed band members and their elected leaders to exert a certain 
amount of coercive force through strict legislative penalties and contractual clauses. This, in 
turn, elevated certain residents to positions of power from which they could fortify their 
standing, frequently at the expense ofPicard's "honest people." 
An image of money as a relationship, with ail the flexibility that this term suggests, 
emerges from this chapter's analysis. When studied at the locallevel, from the perspective of 
its use among community members, money's social character reveals itself through the way it 
favored certain individuals and groups over others, in the process contributing to the ongoing 
formation of local class society. Inequalities in money's availability helped structure 
relationships between residents ofWendake, Moose Factory, and Mashteuiatsh, with some in 
a position to exploit others. However, such internai disparity existed in parallel to external 
discourse that cast First Nations as separate and inferior to "mainstream" Euro-Canadian 
society. As in earlier periods, the ways in which money was marked through restrictions on 
individual credit and expenditure of communal funds both justified and were justified by the 
political discourse through which the state rendered Amerindians theoretically distinct from 
other groups and individuals in Canadian society. However, the legal regime which both was 
inspired by and inspired this discourse contributed not only to maintaining Amerindians' 
separate status, but also to the reproduction within First Nations of the unequal economic and 
political power relations from which the state claimed to protect them. Through its analysis of 
local money-use, then, this chapter argues that during the first half of the twentieth century 
money continued to provide Amerindians with a means of pursuing their livelihoods while it 
simultaneously favored socioeconomic stratification. In this sense, this chapter claims that 
state discourse representing Amerindians as inherently improvident belies the ways in which 
Huron, Innu, and Cree led their everyday lives during the period and hides each of these First 
Nations' increasing internai socioeconomic complexity. 
Money's Role in the "ModitionaI Economy" and Class Formation 
In conjunction with the fur trade, wage work provided the Cree, Huron, and Innu 
the largest part of their monetary incorne during the period. As they had during the preceding 
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century, Aboriginal peoples agam proved able to satisfy most of their wants themselves, 
thereby directly contradicting the state's continued assertion oftheir improvident nature. This 
section analyzes the development of each community's labor market during the period, 
emphasizing how the ways in which individuals earned income points to the continlled 
relevance of class formation in Wendake and the phenomenon's emergence at Mashteuiatsh. 
Although this process seems to have been absent from Moose Factory during the first half of 
the twentieth century, money from wage work fllnctioned to favor certain, less developed 
forms of socioeconomic inequality in western James Bayas weil. Ultimately, this section 
argues that the ways in which Huron, Innu, and Cree earned money continllcd to inform local 
power relations while simultaneously defying stereotypes of Aboriginal economic incapacity. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, Euro-Canadian observers divided the 
Innll of Mashteuiatsh into two categories depending on economic practice, either "half-breed" 
or "Indian." In doing so, they used racial classification as shorthand for economic activity in 
a similar manner to that employed elsewhere in North America. 2 In 1922, the Indian agent, 
Armand Tessier, reported to his superiors that, "We caU here 'half-breeds' those who farm, 
work in the shanty, float logs, guide sportsmen, while those whom we call 'Indians' 
(Sauvages) are those who go into the bush during eight or ten months in the year and depend 
solely on their hunt to live.',3 While Euro-Canadian commentators clearly remarked on the 
2 For an analysis of one example of local political consequences in the United States of a similar 
distinction (mixed-bloocl/assimilated versus full-bloocl/community-oriented), see Paul C. Rosier, 
"Searching for Salvation and Sovereignty: Blackfeet Oil Leasing and the Reconstruction of the Tribe," 
in Brian Hosmer and Colleen O'Neill (eds.), Native Pathways: American lndian Culture and 
Economie Development in the Twentieth Century, Boulder, University Press of Colorado, 2004, p. 27­
51. 
3 A. Tessier to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, Il August 1922, LAC, RG 10, vol. 7116, 
file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680. Ten years later, the HBC post manger, George Fowlie, adopted the 
same categorization when describing the economic difficulties of the two segments of Mashteuiatsh's 
population. "The halfbreeds exist by selling wood to Roberval Merchants and getting provisions in 
exchange. Nobody at Pointe Bleue has been able to get employment with the lumber companies this 
year which is affecting our trade. Very few Indians are coming down to Pointe Bleue, mosl of them 
come down to the nearest seUlement and sel1 their furs and buy a few provisions & relurn to their 
hunting grounds." Thursday, 10 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 1, reel1MA53. 
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wide array of economic activities in which the Innu engaged, they did so through a hierarchy 
of activities, seeing "half-breeds" as progressive and "Indians" as beholden to the pasto In 
spite of this external assessment, at mid-century most Innu continued to seek revenue in the 
"traditional" economy, while making increasing use of its "modern" counterpart.4 
However, the ways in which the Innu made use of money make clear that this 
image of two, mutually exclusive subpopulations is misleading. For example, Tom Moar and 
Napoléon Bégin, who HBC employees considered "half-breeds," earned cash from both 
trapping and trading on behalf of the company.5 Several other Innu who spent the major part 
of the year in the bush also adopted hybrid economic relations extending beyond the simple 
acceptance of market exchange entailed by the fur trade. They did so through a system of 
apprenticeship in which an older or more successful hunter-trapper "hired" another band 
member, either outfitting him himself or guaranteeing repayment to a merchant on his behalf. 
This system expanded the availability of credit while placing senior hunters in positions of 
power vis-à-vis their younger or less prosperous counterparts. According to J. Allen 
Burgesse, a former HBC employee at Mashteuiatsh, 
Ali furs caught during the winter belong ta the Indian who makes the advances. In 
most cases it is the latter who makes the arrangements for trading the furs in the 
spring, and he allows the subject hunter a certain fixed sum - or a proportion of the 
catch - in lieu ofwages. Often enough, however, the hired hunter works entirely for 
the account of his master who undertakes to feed and clothe him and provide certain 
little luxuries such as tobacco and the occasional bottle of beer. 
Burgesse, writing in 1945, asserted that this "is an important aspect of the Montagnais 
economic structure, and is of immense value to certain Indians who, either from sickness, a 
poor fur crop, or other such causes, are unable to obtain any advances from the traders. It 
4 According to the HBCs post manager, during the Depression hunting and trapping accounted "for 
the greater part of the revenues of the village." Thursday, 26 October 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 25, 
reellMA53. 
S For more on this case, see Chapter Five. 
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enables them to make an effort to re-establish themselves financially.,,6 It also provided these 
relationship's senior hunting and trapping partners opportunities to profit to a greater extent 
in years of abundance by taking upon themselves the financial risk associated with poor 
catches. If the partnership proved successful, the "apprentice" and his family would earn a 
living while the "master" would reap greater retums than he would have been able to alone. 
However, if the hunt was a failure, the senior partner risked finding himself unable to secure 
credit due to the substantial debt that advances for two households generated. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, hunter-trappers also stood to earn 
money from Euro-Canadian and Euro-American scholars by sharing their knowledge and 
experience of "traditional" Aboriginal practices. During the 1930s, Regina Flannery paid 
cash to the Cree informants she consulted while doing anthropological fieldwork at Moose 
Factory. The region's relative dearth of cash provided Flannery with an effective means of 
convincing the Cree to participate in her research. "Currency, a scarce commodity in the 
community, was most welcome, since it offered the possibility of ordering items from the T. 
Eaton Co. department store catalogue more cheaply than purchasing them from the HBC 
store at Moose Factory.,,7 Given that Flannery's advisor at the Catholic University of 
America, John M. Cooper, also did fieldwork in the region, it seems likely that he too 
provided monetary incorne to the Cree, allowing them to circumvent to sorne degree the 
company's attempts at maintaining a captive clientele while contributing, in a very small 
way, to the maintenance of "traditional" economic activity. 
The Lac St. Jean Innu most likely received cash payments from scholars as weil. 
During the 1920s, Frank G. Speck, a professor in the Anthropology Department at the 
University of Pennsylvania, spent time with the Innu of Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, in the process 
6 1. Allan Burgesse, "Property Concepts of the Lac-St-Jean Montagnais," Primitive Man, vol. 18, nos. 
1-2 (1945), p. 18-9. 
7 Regina Flannery, Ellen Smallboy: Glimpses ofa Cree Woman's Li/e, Montreal and Kingston, McGiIl­
Queen's University Press, 1995, p. 4. 
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laying the foundation for anthropological understandings of eastern subarctic Aboriginal 
society.8 Julius E. Lips, a German anthropologist based at Columbia University, also worked 
with the Innu of Mashteuiatsh. In 1935, he visited "Pointe Bleue to record the tribal Law of 
the Montagnais.,,9 While there, he worked with Burgesse, who possessed a "collection of 
ethnological specimens," and several members of the band who were active participants in 
the fur trade.'o Joseph Km1ness worked with both of these men. During the 1990s, Harry 
Kurtness described his grandfather's work: "Il est allé avec des linguistes, un nommé 
monsieur Speck. D'ailleurs, c'était facile pour lui, il possédait les trois langues: l'anglais, le 
français et le montagnais. C'était facile d'échanger avec ~ux autres. Ils ont fait une étude itou 
sur la chasse et la trappe. Il y en avait un autre qui est venu, je ne me souviens plus de son 
nom. Je pense que c'est un monsieur Lips. Ils ont fait ça une couple d'années, si c'est pas 
deux ou trois ans."" Both Speck and Lips also worked with several other community 
members. 12 While neither scholar provides information concerning compensation, in light of 
8 Speck first appears in the Pointe Bleue post journals in February 1925 when he stayed at the post for 
three days. Sunday 1 through Tuesday 3 February 1925, HBCA, B.329/a/9, p. 33, reel IMA53. The 
post journals refer to Speck somewhat condescendingly as "a collector of Indian curios." 
9 Sunday, 4 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/aI18, p. 18, reel 1MA53. 
10 Sunday, 28 July 1935, HBCA, B.3291a118, p. 16, reel 1MA53. Lips remained in the region into early 
September. Monday, 2 September 1935, Ibid, p. 27. 
Il Harry Kurtness et Camil Girard, La prise en charge: Témoignage d'un Montagnais, Chicoutimi, Les 
éditions JCL, 1997, p. 50-1. It should be noted that according to both economic practice and apparent 
public opinion, Joseph Kurtness belonged entirely to the "Métis" portion of the band's population. 
Petition from David Philippe to [the Department of Indian Affairs], 21 July 1922, LAC, RG 10, vol. 
7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, reel C-9680. 
12 Speck worked with, among others, "Old Napani," "old Maurault," Tsebic, and Simon Raphaël. 
Frank G. Speck, "Ethical Attributes of the Labrador Indians," American Anthropologist, New Series, 
vol. 35, no. 4 (October-December 1933), p. 559-94. Lips received information from Joseph Kurtness 
Kak'wa, Tomo Kak'wa Kurtness, Joseph Jourdain, Napoléon Begin, François Germain, Tommy Moar, 
Maggy Moar, Johnny Conelly, and Joseph Manigouche. Julies E. Lips, "Naskapi Law: (Lake St. John 
and Lake Mistassini Bands) Law and Order in a Hunting Society," Transactions 01 the American 
Philosophical Society, vol. 37, part 4 (December 1947), p. 379-490. 
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Flannei)"s description of the payment she afforded Cree informants at Moose Factoi)' it 
seems likely that this form ofwork generated cash revenue for those who undertook it. 
Those Innu who spent the majority of the year in the bush earned revenue in other 
ways as weil, perhaps most importantly through the sale of moccasins and other handmade 
goods to the two primai)' on-reserve retailers: the HBC and Meridy Robertson. Lips reports 
that during the period Maggy Moar was universally perceived as being the most skilled 
moccasin manufacturer in Mashteuiatsh, particularly due to the complexity of her beadwork 
and embroidery. "Her needlework was of such daintiness and neatness in the most minute 
details that white experts later refused to acknowledge it as handmade.,,'3 While the 
documentai)' record provides information on the priees at which the HBC and Robertson sold 
such work, it fails to furnish the amount of money that Moar and other Innu women received 
for each sale. In 1935, for example, the HBC sold Moar's moccasins for $2.50 per pair while 
Robertson charged $1.75 for her competitors' work. 14 While both stores certainly charged her 
a percentage on the final sale, these priees suggest that Moar and the other Innu women who 
manufactured such goods most likely earned good wages for their work, whether in cash or in 
store credit. 
While hunter-trappers ("Indians") could earn money from a variety of activities, so 
too could those Ionu who remained in Mashteuiatsh on a more permanent basis (the "half­
breeds"). In 1911, the Indian agent described the nature of this portion of the Innu economy: 
When the work of the farm permits them, if an opportunity of eai'ning money in any 
other way offers, they do not fail to make use of it. They become in turn teamsters, 
guides or wood-cutters. Thus in winter they go to the shanties and cut timber, 
13 Ibid, p. 385. 
14 Of course, the HBC's employees agreed with Lips that Moar's work was superior to thal sold by 
Robertson. "Had visits of a few American tourists today and sold a pair of sealskin gloves. One man 
found our slippers (Mrs. Moor's work) very expensive al $2.50. Meridy Robertson is selling slippers at 
$1.75. The Yank admitted that Robertson's goods were not so weil embroidered, nor was the hide so 
weil tanned but they were trimmed with mink and he see [sic] why he should pay more than this 
amount." Thursday, 20 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a!l8, p. 6, reellMA53. 
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engaging in the floating of the logs in spring; then when the season for fishing and 
hunting arrives, they are ail appreciated as guides by the sportsmen who come each 
year to the different clubs having quarters along the Lake St. John railway.15 
Later in the decade, several Innu worked on the construction of the James Bay and Eastern 
Railway, while during the 1930s and 1940s, community members continued to earn wages in 
the forestry industry, generally passing much of the year away from Mashteuiatsh. 16 While 
band members employed in the lumber camps were often paid in cash, Innu who worked for 
certain timber corporations received payment in vouchers for Roberval stores as did those 
families who cut wood and sold it independently to area merchants. '7 Although difficult to 
estimate, the average unskilled forestry worker in the Lac St. Jean region appears to have 
made roughly $20 per month (approximately $0.80 per day) during the early 1930s.1 8 
Forestry work, of course, was principally available in the winter. During the summer and fall 
months, many Innn eamed significantly higher wages guiding sportsmen. George Fowlie, the 
HBC post manager at Mashteuiatsh, commented in 1936 on the difficulties the company 
experienced hiring temporary laborers for work at the post "for 20~ per hour when people are 
15 Armand Tessier, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 23 May 1911, in lndian AfJairs Annual 
Report. 1911, part l, p. 51. 
16 Armand Tessier, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 7 June 1913, in lndian AfJairs Annual Report, 
1913, part l, p. 53 and Kurtness et Girard, La prise en charge, p. 19 and 31-2. 
17 In 1935, the HBC post journal records: "Cash sales gradually showing improvement. Most of the 
lumber company men are out of the woods with their earnings by which we benefit to some extent." 
Wednesday,27 March 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/17, p. 61, reel IMA53. This report was echoed in the 
same source at the end of the decade: "Business improving with the influx of the odd trapper and 
cheques from lumber camps." Monday, 27 November 1939, HBCA, B.329/a/22, p. 34, reel IMA54. 
The HBC reported in 1934 that, "The little trade at Pointe Bleue which is slipping through our fingers 
is that of the farmers who are selling wood to the Roberval merchants or of families who have men 
working in the Gagnon Freres lumber camps. These people are pa id with orders on the Roberval 
stores." Saturday, 10 March 1934, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 54, reel lMA53. 
18 In an interview conducted during the 1980s, Roger Jourdain, a retired Domtar employee, claims ta 
have eamed $19 per month in 1932. Another former forestry worker, Pierre Peron, placed the salary at 
$0.77 per day or roughly $20 per mon th (men worked six-day weeks during the period). Quoted in 
Isabelle Trottier and Huguette Labrecque, Un siècle d'histoire: les chantiers au nord du Lac-Saint­
Jean, 1850 à 1950, vol. l, Dolbeau-Mistassini, Société d'histoire et de généalogie Maria-Chapdelaine, 
2003, p. 164-5. 
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getting $3.00 & $4.00 a day guiding with food & tobacco over and above.,,19 By the late 
1940s, large numbers of hUlU held employment "in the pulpwood and lumbering industries 
and in farming," thereby keeping departmental relief expenditure in Mashteuiatsh relatively 
smal1. 20 Thus, even the "half-breed" portion of the band spent a large part of its time off­
reserve practicing the "co-integrated" or the "moditional" economy alongside Euro-Canadian 
neighbors. Furthermore, as much of this information was freely available in Indian Affairs' 
Annual Reports, both its headquarters and field staff were weil aware of the lengths to which 
the Innu would go to secure paid employment, suggesting once more the resistance of the 
discourse of Aboriginal improvidence to accounts ofFirst Nations' material success. 
Somewhat paradoxically, at the height of the Depression, Mashteuiatsh's tourist 
industry boomed. Although never large enough to support a majority of Innu households, 
tourism provided solid income to both those engaged in the manufacture of artisanal goods 
and those who sought employment guiding sportsmen. Mashteuiatsh owed this economic 
renaissance to Meridy Robertson, the community's principal socioeconomic figure. Indeed, 
the owner of Robertson & Son, one of the two main on-reserve stores and fur buyers (along 
with the HBC), diversified his target clientele in an effort to overcome the Innu's declining 
purchasing power. In 1934, Robertson began advertising Mashteuiatsh as an ideal destination 
for American sportsmen through the publication of "a beautiful, little, twelve-page booklet, 
weil illustrated, which describes the country admirably," with which he planned "to flood the 
Northem United States." Robertson sent copies of this brochure to the several thousand 
sportsmen who had frequented one "of the defunct clubs in the district.,,21 By 1936, 
Robertson did "a roaring tourist business," claiming in [ate September to have made $6,000 
19 Wednesday, 23 September 1936, HBCA, B.329/a119, p. 23, reel1MA54. 
20 Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1947, p. 212. This quantitative remark also applies to the period prior 
to the Depression. Between 1909 and 1929, Indian Affairs provided pel' capita average annual relief in 
Mashteuiatsh and Wendake of only $0.30 and $0.70 respectively. Indian Affairs Annual Report, 1909­
1929. As noted above, this amoLmted to less than a single day's salary for an unskilled forestry worker 
in Lac St. Jean in the 1930s and far less than a guide might earn during the same period. 
21 Friday, 9 March 1934, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 51-2, reel 1MA53. 
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on the year.22 As a result of this flow of visitors, which continued through the end of the 
decade, Robertson became the Iynchpin of the reserve's guiding economy.23 Indeed, without 
the business that he brought to Mashteuiatsh, many Innu who made their living escorting 
sportsmen would have most likely found themselves in dire economic straits, something of 
which they seem to have been aware. In order to repay Robertson, several Innu appear ta 
have encouraged tourists to shop at his store, even going so far as to tell "a few tales about 
the Company" to ensure that they did not give their patronage to the HBC?4 
Like the Innu, the Huron, too, benefited from the demand for hunting and fishing 
guides, integrating this activity into their own form of the "moditional economy" which was 
also based to a large extent on seasonal changes in work and address. Writing in 1902, Agent 
Bastien noted that, "the tourists who visit the lakes in the region of Lake St. John are each 
year becoming more numerous, and always encourage our Indians, whose skill they admire. 
They employ the latter for most of the summer season.,,25 This sector of the economy 
continued to supply work to a Iimited number of band members through the mid-1930s, by 
which point, Huron guides secured $3 a day both while working at the game clubs and when 
independently guiding hunting and fishing parties?6 These men generally left the village for 
22 Tuesday, 22 September 1936, HBCA, B.329/a/I9, p. 22, reellMA54. 
23 In 1938, George Fowlie, the HBC post manager, reported that "Meridy Robertson is doing a big 
tourist business putting out 6 parties to-day. Altogelher he has 22 parties in the bush at present. He gets 
ail his tourists through the various Sportsmen's shows in the U.S... he will probably c1ear several 
thousand dollars this year." Thursday, 15 September 1938, HBCA, B.329/a/21, p. 22, reel 1MA54. 
24 In this instance, the HBC's manager blamed David Philippe, who had served as guide to "Dr. Hull & 
family," for diverting tourists away from the company. Tuesday, 6 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/a118, 
p. 19, reel lMA53. 
25 Antoine O. Bastien, Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency, 31 July 1902, in Indian AjJairs Annual 
Report, 1902, p. 50. 
26 In his M.A. Thesis, Georges Boiteau notes that Emiri Sioui was employed at Club Laurentides 
around 1925 and lhal Harry Groslouis worked al lhe Trilon Club belween 1926 and 1935. Georges 
Boiteau, "Les chasseurs hurons de Lorette," M.A. Thesis, Quebec City, Université Laval, 1954, p. 167. 
For information on wages, see "Quebec Indian Sells his Wares to U.S. Tourists," July 1934, The 
Omnibuster, vol. 2, no. 5, n.p., ACNHW, P2-S3-B2, File B-2-19. 
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the sportsmen's clubs in the spring or early summer to erect camps, staying to work there 
through the fall when they retumed to Wendake and, at least during the difficult years of the 
early 1930s, a grim labor market?7 
This pattem of seasonal movement resembles the less regular migrations that many 
Huron undertook in order to cushion their households from difficult economic times. In 1909, 
the Indian agent, Antoine Oscar Bastien, report~d that, "The heads of families on the reserve 
are obliged in order to maintain their families to go off at a distance in order to earn money in 
the neighbouring towns.,,28 However, once "the special industry of the Hurons, that is to say, 
the making of moccasins and snow-shoes" returned to relative health, the majority of these 
migrant families made their way back to Wendake?9 By 1920, this sector of the economy had 
returned to relative prosperity as Huron footwear sold well throughout Canada and in parts of 
the United States. According to the journalist Victoria Hayward, in Wendake "One hears of 
half a million pairs [of moccasins] spoken of with equanimity.,,3o 
The Bastien family continued to dominate this industry and the profits it generated. 
Such control was in pali due to the diversified business of the family's members and was 
reinforced by the cOUli-ordered payment to Bastien Brothers of considerable funds in the 
1920s. In 1909, Ludger and his brother Ernest Bastien purchased a lot on the St. Charles 
River in Wendake on which they erected a tannery operated by their company, Bastien 
27 In June 1919, Pierre Albert Picard wrote: "Telesphore Picard, sous Chef, part pour les clubs bâtir des 
camps." 16 June 1919, Pierre-Albert Picard, Journal personnel, 1916-1920, p. 117, ACNHW, F-I-79. 
According ta Agent Picard, Moise Gros Louis, a band member who had requested departmental relief, 
"is agame warden and spent ail last summer at his work up ta the late fall. He is going back in the 
early spring." [Pierre Albert Picard] to the Secretary, Deparlment of Indian Affairs, 3 January 1931, 
BANQ-Q, P883, S5, File 13. 
28 Antoine O. Bastien, "Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency," 14 June 1909, in Indian Affairs Annual 
Report, 1909, p. 47 
29 A.O. Bastien, "Report on the Jeune Lorette Agency," 1°May 1913, in Indian Affairs Annual Report, 
1913,p.47. 
30 Victoria Hayward, "Indian Lorette," The Quebec Daily Telegraph, 13 April 1920, n.p. 
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Brothers. In 1895, Quebec City had begun diverting water from Lac St. Charles (where the 
river had its source) into its municipal water system. However, at that time it failed to make 
any compensation to the landowners whose access to water would be affected. In 1914, 
Ludger and Ernest Bastien sued the City of Quebec and in 1923 the Privy Council awarded 
them $175,000 in damages in addition to free water in perpetuity for the washing and soaking 
of hides. 31 This massive payment provided the company with needed capital reserves while 
also providing a tidy personal profit to the Bastiens who invested this money in a series of 
commercial ventures over the subsequent decades. Within a few years of the court-ordered 
settlement, Ludger Bastien was vice president of two family-owned companies (Alexandre 
Bastien, Limited and Bastien Silver Fox Breeders) and president of two others (Bastien 
Brothers and Bastien, Gagnon et Cloutier). Presumably because Wendake did not hold 
sufficient space for Ludger Bastien to live according to his standing, he lived off-reserve in 
Loretteville. As a result, he was able to actively participate in both political and federal 
politics. 32 By the late 1940s, Ernest Bastien had revived Bastien Silver Fox Breeders (this 
time without Ludger), raising fur-bearing animais in the village of Chateau d'Eau with 
33
considerable success. 
While the family also made tidy profits through its state-supported retailing 
activities in the 1930s, the workers it employed in its manufacturing operations failed to share 
in this relative prosperity.34 Indeed, during the Depression, Bastien Brothers significantly 
31 On the iawsuit, see: "La cité et les Bastien font la paix après des années de lutte," L'action 
catholique, 30 June 1923, n.p. and "L'Oeil au Conseil de Ville: L'affaire Bastien," L'Oeil aux afJairs 
de Québec, vol. l, no. 5, 6 July, 1923, p. 1, ACNHW, P2-S3-B2, File B-2-19. 
32 During this period, federal and provincial laws based the eligibility to vole on the payment of taxes, 
something which, given the federal regime of Aborigina1 "protection," was impossible for those who 
only held on-reserve property. Raphaël Ouimet, "Ludger Bastien," extract from Biographies 
canadiennes-françaises, Montreal, n.p., 1926, p. 98, ACNHW, C-4-36. 
33 [?] Potvin, "Une après-midi à Château-d'Eau," Les pelletries du Québec, March 1947, p. 8-9, 
ACNHW, G-\-99. 
34 On the state's role in the Bastien's Depression-era retailing profits, see Chapter Six. 
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reduced its workforce, leading to increasing requests for state relief on the part of the 
Huron. 35 According to a reserve resident, "a girl working periodically in a slippers factory" in 
Wendake in the mid-1930s could expect to earn "just a few dollars a week" white "remaining 
without work at frequent intervals.,,36 Indian Affairs recognized this difficult state of affairs. 
In 1937, the secretary of the Department of Mines and Resources, W.J.F. Pratt, claimed that 
37Wendake held no job prospects. Thus, during the twentieth century, class formation 
accelerated among the Huron as the Bastien family grew increasingly wealthy and its workers 
were unable to keep pace. 
As the Depression wore on and on-reserve employment remained limited, the band 
council attempted to improve Wendake's economic outlook on several occasions by 
soliciting work through political channels for reserve residents. In 1937, for example, the 
council asked Indian Affairs to allow a Canadian corporation (the Quebec Glove Co.) to open 
a factory in Wendake and, on different occasions in 1938 and 1940, it requested that the 
Branch intervene on the band's behalf with other state agencies.38 The band council also 
directly petitioned the Quebec Department of Mines and Fisheries, asking that it provide 
35 In 1930, the Indian agent recommended the relief application of "Miss Elize Gros-Louis ... [who] 
Generally works al shoes; no work at present." [Pierre Alberl Picard] to the Secretary, Departmenl of 
Indian Affairs, 26 December 1930, BANQ-Q, P883, S5, File 13. In this sense, Indian Affairs' 
provision of vouchers to the Basliens' store ("Au bon marché"), effectivelty subsidized the family even 
as they laid off many of their workers. 
36 Gaspard Picard to T.G. Murphy, 1 September 1934, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-0 \. 
37 However, he made this daim in order to reject an appeal for assistance. Pratt made his assel1ion in 
response to Ovila Gros Louis's requesl for an Indian Affairs pension so that she could return to 
Wendake from Quebec City, where she lived with her daughter. Pratt feH that her daughter's $50 
monthly salary (earned from the solidly white-collar Metropolitan Life Insurance Company) should be 
sufficient for Gros Louis's support, especially since "il n'existe aucune chance d'êlre employée" in 
Wendake. W.J.F. Pratt to Mr. Sharpe, 17 April 1937, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-0\. 
38 Minutes du conseil, 2 November 1937, 25 February 1938, and 26 July 1940, Bastien, Livre de 
conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919-1949, p. 50-2 and 90-1, ACNHW. 
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work to unemployed Huron in the Parc des Laurentides?9 However, given that the council 
repeated these requests on several occasions, it seems likely that they failed to bear fruit and 
that the community's economic situation only began to improve after the outbreak of World 
WarII. 
While the Depression caused great harm to moccasin manufacturing in Wendake, 
by the middle of the 1940s the industry had rebounded substantially. However, by this time it 
employed a much smaller portion of the reserve's population than it had earlier in the 
century. Gaston Blanchet observed in 1945 that snowshoe-making, the sole "industrie 
essentiellement huronne" that remained in Wendake at the hlrn of the twentieth century, had 
disappeared and that the only local industry that remained, the manufacturing of shoes and 
slippers, employed no more than a handful of Huron. 40 Despite the industry's relatively small 
Aboriginal workforce, Maurice E. Bastien took advantage of his role as Indian agent to enlist 
the help of the Branch's Handicraft Section in procuring scarce materials (imported, Italian or 
Czechoslovakian beads) during the war years.4 \ Following the war, the Branch reported that, 
"The Indians engaged in handicraft work were able to sell their wares, which are in great 
demand, at high prices.,,42 Bastien Brothers, still owned by members of the Bastien family, 
39 Minutes du conseil, 16 May 1938, ibid, p. 52-3. The councillater requested that Indian Affairs take 
up the with provincial authorities on their behalf. Minutes du conseil, 3 March 1939, ibid, p. 81-2. 
40 He writes: "l'unique manufacture de la réserve, qui emploie une centaine de personnes dont très peu 
d'Indiens, fabrique des souliers, des pantoufles." Gaston Blanchet, "Étude de la communauté de 
Lorette," Bachelor's (Licence) Thesis (Sociology), Quebec, Université Laval, 1945, p. 6-7. 
41 M.E. Bastien to Indian Affairs Branch, 25 March 1944 and Kathleen Moodie to M.E. Bastien, 17 
April 1944, LAC, RGIO, vol. 7552, file 41,014-1, reel C-14817. Indian Affairs launched the handicraft 
program as a means of diminishing relief expendillire. Despite the maturity of Wendake's 
manufacturing sector, a segment of the village's population benefited from slate funds when engaging 
in such work during wartime. Thus, between 1 April and 30 April 1940, the Branch invested $450.29 
in Wendake while selling the community's production at a loss (for $439.83). Unfortunately, from the 
archivai record it is unclear whether Bastien or other Huron benefited from these funds. Stalement of 
Handicraft Trust Account #470, 1 April - 30 November 1940, n.d. [II December 1940], LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 7551, file41,001-1, reel C-148I7. 
42 Indian AjJairs Annual Report, i947, p. 212. 
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continued to be the primary manufacturer of moccasins, shoes, slippers, and other "articles­
souvenirs indiens pour les touristes" through mid-century.43 As during the Depression, then, 
the Bastiens appear to have continued to prosper while affording relatively little benefit to the 
majority of Huron families. 
While the unequal distribution of manufacturing benefits partly resulted from the 
industry shedding significant numbers of Huron-held production-line jobs, it also arose from 
Wendake's growing middle class. Indeed, during the first half of the twentieth centulY 
increasing numbers of Huron worked in white collaI' or other prestigious and economically 
advantageous jobs. Although the archivai record most frequently refers to members of the 
Picard family occupying such positions, a handful of other cases suggest that the 
phenomenon was relatively widespread. 44 Among those Huron concerning whom little 
information has been found, several held government jobs while others found employment in 
industries such as insurance. 45 Meanwhile, members of the Picard and Bastien farnilies 
continued to occupy socially prestigious, white collaI' work through mid-century. Pierre 
Albert Picard Tsichiek8an, who served as both grand chief and Indian agent during the 
period, was certainly the most visible and well-paid Huron civil servant. Beginning in 1921, 
he occupied a position working for the cadastre service of Quebec' s Ministry of Colonization, 
43 [?] Potvin, "Une après-midi à Château-d'Eau," Les pelle/ries du Québec, March 1947, p. 8-9, 
ACNHW, G-I-99. 
44 This is due to the Picard family's importance in the documentary record. Indeed, members of the 
Picard family produced the majorily of non-governmental sources consulted for the twentieth century, 
something which allows for only rare glimpses of much of Wendake's population during the period. 
45 In 1930, for example, one of Elzéar Picard's three sons worked for Quebec's Treasury Department. 
[Pierre Albert Picard] to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 26 December 1930, BANQ-Q, 
P883, S5, File 13. Paul Launière also worked for the provincial government, although his post is 
unknown. M.E. Bastien to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 18 June 1938, LAC, RG 10, 
vol. 7552, file 41,014-1, reel C-14817. Ovila Gros LOllis's dallghter worked for the Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Company. W.J.F. Pratt to MT. Sharpe, 17 April 1937, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 
8551-0/. 
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Mines, and Fisheries. 46 Picard's annual salary for this post increased from $1,200 in 1921-2 
47to $1,800 in 1928-9, the level at which it stayed through his retirement in 1942. In addition, 
during his brief stint as Indian agent between 1929 and 1931, Picard drew a supplementary 
48
annual salai)' of $400 from the federal government. One of the Bastien brothers (Joseph) 
held a high-level commercial post as the manager of the fur department at Holt & Renfrew, a 
department store in Quebec City.49 Louis Philippe Ormond Picard Arôsen's military career 
underlines the prestige which certain Huron were able to acquire in the Jabor market. In 
September 1914, Picard, an "Explorer & Draughtsman," re-enlisted in the military, this time 
at the rank of Captain, serving in France with the 12th battalion.50 This made Picard one of 
only eight commissioned Amerindian officers serving in the Canadian Expeditionary Force in 
1916. 51 Wendake also produced a handful ofprofessionals during the period, with Léon Gros 
Louis erowning Huron professional progress by beeoming Wendake's first medieal doetor in 
46 Pierre-Albert Picard to lE. Perrault, Ministre de la Colonisation, des Mines & des Pêcheries, 23 
March 1921, ACNHW, P2-S3-AI3, File B-2-16. 
47 He received raises in 1922, 1923, 1925, and 1928. Copy of a letter from Pierre-Albert Picard to 
Hector La Ferté, Ministre de la colonisation, la chasse et les pêcheries, 28 May 1931 and [List of 
annual revenue of Pierre-Albert Picard from the Ministère de la colonisation, la chasse et les pêcheries, 
1921-1941], n.d. [19417], ACNHW, P2-S3-A 13, File B-2-16. 
48 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1930, part l, p. 9 and [ndian Affairs Annual Report, 1931, part l, p. Il. 
49 Joseph Bastien, "Éleveurs, lisez-moi ça," La revue des éleveurs de renards, vol. 1, no. 3 (December 
1934), p. 29-30. (ACNHW, file E-2-17). 
50 "Officers' Declaration Paper, Canadian Overseas Expeditionary Force: Captain Picard, Louis Phil. 
Ormond," 31 October 1918, LAC, RG150, accession 1992-93/166, box 7809 - 33. According to 
official documentation, Picard began his militai)' career as a private in the 87th battalion of the 
Canadian Militia in 1897 before becoming a lieutenant the following year. He again enlisted in April 
1902 and served a short stint in South Africa before being honorably discharged in July of the same 
year. "Canadian Mounted Rifles, Attestation Paper, No. 383," 16 April 1902 and W.E.L. Colemen, 
"Record of Service: Private Picard, Ormond," 28 October 1940, LAC, RG38, A-I-a, vol. 84, reel T­
2082. Picard's Brother, Pierre Albert, leaves a journal entry giving a different account of this period of 
his life. "1899, partit pour l'Afrique-Sud, guerre des Boers, avec le 4ème Régiment Canadien monté, 
(Colonel Boulanger) 1899-1900, et fut fait caporal." n.d., Picard, Journal personnel. 1916-1920, n.p., 
ACNHW, F-(-79. 
51 [ndian Affairs Al1l1ual Report, 1916, p. xxxvi. 
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1952 following his graduation from Université Laval in Quebec City.52 Thus, during the first 
half of the twentieth century certain Huron found skilled, white-collaI' employment, pointing 
to the importance oflocal socioeconomic diversification and to the ability of residents to eam 
substantial income despite official discourse asserting otherwise. 
While the state provided significantly higher pel' capita relief to the Moose Factory 
Cree during the twentieth century than to either the Innu or Huron, this situation arose mainly 
from western James Bay's dependence on the fur trade, a sector of the economy that 
experienced difficult times during the first half of the twentieth century.53 Throughout the 
period, the Cree proved eager to engage in various fonns of employment in order to earn 
income. Wage work for fur trade companies provided the Cree with their most important 
economic activities other than hunting and trapping prior to the 1931 arrivaI of the railroad at 
Moosonee. Given its centrality to the HBC's transportation network in nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century James Bay, Moose Factory fumished the Cree with significant revenue 
generated through dock and transportation work. In the summer of 1900, the HBC spent a 
total $7,873.58 on shipping at Moose Factory, most of which was expended in the form of 
wages. 54 Of this amount, the Cree earned $3,854.13 - $2,993.93 for labor paid to 102 Cree 
and $860.20 for freight transportation to inland posts provided to 36 Cree (ail of whom also 
eamed pay working on the docks). In comparison, it only provided $1,878.80 to 74 Moose 
52 Before taking the post with the Quebec government, Pierre Albert Picard Tsichiek8an worked as an 
engineer on several large construction projects in Quebec City. For example, between summer and 
autumn 1917, Picard was employed by Quinlan and Robertson in Limoilou. 3 September and 4 
November 1917, Picard, Journal personnel, 1916-1920, p. 65 and 7, ACNHW, F-I-79. Speech by J. 
Arthur Vincent for Léon Gros-Louis, 15 June 1952 and Souscription en faveur de M. Léon Gros­
Louis, n.d. [15 June 1952], ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-02. 
53 Whereas Indian Affairs provided pel' capita average arulllal relief in Mashteuiatsh and Wendake of 
only $0.30 and $0.71 respectively between 1910 and 1929, it provided the Cree of Moose Factory with 
$7.09 in annual pel' caita assistance during the same period.1ndian Affairs Annual Report, 1910-1929. 
For more on the fur trade in the region du ring the period, see Chapter Five, and for more on the state's 
attempts to reduce relief through beaver preserves in western James Bay, see Chapter Six. 
54 "Report on Transport: James Bay District," n.d. [1900], HBCA. B.l35/e/33, p. 4, IM1257. These 
figures were wel1 above what the company's upper management wanted to see. 
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Factory Cree in exchange for furs. While most Cree continued to pursue traditional activities 
in the bush, for a brief moment summer wage work, which accounted for nearly 70% of the 
Cree's income in 1900-1, replaced winter trapping as the core ofMoose Factory's economy55 
However, the shallow waters around the post, the transshipment system's high operational 
cost, and its counterproductive nature (the fur trade cou Id not generate profits through 
transportation alone) led the company to move its main James Bay port to Charlton Island, in 
the process slashing the number of Cree employed as dockworkers to "ten or twelve in ail" by 
1910. According to longtime HBC employee J.W. Anderson, "To handle the cargoes, Indian 
stevedores would be hired at Moose Factory and brought out to Charlton Island for the 
transportation season. These men would be trappers during the winter and casual labourers 
during the summer.,,56 Charlton Island remained the hub of the HBC's James Bay 
transshipment network until the 1931 arrivaI of the Temiskaming and Northern Ontario 
Railroad (T&NO) ended the practice of supplying the region by sea. The Cree also secured 
positions on company steamers that transported goods and furs between the various posts in 
James Bay, although this sector never employed more than a handful of band members. At 
the turn of the century, the HBC's James Bay management felt that, "Indians make the best 
[steamer] Pilots.,,57 However, by 1910 the HBC no longer appears to have employed Cree on 
its boats in James Bay, having replaced them by "natives" - that is, men of mixed ancestry 
58born in the region but not considered to be Cree. Amerindian labor also provided domestic 
services at Moose Factory, thereby ensuring that a very smal1 number of band members 
55 The report provides figures in Made beaver (MB), one of which it evaJuates at $0.55. Thus, the 
company provided 5,443.5 MB for labor, 1,564 MB for freight transportation, and 3,416 MB for furs. 
Alex Milne, "Inspection Report on Moose Factory," 4-11 July and 12-18 August 1901, HBCA, 
B.135/e/34, p. 19-21 and 24, reellMl257. 
56 J.W. Anderson, Fur Trader's Story, Toronto, Ryerson Press, 1961, p. 12. For the names of Cree 
employed on Charlton Island, see [7], List of Supplies Provided on Account, Servants and Indians, 26 
November 1904, HBCA, B.135/b/57, vol. 2, f. 397, reellMl122. 
57 "Report on Transport: James Bay District," n.d., HBCA. B.135/e/33, p. ID, IMI257 
58 Anderson reports that in 1910 "The mate, the assistant engineer, the stoker and the crew were 
natives of Moose Factory." Anderson, Fur Trader's Story, p. 15. 
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eamed a steady, year-round income. This sector of the economy also provided Cree women 
with their only opportunity to work for wages. S9 
Of course, aIl. of these workers received payment from the HBC in store credit 
rather than currency. Indeed, the company used labor expenditure in the same way it used the 
credit it extended in anticipation of furs. In both contexts, abstract money served to guarantee 
the sale of merchandise priced above standard market value. Despite this strategy, the 
competition between the HBC and Revillon Frères that characterized the western James Bay 
fur trade fueled a general increase in the wages paid by the two companies, at least prior to 
World War 160 
The 1931 arrivaI of the T &NO changed employment opportunities ln Moose 
Factory, eliminating some while adding others. From the turn of the century, the HBC and 
Revillon Frères conjointly paid two Cree to carry the winter mail "packet" south to the \ine at 
Cochrane once each year, retuming with whatever correspondence was held there for Moose 
Factory. Beginning in the mid-1920s, mail delivery at Moose Factory greatiy increased in 
frequency, when "a govemment subsidy gave a monthly mail service excepting for the spring 
and fall break-up and freeze-up periods.,,61 Cree such as James Quachegan and James 
59 "The cooking [for the district and post officers at Moose Factory] was usually done by an Indian 
man or woman trained for the purpose. Very often the larger household establishments, sllch as the 
district manager's residence, would be operated by an Indian man and wife team. The wife would be 
the cook and the husband would be the chore-man who wOllld attend to the sllpply of wood and water, 
light tires in the moming and maintain them dllring the day, and in general help his wife in the nmning 
of the household." Ibid, p. 20. 
60 In 1911, the James Bay District manager reported to his superiors that, "Expenses have increased 
owing to higher wages having now to be paid to Servants on re-engaging." Althollgh "servants" refers 
to non-Aboriginal employees, this wage increase most likely extended to the district's Cree who would 
have been just as capable of exploiting fur trade competition as others. A.C. McNab, "Report on Trade 
James Bay District Outfit 1910," 18 September 1911, HBCA, A.l1!48, p. 283, reel 725. 
61 Anderson, Fur Trader 's Story, p. 17. 
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Sutherland could expect to eam $60 in addition to rations for carrying the mai1. 62 However, 
once the T&NO had arrived at Moosonee, this source of revenue disappeared. A similar 
situation developed with respect to the HBC's method of supplying inland posts. At the tum 
of the century, the HBC employed Moose Factory Cree to carry supplies inland to its post at 
Abitibi. 63 However, due to the arrivai of the National Transcontinental Railway in Cochrane 
during the first decade of the twentieth century, the company began supplying Abitibi from 
the "Iine" instead. With the exception of 1900-1, no information on either the number of men 
working this route or the amount of wages they received has been found. Regardless, the 
HBC's shipping rates rose significantly during the period, from $4 pel' 100 lbs in 1895-6 to 
$9.25 per 100 lbs in 1914-5, suggesting that Cree wages similarly increased. 64 In 1915-6, the 
HBC decided to extend its transportation route from Cochrane to Abitibi through to New 
Post, thereby reducing Cree employment in this sector. 65 Despite the savings effected in this 
way between 1915 and 1917, the HBC retumed to its earlier Moose Factory-based system in 
1918 due to the losses that it suffered in sales. Indeed, "as ail the payments were made in 
cash," those who worked the route apparently spent their wages elsewhere, depriving the 
HBC of its profit on the inflated prices it charged for merchandise. 66 In this sense, wage work 
provided by the HBC served yet again to guarantee the company's profits while severely 
62 Thierry Mallet, "Mr. Mallet's Diary, James Bay and Hudson's Bay Trip - Summer 1920," LAC, 
MG28-TTT97, p. 65, reel F-1615 and Tuesday, 17 July 1926, in Edward Alexander McGregor, Journal 
ofE.A. McGregor, 1922-1927, n.p., LAC, MG30-AI25. 
63 W.K. Broughton to the Commissioner, Hudson's Bay Company, 6 Febrllary 1901, HBCA, 
B.135/b/56, file 1, doc. no. 206, reel IM1120. 
64 W.K. Broughton to c.c. Chipman, 31 December 1895, HBCA, B.J35/e/32, p. 2, reel IM1257 and 
N.H. Bacon, "Fur Trade Annual Report, Olltfit 1914," 31 January 1916, HBCA, A.74/23b, p. 55, reel 
1350. 
65 F.D. Wilson, "Annual Report: James Bay District, Outfit 1915," 6 December 1916, HBCA, A.74/45, 
p. 92, reel 1354. 
66 F.D. Wilson, "Annual Report: James Bay District, Outfit 1916," 20 January 1918, HBCA, A.74/46, 
p. lI0,reeI1355. 
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limiting Cree purchasing power. In 1931, as a result of the T&NO's complction, this source 
of Cree wage work also disappeared. 
While the railroad's arrivai at Moosonee adversely affected certain sectors of the 
Cree economy, it also brought new forms of wage work to the region. Anderson notes that 
from 1931 "Moose Factory with its ancient buildings, mission station, Indian village and 
R.C.M.P. detachment naturally became quite an attraction for tourists.,,67 Although the post 
had been receiving occasional parties of visitors since at least the nùd-I920s, the T&NO 
recast this sector of economic activity in important ways. First, earlier tourists required 
guides in order to access the region. However, prior to the railroad's completion, these men 
were most likely Amerindians who lived further to the south for whom it would be more 
convenient to meet those arriving in Cochrane.68 Once sportsmen and other visitors began 
arriving directly at Moosonee, the Cree could more readily secure income as hunting and 
fishing guides and through work ferrying visitors by canoe or boat to the tourist attractions on 
Moose Factory Island. 
During the late 1930s and 1940s, wage labor again took on a new hue through large 
privately and publicly financed building projects. These initiatives attracted Cree from around 
James Bay to Moose Factory, in the process turning the settlement into the region's 
"metropolis." However, many jobs, such as those in railway construction, were reserved for 
union members, making them inaccessible to the Cree, many of whom "moved further up the 
track" as a result. 69 At the end of the 1930s, the Anglican Church launched the first 
67 Anderson, Fur Trader 's Siory, p. 173. 
68 For example, in 1926 E.A. McGregor records the "Arrivai of a canoe from the line with a party of 
tourists, Capt Hall, ML Bowles & ML Wilson of New York, Sam Thompson guide." Thursday, 22 July 
1926, in Edward Alexander McGregor, Journal of E.A. Mc Gregor, 1922-1927, n.p., LAC, MG30­
A125. 
69 Jennifer M. Blythe, Peggy Martin Brizinski, and Sarah Preston, '''1 was Never 1dle': Women and 
Work in Moosonee and Moose Factory," Research Program for Technology Assessment in Subarctic 
Ontario, Report No. 21, Hamilton, Ont., McMaster University, June 1985, p. 38. 
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construction project of the period by funding a new structure to house the organization's 
residential school in Moose Factory. According to Reverend Gilbert Thompson, the principal 
of the school, this building, which was opened in 1938, "was practically put up by local 
lndian labour.,,70 During the 1940s, the state also funded several construction projects in 
Moose Factory. However, because it did not apply a unitary model or pay scale to the 
management of these sites, it inadvertently created competition among them for workers. 
Those Cree who were able took advantage of the higher wages offered by one of the projects 
(the hospital) Even though the competing program (aimed at providing free homes to Cree 
families) may have served their needs more effectively. ln an article published in 1949, John 
1. Honnigman describes the problems created by this intra-state rivalry: "Administrators there 
are trying to secure Indian labor to work with a model conununity which will be turned over 
to the population without charge. Wage rates, however, are lower than on the large new 
Govemment hospital going up under the direction of a private contracting firm. The bulk of 
available labor is employed on the latter undertaking while the more incompetent men find 
work on the housing project whose progress is crawling.,,71 Thus, in this one instance, Cree 
men eamed different wages for essentially the same work as money, in this case provided by 
the state, encouraged inequality in western James Bayas it did elsewhere. 
During the first half of the twentieth century, then, wage work became increasingly 
central to the economies of Mashteuiatsh and Moose Factory while remaining absolutely 
critical in Wendake. Money continued to favor the stratification of Huron society that had 
begun during the nineteenth century; the Picards and others sought their income in 
prestigious, off-reserve work, the Bastiens domjnated the reserve's labor market, and other 
band members found themselves wholly dependent on relatively low-paying wage labor. 
lndeed, this 1ast segment of the population bore the brunt of the Depression as they found 
70 Gilbert Thompson ta T.R.L. Mac1nnes, 14 January 1941, LAC, RG 10, vol. 6514, file IND-15-1-146, 
part 1, reel C-15046. 
71 John J. Honigmann, "Incentives to Work in a Canadian Indian Community," Human Organization, 
vol. 8, no. 4 (Fall1949), p. 27. 
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themselves under- or unemployed and increasingly dependent on state-funded welfare that 
effectively subsidized those local elites who had previously employed them (the Bastien 
family).72 While sorne Innu and Cree remained able to eam their livelihood from the bush, the 
increasing presence of Euro-Canadian trappers and the declining fur market of the late 1920s 
and 1930s pushed many to supplement or wholly replace their income through wage labor 
whenever possible. While in economic terms the Moose Factory Cree remained a relatively 
homogenous conununity, the Innu began undergoing a more marked process of income-based 
stratification, with Meridy Robertson notably coming to occupy an important economic role 
at Mashteuiatsh. These changes both influenced and are visible in the financial relations and 
consumption practices that members ofthese conununities pursued during the period. 
The Local Financial Sector in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh 
During the twentieth century, creditldebit relations between community members 
continued to provide one of the primary monetary resources in the economies of 
Mashteuiatsh and Wendake.73 The Indian Act's prohibition on the seizure of on-reserve 
property for the repayment of personal debt remained in force beyond mid-century and as a 
result, the Huron and Innu were for the most part forced to either generate loans locally or to 
go without. Although a handful of exceptions to this general rule existed, most notably in the 
form of credit supplied by fur traders at Mashteuiatsh, most projects that required 
considerable capital investment, such as the purchase of a home, could only be financed 
through the aid of other conununity members. In both First Nations, such assistance came 
overwhelmingly from the socio-economic elite. These individuals, in contrast to other 
conununity members, employed the full battery of tools allowed by the law in guaranteeing 
72 For more on welfare in Wendake during the Depression, see Chapter Six. 
73 While the Moose Factory Cree certainly shared their monetary resources, the documentary record 
attests to a marked lack of what might be termed financial relations during the period. As a result, this 
section focuses on Wendake and Mashteuiatsh alone. 
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repayment. Unlike Euro-Canadian financial or corrunercial institutions, by 1930 band 
members had the right to seize collateral in the case that a debtor failed to respect the 
conditions of a loan. By this time, those who offered loans did so as a business transaction, 
charging interest and seizing collateral when payment was not forthcoming. In this way, 
loans reinforced the power of those band members who had access to significant capital 
reserves by placing a novel form of authority in their hands - that to decide who should have 
access to money and under which conditions. In this sense, the Indian Act, explicitly 
designed to protect Amerindians from outside exploitation until sucb time as they were ready 
to assume the responsibilities of full Canadian citizenship, encouraged inequality and 
exploitation within Aboriginal communities. At the same time, however, this practice also 
permitted Huron and Innu of relatively modest means access to capital that would otherwise 
have been unavailable. Thus, the local financial sector in Wendake and Mashteuiatsh served 
both to promise greater equality and to exacerbate existing inequality. 
The second part of this section focuses on Huron and Innu patronage of Euro­
Canadian financial institutions such as banks and insurance companies. While the Indian Act 
certainly limited their interaction with the formai financial sector, at least some band 
members held savings accounts and insurance policies, indicating that they were just as savvy 
and concerned with their own and their family's economic well-bcing as their non-Aboriginal 
neighbors. Furthermore, such investment, with the exception of that made overseas, was 
widespread, indicating that most Innu and Huron sought to increase their monetary holdings 
while reserving a portion of this resource to ensure their welfarc in times of hardship. 
Loans and the Local Economy 
From 1876 to 1930, the Indian Act declared that, "No person shall take any security 
or otherwise obtain any lien or charge, whether by mortgage, judgment or otherwise, upon 
real or personal property of any Indian or non-treaty Indian within Canada, except on real or 
personal property subject to taxation." As this clause applied to al! "persons," it formally 
excluded Amerindians from making use of lien in contracts among themselves. However, the 
law did permit those who sold goods to Amerindians to "take security on such article for any 
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part of the priee thereof which may be unpaid. ,,74 Thus, traders might recover merchandise 
sold on credit should the buyer fail to pay full priee, but could not seize other property on the 
reserve (which was exempt from taxation). Indeed, in at least one instance, the HBC secured 
a ruling requiring that four Innu repay the company for debts they had incurred at 
Mashteuiatsh.75 Its lawyers may have invoked this section of the Indian Act. Alternately, the' 
company may have attempted to secure the repayment of debt through off-reserve property 
(such as savings held in Euro-Canadian financial institutions) which, because it was taxable, 
was liable to seizure. 76 In 1930, Parliament altered the wording of the section to permit band 
members to make use of lien in agreements between themselves. 77 
Given the protection afforded Aboriginal debtors by the Indian Act, it is not 
surprising that Euro-Canadians rarely provided loans to Amerindian reserve residents. In fact, 
only two such loans have been found in the documentaI"y record. 78 While the first of these 
demonstrates the dangers associated with lending to Amerindians during the period, the 
second provides an example of a loan that satisfied al! parties, affording necessary capital in 
exchange for deferred payment. This suggests, then, that while such inter-ethnie [oans never 
constituted a major method of borrowing among First Nations they occasionally 
supplemented money from other sources. 
74 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians," 12 April 1876, 
39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 66. 
75 No infonnation on the court that ruJed in these cases has been found. The individuals the court found 
guilty, along with the amount each was ordered to pay, were: A. Petecolagan ($59.80), N. PetecoJagan 
($46.85), H. Connelly ($39.50), and D. Alexis ($39.50). Gustave Perrault to W.R. Hamilton, 12 
August 1902, HBCA, B.329Ic/2, f. 176, reellMB89. 
76 As noted below, severa! Innu held savings accounts in Roberval during the period. 
77 Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the lndian Act," 1930, c. 25, s. 10. 
78 This excludes the standard fur trade practice of "advancing" hunter-trappers, which is covered in 
Chapter Five. 
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In July 1906, Charles Siméon transferred the title of two houses that he owned at 
Mashteuiatsh to L.N. Tremblay, a French Canadian merchant from Sainte Anne de 
Chicoutimi, "as security for advances already made and to be made to Simeon by Tremblay." 
Although Siméon made this transfer with the help of a notary public in Chicoutimi, he did so 
without the knowledge of the Indian agent. In 1910, Tremblay's creditors, who had had his 
assets seized, sold the houses at public auction. Following the Indian agent's protests of the 
sale's illegality under the Indian Act, the Superior Court of Chicoutimi declared it void and 
Siméon therefore retained the title to the houses.79 This case, then, illustrates both the 
potential short-term benefits and 10ng-terrn handicaps faced by Aboriginal borrowers. 
Although Siméon kept his houses and the credit he had received based on their "security," 
Tremblay's business associates learned the painfullesson that on-reserve collateral could not 
be legally seized. Given the absence of any comparable case either in Wendake or 
Mashteuiatsh, it would appear that as this knowledge became more widespread, the Innu and 
other Amerindians found themselves unable to attract capital in this way. 
Howcver, at least one other case suggests that the local economy continued to 
support at least sorne informai and unsecured loans between Euro-Canadians and 
Amerindians. During the 1930s or 1940s, Anne-Marie Siméon secured $300 in credit from 
the owner of the sawmill in Roberval in order to construct a house in Mashteuiatsh. Siméon 
herself provided $300 that her husband, William Valin, had given her prior to leaving for the 
autumn hunt. Only a verbal contract appears to have been made in this instance and both 
parties fulfIiled their part of the bargain, the owner of the sawmill having the house built and 
Siméon and her husband repaying the borrowed funds from their revenue generated by 
hunting, trapping, and forestry work. 80 Although this loan concerns real estate, its forrn 
79 A. Tessier ta J.D. McLean, 31 May 1910 and A. Tessier ta the Secretary, Department of Indian 
Affairs, Il July 1910, LAC, RG 10, vol. 3161, file 365,577, reel C-11332. 
80 Anne-Marie Siméon et Camil Girard, Un monde autour de moi: Témoignage d'une Montagnaise, 
Chicoutimi, Les éditions JCL, 1997, p. 33-7. While Siméon's reminiscences do not allow precise 
dating, the context suggests that she received her loan either during the 1930s or the 1940s. 
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recalls the unsecured credit that merchants advanced to Amerindian hunter-trappers rather 
than the secured mortgages fumished by band members. In this sense, the amount of the loan 
appears to have been of greater importance than the ends to which its recipient put it. 
While loans that crossed ethnie divides were extremely rare, both the Innu and the 
Huron extended monetal)' credit within their respective communities with greater frequency 
through mid-century. Although no trace of a specifically Huron credit system has been found, 
Julius E. Lips daims that, during the 1930s, the Innu of Lac St. Jean and the Cree of 
Mistassini conceived of credit and debt in culturally specifie ways. Both of these groups had 
a lcgal system that recognized the use of an item as security for a promise to pay. In the same 
manner as a mortgage provided by a bank or other financial institutions, the Innu based their 
liens not on monetary value but on a specifie good or chattel (but not a hunting territory). "If, 
during the period of gaging, the gaged object decreases in value, thereby lowering its sales 
value, and if the sale therefore covers only part of the debt, the creditor has no claim to 
additional payment. He can satisfy himself only with the gaged object itself and loses money 
if its sale brings less money than expected.,,81 Thus, by the early twentieth century Innu law 
functioned in much the same way as its colonial counterpart, requiring that security for 
monetary 10ans be provided not by sorne specifie amount of cash reserves but by a tangible 
object that, should the debtor fail to repay his or her loan, the creditor had the right to seize. 82 
However, most loans between band members were contracted without reference to money, 
although not in the absence of interest. According to Lips, "the Joan of a canoe for a trip of 
sorne length is not gratuitous, such a loan falling rather under the classification of rent. It is 
paid for with goods agreed upon at the time of the loan rather than with money." Such loans, 
81 Lips, "Naskapi Law," p. 437. 
82 This observation applies to loans from multiple sources, including banks, credit unions, and 
pawnbrokers. For a recenl study of eighleenth and nineteenth-century American pawning, the form of 
credit that most closely approximated the relatively small loans made within the community at 
Mashteuiatsh, see Wendy A. Woloson, "In Hock: Pawning in Early America," Journal of the Early 
Republic, vol. 27, no. 1 (Spring 2007), p. 35-81. 
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whether involving goods or money, were "always bound to a definitely fixed time.,,83 Innu 
custom again closely approximated Euro-Canadian practice when a loan consisted of money 
rather than a particu1ar object. Lips notes that" the Innu frequently lent each other money, "as 
a rule free of charge," although sometimes "It may be agreed that someone who lends money 
to a man will get it back with a small percentage of interest.,,84 Following the death of a 
debtor, his or her creditors possessed neither the power to seize property nor to require 
reimbursement on the part of the debtor's heirs. Although the Innu occasionally offered to 
paya portion of such debts when incurred towards other band members, commercial partners 
from outside of the community cou1d expect no such favors. '''La Compagnie est riche' is the 
motto of the Indian and the inheritor therefore does not dream of paying to the Company 
voluntarily the debts of their deceased debtor.,,85 Thus, "traditional" Innu credit law, as 
described by Lips, bore more than a passing resemblance to its Euro-Canadian counterpart. 
In practice, mortgages represent the majority of actual loans concluded between the 
Huron or Innu for which the documentary record provides details. Initially at least, Indian 
Affairs opposed contracts involving reserve residents that permitted payment for real esta te 
over a period of time while securing repayment with the property itself. In 1894, Duncan 
Campbell Scott, the acting deputy superintendent general and Indian Affairs' chief clerk and 
accountant, instructed Antoine O. Bastien, the Indian agent at Wendake, that, "Transfers of 
this nature should be discouraged by you, as they are conditional in their terms." Scott 
described the Department's position to Bastien by stating that, "Of course, there can be no 
valid objection to exchanges made by Indians of their lands, when paid for in full.,,86 Thus, 
83 Lips, "Naskapi Law," p. 440. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid, p. 438. Although the lndian Act provided the superintendent of Indian Affairs with authority 
over the estates of Amerindians, it only addressed issues relating to the division of property and not the 
responsibility for the repayment of outstanding debt (which, presumably, was covered by the clauses 
reJating to loans). Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend and Consolidate the Laws Respecting Indians," 
12 April 1876, 39 Victoria, c. 18, s. 9 and 66. 
86 D.C. Scott lo A.O. Bastien, 20 Oclober 1894, LAC, RG 10, vol. 2773, file 154,998, reel C-11276. 
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Indian Affairs, which was under Scott's leadership from the 1910 into the 1930s, opposed not 
only the use of lien but also that of interest-free loans in the transfer of on-reserve real estate. 
Of course, if this policy had been implernented, it would have essentially removed the 
rnajority of Huron and Innu homes and lands from the bands' internai market as very few 
community mernbers wou Id have been able to raise sufficient funds to purchase by way of a 
single payment. 
Although Indian Affairs may have objected to the adoption of the fixed-term 
mortgage, it tended to follow the reconunendation of the band council when considering 
whcther to validate or annul real estate sales. This explains the use, from the 1890s, of 
mortgages in both Wendake and Mashteuiatsh. Whenever a sale took place within the limits 
of a reserve, the band council would read the contract aloud at a meeting and decide whether 
to recommend that the sale bc recorded or cancelled. In 1919, for example, the Huron counci1 
considered several contracts, including one by which Armand and Alex Bastien sold a store 
and the occupation rights to the lot on which it was situated to Alphonse Picard.87 Although 
they could reconunend against accepting sales, neither the Mashtcuiatsh nor Wendake band 
council ever appears to have exercised this power. 
In both conununities, notaries initially adopted the fixed-terrn, interest-free 
mortgage as the preferred means of effecting land sales. In 1893, Maurice Bastien Ahgniolen 
sold a house in Wendake to Maxime Sioui for $125. Sioui made a down payment of$75 and 
agreed to provide the remaining $50, without interest, to Bastien within a year. The contract 
of sale stipulated that if Sioui failed to make payment within the allotted time, "the vendor 
shall have the right to keep his house without any expense and the money paid shall be for 
rent of the said house.,,88 Aiso in 1893, Michel Réné sold a house, along with the lot on which 
it was situated, to Narcisse Picard for $225, $100 as a down payment with the remaining 
87 Picard, Journalpersonnel, 1916-1920,26 March 1919, p. 116, ACNHW, f-I-79. 
88 Cyrille Renaud, Deed of Sale from Maurice Bastien, Junior ta Maxime Sioui, 8 September 1893, 
LAC, RGIO, vol. 2773, file 154,998, reel C-11276. 
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$125 to be paid within a year of the contract's signature. In order to insure payment, the 
contract reserved for Réné "the privilege of bailleur de fonds (money lender) for the amount 
remaining due.,,89 Given that Agent Bastien attempted to register the contracts a year after 
their signature, both would appear to have been honored. 90 
The sel1er's provision to the buyer of an interest-free loan, payable in predefined 
installments over a short period of time, remained the primary method of land transfer in 
Wendake into the 1910s. In April 1912, Ebrahim Picard sold a'lot in the village, containing a 
barn and a store, to Gaspard Picard for $200, $70 of which Gaspard Picard provided upon the 
contract's signature, while undertaking to repay the remaining sum in two installments: $30 
in May 1912 and $100 the following May. The contract stipulated that the seller provide what 
was essentially an interest-free mortgage to the purchaser. As security for this loan, Ebrahim 
Picard retained "son privilège de bailleur de fonds jusqu'au paiement final" which 
presumably allowed him to recover the property in the case that Gaspard Picard failed to 
make timely payments.91 However, in this particular instance, he never invoked the clause as 
he received full payment for the sale.92 
Certain Innu also completed real estate transactions based on similar loans. In July 
1901, James Robertson sold a portion of his lot at Mashteuiatsh to Ned Robertson. "The said 
sale is made for the sum of Seven Hundred Dollars payable as follows, Three hundred 
Dollars first of July 1901 and the balance, one hundred dollars a year, without interest, also 
payable on the first of July every year until the account of Seven hundred dollars has been 
89 Cyrille Renaud, Deed of Sale from Michel Réné ta Narcisse Picard, 9 September 1893, LAC, RGI0, 
vol. 2773, file 154,998, reel C-11276. Emphasis in original. 
90 Antoine O. Bastien ta Hayter Reed, 15 October 1894, LAC, RGlO, vol. 2773, file 154,998, reel C­
11276. 
91 Copy of Deed of Sale from Ebrahim Picard ta Gaspard Picard, 16 April 1912, ACNHW, Fonds 
Marguerite Vincent, 8542-02. 
92 Ebrahim Picard, Sworn Statemenl, 4 October 1924, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-02. 
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paid.,,93 In accordance with the terms of the contract, the Robertsons completed this sale in 
July 1905.94 In 1925, Ned Robertson sold a pOltion of this lot to Thommy Robertson for 
$2,000. Again, the deed of sale contains a clause specifying the manner in which the sale 
priee was to be paid. Following a down payment of $200, Thommy Robertson "promised to 
pay to the vendor accepting, at the latter's domicile, as follows: fifty dollars the 1st day of 
each of the months of January, May and September of each of the following years, until full 
payment, without interest." Ned Robertson 
reserved unto himself the right to ask for the cancellation of this sale, should the 
purchaser fail to pay in the month when they fall due, each and every one of the 
term payments of the aforesaid balance of the sale priee, without him being required 
to observe any judicial formality whatsoever, without putting in default, without 
indemnity for the improvements which the purchaser may have made to the said 
immoveable during his possession, and without refund of what may have been paid 
up to then in respect of the sale priee, the whole will be kept by the said vendor by 
way of rentai and pecuniary compensation liquidated, and the said purchaser will 
proceed against, as by virtue of a lease pure and simple.95 
Ned Robertson made an intervivos donation of the payments he was to receive for the sale ta 
Mary Victoria Robertson the following month, payments that she had received in full by 
1937.96 
By the late 1920s, mortgages in Wendake had begun charging interest. Although 
unclear who provided the funds, Philippe Sioui had secured an interest-bearing mortgage by 
the late 1920s. In 1929, Sioui held a $500 mortgage on the workshop where, prior to losing 
93 Deed of Sale from James Robertson to Ned Robertson, n.d. [1 July 1901], LAC, RGIO, vol. 10264, 
file 377/36-7, reel T-7555. 
94 Modification to a Deed of Sale from James Robertson to Ned Robertson, 7 July 1905 and Sworn 
Statement of James Robertson, 7 July 1905, LAC, RGIO, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555. 
95 Deed ofSale from Ned Robertson to Thommy Robertson, 17 July 1925, LAC, RGIO, vol. 10264, 
file 377/36-7, ree1 T-7555. 
96 Deed of Donation from Edouard Robertson to Mary-Victoria Robertson, 25 August 1925 and Sworn 
Statement of Mary Victoria Robertson, 12 August 1937, LAC, RG 10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T­
7555. 
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his eyesight, he had produced canoes. The Indian agent, Pierre Albert Picard, valued this 
workshop at approximately $1,000 and stated that with interest, Sioui owed his creditor 
$701.15.97 Despite the continued illegality of interest-bearing mortgages between reserve 
residents, Indian Affairs requested that Picard determine "whether it will be possible to 
dispose of the said work-shop to advantage in order that Sioui may pay off his mortgage and 
still have sorne funds in hand.',98 In addition to Sioui's blindness, both his wife and son 
suffered from tubereulosis, prompting Indian Affairs to issue the family monthly assistance. 
However, the Departrnent did not expect to pay for either the family's relief or Sioui's debts. 
lD. McLean, the secretary ofIndian Affairs, wrote to Picard: 
With regard to the property owned by Sioui, and which it is advisable to sell, as he 
can no longer earry on business as a builder of eanoes, 1 have to point out that you 
should persuade him to aecept the first reasonable offer he reeeives. He should not 
hold out for too high a priee, as probably there will be but few persons prepared to 
make purehase, and the mortgage on the building will have to be paid off from the 
proceeds of the sale. Assistance in the way of relief will also be chargeable against 
money realized from the sale of property .99 
In a move reminiscent of its relations with other state agencies, Indian Affairs, then, sought to 
persuade Sioui to sell his home in order to subsidize his own welfare payments. 
Although unclear who loaned Sioui funds against his workshop, Ludger Bastien is 
the most likely candidate. During the late 1920s and 1930s, Bastien dominated Wendake's 
mortgage market. In 1928, for example, Moïse Gros Louis mortgaged his home to Bastien for 
$550 by way of a contract of vente à faculté de réméré (roughly equivalent to pawning).IOO 
The agreement that the two men signed required Gros Louis to repurchase the house over five 
97 [Pierre Albert Picard] to the Secretary, Department of Indian Affairs, 15 October 1929, BANQ-Q, 
P882, SI, SS2, File 18. 
98 J .D. McLean to PA Picard, 17 October 1929, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 18. 
99 lD. McLean to PA Picard, 12 November J 929, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 18. 
100 However, instead of terming the transaction a mortgage (hypothèque), the notarized contract made 
use of a legal mechanism (vente à/acuité de réméré) that is roughly equivalent pawning. 
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years byrepaying the full $550 in installments of no less than $100 per year along with 6% 
interest, twice annually over the lifetime of the loan. In other words, Gros Louis agreed to 
pay Bastien $166 per year ($100 in principal and $33 in interest, twice yearly). The contract 
also stipulated that Gros Louis was to insure the house against fire to the value of the 
mortgage ($550), the policy for which was to be in Ludger Bastien's name. During the period 
covered by the contract, Gros Louis was to continue to occupy the house. IOI However, given 
that the average anouaI household income in Wendake entered freefall during the mortgage's 
lifetime (from nearly $500 in 1929 it dropped to roughly $150 in 1933 before rebounding 
slightly to $200 in 1934), it seems likely that Gros Louis lost his home. 102 In faet, Bastien 
may have resold this same house to Elzéar Sioui in the early 1930s. In 1930 or 1931, Sioui 
purehased a house on the reserve from Bastien. Although the priee is unknown, Sioui, 
apparently sueeumbing to eeonomie diffieulties,103 rapidly proved unable to pay the 
instal1ments required by the eontraet of sale and, at the end of the deeade, a Quebee City 
newspaper reported that the little money paid did not even amount to the interest stipulated in 
the eontraet. Beeause the home was loeated on the reserve, jurisdietion fell to Indian Affairs 
lOI Adélard L'Heureux, Contract of Sale from Moise Gros Louis to Ludger Bastien, 27 October 1928, 
ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-12. 
102 Although the Indian agent's income figures should be regarded skeptically, this picture of a 
generalized drop in income corresponds to the massive increase in state welfare distributed in 
Wendake during the period. The household incomes are based on the census returns of 1929 and 1934 
which respectively reported 270 and 235 Huron men and women between the ages of 21 and 65. Each 
household is assumed to be made up of one male and one female earner. For the census figures, see 
1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1929, p. 64 and 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1934, p. 48. For the 
Indian agent's estimate of reserve income, see 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1929, p. 90, Indian 
AfJairs Annual Report, 1930, p. 74, 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1931, p. 46, 1ndian AfJairs Annual 
Report. 1932, p. 44, 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 1933, p. 41, and 1ndian AfJairs Annual Report, 
1934, p. 64. 
103 Sioui clearly struggled to maintain solvency during the Depression. In 1939, for example, he 
pleaded guilty to having abandoned two children, the first in 1936 and the second in 1938, at La 
Crèche, an orphanage in Quebec City. "Abandoned 2 Infants: Huron Reserve Indian Admits Separate 
Offences," Montreal Gazette, 16 March 1939, p. 21. 
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who, although working more slowly than the superior court (the standard legal channel 
providing for the seizure of property) allowed Bastien to recover the house in 1938. 104 
Like Moïse Gros Louis, sorne Innu used their homes, land, and other property to 
secure funds from wealthy band members. In both cases that have been found at 
Mashteuiatsh, loan recipients sought this money in order to outfit themselves for their winter 
hunt. In 1931, the HBC post manager at Pointe Bleue reported that, "Chas Boivin arrived last 
night so 1 went to see him. 1 spent ail forenoon there grading his fur he had a good hunt 
nearly $3000.00. Chas Boivin explained to me that he owed Meridy Robertson about that 
amount and that Robertson had a guarantee on his house & land and that he would require ail 
his fur to pay it but when his son Renée [sic] came down that he would be sure to pay what 
he owed US."IOS The next day, the post manager described a similar deal: "went to see Michel 
Dominique to try and collect part of his old Debt. He said he had only for about three 
hundred and Meridy Robertson & Chas Buckell had guarantees on his house & property so 
he would not have enough to pay me."IOG All parties to these deals were band members, with 
Robertson and Buckell both being relatively wealthy traders. Thus, as at Wendake, local 
elites took advantage of their Indian status to supply credit to other band members using the 
recipients' "house & property" as collateral, a mechanism for securing repayment that was 
not avai1able to Euro-Canadian merchants conducting business on the reserve and that 
contributed to the creation of distinct socioeconomic classes in both communities. 
104 "Fin d'un long litige à la réserve huronne," L'Evénement, 21 April 1938, n.p., ACNHW, P2-S3-B2,
 
File B-2-19.
 
105 Tuesday, 9 June 1931, HBCA, B.329/aIl4, p. 39-40, reellMA53.
 
lOG Wednesday, 10 June 1931, HBCA, B.329/a/I4, p. 40, reellMA53.
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External Financiallnstitlltions: Banks and lnsllrance 
While the majority of Huron and Innu lending and financial needs were serviced 
within the community itself, the inhabitants of Wendake and Mashteuiatsh also conducted an 
impressive amount of business with external financial institutions. Chief among these were 
savings banks and life insurance companies, although members of both conununities dealt 
with other types of financial institutions as weil. In this sense, the Huron and the Innu 
resembled their Euro-Canadian neighbors who increasingly employed their revenue to 
generate interest and to ensure monetary security in the case of an accident. 107 
At Wendake, both Ormond Picard and Alfred Sioui held life insurance policies. 
Although the benefits provided by Picard's policy are unknown, Alfred Sioui's widow 
received $1,000 from his insurer upon her husband 's death in 1910. 108 While only these two 
instances of Huron life insurance policies have been found during the period, this number 
appears to significantly underestimate the number of conununity members who purchased 
coverage. This is primarily due to the socioeconomic gap that separated Picard from Sioui. 
While the former was weil educated and earned a significant income, the latter appears to 
have led a relatively modest life. Thus, it seems likely that several other Huron, both among 
the economic elite (e.g. the Bastien family) and the "people," also purchased life insurance. 
In addition to life insurancc, at least a portion of the residents of Wendake also insured their 
homes against fire. 109 
107 For recent studies that consider these practices among North Americans of European origin, see 
Viviana A. Rotman Zelizer, Marals and Markets: The Development of Life Insurance in the United 
States, New York, Columbia University Press, 1979, Yvan Rousseau and Roger Levasseur, Du 
comptoir au réseau financier: L'expérience historique du Mouvement Desjardins dans la région du 
centre du Québec, 1909-1970, Montreal, Boréal, 1995, and Martin Petitclerc, "Nous protégeons 
l'infortune ": Les origines populaires de l'économie sociale au Québec, Montréal, VLB éditeur, 2007. 
108 On Sioui's policy, see Antoine O. Bastien to J.D. McLean, 20 January 1911, LAC, RG10, vol. 
2567, file 115,520-IA, reel C-11240. For information on Picard's Iife insurance, see Adélard 
L'Heureux to Mrs. L.P.O. Picard, 19 May 1931, BANQ-Q, P882, S2, File 7. 
109 As noted above, Ludger Bastien required Moïse Gros Louis to insure his home to the value of the 
mortgage ($550) supplied by Bastien. 
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According to the Indian agent at Mashteuiatsh, several Innu purchased life 
insurance in addition to other forms of coverage, while also belonging to fratemal mutual aid 
societies. In 1911, he reported to his superiors in Ottawa that, "Fourteen houses are undel' fire 
insurance to the extent of from $500 to $2,000. Five Indians have their lives insured for 
amounts of from $1,000 to $3,600, and pay their premiums faithfully. Others belong to 
mutual benefit societies; sorne of them have even received the benefit this year of assistance 
in case of illness.""o This belief in insurance remained in effect throughout the period, with 
the Innu continuing to pay premiums even at the height of the Depression. In 1935, the 
HBC's post manager wrote in his post journal that, "lB. Leveillé of Metropolitan Life in 
aftemoon to collect on sorne of his Indian policies.,,111 Both the Innu and the Huron, then, 
used money to prepare themselves for the risks of the future, once again demonstrating the 
incommensurability of the discourse of improvidence and actual Aboriginal practice. 
The residents of Mashteuiatsh and Wendake also conducted business with banks, aIl 
of which were located off-reserve. Among the Huron, for example, Pierre Albert Picard held 
an account at the Bank of Montreal and Harry Gros Louis, Sr. had money deposited at the 
Loretteville branch of the Banque provinciale du Canada. 112 Once again, the bank accounts 
reported by the documentary record certainly only represent a fraction of those who placed 
the il' money in these institutions. In Mashteuiatsh, the Indian agent wrote in 1904: "1 know 
two or three Indians who have fairly considerable amounts deposited in the savings branch of 
the Banque Nationale at Roberval. Last Easter an Indian took advantage of a trip to Roberval, 
where he sold a lot of skins and deposited in the savings bank the sum of one hundred dollars, 
110 Armand Tessier, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 23 May 1911, in Indian AfJairs Annual 
Report, 1911, part 1, p. 52. 
III Friday, 8 March 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/17, p. 56, reellMA53. 
112 Copy of Check from Harry Gros-Louis, Sr. to Paul Lesage, 31 December 1936, ACNHW, Fonds 
Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05 and Antonio Falardeau to [Pierre] Albert Picard, 24 May 1932, 
ACNHW, P2-S3-A13, File B-2-16. Picard used this accaunt ta pay for his brother Ormond's funeral 
expenses. In the margin of this letter requesting payment, Picard wrote: "Ce 6 juin 1932 Compte 
d'Antonio Falardeau payé par moi cheque sur la Banque de Montréal." 
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which he will apply during the course of the summer to the building of a house.,,113 Over the 
following several years, the Indian agent would make similar observations indicating that 
banking at Roberval had become a permanent fixture of Innu life. 114 
At least one Huron involved himself with financial institutions to a greater extent 
by investing in foreign bonds. In 1927, Pierre Albert Picard purchased from the National 
Bank of Canada 550 German Reichsmark securities. lls Again, given that their familial 
fortune dwarfed that of the Picards during the period, the Bastiens almost certainly heId 
similar investments. As a result, although impossible to truly gauge the depth of Huron 
interaction with the financial sector based solely on these scatterèd archivai traces, it seems 
likely that Wendake's bourgeoisie spent at least a portion of their money on securities and 
other investments during the period. 
First Nations Consumption during the 1930s and 1940s: Cash, Credit, and Vouchers 
During the first half of the twentieth century, retailing in Wendake, Mashteuiatsh, 
and Moose Factory underwent major changes. While the Cree had access to multiple 
merchants in the immediate vicinity of the HBC posts in western James Bay for the first time, 
the Innu and Huron were exposed to an effervescent retail sector that provided consumers 
with increasing options. Although the documentary record rarely makes explicit reference ta 
maney, it clearly played a central raIe in consumption. Indeed, as the years passed, cash 
113 Alphonse Marcoux, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 30 June 1904, in Indian AfJairs Annual 
Report, 1904, p. 52. 
114 For example, in 1911 he wrote: "Some have deposits in the bank, others do business by notes, just 
like white people." Armand Tessier, Report on the Lake St. John Agency, 23 May 1911, in Indian 
Affairs Annual Report, 1911, part l, p. 52. See also, Armand Tessier, Report on the Lake St. John 
Agency, Il June 1910, in Indian AJJairs Annual Report, 1910, part l, p. 50. 
115 [?], Banque Canadienne Nationale, ta P.A. Picard, 7 October 1927 and [?], Exchange Agent, 
Banque Canadienne Nationale, ta Pierre Albert Picard, 8 October 1927, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 
6. 
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became increasingly ubiquitous among Amerindians. This process opened new horizons to 
the members of aU three First Nations, allowing them to spend their money in novel ways on 
an array of consumer goods that had previously been unavailable. It also had the effect of 
reinforcing the power of many of those individuals already identified as economicaUy central 
in the context of employment and the financial sector. However, the absence of currency also 
sometimes provided Amerindians with power in the retail sector. Indeed, Mashteuiatsh 's and 
Moose Factory's consumers wielded the most economic clout precisely when they possessed 
the least amount of cash as a result of the ferocious retail competition that this limited 
resource inspired. This chapter focuses on the 1930s and 1940s because these decades 
witnessed important changes in retailing in aU three communities and because the 
documentai)' record provides greater detail concerning consumption during this period than 
any other prior to mid-century. It describes the ways in which Cree, Huron, and Innu ably 
employed their purchasing power during the period to shape the communities in which they 
lived, clearly demonstrating yet again their talent for effectively disposing of their income, 
whether it came in the forrn of cash, credit, or state-backed vouchers, even in the extremely 
chaUenging context of the Great Depression. 
The first half of the twentieth century witnessed stiff competition among retailers in 
Mashteuiatsh. During this period, a total of seven stores operated at different times on the 
reserve, with at least three always simultaneously active. The most important of these were 
those of the HBC, Meridy Robertson, and Revillon Frères. 116 At the same time, itinerant 
116 Meridy Robertson had opened his store by March 1900. J.A. Macrae, Report to J.D. McLean, 7 
April 1902, LAC, ROIO, vol. 3048, file 237,660, part 6, reel C-11316. By 1939, Tommy Robertson 
had taken over this business and continued to run it through at least the late 1940s. Tuesday, 21 
November 1939, HBCA, B.329/a/22, p. 33, reel lMA54 and Bill from Robertson & Son to Achille de 
la Boissière, 24 August 1948, LAC, ROIO, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555. Revillon Frères 
opened an on-reserve post during the tirst decade of the twentieth century which, by autumn 1933, it 
had relocated to Roberval. Friday, 20 October and Thursday, 16 November 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/l6, 
p. 24 and 29, reel IMA53. The other stores (three of which were run by Inn) were those of Charles 
Siméon (active at the lum of the century), the Indian agent, W.T.A. Donohue (1900-1902), William 
Connolly (ca. 1911), and Joseph Kurtness (ca. 1924-?). 
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merehants frequently visited Masbteuiatsh, both from stores in Roberval and elsewhere. 117 
Prior to the late 1920s, the retail environment appears to have been relatively stable, with the 
Innu spending the money they earned generally as they saw fit. However, the massive 
deerease in revenue eaused by the failing fur market of the late 1920s and the widespread 
eeonomic difficulties of the 1930s prompted an unprecedented struggle among stores and 
travelling salesmen. The shrinking money supply that resulted' proved central to a struggle 
between retailers as they scrambled to collect what little cash eirculated while continuing to 
sell on credit and also accepting payment in kind. Thus, although the period was certainly 
difficult, Amerindian consumers found themselves with options they had not previously had. 
In March 1932, the HBC entered the increasingly lucrative door-to-door sales 
market in an effort to compete with storekeepers from Roberval who conducted business in 
this manner on the reserve several times a week. 118 The program started slow Iy and after 
nearly two months the HBC still struggled to gain meaningful access to the market. George 
Fowlie, the company's post manager at Mashteuiatsh, claimed that, "Boutet a Roberval 
merchant used to come only twice a week and now he is coming four times a week to try and 
cut us out. Leclerc is also passing three times a week and selling very cheap, so these two 
merchants are getting the most of what little cash there iS.,,119 In addition to selling goods at 
lowcr prices than those offered by the HBC, these traveling salesmen also employed a 
preferred customer program. Fowlie reported that, "the Roberval merchants have again 
lowered their priees on several lines, and besides are giving a present for each purchase of 
25.00. They are issuing cards and they punch the value of each purchase and when the total 
amounts to 25.00 the customer gets a present of 6 cups & saucers or the choice of several 
117 Traveling salesmen had been present in Mashteuiatsh since the beginning of the cenlury and 
maintained a presence there throughout the period. See, for example, W.T.A. Donohue to the Secretary 
oflndian Affairs, 12 June 1900, LAC, RGIO, vol. 3021, file 223,390, reel C-11312 and Monday, 25 
June 1928, HBCA, B.329/a/13, f. 3r, reel 1MA53. 
118 Tuesday, 8 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/I5, p. l, reellMA53. 
119 Wednesday, 27 April 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/15, p. 13, reel IMA53. 
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other pieces of crockery.,,\20 The HBC responded the following autumn by instituting a 
rewards program of its own. "In order to encourage the local inhabitants to trade with us 
instead of the Roberval merchants we are offering attractive premiums to ail customers 
(credit or cash) who purchase to the extent of $100.00. Housewives are especially interested 
in this scheme.,,12\ However, this approach failed to tum the tide in the HBC's favor and by 
late 1933, the company had added circulars advertising special sales to its retailing arsenal. 122 
Although the company's first sale did not generate as much cash revenue as Fowlie had 
hoped, the post manager planned "to make these special sales a weekly event.,,123 
The use of these modem marketing techniques, however, did not address the 
primary problem facing retailers du ring the period: the marked lack of hard cUiTency caused 
by widespread unemployment. 124 In this context, sorne Innu chose to remain in the bush 
rather than come to Mashteuiatsh where they would be unable to make purchases for want of 
cash while others dealt with merchants who accepted non-monetary payment. In 1932, 
Fowlie wrote that, "Conditions are very bad here, the people have no money. The halfureeds 
exist by selling wood to Roberval Merchants and getting provisions in exchange. Nobody at 
Pointe Bleue has been able to get employment with the lumber companies this year which is 
affecting our trade. Very few Indians are coming down to Pointe Bleue, most of them come 
down to the nearest settlement and sel! their furs and buy a few provisions & retum to their 
120 Tuesday, 15 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a!l5, p. 3, reellMA53. 
121 Friday, 7 October 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/I5, p. 38, reellMA53. 
122 In November 1933, the HBC's post journal records that, "Staff preparing circulars for special sale 
which we hope to make on Saturday." Wednesday, 8 November 1933, HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 27, reel 
IMA53. 
123 Saturday, Il November 1933, HBCA, B.329/a!l6, p. 28, reel IMA53. 
124 For an analysis of similar marketing strategies employed by retailers in the United States in their 
efforts to overcome the dearth of cash during the Depression, see Sarah Elvins, Sales & Celebrations: 
Retailing and Regional ldentity in Western New York State, 1920-1940, Athens, Ohio University Press, 
2004, p. 106-38. 
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hunting grounds.,,125 The HBC dealt with this situation by using its size and financial reserves 
to eliminate competitors that could not weather a prolonged priee war. In April 1934, Fowlie 
reported that, "Our system of passing round houses is serving a useful purpose. We have had 
to eut our priees very low and our Roberval Competitors are becoming discouraged. One has 
abandoned and the two who remain do not appear to be making anything. We have the 
greater part of what !ittle trade there is to be had in the village.,,126 The HBC pressed ahead 
with this policy, allowing it to slowly squeeze its competitors from the reserve's retail 
sector. 127 Despite such dominance, the HBC appears to have been unable to tum a profit on 
Innu consumption through the end of the decade as a result of the slumping fur market and 
the continued lack of hard currency in the village. In August 1935, after all of the returned 
hunter-trappers had sold their winter catch, Fowlie reported that an employee "went round the 
village interviewing the people with outstanding accounts. Everybody was very polite and 
promised to do their best, but ail the money he collected was five dollars from Phylomène 
Paul.,,128 At the same time, the increasing ease and rapidity of travel to Roberval provided the 
Innu with access to stores in neighboring Euro-Canadian towns, providing them with less 
expensive goods and additionallines of credit. 129 
125 Thursday, 10 March 1932, HBCA, B.329/a/I5. p. 2, reel IMA53. 
126 Saturday, 21 April. HBCA, B.329/a/16, p. 66, reel 1MA53. 
127 In 1935, Fowlie again claimed that this policy was a success. "Compared with previous years, 
business is very quiet. The Indians have practically no money & cannot spend freely. Purcbases are 
confined lo the strict necessities and living is from hand to mou th. Roberval merchants who sell on the 
Reserve must also be feeling the lack of ready money for we do not see their wagons in the village as 
often as formerly." Monday, 17 June 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/I8, p. 6, reellMA53. 
128 Saturday, 31 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/ 18, p. 26, reel IMA53. The currency shortage at 
Mashteuiatsh continued for several more years. In 1937, for example, H.R. Cummings, an HBC 
employee, claimed that there was "No cash in the village al ail this season." Monday, 14 June 1937, 
HBCA, B.329/a/20, p. 3, reel IMA54. 
129 In 1935, Fowlie reported that "Louis Paul... has been getting his supplies from Grenier at Roberval 
because we sell to [sic] dear." Friday, 30 August 1935, HBCA, B.329/a/I8, p. 26, reel IMA53. 
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By the summer of 1936, state work-for-welfare programs began injecting a modest 
amount of cash into Mashteuiatsh's economy. In August, Fowlie WI"Ote: "Business fairly 
brisk due to money circulating in village from the few days work which have taken place on 
roads.,,130 Despite the healthy tourist trade in "Moccasins and Indian Handicrafts" carried on 
by the HBC, the post' s sales figures remained weil below those of the early 1920s, suggesting 
that the Innu continued buying only essentials while doing business at several different 
stores. 131 By the end of the decade, the HBC's retail business at Pointe Bleue appears to have 
improved both with respect to tourists and the Innu. The outbreak of World War II caused 
priees to skyrocket and led to brief provision shortages in Mashteuiatsh. 132 However, the 
situation rapidly righted itself and although priees undoubtedly remained high, the HBC post 
journal makes no mention of difficulties after the early faU. Moreover, the general economic 
situation on the reserve had improved markedly by 1940, with the HBC's manager, H.B. 
Frankland, noting in June that, with only a handful of exception, trappers were "paying 100% 
as they arrive.,,133 
Thus the HBC, Roberval merchants, and presumably Meridy Robertson l34 pursued 
Innu dollars through the use of increasingly sophisticated marketing techniques. This struggle 
reached its height during the 1930s, when the reserve's money supply was nearly depleted. 
This meant that the Innu's relative power as consumers acrually reached its climax as their 
130 Monday, 17 August 1936, HBCA, B.329/al19, p. 15, reel1MA54. 
131 Throughout the surnrner and auturnn of 1936, the post effected large sales to tourists. See, for 
example, Saturday, 19 and Monday, 21 September 1936, HBCA, B.329/a/19, p. 21-2, ree1 1MA54. 
132 Just after the the outbreak of hosti!ities the post manager reported that it had become "practically 
impossible to obtain flom and other staple groceries." Wednesday, 6 September 1939, HBCA, 
B.329/a/22, p. 20, reel 1MA54. Although the HBC continued to outfit Innu trappers, in the short term 
the provision shortage forced some to significantly de1ay their departure. "Francois Germain left for 
his hunting grounds after waiting a week or two for his fiour." Thmsday, 14 September 1939, HBCA, 
B.329/a/22, p. 21, reel 1MA54. 
133 Tueday, II June 1940, HBCA, B.329/a/23, p. l, reellMA54. 
134 UnfOlwnately, the sources consulted make !iule mention ofRobertson's retail practices. 
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access to currency approached its nadir. As priees fell and credit and in-kind payment 
replaced cash, retailers competed for decreasing supplies of money while hoping to weather 
the economic downturn and be repaid thereafter by a clientele grateful for having been 
supported through hard times. In this sense, the resumption from 1940 of full payment by the 
Innu of the credit they had received and the persistence of Robertson's store throughout the 
period suggests that this gamble ultimately proved successful for retailers. At the same time, 
the Innu demonstrated an ability to take advantage of market conditions in order to stretch 
their extremely modest income to the limit, relying on small amounts of both state assistance 
and private credit to make ends meet. 1J5 
The Huron received far higher levels of per capita assistance during the 1930s than 
the Innu. However, the form in which Indian Affairs supplied this relief along with the 
absence of a competitive retailing environment similar to that of Mashteuiatsh meant that the 
residents of Wendake had iess room to maneuver. By the 1930s, the Huron could choose 
between Euro-Canadian stores neighboring the reserve and three establishments in Wendake 
itself. Gustave Gros Louis, Paul Sioui, and Maurice E. and Ludger Bastien owned the stores 
situated in Wendake while Albert Rochette owned a competing establishment in Loretteville. 
However, these retailers did not possess identical economic power. Although little is known 
about Rochette's store, the Bastiens enjoyed access to their family's capital reserves and 
political weight, allowing them to dominate sales to on-reserve consumers. In the context of 
the Depression, they did so largely through control of relief vou chers provided by Indian 
Affairs which, according to Sioui and Gros Louis, had become more important than cash in 
the local economy because they formed "la presque totalité du pouvoir d'achat d'épicerie de 
135 As mentioned in Chapter Six, the Innu of Mashteuiatsh received extremely limited relief funds 
during the Depression as a result of Indian Affairs' claim, made in complete ignorance of 
environmental and market conditions, that subarctic populations had easy access to subsistence 
resources in the bush. 
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la réserve entière.,,136 Through early 1930, Indian Affairs had provided relief vouchers to 
destitute Huron through Albert Rochette's store. 137 However, shortly thereafter, the state 
began issuing vouchers to Huron-owned stores alone (and primarily that run by the Bastiens), 
in the process tuming them into a major subject of political debate. Maurice E. Bastien 
explained that the dominance of state-funded relief enjoyed by his store, "Au Bon Marché," 
provided a simple demonstration of the law of supply and demand, given that Huron 
beneficiaries were free to choose the establishment for which the il' vouchers were issued. He 
argued that, "la plupalt choisirent le 'Bon Marché, [sic] parce que il y avait un plus grand 
assortiment et à des meilleurs prix, cette épicerie étant affiliée aux 'Epiciers Unis' de 
Québec.,,138 However, an analysis of the priees charged by the three stores for common 
consumer goods calls Bastien's assertion into question. 
On 15 September 1929, Pierre, Albert Picard compiled a comparative priee list for 
the three on-reserve stores. This document, which contains ten different products, allows for 
two observations: tirst, the Bastiens carried a wider array of merchandise and, second, the 
priees charged by Sioui and Gros Louis for the items they carried were always inferior to 
those of "Au Bon Marché.,,'39 In this case, Indian Affairs' policy of issuing a single voucher 
for a single store to al! households that received relief appears to have imposed a decision on 
136 Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui to J.F. Pouliot, M.P., 2 January 1933, in "Lettres que nous 
recevons," Le Soleil, 2 février 1933, p. 4. For more on the store owners' political struggle over Indian 
Affairs vouchers, see Chapter Six. 
137 For example, Bill for purchases made by Madame George Gros-Louis from Albert Rochette, 15 
October 1929 and Bill for purchases made Joseph Sioui from Albert Rochette, 15 February 1930, 
BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 12. 
138 M. E. Bastien, Agent des Hurons de Lorette, to M. le Rédacteur, 6 February 1933, in "Lettres que 
nous recevons," Le Soleil, 10 February 1933, ACNHW, P2-S3-B2, File B-2-19. 
139 Picard's Iist gives an average price of$0.32 for goods al Gros-Louis's store and an average of$0.34 
for those sold by Sioui with a price differential with "Au Bon Marché" of $0.06 for the first store and 
$0.03 for the second. In other words, Gros Louis's clients saved almost one-fifth and those of Sioui 
slightly less than one-tenth of the price charged by the Bastiens. Price List for Au Bon Marché, 
Gustave [Gros Louis], and Paul [Sioui], 7 October 1929, BANQ-Q, P882, SI, SS2, File 12. 
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beneficiaries between lower prices and better selection. The vast majority of Huron chose the 
latter, in the process providing the Bastien brothers with control of much of the Huron' s 
140purchasing power. Of course, given that the Bastiens also controlled the majority of the 
limited number of on-reserve jobs, unemployed Huron may also have chosen to use their 
vouchers at "Au Bon Marché" in the hopes of earning sorne much-needed monetary income. 
Relief vouchers continued to displace money in Wendake's economy through the 
end of the 1930s. By the middle of the decade, Harry Gros Louis, Sr. also operated a store on 
the reserve. In 1936, with his business in dire straits, Gros Louis contacted the MPPs for 
Quebec-Montmorency and Quebec County to request their assistance "en obtenant du 
Département des Affaires Indiennes quelques pensions que celui-ci accordes aux Indiens­
Hurons, de Lorette comme RELIEF, ceci me permettrait de faire des affaires avec mon 
magasin.,,141 Although the result of Gros Louis 's efforts is unknown, his lettcrs underline the 
importance of vouchers to both Huron businessmen and consumers. 
By 1941, a French Canadian had begun operating a store on Gros Louis's property. 
This raised the political issue of whether non-Huron should be allowed to compete in 
Wendake's retail market. In May, Georges Picard, himself a storekeeper in Wendake, asked 
the band council to ensure that, "le nouveau locataire de la Maison d'Harry Gros Louis, Mr. 
Guay soit assermenté ainsi que Mr. Harry Gros Louis Sr. afin d'établir si le commerce qu'il 
exploite est ou sa propriété ou celle de Mr. Hall)' Gros Louis. Au cas ou il serait la propriété 
de Mr. Guay, le dit Mr. Picard demande qu'il soit discontinué, vu qu'il n'est pas Indien et 
140 "Au Bon Marché" controlled approximately 90% of Wendake's relief budget. According to Sioui 
and Gros Louis, their stores received $46 and $62 per month in vouchers at the beginning of 1933. 
Gustave Gros-Louis and Paul Sioui to J.F. Pouliot, M.P., 2 January 1933, in "Lettres que nous 
recevons," Le Soleil, 2 février 1933, p. 4. Indian Affairs distributed a total of $11 ,285.59 in relief in the 
village during 1932-3. Indian AfJairs Annual Report, J933, partie l, p. 6. In other words, the Bastiens 
received $832 in month1y vouchers from a total of $940. 
141 Emphasis in original. Harry Gros-Louis, Sr. to Wilfrid Lacroix, 27 March 1936 and Harry Gros­
Louis, Sr. to Frank Byrne, 28 March 1936, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8551-01. 
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corrune tel, n'a aucun droit de faire concurrence à un Indien.,,142 Although the outcome of 
Picard's request is unknown, he was not alone in promoting this form of economic 
nationalism in the village. In his 1945 sociological study of the parish of Loretteville (which 
included Wendake), Gaston Blanchet claims that Jules Sioui, an "épicier-barbier, dans son 
ardeur, refusa pendant un certain temps de vendre aux Canadiens-français, sous prétexte qu'il 
ne vendait pas aux blancs. (Il a le mérite d'avoir établi la 'vente chez nous'). " Although 
Sioui eventually dropped this policy for economic reasons ("il fait son profit avec les 
blancs"), its brief existence highlights the political importance that some Huron attached to 
money spent on consumer goodS. 143 This form of political action continued to be prevalent 
through the end of the decade. In 1946, the Huron band council passed a resolution barring 
144from the village ail traveling salesmen with the exception of those from Loretteville. This 
proposaI, which Indian Affairs most likely accepted because it corresponded to the powers 
spelled out in the Indian Act, clearly demonstrates the political importance of supporting the 
local economy.145 Three years later, the counci1 again considered charges brought by a band 
member, Harry Gros Louis, Sr., that an on-reserve place of business (a pool hall) was owned 
and operated by a Euro-Canadian instead of its apparent Huron proprietor, Claude Sioui. The 
council, however, found that Sioui was "le seul propriétaire," and that the Euro-Canadian in 
142 Minutes du conseil, 9 May 1941, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919­
1949, p. 102, ACNHW. 
143 Blanchet refers to Jules Sioui as 'Ti-Jules." Blanchet, "Étude de la communauté de Lorette," p. 31. 
Sioui was by this time a relatively well-known activist throughout Canada. On his political activity, see 
Hugh Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian Political Radicalism in Canada, 1943-1944," Journal of 
Canadian Studies, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 211-42. 
144 Minutes du conseil, 27 November 1946, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 
1919-1949, p. 156, ACNHW. 
145 In 1932-3, Parliament amended the lndian Act in order to provide band councils with the power of 
"Regulating the operations of hawkers, peddlers or others coming on the reserve to se Il, or take orders 
for, wares or merchandise." Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the Indian Act," 1932-3, c. 42, s. 6. 
At the same time, this same power was provided to band councils who benefited from the Indian 
Advancement Act. Canada, Statutes, "An Act to Amend the Indian Act," 1932-3, c. 42, s. 11. 
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question was "son employé seulement.,,146 Thus, during the 1940s, a form of economic 
nationalism became relatively widespread in Wendake, inspiring both the band council and 
individual band members to promote local business through a political agenda that might best 
be described as "buy and sell Huron." Although the effects of this politico-economic 
campaign remain unclear, the renewed vigor during the 1930s and 1940s of certain band 
members' political activity, most notably Jules Sioui's pan-Indian activism and 1. Arthur 
Vincent's pursuit of specifically Huron land claims, clearly contributed to inspiring the 
movement's political philosophy.147 
Thus, an analysis of consumption, like that performed in relation to finance and 
wage work, underlines the political and economic force exerted by the Bastien family in 
Wendake. Money, whether in the highly restricted form of relief vouchers or in the more 
widely accepted form of currency, provided the means by which this power was brought to 
bear. However, even though they dominated its deployment, the Bastiens never enjoyed a 
monopoly over such power and other Huron made use of money for their own ends. Thus, 
Jules Sioui and the band council sought to use money as a means of exclu ding certain forms 
of Euro-Canadian participation in on-reserve consumption. 
In comparison to Wendake and Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory remained a relative 
backwater in terms of retailing throughout the first half of the twentieth century. As a result, 
consumption forrned a much less significant issue in monetary terms. The 1920s proved to be 
a turbulent period for Moose Factory's fur trade and, therefore, for Cree consumption. 148 In 
146 Minutes du conseil, 24 January 1949, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons. 1919­
1949, p. 182, ACNHW. 
147 On Sioui's political activity during the 1940s, see Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian Political 
Radicalism..." On Vincent's land c1aims, see, for example, Paul Lesage to 1. Arthur Vincent, 31 March 
1936, ACNHW, Fonds Marguerite Vincent, 8542-05. On the history of economic nationalism in the 
United States, which helps to situate Huron politico-economic activity in the larger North American 
context, see Dana Frank, Buy American: The Untotd Story of Economie Nationalism, Boston, Beacon 
Press, 1999. 
148 For a more in-depth analysis of changes in the region's market during the period, see Chapter Five. 
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1925, the manager of the HBC's James Bay District, George R. Ray, described the constancy 
ofhis Cree clientele: "Indian receipts are irregular, their consumption constant.,,149 However, 
the rapidly declining value of furs on the world market during the second half of the decade 
led the Cree, like the Innu, to begin looking to retailers other than the HBC and Revillon 
Frères. By the end of the 1920s, the Cree traveled south more frequently to the railroad in 
search of both a greater selection of goods and lower priees. ISO Simultaneously, independent 
traders visited Moose Factory more regularly, providing items that neither the HBC nor 
Revillon Frères sold (e.g. "fancy dtY goods and fresh fruits"). 151 In this sense, the Cree of 
Moose Factory benefited from increased competition between Euro-Canadian retailers for 
dirninishing monetary resources. This process only accelerated following the completion of 
the railroad. 
The T&NO arrived at Moosonee in 1931, bringing with it novel sources of goods 
while significantly lowering their priee for Cree consumers. J.W. Anderson, manager of the 
HBC's James Bay District from 1931 to 1937, later wrote that following the stock market 
crash and the opening of the railway, "Business was so poor that Moose Factory was 
practically the only post where we were selling merchandise in any considerable quantity, 
and there we had to dispose of it at fire sale prices!,,152 In addition to lower priees, the 
railroad brought two independent stores to the area, bringing the total number of competing 
retailers to four and shifting consumer focus away from Moose Factory and to Moosonee 
149 George R. Ray, "James Bay District Annual Reporl for Outfit 256," 1 September 1926, HBCA, 
A.74/40, p. 151, reel1352. 
150 On this phenomenon, see V.W. West, "James Bay District, Annual Report: Outfit 258," n.d. [1928], 
HBCA, A.74/42-8, p. 14-5, reel 1353 and V.W. West, "James Bay District, Annuai Report: Outfit 
259," n.d. [1929], HBCA, A.74/43-8, p. 16-7, ree11354. 
151 V.W. West, "James Bay District, Annual Report: Oulfit 259," n.d. [1929], HBCA, A.74/43-8, p. 16, 
reel1354. 
152 Anderson, Fur Trader's Story, p. 170. 
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(where both Revillon Frères and the new businesses were located).153 Revillon Frères ceased 
operations at Moosonee in 1936 and, by 1940, had been replaced by W.R. Cargill & Son, a 
general store and fur buyer owned and operated by a fonner HBC employee. 154 During the 
same period, mail order also began making inroads at Moose Factory for the first time. 
According to Arthur J. Ray, Eaton's had been engaged in servicing those First Nations that 
lived in the vicinity of the railroad since the early 1920s. "By 1922 many line post managers 
complained that the T. Eaton Company was taking away the most lucrative aspects of the 
dry-goods trade.,,155 However, the Moose Factory market only became accessible to mail 
order after 1931, when trains permitted the regular shipment of bulky goods to the post. As 
we have already seen, those Cree who worked with anthropologist Regina Flannery during 
the 1930s appreciated being compensated for their time in cash because this allowed them to 
purchase goods by mail order from the T. Eaton Company at lower priees than those charged 
by the HBC. 156 Cree consumers, then, like their Huron and Innu counterparts, made reasoned 
use of the retailing options open to them, supporting their families to the best of their ability, 
in the process forceful1y countering the discourse of Aboriginal improvidence. 
Money and Local Politics 
While this chapter has occasionally evoked formai politics, it has yet to analyze 
money's political raie in Mashteuiatsh, Moose Factory, and Wendake in depth. Although 
153 Ibid, p. 172. 
154 Cargill worked at the HBC's Moose Factory Post through the fall of 1939. W.R. Cargill, Invoice of 
Goods Sold by the HEC to Dinah Tapas, 30 September 1939, LAC, RGIO, vol. 6796, file 452-584, 
reel C-8572. By early 1940, he operated his own store. W.R. Cargill, Invoice ofGoods Sold by W.R. 
Cargill & Son to Mrs. Sam Cheena, 3 April 1940, LAC, RG10, vol. 6789, file 452-482, part 2, reel C­
8525. 
155 Arthur 1. Ray, The Canadian Fur Trade in the Industrial Age, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
1990, p. 151. 
156 Flannery, Ellen Smallboy, p. 4. 
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band counci1s and individua1 Amerindians wie1ded power through loans and consumption, 
money infonned action that fell beyond the scope of the more traditionally economic. In this 
sense, currency relations a1so recast the politica1 realm as traditionally defined. This section 
focuses on the local level in order to analyze the repercussions of certain state policies as weil 
as the genesis of novel Indigenous approaches to poli tics as expressed through money-use. 
Once more it demonstrates that, despite the much greater force that the state and capital could 
bring to bear, First Nations, both collectively and individually, possessed definite monetary 
agency, allowing them to both explicitly contest external authority and implicitly reinforce 
local authority, the latter often as resu It of the former. 
When the treaty negotiators sent by the federal and provincial states arrived in 
western James Bay in the sununer of 1905, Cree notions of conununity were radically 
different from what they have since become. Althollgh they had long freqllented fur trade 
posts for a few weeks each sununer, the Cree spent the vast majority of the year in small 
hunting groups made up of several related families that generally restricted their activities to 
a specific territory within a given river basin. 157 This meant that political organization at the 
national level remained relatively undeveloped. Nonetheless, the Cree did recognize leaders 
within the conununity. Robert John Renison, the Anglican missionary at Fort Albany in 1905 
and later the Bishop of Moosonee, notes that while the concept of leadership was not foreign 
to the Cree, democracy was. Thus, the requirement that the Albany Cree elect a chief to 
negotiate Treaty No. 9 struck them as bizarre. "As long as a man is able to be a leader he is 
Chief to the lndian. The same is true of his dogs. There is always a Leader, who rules the 
pack, gets the best bones and the pick of everything.,,158 Despite the foreign nature of 
electoral politics, Renison writes that the Cree understood that the spoils wou Id go to the 
victor. "It was said among the wigwams that the Chief of every band would wear a red coat, 
157 Victor P. Lytwyn, Muskekowuck Athinuwick: Original People of the Great Swampy Land, 
Winnipeg, University of Manitoba Press, 2002, p. 8-11. 
158 Emphasis in original. Robert John Renison, One Day at a Time, Margaret Blackstock (ed.), 
Toronto, Kingswood Bouse, 1957, p. 61. 
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that he would never work, that he would eat at the table of the Hudson's Bay Factor, that his 
credit would be good for any amount and that his wife would wear a hat. The fact that none 
of these things was true did not matter; they added zest to the election that was to take 
place.,,159 The Cree proceeded to vote as instructed, electing chiefs everywhere that the treaty 
party visited. At Moose Factory, Frederick Mark won the election and was joined on the band 
council by James Job, Simon Quachegan, and Simon Cheena. 160 Despite their mistaken ideas 
about the benefits of being chief, Renison writes that the Albany Cree were perfectly aware 
that the winner would reap significant material and symbolic capital. "The Chief was to be 
paid twenty dollars a year, and he was to be given a flag. Every six years he was to be given a 
new blue suit. Obviously he would be the most important person in his district.,,161 Thus, 
money played a central role in the introduction of an entirely new political system to western 
James Bay while reinforcing the authority of local leaders. 
Eisewhere, money also served to endow elected officiais with authority. Indeed, 
band councils' continued deployment of monetary penalties to enforce their wi Il during the 
first half of the twentieth century provided band members with evidence that these elected 
bodies possessed genuine power. Of course, given the extremely narrow legislative scope 
provided them by the Indian Act, band councils were only rarely capable of instituting 
monetary bylaws. In 1902, the Mashteuiatsh council passed a resolution naming Joseph 
Launière and Thommy Cleary road inspectors. The resolution charged these men with 
ensuring that the road crossing the reserve remained in good repair. Wherever Launière and 
Cleary dcemed it necessary, the owners of lots adjacent to the road were required to perform 
maintenance work themselves. In order to provide the inspectors with a means of enforcing 
their decisions, the band council authorized them to fine residents who refused to cooperate. 
159 Ibid, p. 63. 
160 Although the treaty commissioners' diary refers to Simon "Quatchequan," the spelling used above 
is the variant used in present-day Moose Factory. Canada, The James Bay Treaty, Treaty No. 9 (Made 
in 1905 and 1906) and Adhesions Made in 1929 and 1930, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, [193.1] 1964, n.p. 
161 Renison, One Day al a Time, p. 65. 
440 
"Inasmuch as it was djfficult to get the roads repaired on the reserve voluntarily by those who 
are obliged to do so, the council. .. decided to impose a fine not exceeding $5 upon those, 
who having been wamed on two consecutive occasions by the inspectors to repair their 
portion of the road wjJJ not act.,,162 At the end of the 1920s, the council renewed its use of 
potential fines or jail time in order to guarantee that band members effected the "upkeep of 
ditches, [and] roads ... on their lands.,,'63 Thus, money provided the council with coercive 
powers vis-à-vis intransigent band members, thereby reinforcing its political authority. 
The Huron band council also employed monetary penalties to impose its policies 
and reinforce its authority. In 1936, the council passed four resolutions regarding the 
maintenance of public order and the suppression of blasphemy, each of which applied a cash 
fine to anyone contravening their articles. The first and the fourth resolutions imposed a $10 
to $30 penalty or a prison sentence ranging from eight days to three months, depending on 
the place in which the convicted individual had contravened the bylaw. The second and third 
resolutions, on the other hand, dealt primarily with individuals impersonating or insulting the 
members of the band council. These resolutions again imposed a monetalY penalty of $10 or 
from one to thirty days in jail. 164 Through recourse to fines and imprisonment, then, the 
council sought to enforce a particular moral code within the limits of the reserve while 
simultaneously bolstering its authority with respect to rank and file band members. 
In theory, money could also confer authority through its positive use as a reward. In 
1946, the Mashteuiatsh band council attempted to employ money in precisely this way when 
it requested that Indian Affairs permit each councilor a $50 monthly salary. The resolution 
162 Minutes of Pointe Bleue Band Council Meeting, 14 August 1902, LAC, RGIO, vol. 1735, file 
250,659, bob. C-15022. 
163 Resolution of the Pointe Bleue Band Council, 4 February 1929, LAC, RGIO, vol. 7151, file 377/3­
10, part l, reel C-9685. 
164 The third resolution also dealt with "vagabondage où toute sorte de scandales en troublant la paix." 
Minutes du conseil, 13 July 1936, Bastien, Livre de conseils tenus au village des Hurons, 1919-1949, 
p. 42, ACNHW. 
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stated that the counci1 made this request so that its members, being re1ieved of the need to 
secure a living through activities other than managing the band's affairs, might remain on the 
reserve on a more permanent basis. 165 The Indian agent contemptuously described the 
council 's request as a "ridiculous proposition.,,166 Although this attempt certainly failed, the 
council's intentions were clear: it sought to augment its clout among the Innu while providing 
the chief and councilors with a relatively comfortable living. 
Indian Affairs supplied the vast majority of money employed on the local level for 
both administration and public works. Although the federal governrnent held funds in trust 
for the majority of First Nations during the period, the ability of band councils to spend such 
money was circumscribed by Ottawa's often invasive administrative practices and its general 
opposition to ail but the most limited expenditure. In order to overcome this obstacle, band 
members occasional1y raised money for political projects themselves. In 1903, a general 
meeting of the Mashteuiatsh Innu decided to build a new Roman Catholic cemetery on the 
reserve. It appointed a committee, composed of the chief Charles Jourdain, councilor 
Matthew Jourdain, and Joseph Kurtness, to co11ect the money needed from reserve residents 
for the purchase of the cemetery site from Luc Siméon and for the payment of fencing and 
other necessities. 167 After having been informed of the council's resolution by the Indian 
agent, the deputy superintendent general approved the project which was apparently 
completed as proposed.1 68 Although the band council would again work to enlarge the 
reserve' s Catholic cemetery in the 1930s and its Anglican counterpart in the 1940s, it did not 
165 Resolution of the Pointe Bleue Band Council, 27 December 1946, LAC, RG 10, vol. 7116, file 
377/3-5, part l, reel C-9680. 
166 A. de la Boissière to the Secretary of Indian Affairs, 28 December 1946, LAC, RG 10, vol. 7116, 
file 377/3-5, part l, reel C-9680. 
167 Minutes of a General Meeting of the Pointe Bleue Montagnais Band, 6 July 1903, LAC, RG 10, vol. 
10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555. 
168 Deputy Superintendent General oflndian Affairs to A. Marcoux, 22 July 1903, LAC, RGIO, vol. 
10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555. 
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attempt to finance the projects through voluntary contributions of band members, preferring 
to request that Indian Affairs grant it access to band funds. 169 
This practice of sidestepping the state through fundraising for political purposes 
affected the authority of both local politicians and Indian Affairs. While the Department had 
not opposed the application of donated money in the creation of a cemetery, it did object to 
its use in supporting Aboriginal activism. During the mid-I920s, Joseph Kurtness, a World 
War l veteran and the chief of the Innu of Mashteuiatsh, had begun aggressively promoting 
his own interests and those of the reserve community through trips to Ottawa paid for by 
local fundraisers. In July 1923 and 1924, the chief held dances on the reserve in order to raise 
money for his activities. 170 In 1924, the Indian agent, Armand Tessier, informed the 
Department that KUliness had organized a fundraising dance on the reserve "to draw a fairly 
good amount of money from the dancers to allow him to go to Ottawa." The agent clearly 
perceived this activity as a threat to his own authority, reporting that, "1 am told that he made 
the Indians believe that by going to Ottawa, with his authority as chief, he wouId force the 
Department to grant him immediately a lot of things." According to Tessier, the chief had 
been contaminated by the radical politics of another Quebec reserve and had begun 
attempting to infect the other Innu. "[H]e went sorne time aga to Caughnawaga to inspire 
himself returning with barbarian ideas with which our Indians were not fami liar. He considers 
himself now as the highest authority on the reserve and the agent does not count." The agent 
continued to charge Kurtness with corruption: 
l learned from creditable sources that lately he granted a permit to a man named 
Larouche to show moving pictures on the Reserve on the condition that Larouche 
pay him a certain sum of money which he pocketed. The same thing happened in 
169 Extract of a letter from A. de la Boissière to [?], 8 July 1932 and Pointe Bleue Montagnais Band 
Council Resolution, 11 July 1944, LAC, RG 10, vol. 10264, file 377/36-7, reel T-7555. 
170 While the reference to the dance's purpose in 1923 is vague, the repetition of the event in 1924 
suggests that both dances' goal was jdentical. In July 1923, the HBC's post manager wrote: "The 
Indian Chief is having a Dance this Evening." Wednesday, 18 July 1923, HBCA, B.329/a/8, p. 5, reel 
IMA53. 
443 
connection with another man named De Lamarre who came here to give an 
exhibition of strength. The Chief made him pay the sum of $5.00 for permission to 
give an exhibition oftwo hours in a barn. He told these people that he was the grand 
chief and the only man who could grant them permission to come on the reserve 
and that he would give such permissions only for money.l7I 
Tessier, then, portrayed Kurtness as undermining his authority and that of the Department. 
Indian Affairs responded by reprimanding the chief in writing, threatening his dismissal, and 
reminding Kurtness that his political power was wholl).' dependent on the Indian agent. "You 
will take no action whatever in the management of the affairs of your band without 
consulting the Indian Agent, who, you must not forget, is the official representative of the 
Department on the Reserve.,,172 Kurtness rejected ail of Tessier's charges, claiming that they 
were the product of "ceux qui font métier de collectionner des bagatelles pour monter des 
histoires.,,173 Indian Affairs took no fUlther action against KUltness who remained chief until 
defeated by Xavier Gill in 1927. 174 
Conclusion 
This chapter has analyzed the ways in which the Huron, Innu, and Cree made actual 
use of currency during the first half of the twentieth centUlY. Il demonstrates that during this 
period residents of ail three communities employed money judiciously, whether in the form 
of wages, credit, insurance, or expenditure on consumer goods, in order to ensure their 
economic well being, both in the present and the future. However, in doing so, Amerindians 
171 A. Tessier ta J.D. McLean, 23 July 1924, LAC, RG 10, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part l, reel C-9680. 
172 A.F. MacKenzie ta Joseph Kurtness, 30 August 1924, LAC, RGIO, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part l, 
reel C-9680. 
173 Joseph Kurtness ta A.F. MacKenzie, 25 October 1924, LAC, RGIO, vol. 7116, file 377/3-5, part 1, 
reel C-9680. 
174 Report of Constable Delvallet, Mounted Police, Pointe-Bleue, 17 July 1927, LAC, RG 10, vol. 7116, 
file 377/3-5, part l, reel C-9680. 
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particip,ùed in the redistribution of power at the local level, most notably through the process 
of internaI socioeconomic stratification that reshaped Wendake and, to a lesser extent, 
Mashteuiatsh. First Nations, though, were not the sole actors that contributed to these 
changes. Both capital, through the jobs it provided and the goods it sold, and especially the 
state, through the legislation it passed concerning Aboriginal peoples, were active 
participants in this process. Indeed, while the state sought to "protect" its wards, who it 
discursively defined as being inherently improvident, from those who wielded greater 
political and economic power, the legal framework that bureaucrats and legislators erected ta 
do so contributed to reproducing these same inequalities within Native communities during 
the period. In this sense, the state's essentialized Amerindian, a figure that while allegedly 
exhibiting improvidence also applied (according to official discourse) to ail Aboriginal 
peoples, contributed, at least in socioeconomic terms, to increasing diversity within Wendake 
and Mashteuiatsh, thereby contradicting itself on the level of both form and content. In this 
sense, Huron, Cree, and Innu monetary practice, using material and abstract currency alike, 
demonstrates the fallacy of official discourse and the oversimplification involved in claims 
that Amerindians form or formed an undifferentiated who le. 
Conclusion 
This dissertation has traced the political dimensions of First Nations money-use in 
the context of nineteenth- and twentieth-century Canadian colonialism. Ultimately, it argues 
that money's role in the process through which Amerindians found themselves increasingly 
marginalized by Europeans and their descendents in economic, political, geographical, and 
social terms was never singular, as actors made use of it in a variety of contexts to effect a 
variety of outcomes. Indeed, this study demonstrates that between the 1820s and 1950 First 
Nations frequently exerted force through currency both individually and collectively. They 
did this in spite of Euro-Canadians' growing control of much of the northern half of North 
America's land, resourçes, and labor power, in the process shaping in part both their internai 
and extemal relations. Moreover, this study demonstrates that the state's implementation of 
policy based on the conviction that Amerindians, as a general nJ!e, formed an improvident 
mass contributed to providing certain band members with monetary power that, in turn, 
played an important role in the socioeconomic stratification of Aboriginal communities. 
Throughout the period, however, the "improvident Indian" existed first and foremost in state 
discourse and not in Aboriginal reality, as both authorities in Ottawa and Indian agents in the 
field asserted Amerindians' incapacity to manage monetary affairs. This discursive refrain 
contributed to both the justification of the state's relationship with First Nations and, at least 
in the case of Wendake, the economic advancement of Aboriginal elites. This second 
observation points to the importance of class fonnation among First Nations while suggesting 
that Indian Affairs' role in this transformation may help to explain the absence of any 
criticism of state policy on the part of Aborigina1 socioeconomic elites who materially 
benefitted from assertions of generalized improvidence. 1 
1 Although beyond the scope of this study, the increasing traction attained by Aboriginal critiques of 
Indian Affairs' policies during the second half of the twentieth century appears to be linked to the 
growing role in mainstream Canadian society of Amerindians who were not members of their band's 
socioeconomic or political elite. For the emergence of this phenomenon in Wendake just prior to mid­
century, see Hugh Shewell, "Jules Sioui and Indian PoliticaI Radicalism in Canada, 1943-1944," 
Journal ofCanadian Studies, vol. 34, no. 3 (Autumn 1999), p. 211-42. 
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The present study has examined these issues from a dual bottom-up and top-down 
perspective, integrating the study of local experience with that of large-scale political and 
economic factors. At the same time, it has engaged in both discursive and material analysis. 
Together, these approaches provide a general portrait of Canadian colonialism's monetary 
dimension while remaining sensitive to local and regional phenomena that may or may not 
have been generalized throughout the country, demonstrating the ways in which a global 
process can encompass diverse and sometimes contradictory elements. As a result, both the 
shared experiences of the Huron of Wendake, the Moose Factory Cree, and the lnnu of 
Mashteuiatsh and those that set them apart from each other serve to complicate the narrative 
of capital and state expansion as seen from "on high." Rather than assuming colonialism's 
efficacy by relating its monetary history solely in terms of either the actions or the discourse 
of extra-regional institutions, this approach requires the comparison of global and local 
experience and discourse. Ultimately, it underlines colonialism's discursive force which, in 
the present case, allowed it to theoretically integrate diverse realities into overarching 
political, economic, and legal structures, while suggesting that such global factors may have 
influenced everyday life among First Nations in very different ways from those often claimed 
by both historical actors and the historiography. 
Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, European political economists 
solidly situated North America's native inhabitants at the bottom of the evolutionary ladder 
with respect to money-use. Beginning with Locke and continuing through Marx and John 
Stuart Mill, thinkers considered money to have spontaneously developed as a means of 
overcoming the inherent inefficiency of pre-monetary exchange. The "barter fable," classical 
economics' speculative explanation of the development of money, combined with widespread 
belief in the inhcrent superiority of precious metal-based currencies to portray those societies 
that lacked such monetary media as necessarily inferior to the more "developed" economies 
of Europe. In this sense, the intellectual environment in which colonists, the state, capital, and 
First Nations interacted during the period represented Amerindians as monetarily primitive 
and emphasized the self-evidently "superior" nature of systems of exchange based on 
European currency. 
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While thinkers formulated monetary theory, thereby reinforcing the common 
conception of Aboriginal peoples as being "prehistoric," imperial bureaucrats, European 
colonists, and their descendents adapted this vision born of conjectural history to their 
relations with British North America's First Nations. Indeed, the debates concerning the 
proposed monetization of Indian presents during the 1820s and 1830s provide a striking 
illustration of how preconceived notions combined to shape novel state discourse. In the 
context of these debates, colonial authorities cast monetary payments in lieu of in-kind 
presents as being dangerous to the interests of both the imperial treasUlY and Amerindians 
themselves due to the widely accepted assertion that Aboriginal peoples tended to spend ail 
of their money on alcohol. Officiais reinforced this vision by drawing a parallel between the 
urban poor, commonly depicted as improvident and therefore singularly incapable of 
handling cash, and Natives whom they claimed exhibited many of the same deficiencies. This 
argument owed much of its purchase to older stereotypes of the "poor Indian" while also 
benefiting from the general intellectual climate created by Adam Smith's assertion that 
"every prudent man" realized the worth of precious-metal-based currency. Rather than 
possessing an economy that occupied a level comparable to that of Europe or its overseas 
colonies, First Nations remained in the eyes of colonial commentators beholden to the 
cumbersome system of barter from which, according to contemporaneous specialists, money 
had developed. In this sense, colonial authorities and theil' superiors in London believed that 
they could not reasonably expect the "improvident Indian" to manage his own monetary 
affairs, laying the ideological groundwork for a significantly expanded state presence in 
everyday Aboriginal life. 
While this debate unfolded, however, the Indian Department, the agency charged 
with managing the imperial state's relations with First Nations, was in the process of 
undergoing deep budget cuts that severely handicapped its ability to implement a program 
corresponding to this newfound ideological orientation. However, during the 1850s, 
following an extended period of retrenchment in which the state found itself forced to rely on 
private efforts to encourage Aboriginal "civilization," colonial legislators began altering the 
legal framework within which the Department functioned, providing it with new powers, a 
new mandate, and a new means of justifying its own existence, all of which wcrc partially 
based on the "improvident Indian." After the transfer of authority over Indian Affairs from 
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London to the Province of Canada in 1860, this legitimacy formed the foundation for the 
massive growth in personnel and geographic reach that the Department experienced 
following the purchase of Rupert's Land and the signature of the first seven Numbered 
Treaties. From 1869, Parliament accorded increasing authority to the Department of Indian 
Affairs, providing the agency with a series of theoretical powers through which it could, first, 
protect and guide First Nations, groups it held suffered from a marked lack of foresight, and, 
second, simultaneously prepare them for assimilation into the Canadian body politic. In this 
sense, the assertion of Aboriginal peoples' improvident nature, articulated in the context of 
high-Ievel debates on the monetization of Indian presents and maintained both through the 
powers that Parliament afforded Indian Affairs and this institution's apparently humane goal 
of assimilation, underlay (and continue to underlie) departmental daims to legitimacy. 
At the same time, the state greatly increased the overall amount of cash ln 
circulation among First Nations through its monetization of treaty payments. However, this 
rare case of state provision of hard currency to Amerindians arose from obligation rather than 
discretion, explaining the gap between treaty practice and the state's rhetorical emphasis on 
Aboriginal improvidence. Whereas from 1850 treaties signed by authorities and First Nations 
required the use of cash, the funds the Department held in trust either from Parliament or for 
individual bands carried no such requirement. Thus, officiaIs rarely used the monies on which 
they could draw to supply Amerindians with cash, arguing that Aboriginal improvidence 
necessitated strict supervision on their part (a daim which reinforced Indian Affairs' raison 
d'être), while internally and extemally portraying treaty payments in terms that corresponded 
to any other market transaction (since the state had purchased lands from First Nations, it 
provided them with cash in retum). 
Despite the discursive refrain of Aboriginal improvidence and the marked growth in 
legal authority, geographic reach, and personnel that the Department underwent during the 
final third of the nineteenth century, the state's monetary practice in Mashteuiatsh and 
Wendake remained extremely discreet throughout the century. Although by the I860s the 
Huron had lost the limited autonomous control over natural resources they had enjoyed since 
1840 along with the funding that this system provided for independent political action, Indian 
Affairs only rarely used the newfound powers it gained in this instance or as a result of 
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legislative intervention to directly affect money-use on the ground in either Mashteuiatsh or 
Wendake during the century. Instead, elected members of both the Huron and Innu band 
councils made sustained political use of money through the end of the century in order to 
support their political authority, with respect to both local rivals and the state. At the same 
time, authorities often proved incapable of intervening in even the most obvious cases of 
local political money-use, suggesting that money primarily formed a rhetorical rather than a 
material tool for the state during the period. In Wendake, for example, the agent"s clear 
contravention of regulations through the maintenance of a general store and the sale of goods 
on credit to the reserve's residents underlines the limits of the Department's monetary control 
and the need to situate policy and practice in the same analytical framework. 
The power that commerce and poli tics together afforded the Huron agent reflects 
the development of money-use in both Mashteuiatsh and Wendake during the nineteenth 
century. Saguenay-Lac St. Jean, a region in which the state leased monopoly rights in the fur 
trade to a succession of capital interests through the middle of the century, effectively 
illustrates this phenomenon. These companies combined their political and economic power 
to control the monetary system throughout the region into the l 840s. Although the HBC 
ultimately succumbed to the pressure of colonization and the massive increase in the 
circulation'of publically-issued currency that accompanied it, it continued whenever possible 
to force the Innu to accept payment for their fur catch in abstract accounting currency weil 
into the twentieth century. Such political power exerted through money applied to Wendake 
as well, although there band members rather than external capital interests used currency to 
strengthen their position. Among the Huron, two families benefitted from manufacturing­
based capital accumulation, allowing their members to occliPy particularly influential 
political posts while continuing to carry enormous economic weight in the community. These 
processes inscribed both the Huron and the Innu to an ever-greater degree in the regional and 
extra-regional economy, both allowing them to profit from and increasing their vulnerability 
to economic and political factors beyond their control. At the same time, they also highlight 
the incommensurability of official discourse, which held that Amerindian improvidence was 
universal, and the increasing stratification of Ionu and Huron society, stratification which 
owed some of its existence to the local implementation of the national Indian policy from 
which this discourse emanated. 
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The process by which the state replaced private enterprise at the center of the 
monetary system began once more at Moose Factory at the tum of the twentieth century 
following the arrivai of Revillon Frères and the signature of Treaty No. 9. Although the HBC, 
along with its French rival, would seek to undermine the free circulation of the Canadian 
dollar through the 1930s, such attempts would ultimately fail as the state entered the fur trade 
and the field of social assistance in the region en force during the 1940s. This action relieved 
the HBC of its more explicit political power (without necessarily decreasing its profits) while 
contributing, through fur purehases and family allowances, to a significant increase in 
monetary circulation among the Cree. These programs, along with veterans' and dependents' 
benefits, are indicative of Indian Affairs' will to be its wards' sole interlocutor within the 
state during the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, this attempt to justify its own 
existence by eliminating its state-based "competition" represents, along with its attempts to 
justify Amerindian ward status in general, the primary thmst of departmental involvement 
with Aboriginal money-use through the middle of the twentieth century. For the state, then, 
money formed first and foremost a discursive tool serving to found its actions with respect to 
First Nations in reason and nature. 
When implemented, however, Indian Affairs' official goals with respect to money­
use frequently contributed to local conditions that deviated in important ways from both the 
state's official objectives and its description ofreal-life Amerindians. For example, the state's 
reticence to provide cash to welfare beneficiaries during the Depression allowed the Bastien 
family to reinforce its dominance in Wendake's retail sector. Although impossible to 
determine the validity of contemporaneous charges of cormption, it is clear that the most 
economically and politically powerful Huron family benefitted enormously from the funds 
Indian Affairs provided in the form of vouchers to the community's poorest members. State 
policy, then, materially encouraged socioeconomic stratification in Wendake despite ongoing 
adherence to a legal regime based on the c1aimed incapacity of Amerindians to manage their 
own affairs. Through the Indian Act, which effectively banned the seizure of on-reserve 
property for the repayment of Amerindian debt to non-Indians, state policy also created the 
preconditions for the emergence of local financial markets among First Nations, thereby 
favoring class formation. The Bastiens made use of this sector to strengthen their 
socioeconomic position in Wendake while Meridy Robertson did likewise in Mashteuiatsh. 
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Although classical and neo-classical economists often characterize money as the 
"neutral veil," describing it as an object that allows individuals and groups to verbalize the 
value inherent in goods and services while not exerting any influence of its own, the present 
dissertation's analysis suggests that this conception disposes too readily with questions of 
power. Rather than being neutral, money, like any other conduit through which people 
articulate social relations, permits sorne individuals, groups, and institutions to exert more 
force than others. This is made clear by the HBC's maintenance of the subarctic's monetary 
system during much of the period. Beaver currency, especially when restricted to account 
books, allowed the company to lock its Amerindian trading partners into a relationship built 
on credit/debit. This system served to guarantee repayment of debts in the absence of the 
courts which took on this charge among Euro-Canadians to the south. In this sense, money 
quantified relations between trading partners in a way that would not otherwise have been 
possible. Of course, this quantification primarily served the company's interests rather than 
those of Amerindians, as priee manipulation and the massive markup imposed on consumer 
goods make clear. Money's power, though, remained in no way the exclusive preserve of 
capitalist enterprise; the state also exerted force through both abstract and material money. 
From its refusai to provide cash in lieu of presents through its use of treaty payments as a 
means of conducting censuses of populations that would have otherwise escaped its 
surveillance, the state employed money to create First Nations as objects of governance and 
to justify Indian Affairs' institutional raison d'être on ideological grounds that were 
acceptable ta Euro-Canadian society. Together, money's use in these ways contributed to 
rendering Amerindians' ward status apparently natural white reinforcing the claims of the 
British Empire and Canada to the territory they occupied. 
Despite the apparent preponderance of the state in the monetary system, Huron, 
Cree, and Innu alike made daity use of money throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries in the absence of Indian Affairs' involvement. Indeed, while officiais employed 
harsh words when describing their wards' ability to manage their own monetary affairs, 
Amerindians spent and received currency in similar ways to the Euro-Canadian population. 
Like their neighbors, Cree, Huron, and Innu earned wages, sold manufactured goods and 
agricultural produce, ran businesses, purchascd provisions and other merchandise (both with 
cash and on credit), made charitable donations, and invested funds for the future. Although 
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the state theoretically oversaw many of these transactions through the powers afforded by the 
Indian Act, in practice it rarely intervened. In this sense, Amerindians' material experience of 
money-use calls into question the historiography's emphasis on the centrality of the legal 
framework goveming First Nations-state relations, suggesting that while the law certainly 
influenced aspects of everyday life, its effects may have been more limited than generally 
believed. 
Although this study comes to a close in the immediate post-World War II period, 
the story of Aboriginal peoples, money, and colonialism does not end there. Indeed, as North 
Arnerica's consumer society surged in the succeeding decades, First Nations found 
themselves subject to new state policies, now aimed at encouraging their "development" 
rather than their assimilation. As in earlier periods, the state instead of First Nations drove 
this policy and the discourse that surrounded it white controlling the financial and human 
resources used in its implementation, although it now employed university-trained social 
workers rather than the missionaries and bureaucrats of earlier generations to implement its 
policies and to ground their raison d'être in contemporary mores. While certain First Nations 
made windfalls from operating casinos and others did likewise through the sale of land and 
natural resources, the money generated in this way often failed to create the wealth and 
comfort that development discourse predicted. In this context, Indian Affairs continued to 
project an image of Arnerindians as being improvident by nature, necessitating the agency' s 
existence and justifying its burgeoning version of the welfare state upon which First Nations 
were becoming increasingly dependent.2 At the same time, new corporate actors, such as 
hydroelectric, mining, and fOl'estry companies, replaced the older fur trade enterprises as the 
primai)' capital interests with whom First Nations dealt. The market relations that developed 
from this change were not identical to those of preceding periods, as corporate actors, still 
2 For a striking example of lndian Affairs' continued discursive use of the "improvident Indian," see 
the lengthy quote from a 1962 pamphlet, The Indian>In<Transition, in .Hugh Shewell, "Enough ta 
Keep Them Alive": Indian Welfare in Canada, 1873-1965, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 
2004, p. 302. On increasing Aboriginal dependence on the welfare state, see Ibid and John Sutton Lutz, 
Makûk: A New History ofAboriginal-White Relations, Vancouver, UBC Press, 2008, p. 257-73. 
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dedicated to the generation of profit for extra-regional interests, now often failed to provide 
even the modest income their counterparts had previously supplied Amerindians. Thus, from 
1950, First Nations became increasing1y vulnerable to monetary force exerted by the state 
and capital. Tllls context allowed Indian Affairs and others to continue asserting Amerindian 
improvidence even as increasingly vocal activisists challenged the marginal place generally 
accorded First Nations in Canadian society, indicating the ongoing discursive and material 
interaction of money and colonialism. 
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